The possibility of FRELIMO committing itself at an early stage against South Africa, however, is another matter entirely. When Mozambique gains its independence at mid-year, it will find itself almost bankrupt and will require not only massive local efforts but also major international assistance just to reestablish its economy on a noncolonial basis, particularly since the country possesses few natural resources. In this context, it becomes highly significant that the economies of Mozambique and South Africa are closely intertwined as a result of a combination of traditional policies and geographic realities. One may trace three major areas of economic interdependency. First, the viability of Lourenço Marques (Mozambique's capital city and second most important port) depends largely on South African traffic, which currently accounts for some 75 percent of the trade passing through the port city. For South Africa, hauling exports from the Eastern Transvaal through Mozambique to the sea not only affords the cheapest transportation route

but also eases congestion at South Africa's own heavily-used ports. Second, Mozambique's largest single source of foreign-exchange earnings derives from the wages of some 135,000 migrant workers at the Rand gold mines, a labor force which is, in turn, vital to South African gold mining. Third, the controversial Cabora-Bassa controversial Cabora-Bassa hydroelectric power complex in Mozambique-whose construction was financed largely by South African sources-is now nearing completion. Cabora-Bassa 'has an energy potential far greater than Mozambique's imaginable needs, and its only other sizable potential customer is South Africa.

These mutual economic interests impose their own inexorable demands on the policies of both countries. Only a Mozambique revolutionary government willing to sacrifice its own immediate national interests and ready to plunge the country into an even deeper state of bankruptcy could contemplate breaking off all economic relations with Pretoria. Such a decision, to judge from Machel's

-Colin Legum.

initial policy statements, seems improbable. What remains to be seen is the kind of bargains that the two natural political adversaries can strike in order to serve their essential and at present complementary national economic interests.

The Future of Angola

The internal situation in Angola is altogether different from that in Mozambique and potentially quite explosive. Angola's liberation movements, three in number, failed to get firmly established on the ground prior to the Portuguese collapse and long eschewed any common action. Moreover, Angola's riches-oil, minerals, and cash cropshave created important vested interests among the Portuguese of Angola. (The important oil fields around Luanda and in the Cabinda Enclave constitute an exception, for they are largely controlled by American-owned multinational firms). Finally, the Portuguese form a community of some 600,000 out of a total population of six million and hence constitute a minority twice as large as the white minority of Rhodesia at the time of the latter's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. As a result of these many factors, Angola runs the risk of plunging into a civil war with potential consequences as dire as those that befell the Congo in 1960 after the precipitate ending of Belgian rule.

However, there is ground for hope that this eventuality may be avoided. So far, Portugal and the African states have cooperated to try to form a stable national coalition government that could assume responsibility for the country's future. The conclusion of an agreement between the competing liberation groups in Mombasa, Kenya, on January 5, 1975, and subsequently ratified in the Algarve agreement with the Portuguese government at the end of January, marks a significant stride forward in this. regard. Each of the movements is to provide three ministers for a coalition government, which will also include three ministers appointed by Lisbon. This government, which was installed in Luanda early in February, is to preside over the transition to independence, now expected to come within 12 months." While the Mombasa agreement has diminished

16 The New York Times, Jan. 5, 1975, reported the unity accord in Mombasa. Agreement on the transitional government and the setting of Nov. 11, 1975, as the date for Angolan independence, I was reported in The Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1975.

the threat of civil war, it remains to be seen how well differences among the rival movements and their various supporters will be worked out during the transitional period or after independence is granted. Particularly thorny is the question of the creation of a unified Angolan army.

Of the insurgent groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)-led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a distinguished poet in the Portuguese language-has been the one favored by the OAU. It also enjoys direct and heavy backing from Moscow. The MPLA suffers from internecine conflicts that have little to do with ideology, however much some of the rivals pretend otherwise. These stem from personality conflicts centering on the introverted and secretive Dr. Neto. His rivals accuse him of having clandestine dealings with foreign supporters, and he denounces his detractors as tribalists and neocolonialist agents who have betrayed MPLA's radical principles. Neto boasts two major assets-the loyalty of perhaps a major part of the MPLA's fighting force in the eastern zone and his popularity among the black urban population.

