riods when they were fighting each other, and any kind of negotiation for them seems to be extremely difficult. As far as the Geneva Conference itself is concerned, the international aspects of it have moved toward a reasonably good prospect. The buttoning up of those discussions now depends upon the possibility of a coalition government in Laos itself. There had been gain in the discussions from the point of view of the West, and one impasse. I hesitate to use language that sounds perhaps like it is a little esoteric at this point, but these long negotiations tend to create that kind of terminology. ATTEMPTS TO SET UP NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT Souvanna Phouma, who was authorized by the King to attempt to find a government, started out with a formula of four members of the present government, based on Vientiane, on one side, four members of the Pathet Lao on the other side, and eight of his own neutralists in the center. We and the Laotian Government people felt this was not a promise of a genuinely neutral government, because among those that he considered in the eight in the center were some who were under very strong Pathet Lao influence and did not seem to us to suggest a possibility of neutralism. Over a period of some weeks, Souvanna Phouma has changed that formula not to 4-8-4 but to 4-5-5-4 the two 5 being a split-up of the neutralist influence between those who are personal followers of his, on the one side, and five who have had previous experience in government in Vientiane, but who are not now associated with the present government. In other words, we call those fellows Vientiane neutrals. This is the Xiengkhouang neutrals and the Vientiane neutrals. ALLOCATION OF PORTFOLIOS Now, the problem is to talk the details over about the actual allocation of portfolios. Souvanna Phouma has not gotten around to that in detail, so far as the other princes are concerned. He has given us some indication of what he has in mind and, by the large, it is not too bad in terms of getting responsible people to take the key portfolios. But the impasse is on the portfolios of defense and interior, because those are the two who will determine who have the instruments of actual power in the country. Souvanna Phouma so far has been insisting that he be the Defense Minister, and that the Interior Minister be one of his own Xiengkhouang neutrals. The present government people, Phoumi and Bon Oum, 10 insist that both of these portfolios be given to present governmental people and, particularly, to General Phoumi. One can understand why General Phoumi does not want to surrender his position with regard to the armed forces and, at the 10 In December 1960, right-wing forces under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan deposed Souvanna Phouma and installed Boun Oum as Loatian premier. In the new coalition government created in June, 1962, Gen. Phoumi took Boun Oum's place, serving as deputy premier and finance minister. Souvanna Phouma served as premier and defense minister. same time, understand that Souvanna Phouma is not willing to turn the Ministry of Defense over to a man who unseated him December a year ago. But there has not been enough palaver among these people on this subject yet. There are various things that could be worked out as alternatives. ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO For example, if Souvanna Phouma were to become Minister of Defense, and General Phoumi were to be Deputy Minister of Defense and commander of the army in the South, and somebody on the other side were Deputy Minister of Defense and commander of the army in the North, and Souvanna's own troops were pulled out of their present situation and brought into the center, that might form the basis for a transitional period in which you could find out whether these people could work together before the instruments of power are all turned over to any single person. Meanwhile, during the cease-fire the government forces have continued with their training, with reequipment to a degree. Mao tribesmen have been recruited by the government in very considerable numbers and are now, during this cease-fire period, forcing the Pathet Lao to do all of their supply at any distance from Xiengkhouang from the air rather than from the ground. The position of the government forces is somewhat strengthened in the absence of any further infiltration of troops from North Vietnam. CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED We, at the present time, think we should maintain the cease-fire and still go through a period of palaver to find out the actual basis of handling portfolios. We do not know if it can succeed, but if it cannot succeed, then we have the problem of a choice of letting this country go to the Pathet Lao because if they simply were left alone and fought it out themselves, that would almost certainly be the result, or putting American forces in there to fight a war in this landlocked country alongside of armed forces who have not yet demonstrated any first class capacity to fight their own battles. This is not a pleasing prospect, and we do believe that this course of negotiation which was started in early January a year ago, should be continued for a further period. COULD SEATO HELP BE EXPECTED? Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, in the event of the last contingency, would we have any help from SEATO countries? Secretary RUSK. I think in the event of military action there would be no question but what there would be participation of some scale by the other SEATO countries, with the possible exception of France. I think France would almost certainly not participate militarily. Senator SPARKMAN. Would Thailand? Senator SPARKMAN. The reason I asked that question is a few months ago, Thailand objected to our putting troops in, was it, through Thailand, something to that effect. It is hard for me to understand Secretary RUSK. The question that came up at that time, sir, was not whether we could move personnel into Laos through Thailand, but whether it would be wise to have a SEATO consolidated force physically present in Thailand, at least for a period of time, whether it was a training exercise or something else, as a tangible representation of SEATO in the area. They did not think much of that second point. THAILAND WOULD CONTRIBUTE IF NECESSARY Senator SPARKMAN. Wouldn't you almost have to have that in order to conduct operations in Laos? Secretary RUSK. Well, you would have to- Senator SPARKMAN. You would have to have a staging area. Secretary RUSK. I think if it were decided that we and other SEATO members ought, in fact, to put forces into Laos, and fight the war there, that Thailand would contribute forces, and there would be no problem of that sort. But this was a force that was not at that point to be committed