groups that had been actively fomenting unrest since the days of the cultural revolution, not because he was a radical.26 Finally GVIO in Szechwan-a province that was not quite so seriously disrupted as Chekiang, Kweichow and Yunnan-grew satisfactorily in 1974 but declined in 1976. Unfortunately there have been few detailed reports on Szechwan's industrial unrest during the mid-1970's. First Party Secretary Chao Tzu-yang was promoted to alternate Politburo member at the party's 11th Congress in August 1977, suggesting Peking's confidence in Chao and satisfaction with Szechwan's industrial recovery despite serious and persistent political problems. Industrial recovery, which was well underway by February 1977, has continued to the present with minor fluctuations. B. Politically Stable Provinces With Declines or Slow Growth 27 The provinces in quadrant IV cannot be linked as easily as those in quadrant III. Shensi's GVIO declined in 1974, as did Hopeh's in 1976. Shensi was a hotbed of factional political activity during the 1974 campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. Provincial First Secretary Li Jui-shan was attacked in numerous wall posters and a mass meeting was reportedly held in July in the provincial capital to criticize that city's second-ranking party leader. Meanwhile, in Shensi's factories, veteran workers and managers were accused of being "capitalist roaders" and then subjected to mass criticism and physical abuse. A recent radio broadcast revealed that some factories "halted production for a long time, and production fell in other units." 28 According to one report, for example, the Sian condenser plant, which had fulfilled its production quotas every year since the plant was set up, failed to do so in 1974 because of the turmoil generated by the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius.20 Unlike Shensi's decline (which was largely due to political conflict), Hopeh's was brought about by a combination of factionalism and natural disasters. The well-publicized "Pao-ting Incident," which occurred in the summer of 1976, resulted in considerable disruption and violence and probably had to be brought to a halt by the PLA. Although the few details of the Pao-ting incident that are available are contradictory, the incident nevertheless contributed to Hopeh's 1976 GVIO decline. Most of the decline, however, should be attributed to the devastating earthquake that leveled T'ang-shan in July.30 The normally stable province of Hunan-the birthplace of Mao Tse-tung experienced periods of political turmoil during both 1974 and 1976. Factional problems existed in some localities and especially within the trade union organizations, which were heavily influenced by radicals such as T'ang Chung-fu; T'ang, a "model worker" and former Central Committee member and provincial trade union council chairman had been promoted rapidly under radical sponsorship 26 For a somewhat exaggerated but nevertheless useful description of unrest in Yunnan during 1976, see Issues and Studies, vol. XIII, No. 12, 1977, pp. 41-52. 27 FBIS, June 28, 1974, E-2; and FBIS, July 10, 1974, E-1. "FBIS, May 31, 1977, M-2. 2FBIS, Jan. 31, 1978, M-3. 30 For reports of political unrest in Shensi in 1974 see FBIS, June 28, 1974, E-2; and FBIS, July 10, 1974, E-1. For accounts of the "Pao-ting Incident," see FBIS, May 23, 1977, H-1-H-3; and New York Times, Dec. 30, 1976. On the devastation of the T'ang-shan earthquake, see New York Times, June 2, 1977, and FBIS, Jan. 7, 1977, E-1. during the Cultural Revolution, and was quickly purged following the ouster of the "gang of four."31 T'ang appears to be representative of the young workers, who were either recruited by the "gang of four" or joined the radical cause on their own, and succeeded in attaining political power at the provincial level. T'ang and others like him, were typically Central Committee alternate members, standing committee members of the provincial CCP committee, and provincial trade union council officials. Although they were not powerful within the provincial CCP leadership (especially in moderate-led provinces such as Hunan), they wielded considerable influence and control over the trade union organizations, in which radical workers were heavily represented. T'ang Chung-fu was an active leader of the radical faction and organized worker slowdowns, criticism rallies, and other disruptive activities directed against the moderate faction. In general, trade union organizations during the mid-1970's were not only considerable more radical than their provincial CCP committee superiors, but also a real source of political unrest Hunan's provincial trade union council