CURRENT SITUATION (1976-1978) The Power Shortage In the early fall of 1977, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng issued a series of state directives giving the development of electric power a position of high priority. In stressing the need to conserve electric power, to utilize capacity more fully, and to generate power more efficiently, Hua was clearly indicating that all was not well within the Chinese power industry. That China has been short of power for years was evident from official statements, from reports of visitors, from staggered hours of industrial operations and from a nationwide campaign that preached conservation. But now recognition was being given the fact that if the ambitious program to modernize agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense by the year 2000 was not to be jeopardized, the existing situation in the power industry would have to be rectified quickly. The seriousness of this problem was underscored by the November 1977 statement from Peking tha "solving the notable contradiction (shortage) of supply and demand of electric power has become an important task facing the new leap forward in the national economy present contradictions in supply and demand are fairly large and have directly affected the development of industrial and agricultural production." 20 * * * Perhaps one of the clearest indications of the immediate concern for power supplies came in December at the Miyun reservoir near Peking, when Chairman Hua said, "it (the reservoir's water) must first be used to generate electricity and then to irrigate the land." This appears to reverse the generally held first priority accorded the production of agricultural products. The Chairman had told the Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power that "power output must be increased by fully utilizing hydroelectric power and that when increased power output is achieved throughout the country, the gross value of industrial output will be greatly enhanced without even increasing the amount of industrial equipment." 21 Causes The causes of the current situation are primarily attributable to years of insufficient investment in the electric power industry and in the supporting fuel and rail transport sectors. Investment in mine development, mine mechanization, and coal preparation facilities has lagged for many years. The destruction at the important underground Kailuan mines in Tangshan resulting from the July 1976 earthquake also impaired supplies. Whi'e coal output is now around 500 million metric tons annually, the Chinese rail system and the fleet of rolling stock are not up to the task of expeditiously moving coal from mines to power plants. The rapid development of the Chinese petroleum industry and the conversion of some thermal stations to the firing of oil has somewhat eased the coal bottleneck. In the power industry, itself, capital construction plans have gone unfulfilled and the number of turbine and generator sets to be placed on-line has fallen short. Maintenance of plant and equipment has been 20 FBIS, Dec. 2, 1977, E1. 21 Ibid. neglected, in part due to the failure to create the normal reserve generating units commonly found in the developed industrial countries. This has resulted in overuse of units in base load service and an inability to meet loads at time of peak demand. The limited number of transmission lines and the absence of many interprovincial power grid connections have caused problems of load management that has resulted in outages. All of these factors have brought the safety and reliability of the Chinese power system into question. Short Term Solution To ameliorate the immediate shortcomings of the industry and to provide the basis in 1978 for an acceleration of power growth by 1980, Chairman Hau's directives focus particularly on conservation and full utilization of generating capacity. To balance supply and demand with the needs of the national economy, a specific planned power consumption quota emphasizing conservation will be assigned each and every urban and rural area, enterprise, workshop, and work unit.22 Based on experiences in the important northeast power grid (Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang Provinces), a careful, planned program can result in a 10-percent reduction in consumption." Additionally, attempts will be made to utilize more fully existing capacity, although it would appear that in some cases this will come in conflict with the need to take equipment off-line for maintenance and it will interfere with the creation of adequate reserve capacity. As noted earlier, the greater utilization of hydroelectric facilities may also interfere with