30-percent cut is felt that it could be bearable even without China in it, and some of the other things which we talk about.

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

We talk about the reduction of U.S. and U.S.S.R. armed forces to 2.1 million by the end of the first stage. We talk about a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials during the course of the first stage; we talk about a curb on the transfer of nuclear materials and nuclear know-how to nations not having it; we talk about outer space with no bombs in orbit, and with peaceful cooperation and notification; all of these things could be done, in the opinion of the Defense Department and, of course, all of these are being coordinated within the executive branch as policies which would be followed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Has this plan been worked out with the Defense Department?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have some differences still as to exact methods by which we would reduce the categories of weapons. This has not yet been resolved.

We have had a number of meetings with the so-called Committee of Principals at which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the AEC, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, and two or three White House representatives, Dr. [Jerome] Wiesner and Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy, sit in on it. We have had a series of meetings over the last several months to attempt to coordinate these things, and the outline of the treaty which we are coming to agreement on has very few items which are still open.

I think, Mr. Chairman, if I might go off the record for a moment, I could tell you of those.

[Discussion off the record.]

MANPOWER IN THE EQUATION

Senator AIKEN. Where do you rate manpower in your publicly estimated strength?

Mr. FOSTER. We had last summer suggested that the active forces be reduced to 2.1 million for each of the largest powers.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the end of the first stage.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, by the end of the first stage.

Senator AIKEN. Yes; but if you train 2 million a year, we would have a tremendous potential manpower at the end of a few years. Is that taken into consideration?

Mr. FOSTER. To this extent, sir: We would recommend that the armaments which those men would use would be reduced by this 30 percent, and reserve armaments would also be reduced, so that even though you had the men you would limit their ability to be effective by a reduction in the armaments.

Now, this has some problems, and it is still under discussion. Senator AIKEN. That is what I am getting at. If you reduce the armaments even though you reduced the manpower, the nation with the greatest potential manpower would, with each stage, achieve a degree of, if not superiority, a greater degree of strength

than the smaller nation, one with less manpower, which had been dependent on highly developed weapons; wouldn't they?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; this is a problem and therefore we have――
Senator AIKEN. Is one of your problems.

Mr. FOSTER. And, therefore, we have in the plan this problem of reserve forces as well. As you move down this series of years and progress, we also have controls on the laboratories; we have controls on the educational institutions. Many of these, however, do not become necessary until you begin to get into the second stage. Senator AIKEN. It would require pretty complete verification.

Mr. FOSTER. At all stages you would need verification proportionate to the amount of disarmament which you have undertaken. This is one of the basic things we have insisted on and one of the very great differences, as you know, between us and the Soviet Union.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

A DEPENDABLE SYSTEM

Mr. FOSTER. As I said when I appeared before your committee previously, sir, with Mr. Rusk, we believe we have achieved the outlines of a dependable system under which we could tend to meet Mr. Khrushchev's insistence that the amount of inspection be proportionate to the amount of disarmament. We do that by progressive steps, by a progressive system. We do it by statistical sampling. We have brought this forward in those general terms in Geneva, and they have never publicly commented on this. Of course, as Mr. Rusk told you privately, they had stated that they would not allow one inspector on their soil but, of course, this is impossible.

Senator AIKEN. Are you seriously wanting to put this into effect, or are you proposing it for effect?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; this is something which we have studied from the viewpoint of it being a plan that we would be willing to accept, and we would hope would be accepted in the attempt to turn down the massive measure of the weapons of destruction which are in buildup more and more.

Senator AIKEN. When do you propose to offer it?

Mr. FOSTER. The points I touched on just a moment ago have not been finally agreed on within the U.S. Government, and the President has not made a decision.

But in addition to that we have to go to our allies in Geneva; in addition to this we have to put it before NATO to make sure that this is a Western plan, so there are another 2 weeks before this could possibly be tabled as a suggestion.

INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Senator AIKEN. This would not be used, then, as an alternative to nuclear tests?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. It would not be for that purpose at all?

Mr. FOSTER. Nuclear tests are included in stage 2 if they have not before that time been agreed by the nations which agree to the treaty.

DISPOSING OF ARMAMENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice here that in the first 6 months of stage 1, one-third of the weapons to be discarded will be moved in. What will happen with the other two-thirds, or when do they come in?

Mr. FOSTER. You do this progressively. Each year it is felt that one disposes of 10 percent, moving toward the 30 percent.

Senator SPARKMAN. Wait a minute, disposing of how much?

Mr. FOSTER. We said at the end of stage 1 there would be a 30 percent overall cut in certain specified armaments.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the end of stage 1.

Mr. FOSTER. By the end of stage 1.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you do that 10 percent in each of the-

Mr. FOSTER. Ten percent during the first year, 10 percent during the second year

Senator ŠPARKMAN. Just in reading it over hurriedly, you said within the first 6 months of the first period you would collect onethird of those supposed to be surrendered in that time. I never saw any repetition as to its being done in the second year and likewise the third year, and so I wondered.

Mr. FOSTER. This is a progressive dealing.

THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have any feeling of confidence as to being able to make headway with this with the Russians?

