the whole world of public opinion upon this Middle Eastern area and say, "Look, no more arms. Money, yes; but no more arms."

If you could ever get the Soviet Union to agree with us that there would be no more arms shipped into the Middle East, just that much of an agreement, it would be a substantial step forward. I would not try to say to the Soviet Union that they should not send in technical assistance or economic assistance; that would be their business if they wanted to.

I do not know whether these things have possibilities, but they are no more remote of possibility of success than some of the other proposals that are made.

When you talk to the Soviets about reducing their armed forces and reducing their missiles, which we hope that we can do, we have about as much, I think we have a greater, chance of success in getting the Soviets to reduce some of its military assistance.

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think this is impossible at all. I think this is something that might be done if they really wanted to go down this road. I would hope that perhaps we could talk to them about this kind of thing.

I do not see any immediate probability of their taking any action until we get some agreement on these other measures, but it is one we can do in parallel with the other.

MORE HOPEFUL IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it, do you think, they speak more apparently hopefully in private than they do in public? It would seem to me that if there was any propaganda, it would be in public.

Mr. FOSTER. I speak hopefully in public because I think the pressure on the Soviet Union is increasing. I think it is in their interests to get this kind of an accommodation because I think then they will be able to do a better job in agriculture; I think they will be able to give their people more.

The CHAIRMAN. That is clear. Why don't they come out in public and say some of the things they say in private? Are they afraid of their people at home?

Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid so.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will consider this suggestion at some point, if we move ahead, of assigning a couple of your members to visit us in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. You let me know when you think the time is ripe to where there might be something that would warrant their being there. I am sure we can get some candidates.

Mr. FOSTER. I should be very happy to.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman).

Testifying on the Congo situation, at his own request, was Benjamin Ginzburg, of Arlington, Va.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript. [The subcommittee adjourned at 9:30 a.m.]

(404)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, The Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman and Symington.

Also present: Carl Marcy and Darrell St. Claire, of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

STATEMENTS OF HON. PHILLIPS TALBOT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS; HON. WILLIAM S. GAUD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; AND WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. This chart on page 179 doesn't have the military assistance. Can you supplement that? For example, how much military assistance do we have for Pakistan?

Mr. BUNDY. That material, Mr. Chairman, is in our blue book, the military assistance, page 119, if you want to put it alongside. The amount is $53 million for Pakistan, which is about what it has been, a little down. We are going to take a very firm basis of sticking to past commitments for Pakistan, not adding any more. The CHAIRMAN. There is quite an increase in Iran, $63 million.

SITUATION IN IRAN [P. 174]

Mr. BUNDY. There is an increase in Iran. And we are at the point. of making major decisions in connection with the Shah's visit. Perhaps that figure will go up a little over what is shown there.

But what we are trying to do—and I think Mr. Talbot can speak more in detail on it-is to try to get the Shah to reduce the size of

his army from 180,000 down to 150,000. In order to do that the judgment was that it would be necessary to say what we were going to be able to do in the equipment lines for a considerable time in the future, subject, of course, to the availability of funds. And it is a proposal along those lines, in fact a firm position on those lines, that we will be furnishing to the Shah tomorrow. The CHAIRMAN. He is very proud of his army.

There is an increase in the development loans, too, isn't there, from $40 million to $60 million?

Mr. GAUD. That is the range, Mr. Chairman. What we propose to do with Iran this coming year will depend very largely on the size and content of the third plan, which is not yet available, and we hope as a result to develop a consortium for Iran under the leadership of the IBRD.

And this figure that you see here of $40 million to $60 million is a range in which we think we are apt to end up on the basis of the best information available today.

ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM IN ISRAEL [P. 176]

The CHAIRMAN. Have you found anything out about the atomic energy program in Israel? Have you ever seen that plant? Mr. TALBOT. No, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anybody in your outfit ever seen it?
Mr. TALBOT. Not in our outfit.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do, just ignore it? Do you request any information about it?

Mr. TALBOT. Yes, sir, there has been information requested about it. Some Americans, I understand, have visited it.

The CHAIRMAN. Private Americans or Government Americans? Mr. TALBOT. Americans. I am not familiar with the details.

ISRAELI PROGRAM [P. 176]

The CHAIRMAN. What are you going to do with the money that you are giving Israel?

Mr. GAUD. Our program for Israel next year will be entirely Public Law 480 and development loans. The development loans, of course, will be firmed up next year as to exactly what they will be, but the bulk of it will be what we call program loans; that is for commodities, spare parts, equipment, and the like necessary for their development plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that as long as you are making this kind of an investment there, you ought to know what they are doing in the atomic energy field?

Mr. GAUD. We would like to know.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you bargain with them a little?

Mr. GAUD. It is a thought that has never occurred to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? Are you afraid of it politically?

Mr. GAUD. No, sir. This nuclear energy business doesn't come into the AID ambit, I am afraid.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem to me anything they do would be of interest to you, as long as you are putting up the kind of money you are.

You are talking about working to minimize the frictions with the Arabs.

Senator SYMINGTON. They might be afraid of the Arabs politically.

The CHAIRMAN. There are lots of Arabs in this country. How many do you have in St. Louis?

Senator SYMINGTON. On this Syrian thing with Israel, the United Nations is a mystery to me.

The CHAIRMAN. They just can't understand anybody making a resolution against them.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't see why you are so pro-Arab.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not. I am just trying to seek information. Mr. BUNDY. On this question of the Israeli nuclear project, my recollection, which isn't as good as it should be, is that we got a fairly clear picture of the thing, but the military potential was very limited. And they did give us the assurance that it was not going to be used. Now, any country that produces fissionable material can in the end produce military material.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your group seen it?

Mr. BUNDY. Representatives of the United States have seen it. I think they were AEC and not Defense Department.

SYRIAN-ISRAELI INCIDENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is there a belief, at least in the United Nations that Israel should not have retaliated against continued aggression from Syria?

Mr. TALBOT. There has been a feeling, as you know, for some years that retaliation is going to solve none of the problems of the Near East.

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose that Castro attacked an American ship, is the concept that we would put that in the United Nations in order to carry out our plan of retaliation against attack?

Mr. TALBOT. Well, sir, I would prefer to talk about what we are doing in the Near East, which is the area that I am familiar with.

AID PROGRAMS IN NEAR EAST COMPARED [P. 183]

Mr. GAUD. Let's compare, for example, India and Nepal. India is much better advanced economically, politically, educationally, and in terms of know-how, managerial ability and all the rest of it than Nepal. India is at a point where they can absorb aid in terms of industrial projects, schools, and so forth and so on. Nepal, relatively speaking, can absorb much less aid, because you have to start from scratch in Nepal; you have to train people to do things in Nepal that the Indians already know how to do. You have very few managers; you have very few educated people; you start with a child walking instead of running. And that is what I mean by absorption.

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