Within the MPLA, the most important rival to Neto is one of his former lieutenants, Daniel Chipenda, a guerrilla fighter and onetime Portuguese football star. Chipenda's main internal support comes from among the Ovimbundu people of southern Angola, but he also enjoys the favor of the Zambian government." A third faction-the Active Revolt Group is led by a former Catholic priest, Father Pinta Andrade, who spent 12 years in Portuguese prisons. His headquarters is in Brazzaville, the capital of the Congo People's Republic, which, as a neighbor of the oil-rich Cabinda Enclave, has a strong interest in Angola's future. The Group's principal domestic backing stems from a section of Angola's intellectuals. These divisions, it should be underscored, continue to persist despite repeated attempts by the ALC, as well as by the presidents of the Congo, Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania, to restore unity to the movement.

The faction-ridden MPLA's main competitor has been the FNLA, led by Holden Roberto. This group, once recognized by the OAU as the Angolan government-in-exile," receives its main internal sup

17 Chipenda has threatened to unleash civil war because he was excluded from the talks in Lisbon and from the transitional government established there (see the dispatch by David B. Ottaway in The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1975).

18 For a history of the episode, see Douglas Wheeler and René Péllisier, Angola, New York, Praeger, 1971.

port from the Bakongo people in northern Angola, but its strength derives from the massive support of Zaire, which allows the FNLA to maintain three military camps on its territory. Roberto, it should be added, is the brother-in-law of Zaire's General Mobutu.

The final contender for power among Angola's black liberation forces is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA). Its leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, has somehow managed to maintain his forces inside Angola, mainly in the Ovimbundu country, without assistance from the OAU or other foreign backers. A much-publicized overture to the Chinese in 1969 came to naught." Both the MPLA and the FNLA have accused Savimbi of having a secret understanding with the Portuguese army, which they see as the only possible explanation of his forces' survival. These allegations, however, have not prevented Savimbi from emerging as one of the triumvirate of liberation leaders to share power in the transition to independence.

As the Angolan liberation groups seek to patch up their differences of some 14 years and to establish a framework within which to assume the responsibilities of government, it is important to keep in mind the nature of the foreign support that the rival groups have enjoyed in the past and the bearing that this consideration might have on the evolving Angolan situation.

The strongest force on the scene is Zaire's General Mobutu, who not only possesses the largest army in the area but also is capable of providing economic assistance to his chosen candidateHolden Roberto. Zaire has an important economic stake in Angola's future stability because mineral exports from Katanga Province (renamed Shaba Province) must pass through the heart of Angola on the Benguela rail line to reach the sea and because. recent oil discoveries in off-shore Zaire territory adjoin the Cabinda fields. However, Mobutu's prime concern would seem to be to prevent civil war from breaking out in Angola and thus to preclude the possibility of foreign involvement on Zaire's doorstep. For example, while he has strongly supported the FNLA, he has expanded his contacts by persuading Chipenda and Savimbi to set up offices in his capital, Kinshasa, and by establishing links with the Andrade wing of the MPLA.

In Mobutu's scheme of things, the odd-man-out would appear to be MPLA chief Dr. Neto, whose radical rhetoric and reliance on Soviet support Mobutu may distrust as a result of his own bitter experiences with rebel insurrectionaries and their Communist backers. Nonetheless, Mobutu desires above all to avert civil war and has gone along with the other African leaders in trying to restore unity within the MPLA and in promoting cooperation between it and its two competitors. The other African presidents most closely concerned with Angola's future (Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, and Marien Ngouabi of the Congo People's Republic) have consistently refused to endorse any coalition which excluded Neto, seeing such an exclusion as inviting civil war.

The Portuguese authorities both in the metropolitan country and in Angola, with whom Mobutu has maintained working relations, tend to view his candidate as a "black racist" because of Roberto's role in the massacre of Portuguese families in 1961.20 They prefer either Dr. Neto (because of his Portuguese cultural affinities) or Savimbi (whom they regard as an acceptable moderate).

