Mr. Chairman, I would like to take full advantage of the freedom of limitation in our discussion today to say that we are not at all sure where such discussions can come out. We think it important that NATO make a clearer and far-reaching examination of the problems of an independent NATO nuclear capability because, among other things, it is a brake on the growth of national nuclear capability; but, on the other hand, we are not at all sure they can find a better answer in their own minds than the present arrangements.

At the present time, the very facts of the situation result in the delegation of responsibility for the final decisions in this field to the President of the United States. This came about not through any political acts of governments, but through the very nature of the growth of nuclear weapons and the circumstances under which it came about.

Now, whether it is possible in peacetime for 15 governments to agree to a delegation of responsibility in this field to somebody else as a political matter, as a political step, is a very far-reaching question. It may well be that the only answer to which they can eventually come, is that no other arrangement is likely to be workable except that the responsibility must be left where it is at the present time. On the other hand, if they themselves can agreeand there is not yet any agreement on any arrangements-if those across the Atlantic would agree on some arrangement, we would want to look at it carefully, and we would certainly be talking to the key committees of Congress about it before such arrangements were made.

CREDIBILITY, STRENGTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT

On conventional forces, we have been urging a significant increase in the conventional forces of the NATO Alliance. I think that the essence here is the question of the credibility of the deterrent to forestall a rash move by the Soviet Union which would involve us all in nuclear war. We believe that an increase in the conventional arms capacity of NATO is a reinforcement of that credibility rather than the other way around.

We have been living for a considerable number of years, up until about 1957, under conditions of either monopoly of nuclear weapons or a relative incapacity on the part of the Soviet Union to inflict major injury on the West. The position at the present time is that Soviets have a very powerful ICBM capacity which is positioned and aimed against Western Europe. They have a far less capacity-did I say ICBM? I meant MRBM against Western Europe, and a much more limited ICBM capacity against the United States, a capacity which is still formidable in the sense that, if successful, it could inflict very substantial damage upon us, but is nothing like the overwhelming character of the attack which they could launch against Western Europe.

The United States has a powerful capacity to destroy, in all practical respects, the Soviet Union, either before or after a first strike. I might indicate, without being able to follow too far down the track, Mr. Chairman, that a considerable increase in the certainty of certain kinds of technical information about Soviet capabilities

and installations has greatly increased the nuclear power of the United States, because its targeting has been so more efficient. This has been one of the major changes in the last 2 years in that respect.

IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

We do believe that it is important for the West not to have to choose between a nuclear devastation, on the one side, and surrender on points which may not appear to anyone at the time to be worth a nuclear devastation. We are not at all comfortable about the notion that we rely 100 percent on a nuclear deterrent, because if that deterrent does not deter, then we are confronted with the choice of a nuclear war or the loss of a significant and important position.

We believe that it is important for the West to have some conventional forces for a forward defense in the NATO area, a general forward defense, which does not require them to pull back conventional forces substantially into West Germany, and that we be in a position to engage the Soviet Union, if need be, initially with conventional measures, in order to demonstrate to the Soviet Union if they were gambling on our not being willing to fight, they would be wrong.

This might last 5 minutes, because the decision is also in the hands of the other side. It might last longer, but we do believe it is important to be in a position to engage the state systems and responsibilities of the leadership of both sides before either side is compelled to make a decision to move immediately into nuclear

war.

This does not mean that there is any lack of determination to use nuclear weapons if there is any major or devastating attack by conventional means or otherwise, or if there is almost a certainty of the use of nuclear weapons on the other side.

NO PROGRESS ON BERLIN

4

I might comment very briefly on Berlin, Mr. Chairman. There has been a series of contacts between the West and Moscow on this matter. More recently there have been two discussions which Ambassador [Llewellyn] Thompson has had with Mr. Gromyko * since the turn of the year. I cannot report any significant progress toward an agreed solution of that problem at the present time. Indeed, the second talk which Mr. Thompson had with Gromyko seemed to be retrograde, if anything, in terms of staking out the positions of the two sides.

There is full NATO agreement on the nature of our vital interests in that situation. There is one point of disagreement with General de Gaulle," in which the rest of NATO takes a different view, and that is that some responsible contacts ought to be maintained with the Soviet Union to find out whatever it is possible to bring about a negotiated settlement of these problems.

Now, as we look at the alternatives ahead of us

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

5 General Charles de Gaulle, President of France.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, when you say, Mr. Secretary, a disagreement exists, would you explain on what side de Gaulle is and what side we are.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon. General de Gaulle feels that we should not enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union about Berlin under present circumstances. I think he feels, on the one side, that the very fact of talking might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and that we should simply, in effect, say to the Soviet Union, "We are there; if you bother us, we shoot."

The others have taken the view if we are to take the measures to increase the strength of the West, and if we are to approach a firstclass crisis with the Soviet Union-indeed, one which might conceivably lead to war-that it is important, in terms of the leadership of democratic peoples and the solidarity of the alliance, to try to keep responsible contact with Moscow to see whether, in effect, that crisis is controllable, inevitable, or whether in some way it can be resolved.

There is no difference between us and de Gaulle on the basic, the underlying, policy positions of the West, as far as the solution of Berlin is concerned. There is that one point of difference on the timing and nature of our discussion, negotiation.

I think, if General de Gaulle had his choice in the matter, he would prefer to move into an almost unlimited negotiation, the widest possible discussion of the entire range of world problems. That is not something to be rejected out of hand; it is not something to be discounted. But he is reluctant to start with Berlin at the present time.