irrigation and agricultural production. Finally, equipment is to be used more efficiently and coal and oil conserved. Power Capacity and Generation In both 1976 and 1977, the capacity of the Chinese power industry increased substantially. In 1977 over 40 large and medium-sized hydro and thermal power generating units having a considerably greater generating capacity than those built in 1976 were put in operation. Information concerning the commissioning of a number of individual turbo-generator units has been released by Peking. The capacity estimated to have been added in turbo-generators of all sizes was about 2,900 and 3,600 megawatts in 1976 and 1977, respectively. Based on an 8.5-percent growth in 1976 and 9.8 percent in 1977, generating capacities at the end of 1976 and 1977 are estimated at 36.9 and 40.5 thousand megawatts. U.S. capacity at the end of 1976 was 531.3 thousand megawatts.24 How this installed generating capacity was used in 1976 and 1977 to produce power was highly dependent on the rate of industrial growth. Apparently, there was no industrial growth in 1976.25 Despite this, more power was produced, probably because the industry had not been fully meeting demand in 1975.26 Shantung, in fact, generated 20 percent more power in 1976 than in 1975.27 Power generated in the "FBIS, Oct. 21, 1977, L3. 23 FBIS, Nov. 14, 1977, E8. 24 For additional detail on estimating generating capacity in 1976 and 1977, see appendix 3. 25 Indicators, Op. Cit.? 25 FBIS, Jan. 12, 1977, E20. 27 FBIS, July 15, 1977, E17. PRC in 1976 was an estimated 124 billion kilowatt-hours, an increase of 2.5 percent over 1975. Power generated in the United States in 1976 amounted to just over 2 trillion kilowatt-hours. The year 1977 witnessed a reported 14 percent increase in industrial output.28 Some of this growth, of course, was simply reactivation of capacity idled by the political turmoil of 1976 when plants in various industries were shut down, in some cases for extended periods. During the first 6 months of 1977, power output set a record high; 6 of the 11 largest power systems surpassed all previous records. Although China's plan for power was fulfilled by December 12, 1977, shortages persisted. During the period July-October 1977, Hofei, capital of Anhwei Province, suffered a "30 percent power shortage" despite being tied into the East grid.29 For 1977, power generated ran an estimated 136 billion kilowatt-hours or an increase of 9.8 percent over 1976.30 At the end of 1977, thermal electric stations had 62 percent (25.1 thousand megawatts) of the PRC's total power generating capacity while hydroelectric plants contained nearly 38 percent (15.2 thousand megawatts). This represents a further increase in hydro's share compared to most earlier reports. With emphasis now to be placed on the further development of hydraulic resources, this figure can be expected to rise slowly. In the short term, thermal capacity, which can be brought on line more quickly, may rise faster, but the long-term trend is toward placing a greater share of the industry in hydroelectric capacity. The larger share of power generated, however, continues to be principally from thermal stations. During 1977, an estimated 71 percent of all power produced came from these facilities, about 96.6 billion kilowatt-hours. The reason that hydroelectric stations with 38 percent of the capacity produced only 29 percent of the power is attributable to the reduced hours of operation stemming from low water and irrigation and other demands on the water resource. This natural feature of hydroelectric operations may be improved on some as the share of hydro capacity in larger dams increases and if the priority use of water in reservoirs is accorded to power generation as suggested by Chairman Hua in December 1977. "FBIS, Dec. 27, 1977, E8 (11 mos. growth was 13.7 percent). 29 Lbid. Also Peking NCNA Domestic Service, Nov. 24, 1977. 20 FBIS, Dec. 27, 1977, E9 (For additional detail on estimates of power, produced in 1976 and 1977, see Appendix 3). Hydroelectric Stations There are 66 known hydroelectric stations in China of 30 MW capacity and greater, of which 7 are under construction and have produced no power. These 59 operative stations comprised about two-thirds of the hydroelectric capacity at the end of 1977 while the balance consists of the 65,000 or so small and medium size hydros. Because of the completion of a number of major dams on the Yellow and han Rivers and because of the large increase in small hydros, the share of capacity held by hydroelectric stations has been rising in recent years. In 1974, there were some 73 concrete and 438 stone masonry dams, 15 meters (49') or higher