was rectified shortly after the purge of the "gang of four"; however, a new chairman has not yet been appointed to the council. Moreover, reports of slack management suggest that problems with local trade unions still persist. Provincial GVIO which made little progress toward recovery after the purge of the "gang" until the summer of 1977, declined again in November. C. Politically Stable Provinces With Moderate or Strong Growth The provinces in quadrant I generally achieved solid GVIO growth rates and were seemingly quite resistant to the chaos and unrest that affected the provinces around them. While the provinces in quadrant III possessed perhaps the least favorable political conditions for industrial growth in China, the provinces in quadrant I appear to have had the political environment and leadership most conducive to sustained, high rates of growth in industrial output. For example, Shantung Province, led by Pai Ju-ping, a man with considerable experience in economic affairs, 32 was the most successful province in China during the mid-1970's in obtaining and sustaining the optimum combination of political stability and outstanding industrial growth. There are few reports of unrest in Shantung during the 1970's and even the reports that have surfaced suggest the disorders were compparatively low-key.33 One additional reason may have been Peking's concern with the strategically important Sheng-li oilfield. Peking undoubtedly kept a watchful eye on the province and would have reacted quickly to political turbulence. In any event, Shantung benefited greatly from the relative absence of turmoil. The other provinces in this quadrant also experienced satisfactory GVIO growth rates amidst stable political conditions. There are, to 31 T'ang last appeared in public on Oct. 1, 1976, failed to be reelected to the CCP Central Committee in August 1977. He was finally criticized in a Hunan broadcast on Oct. 22, 1977. See FBIS, Oct. 28, 1977, H-1-H-3. 31 FBIS, Aug. 17, 1977, H-2; FBIS, Oct. 14, 1977, H-6; and FBIS, Dec. 8, 1977, H-2. Donald W. Klien, and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-65, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, pp. 707-708. 33 FBIS, Dec. 8, 1976, G-16; FBIS, May 11, 1977, E-12-E-15; and Issues and Studies, vol. XI, No. 1, 1975, p. 102. 34 be sure, reports of isolated factory unrest, political factionalism, and railway disturbances, but none approaches the seriousness of the turmoil experienced by the provinces in quadrants III and IV.34 Kwangtung and Kwangsi were as much the bastions of moderate politics in China as Shanghai and Anhwei were of radicalism. The fact that Peking is the center of China's party and national government probably prevented the outbreak of serious industrial disruptions there Kiangsu is yet another example of a moderate power base. When Shanghai was taken over by Hua Kuo-feng's subordinates, Su Chen-hua and Ni Chih-fu, in mid-October 1976, Kiangsu's first party secretary, P'eng Ch'ung, was transferred east to run the day-to-day affairs of China's largest city. The fact that Kiangsu could spare such a man as P'eng-a man later promoted to the Politburo-at such a critical time is testimony both to the political stability of the province and to the political trustworthiness of Peng's successor, Hsü Chia-t'un. One province in this quadrant presents an interesting contrast to the earlier examples. During the mid-1970's, Heilungkiang was led by Liu Kuang-t'ao (a radical leader who was only recently purged) yet still achieved favorable annual GVIO growth rates during the turbulent years of 1974 and 1976. Part of the explanation-as in the case of Shantung-may have been Peking's tight control of the Ta-ch'ing oilfield. In late 1976 and early 1977, however, when the Hua administration stepped up the intensity of the campaign against the "gang of four," production in Heilungkiang began to slow down. The drop in monthly GVIO at that time suggests strongly that the interference in the affairs of Heilungkiang by the moderate leadership in Peking had roughly the same disruptive effect on radical-led Heilungkiang as the radical-inspired interference during 1974 and 1976 had on moderate-led Provinces such as Hunan and Shensi. D. A Politically Unstable Province With Strong Growth Tsinghai, a sparsely populated province in Northwest China, is the only politically unstable province to have shown strong annual growth during the years 1974-77. Although there is not a great deal of information on worker unrest in Tsinghai during the mid-1970's, a number of reports provide revealing insights into the factional conflict and other political problems in the province. For