I think part of his reluctance is that he is so preoccupied with Algeria that he would prefer, if possible, to gain some time on Berlin until he can redispose of some of his forces from North Africa.

We are concerned that the situation could erode faster than that, and we ought to find out whether it is possible to resolve this problem by discussion rather than by force.

POSSIBILITY OF BROAD DISCUSSION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, just quickly, do you reject the de Gaulle position of the broader discussions?

Secretary RUSK. We do not reject this as a possibility. This is one of the alternatives. Thus far it has not proved very profitable to sit down and, in effect, try to discuss everything at one time with the Soviet Union. We have tried to chip away at it at certain points of importance to us, and without much success on particular aspects of it.

As you know, the nuclear test ban discussion did not get very far. We have a far-reaching difference with them on disarmament, which will be, I am afraid, apparent when the new disarmament committee meets on March 14.

But we do not reject out of hand that kind of far-ranging discussion. It might prove profitable if these present explorations show nothing but a dead end in a situation.

Senator MORSE. As you have already pointed out, you have tried to do it with them on Laos, and we have kept the faith.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do not want to appear to be naive on this matter, because I am not one of that succession of people who thinks that they know how to get along with the Soviet Union. I, frankly, do not know how to get along with them. But I do think we may be coming to a point where we have to talk with them, in effect, in historical terms of where are we going with the future of man, because we are moving to a period where this is getting to be the real question.

But how you frame that, how you put that up for discussion, how you put it up for discussion against a background that is discussable with a man who is committed to a view of the world which offers little opportunity for settlement of long-range questions, I just do not, I would not want to try to be too clear on today.

CHIPPING AWAY ON BERLIN

We have been reluctant ourselves to insist upon a public conference on this Berlin question of a sort in which there would be the Soviet proposals, dramatic and far-searching proposals from the West about the unification of Germany, an all-Berlin solution, and questions of that sort, because we have felt such a conference would almost certainly end in a failure, and that the crisis itself would be heightened by the failure of such a conference.

The Soviets are talking a very firm and simple position on questions about the unification of Germany and, say, anything like an all-Berlin solution. They are saying unification is simply not negotiable; there is nothing to talk about. They say East Berlin is a part of East Germany; there is nothing to talk about, to just forget it. I mean, this is off the agenda. Their position is that what is theirs is theirs, and they want to talk about our side of it.

What we have been trying to do is to chip away on their position point by point. There has been some progress in terms of the deadline, in terms of an understanding which still exists that any arrangements will be between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers, and not between the Western powers and the East Ger

mans.

BACK TO THE STARTING POSITION

The Soviets fully understand we are not going to agree to the stationing of their troops in West Berlin or subject access rights to the control of the East Germans. But in the last conversation they went back to their, in effect, starting position, with the exception of the deadline.

We do not know whether some of the pressures that are going on within the Sino-Soviet bloc are responsible for this or whether this is part of a rather usual kind of Soviet negotiating technique of moving from somewhat more reasonableness at one period to a very harsh and resistant position in the next meeting. We have not had our complete report from Mr. Thompson yet, but we will be taking a look at that further this week.

There could be some considerable danger if the Soviets went ahead, signed their separate peace treaty without some prior understanding on Berlin, West Berlin, and access to it. Even if they had determined in their own minds that such a peace treaty would

not itself cause the East Germans to interfere, nevertheless, their claims as to the implications of such a peace treaty, even without any de facto action on their part, could lead to a very severe heightening of the crisis.

SITUATION IN ALGERIA

I might make a brief statement on Algeria, Mr. Chairman. We can expect, I think, in the next several weeks a sharp increase in the crisis situation in Algeria, a crisis almost bound to come in either of two directions, either in the case of a failure of discussions between de Gaulle and the Algerian leadership or in the event of success in those discussions.

Our impression is that these discussions have been going quite well; that most of the major points between de Gaulle and the Algerian leaders have been resolved. There are one or two questions still to be worked out; one, for example, involving the future status of French settlers in North Africa, in Algeria, as to their citizenship when they are in Algeria and when they are in France, and their status within an Algerian state. But General de Gaulle has gone a long way to get that matter settled.

One of his difficulties there has been on the Algerian side, between the moderates and the extremists, so that his opposite numbers there have not always been able to be responsible in their discussions. Then, of course, if he is completely successful with the Algerians, then he has a major crisis on this hands in dealing with his own French in Algeria itself.

It is an extremely difficult problem for him. We are trying not to say or do anything that would make it more difficult for him, and to the extent that we can find ways to be helpful, we will try to do so. But we can expect some real tension there in the next several weeks.

PORTUGAL, HER COLONIES, AND NATO

We are, however, concerned about Portugal and its position in NATO. Portugal has undoubtedly had in its mind for years that its membership in NATO gave it a claim on its NATO allies for support in its overseas policies, overseas possessions.

This time, when other NATO colonial powers, such as Britain and France, have gone a long way toward liquidating or basically adjusting their colonial system to the nationalist revolutions of the 20th century, Portugal has not been willing thus far to give its allies very much to support. They have taken a line which is simply to stand pat on the existing situation, without very much adjustment in their policy.

We have been encouraged by the reforms which they have announced with respect to Angola, rather far-reaching electoral and educational reforms. We will do our best to give them some encouragement and support on that in the forthcoming debate on Angola in the United Nations.