to Laos. Senator SPARKMAN. Kind of a standby force. Secretary RUSK. Yes. Senator HUMPHREY. Stationing of troops. LACK OF WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to debate it now except for 30 seconds, on that assurance, but I saw a military maneuver in Thailand, and I could beat them with half that number of American Boy Scouts. I think that kind of military support would be a great handicap to us. Secretary RUSK. The Thais-and this is highly classified information of the sort that is generally publicly known in the area, but something we are not supposed to say publicly officially-the Thais have contributed some artillery units and some cadres to the Laotian Army. They are represented in the field in Laos at the present time. But I think, sir, that you put your finger on a point that is very bothersome in this situation. We have not had much luck in getting the Laotians into any concerned and fighting frame of mind of their own. We gather, if it is any comfort to anyone, that the Soviets are having their problems with their Laotians, too. [Laughter.] It was not until last April or early May that the Laotian Government would let our own military teams go down to the front line units, to battalion level, because they did not want our men down. there reporting on their own officers and their own troop units. back to headquarters. The Laotians refused these artillery elements from Thailand for month after month before they would allow them to come in. I do think it is too easy for Americans to say that the solutions of these problems of this sort are to put American troops in as gendarmes in this situation, particularly where people are not willing to put on a major effort of their own. DIFFICULTY IN FINDING SOMETHING TO SUPPORT Vietnam is different. The South Vietnam Armed Forces do fight. They take casualties and do inflict casualties, and they are trying to do the job themselves. There was something to support in Korea and in Greece, but in Laos, I must confess it had not been easy to find something to support. I got into trouble on the first 2 or 3 days of the Geneva Conference on this thing where I was trying to get the government people seated as the representatives of Laos. I was in a minority of one in that conference. One of the things that just cut my throat diplomatically over there was that, at the time when I was arguing this, these three princes were meeting in Laos, champagne lunches, great cordiality, treating each other like old friends. The question put to me was if they can do that there, why can't they do it in Geneva, and all three of them sit down in Geneva. CONCERN OF OTHER NATIONS Senator LAUSCHE. Which of the nations down there are concerned about what is happening? What about Australia and New Zealand? Secretary RUSK. Australia and New Zealand, without any question, would be prepared to take action in this situation and make their contribution, no question about it. Senator LAUSCHE. What about the Philippines? Secretary RUSK. The Philippines would make a small contribution by way of troops, but only a small one. I would think, as a maximum, perhaps, a battalion. The Pakistanis―― Senator SPARKMAN. At that point, may I ask you why? At the beginning of this thing, they were the most insistent. Secretary RUSK. Well, they were very insistent at a time when their share in the plans was a company of Philippine troops. But they only have less than two divisions of troops altogether, and they have some internal security problems of their own at the present time. I am not sure we would want to urge them to make a major deployment of their forces under present circumstances. Thailand would be a member of the party, no question about it. THAILAND'S FEARS Senator LAUSCHE. Which is the nation that was designated last Friday as being the one that is becoming opportunistic and is already making gestures toward Peking? The Ambassador testified that one of these countries, it was either Thailand or Cambodia Secretary RUSK. Thailand is the country that we are most concerned about as far as the impact of the Laotian problem is concerned. Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Secretary RUSK. They want to see Thailand defended outside of Thailand, and for perfectly understandable reasons. But they are afraid that if a government under Souvanna Phouma were set up, it would not be genuinely neutral-and this is not a fanciful concern, it is a real gamble-and that Thailand would be exposed to step-up of infiltration into their own north; then South Vietnam would be exposed to further infiltration, and that the situation would deteriorate. If they estimate that the situation of Southeast Asia will deteriorate in Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, then I think that we can expect them to consider bending to the wind and finding out what arrangements they can make of their own. This has been their history. Senator LAUSCHE. Did you say that Thailand does not trust Souvanna Phouma? Secretary RUSK. That is correct, so far as Sairt 11 is concerned, he does not. EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA Senator LAUSCHE. I just want to point out that Ambassador Brown a year ago said that Souvanna Phouma could not be trusted, at a meeting on February 2, and we were also told that South Vietnam does not trust Souvanna Phouma. I cannot understand how it is that we are trusting him. Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are not trusting him to that extent. We want to find out what kind of a Cabinet, what kind of portfolios, under whose direction they would come into existence here, as the alternative to this other choice, the choice of abandoning it and putting American and Western forces into it. We are not prepared ourselves to underwrite Souvanna Phouma, but the present effort is to find out what the alternative is in the middle between these other two choices. Senator LAUSCHE. Are there other governments that do not trust Souvanna Phouma? Now, Thailand does not, Vietnam does not. What about Cambodia? Secretary RUSK. I think that the others in SEATO, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, want us to continue this effort through negotiation to find out what the possibilities are. GROUND FOR DISTRUST Senator HUMPHREY. You say you do not trust Souvanna Phouma. What do you mean, trust him on what, because these matters become somewhat of a public discussion, and is this fellow going to betray his country and put it in the hands of Communists or do you mean you do not trust him as being a sturdy ally for the West? Secretary RUSK. No. I think the problem would be whether, in face of the events of the last 2 years, his own relations with the West have become so bad and his own relations with the Commu 11 Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, Premier of Thailand. 48-688 0-86-4 |