in China and more than 250 reservoirs with storage in excess of 100 million cubic meters (35.3 billion cu. ft.) of water. In addition to power generation, Chinese dams are designed with irrigation, flood control, and enhanced river navigation in mind. Fish breeding and water for municipal use are also factors. Liuchia and Tanchiangkou are China's two largest hydroelectric plants and are among the newest constructed, being completed in 1974 and 1973, respectively. Liuchia, the largest powerplant in the PRC, is in Kansu on the Yellow River above Lanchou. This Chinese designed and equipped facility has a powerhouse with one 300 MW and four 225 MW units providing a rated capacity of 1,225 MW. It supplies power to several 220 kV lines and China's only 330 kV line. Liuchia is nominally capable of delivering about 5.7 billion kilowatthours per year, an annual rate of operation of 4,643 hours. Started at the time of the Great Leap Forward, construction at Liuchia was long deferred and the facility did not deliver its first power until 1969. Tanchiangkou was also started in the late fifties with the first generator not being put on line until 1968. The sixth and last 150 MW generator was turned over in 1973. This Chinese-designed and equipped facility is located on the Han River about 430 miles above its confluence with the Yangtze at Wuhan in Hupeh. Tanchiangkou's 900 MW capacity, second largest in the PRC, provides a major share of the power needed in Hupeh. The Sanmen dam on the Yellow River, designed by the Soviets, has been revamped by the Chinese and will not reach its originally intended capacity of 1,080 MW. The Yellow River's silt load, heaviest in the world, forced a revision in the dam and the installation of specially-designed smaller turbines of 50 MW each. Several turbines. are thought to be operating and a total of either four or five will be installed giving the facility a capacity of 200 or 250 MW. China has nine hydroelectric stations with capacities of 300 MW and greater; two more are at 290 MW. Two of these are on the Yalu River where the output is believed to be shared 50-50 with North Korea; operations are controlled by the China-Korea Yalu River Hydroelectric Power Co. The hydro stations of 300 MW or more and the major systems of dams, including cascade systems, are shown in Table 6. A brief description of each hydroelectric station may be found in Appendix 4. TABLE 6.-Major Chinese hydroelectric systems Yellow River (moving upstream): Sanmen, Honan_ Megawatts 1 150. 0 1 50. 0 (2) 225. 0 180. 0 300. O Hulutao Unbong, Kirin- Sungari River: Tafengman, Kirin.-- Han River and tributaries (moving upstream from the Yangtze River): Tanchiangkou, Hupeh_ Huanglungtan, Hupeh. Shihchuan, Shensi-. Tatu River: Kungtsui, Szechwan__ Yangtze River: Three gorge area, Szechwan/Hupeh.. Fuchun River and tributaries (moving upstream): Fuchun, Chekiang_. Chililung, Chekiang Hsinan, Chekiang Cascade systems: Kutien, Fukien (4 stages)- Maotiao, Kweichow (6 stages) 1 Partial capacity. 2 Under construction. 1, 225. 0 (2) 700. 0 400. O 590. O 900. O 150. O 135. 0 508. 0 (2) 260. O 420. 0 652. 5 158. 0 250. O 108. 0 172.0 The drive to assist the modernization of agriculture and to bring electricity to China's rural communes from small hydroelectric plants saw its greatest surge in the past 7 years when the number of small hydros grew from 15,000 to about 65,000. Typically, these stations average only 50 kilowatts in capacity, and some are as small as several kilowatts. In the miniturbine range, the Tientsin Electric Gear-Drive Design Institute has designed seven models from 250 watts to 12 kilowatts which can be manufactured on the commune itself. Although inefficient compared to larger units, both in hours of operation and in cost per installed kilowatt of capacity, China's small hydros have a major impact on the local economy providing flood control, irrigation, and some power without making demands on major production facilities or on the underdeveloped power transmission systems. Thermal Powerplants There are 126 known fossil-fueled thermal electric power stations in China with capacities of 30 MW and higher, of which seven are under construction and are not believed to have produced any power in 1977. Currently, the Wangting station in Wuhsi at over 700 MW is the largest. There are no nuclear-powered thermal power plants. About 75 percent of all thermal stations are fired with coal ranging from lignite through bituminous types to anthracite. The rest of the plants are oil-fired, although a few units in Szechwan are gas-fired. A number of units have been converted to coal and oil-firing or oil-firing alone to ease the coal supply bottleneck. |