"In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it It is comport with our policy to do so. only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence. /With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure and matured by the wisdom, of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety With the existing colonies of dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it,

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and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power,~ submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to of any portion either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

The Monroe doctrine is historically of British origin, and is an outgrowth of what seemed an exigency in European politics which touched British interests closely. That exigency grew out of an alliance for mutual protection against domestic revolutions between Prussia, Austria, France and Russia. These powers had met in congress in 1820 and again in 1822, and had agreed to support each other in suppressing armed revolts in each other's territory. Under this agreement a French force was sent into Spain to put down a revolution against Ferdinand VII. At first Great Britain sented to this agreement of the powers, although not a party to it, but after Lord George Canning succeeded Castlereagh as prime minister he saw reason to fear. that British interests might be menaced by the alliance, and assumed an indifferent attitude toward it, which afterward developed into an unfriendly one.

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About 1810 the American colonies of Spain began to revolt and declare themselves free and independent, and by the time of Canning's accession to power there were several Spanish-American republics whose independence had been formally recognized by the United States and practically by Great Britain. Great Britain had built up a considerable trade with these republics, a trade which was impossible while they were Spanish colonies, and therefore any indication of a purpose on the part of Spain to attempt to re-conquer these former colonies was regarded as a definite menace to British interests. In 1823 Canning thought he saw evidences that Spain intended to claim the support of the parties to the agreement of the year before in an attempt to restore its power in Central and South America on the ground that the revolts of these colonies had been a direct repudiation of the principle of the legitimacy and permanency of the reigning dynasties, which the allied powers had bourd themselves to maintain by armed interference in behalf of the threatened monarch.

Canning called the attention of our minister to Great Britain, Richard Rush, to his suspicions, and asked if the United States could be induced to join in a protest against this apparent purpose of the

allied powers, in an attempt to thwart it. Rush laid the situation, with Canning's suggestion, before John Quincy Adams, then secretary of state, and Adams referred the matter to the president and his cabinet, Adams himself being inclined to make light of the whole matter. Monroe and Calhoun and other members of the cabinet were, says Adams, "very much in fear that the holy alliance would restore all South America to Spain," and he outcome of that fear was the message setting forth the Monroe doctrine. The message was recognized in Europe as an important utterance and Spain tried to call a conference of the allied powers in 1824 to consider the regulation of Spanish-American interests, but the refusal of Great Britain to join caused the abandonment of the project. The message prevented the carrying out of any purpose of interference in Spain's behalf in America, and led to the early and formal recognition of the independence of all the Spanish-American republics by England.

The first appearance of the Monroe doctrine in our politics was almost immediately after its promulgation, its bearing on the part this country should take in the Panama congress of Central and South American states in 1826 being much discussed. The United States was invited to send delegates to this congress and did so, and the controversy over the wisdom of this action lasted for some years and was an unusually warm one, but resulted in practically nothing. Later, when the Clayton-Bulwer treaty relating to the Nicaragua canal was negotiated, in 1850, this doctrine was again to the fore and was exploited in congress and the newspapers, very much in the style with which recent utterances have made us familiar, but the well remembered instance of the French occupation of Mexico is the only case in which this doctrine has been officially and positively asserted by our government. Napoleon III. thought he saw in our distress in 1862 an opportunity to establish a monarchy in Mexico, and, with the sanction of the pope, and the approval of Austria he sent a military expedition to set up a limited hereditary monarchy, with Maximilian of Austria as its first