Mr. FOSTER. Let me say this, Mr. Chairman; it is our belief that the pressures on both sides to get some sort of accommodation on armaments are such-both from the viewpoint of the threat to the survival, at least of the northern hemisphere, and also the threat of the growing economic diversion of resources into the buildup of these things, particularly in the Soviet Union-that there may be a possibility of some agreements on these things.

Certainly the diversion of our best scientific minds to the development of more and more complicated engines of destruction-Senator SPARKMAN. I would certainly wish that it might be true. Mr. FOSTER. There has been little indication of movement on the basic question of verification. There has been a continued desire before the other nations to put the Soviet in a position of being anxious to get this sort of thing, and we believe that this sort of pressure to which I have referred is such that, in their interest as well as ours, there may be movement toward an accommodation over a period.

ROLE OF NATIONAL ARMIES

Senator SPARKMAN. The other day on the Senate floor Senator Goldwater referred to the elimination within 9 years of all national armies. It seems to me that the term "national army" is probably subject to interpretation. For instance, I said on the floor that I certainly felt that the time would never come when any nation would give up its armed forces to the extent required to maintain internal order. That is not contemplated, is it?

Mr. FOSTER. Any plan that we have even discussed or thought about always had included the retention of sufficient arms to maintain internal order.

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice you have that in your paper.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. This is one of the basic requirements. Senator SPARKMAN. There is another thing that I think people may overlook. I do not believe that the temper of Congress or the temper of our people would be such, certainly at this time, to build up what they conceived to be a United Nations army. I have always been in favor of the U.N. police force. I notice you refer to it as the United Nations Peace Force.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, it seems to me that probably the way you conceive it, it would divide itself into two parts. There would be, perhaps, a relatively small police force that would be completely within the control of the Secretary General, and then there would be earmarked units maintained by nations for use by the United Nations in the event it became necessary for the United Nations to raise a force.

Mr. FOSTER. That is the general plan, sir, and it would undoubtedly need to be a strengthening of the officer corps, the cadres, the planning things within that international force, but the people in it on a permanent basis would be only those needed for the kind of emergency which faces us currently.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have to go and vote. I will be back. [A short recess was taken.]

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

The CHAIRMAN. The committee had better come to order. We will continue to make a record, and the other members of the committee can read it.

Where were you? Go ahead. You were explaining this when we adjourned.

Mr. FOSTER. I was explaining, Mr. Chairman, that the purpose of this appearance was to tell the committee the plan, of preparation of this draft treaty outline, and the purpose, which was to submit this within the next reasonable period at Geneva and to the 18Nation Conference as the plan under which we would like to proceed toward these ultimate objectives.

It places most emphasis on stage 1, and the most specific measures are detailed in much greater degree than in the September 25 program, with which you are familiar and which has been presented to this committee before.

We had talked about the methods under which we would reduce armaments by 30 percent by the end of stage 1, in degrees: 10 percent the first year, 10 percent the second, and 10 percent the third. We had mentioned that in that kind of a reduction we could do it without the accession of China to the group, and it was felt, and is felt, by the Defense Department that this could be accepted.

All these measures have been discussed at length in the Committee of Principals, and with the exception of certain details as to exactly what you cut and how you cut it, and how you maintain enough production to keep your lines alive, we have general agree

ment within the executive branch. These items which are still disagreed on

SUPPORT BY THE MILITARY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say with certain exceptions, is it so identified by very fine print in the contract? Is there very much agreement? The military, are they enthusiastic about this? Mr. FOSTER. I would not say, sir, they are enthusiastic. They are in agreement with these exceptions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Everybody is in agreement that we want peace, and they would like to see it arrive.

Mr. FOSTER. The military are in agreement-if we can get acceptance of these restrictions on the other side, if we can get verification measures such as we are proposing-that it is in the national interest to turn down this otherwise uncontrolled armaments race. This is true of the Department of Defense as put forth by Secretary McNamara at the NSC and at the Committee of Principals. Each of these measures has been discussed with them in detail as we have gone along, and it is not really fine print. These are fairly substantive differences, mainly of interpretation of what the effect of this would be, and I think there is difference even within the Department of Defense as to the effects.

They are very complicated measures, and we are dealing with very important things, as you so well know.

But, no, there is a broad measure of agreement on this as a proposed plan, and as an outlined treaty.

CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVERS

We have had military people with us in all of these discussions and, incidentally, Mr. Chairman, at some point if this treaty outline does get agreement within the U.S. Government and is tabled, I would hope that your committee might from time to time be willing to send some observers over in this discussion. I think this would be helpful. We would not ask you to do that right now, because you might feel that at this point it was a waste of time. The CHAIRMAN. It is premature.

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think it is a waste of time in the long run. I think this has been one of the most useful educational processes that has ever been undertaken, and having the eight new nations there has made it clear to them that this is not something that you do the easy way, that the Soviet puts it forth and says, "We will destroy all nuclear delivery systems within the first 15 months."

This is so clearly a completely impracticable balancing of present balances within the relationships of nations, and the other thing that has become clear to the new nations is that you could not afford to undertake any measures of arms control unless it were possible to verify that the measures were undertaken.

THE NECESSITY OF INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. That is the real sticking point, assuming that everything else but I am not sure I would assume that is the real sticking point, is it not?