Neto likewise enjoys the favor of the Soviet Union for several reasons. From its inception in Luanda in the 1950's, the MPLA had among its intellectual leaders a number of prominent Marxists, mainly mestiços; moreover, when Roberto launched his own movement in 1960, he adopted a strongly hostile attitude toward communism. The MPLA also had the backing of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party, whose exile leadership was in Prague. For all these reasons, Moscow saw the MPLA as offering the best medium for deploying its African strategy in Angola.

For their part, the Chinese have by and large steered clear of the Angolan struggle. However, in 1973, after Mobutu had paid a visit to Peking and the OAU had decided to recognize the FNLA once again, China agreed to send 250 commando trainers to assist Roberto's forces. This piece of Peking opportunism was dictated by Chinese interest in having some part in the Angola liberation struggle, but also by Peking's desire to please Mobutu, and especially Nyerere, who had asked for Chinese help at a time when the intensity of the guerrilla struggle was sagging.

One cannot assume from the foregoing, it should be emphasized, that the various liberation move

19 See Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, p. B-349.

20 See Wheeler and Péllisier, op. cit.

ments feel themselves closely tied to any of their actual or potential foreign champions. They appear to rely most heavily on African backers, the strongest of whom at present is General Mobutu. But whether, in the end, he will turn out to be Angola's kingmaker still remains highly speculative.

Two final elements bearing on the shape of independent Angola deserve brief mention here: the powerful white community and the question of Angolan oil resources. Like the Belgians in the former Katanga, Angola's resident Portuguese retain a strong interest in ensuring that their chosen candidate should emerge as the leader of independent Angola, but there is no obvious Moise Tshombe on whom they can count. Had it not been for Roberto's role in the 1961 affair, he might have fitted the bill, being free of radical ideology and by nature and experience a sound businessman. The white Angolans themselves are by no means united, except in the general objective of seeing a multiracial society established in a free Angola on conditions that will enable them to continue to make their

-Camerapix via Keystone.

homes there. A small but influential group is more narrowly concerned with maintaining its own considerable economic stake in postcolonial Angola. The leader of this group is Fernando Falçao, a wealthy industrialist, who also heads the Front for a United Angola (a body representing a broader segment of white Angolans, including the financially powerful interests, anxious to preserve their political rights in the future society). Falçao's preference among black Angolan leaders is Savimbi, but the latter has publicly repudiated any such alliance on the ground that Falçao represents precisely those interests that Savimbi would like to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, in an Angola freed from Portuguese colonial rule.

Oil considerations may also have some effect on Angola's future. Among Africans there were initially two widespread fears: either that Cabinda's neighbors (Zaire and the Congo People's Republic) might seek to gain control of Angola's oil wealth, or that the international oil interests in the enclave might support a secessionist liberation movement-the

Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, led by Luis Franque. At present, however, there seems little doubt that Cabinda's future will be linked with that of an independent Angola-that is, unless the country is plunged into the chaos of civil war.

The Struggle over Namibia

Directly south of Angola lies Namibia (South West Africa), a former German colony mandated to South Africa after World War I and retained by Pretoria despite termination of the mandate and the declaration by the United Nations Security Council in 1966 that South African occupation of the territory was illegal." Armed struggle against South African rule in the territory commenced in the same year, when the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) formed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and began to send insurgents into Namibia

21 This position was upheld by a decision of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, handed down on June 21, 1971. See Colin Legum, Ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, pp. 8384-8386.

-Colin Legum.

through the territory's Caprivi Strip and through southern Angola.

The leading liberation group in Namibia, SWAPO, differs from other movements in southern Africa in several respects. In the first place, it maintains two wings-one an external group that is organized to carry on the armed struggle, the other an internal group that pursues nonviolent political tactics. SWAPO's military incursions have been on a scale sufficient to require a considerable South African armed police force along Namibia's northern frontier, a force which was strengthened by military units after the Portuguese collapse. The movement has achieved its greatest success, however, in infiltrating trained militants into the territory to politicize black Namibians. SWAPO claims some credit for the general strike of black workers in Ovamboland in 1971-72-the first action of such magnitude under South African rule.

A second distinctive feature of SWAPO is the degree of its nonalignment with any major world power center. The movement has avoided taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it enjoys general acceptance both in Western and in Communist