example, shortly after Mao's death in September 1976, a Tsinghai CCP plenum was held at which it was announced that a "tiny group of class enemies that spread rumors to create confusion, disrupted public order, instigated a stoppage of work and production, and engaged in other sabotage" was currently active throughout the Province.35 No new revelations were made, however, until the ranking CCP secretary Chang Chiang-lin was purged in March 1977 as a follower of the now-discredited "gang of four." Chang was accused of disrupting Tsinghai's highways-a serious charge since highways are Tsinghai's main mode of transport-and by implication, of disrupting Tsinghai's economy as well.36 In addition, Chang was accused of stirring up FBIS, Nov. 3, 1976, H-7-H-8; and FBIS, Jan. 21, 1977, H-4—H-7. as FBIS, Sept. 27, 1976, M-2. "FBIS, May 25, 1977, M-6. minority problems and personally being the "root cause of the protracted unrest in Tsinghai." 37 Despite these political disruptions, Tsinghai managed to achieve strong industrial growth during the mid-1970's. GVIO grew steadily in 1974 and 1975, and increased over 22 percent in 1976-a year of chaos and poor performance in other provinces. In 1977, while the rest of China was enjoying a year of recovery in the wake of the purge of the "gang of four," Tsinghai's GVIO grew more slowly than in 1976. In fact, of the 19 provinces for which data are available for the years 1976 and 1977, only Tsinghai and Peking performed better industrially in 1976 than in 1977. Moreover, because industrial growth in Peking was slowed down by the aftereffects of the T'angshan earthquake, Tsinghai appears to be the only Province in China marching out of step in 1976 and 1977. How did Tsinghai manage to achieve such an impressive rate of growth in 1976 with such a high level of political turbulence? Chang Chiang-lin is reported to have said, "Tsinghai is special. . .. [It] has abundant industrial and mining resources: our task is to develop industry." 38 Moreover, during the campaign to criticize local followers of the "gang of four," Chang was accused of having defied Chairman Mao by deliberately reversing economic priorities; that is, by favoring heavy industry over light industry and agriculture. The answer, therefore, may be that Chang increased industrial investment in Tsinghai in defiance of Peking's orders. With the purge of Chang and the appointment of moderate T'an Ch'i-lung to govern Tsinghai, the provincial investment priorities were probably returned to "normal." The impact of changing priorities and of new management may have caused GVIO to grow more slowly in 1977. IV. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON INDUSTRY DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE MID-1970's The findings of the previous section show that politically stable provinces tended to achieve moderate or strong industrial growth during the mid-1970's, and that politically unstable provinces-with only one exception-failed to do so. Because the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) was also a period of political instability during which industrial output declined sharply (see fig. 2), the two periods are compared in this section. FBIS, Dec. 6, 1977, M-2-M-3. Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution because of his dissatisfaction with what he felt was the growing ossification of the party and Government bureaucracies, and his belief that China's youth required a "revolutionary experience" to renew their faith in a revolution that had taken place before most of them were old enough to participate or even remember it. With the power struggle that broke out between the "radicals" (led by K'ang Sheng, Ch'en Po-ta, and Lin Piao) and the "moderates" (led by party bureaucrats Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing), the Cultural Revolution quickly became one of modern China's most chaotic periods. The Chinese Communist Party virtually disappeared as an institution, and the turmoil grew so great that PLA main-force units were ordered to restore order in many provinces and to assume control of a dozen.39 The economic consequences of the Cultural Revolution were especially serious in the industrial sector, where factional struggles in the factories and disruptions along the transportation routes caused production to decline precipitiously and to remain below trend for 3 years. "Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 51, July. September 1972, pp. 444-474; William W. Whitson with Huang Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command, New York, 1973, pp. 390-415; and Huang Chen-hsia, Chung-kung chun-jen chih (Mao's Generals), Hong Kong, 1968. |