pected to rise. In their quest for majority rule throughout Southern Africa, the armed liberation groups have enjoyed the firm support of the Organization of Republic considers itself the indispensable linchpin | minority regimes of the subcontinent can be exin Southern Africa." This view may find some resonance in mounting NATO uneasiness about the true meaning of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the liberation forces are closely monitoring the debate on the latter subject. | African Unity and share with that mentor a basically They found some satisfaction in Britain's decision in 1974 to end the Simonstown Treaty with South Africa. They hope above all to dissuade the Western powers from extending aid to Pretoria in an effort to bolster South Africa against major strategic threats a move that would enhance the Vorster regime's ability to resist black liberation. In this connection, liberation groups deny any long-term political significance in the heavy Soviet and Chinese aid to the liberation movements, and they continue to express a readiness to accept Western support, which they suggest-would strengthen the chances of changing the apartheid system and simultaneously would reduce the risk of international conflict in the area. Balance Sheet As we have seen, black self-determination in Southern Africa took a major stride forward during 1974. It will continue to advance during the current year as Angola, Mozambique, the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tomé and Principe, and the French territory of the Comoro Islands achieve independence. Moreover, pressures against the remaining two African nationalist orientation, one which seeks to avoid the injection of external influences into the battle to liberate the white-dominated South. Additional aid has come from other sources, particularly Communist states, but there is little evidence that such assistance has accorded the donors great influence in any of the individual movements. This is not to say that there are no convinced Marxists and Communists among the liberation forces and their leaders. Nor is it to deny that various movements have drawn heavily upon Chinese or Soviet advice and/or models of insurrection and political action in the struggle for independence and self-determination. But nowhere does one find an inexorable commitment to Soviet or Chinese practices or to alliance with one or another Communist state. It is true that some new black regimes (e.g., those in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) may require massive economic assistance to survive, and some states may be more willing to furnish aid than others. Should an imbalance in the sources of aid arise in any instance, this imbalance could conceivably have an important bearing on the domestic policies of that government. Yet, as the history of the liberation struggle clearly demonstrates, in Africa one cannot assume any distinct correlation between sources of foreign support and the political orientation of a given black liberation group. 31 See James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1973. SALT and the Soviet Military By Raymond L. Garthoff EDITORS' NOTE: In November 1969 the USSR and the United States commenced formal talks on the limitation of strategic arms. These talks, commonly known as SALT, led in May 1972 to a treaty between the two powers restricting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and to an interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. During the subsequent phase of the negotiations, popularly called SALT II, the exchanges have focused on further restrictions on strategic offensive weapons systems, and in this connection General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford reached agreement at Vladivostok in November 1974 on the basis for negotiating during 1975 a 10-year limitation agreement covering such offensive arms. The talks themselves have been private, and the diplomatic record remains closed. But the following article presents observations and reflections on one important aspect of SALT by a direct participant in the negotiations for more than three years, written from his own personal and informed perspective. T he Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), first proposed by the United States at the end of 1966 and begun late in 1969, have now become a familiar feature in the international political landscape and a particularly important element in US-USSR relations. Much more than any other arms control and disarmament effort entered into to date, SALT has engaged the alert and active attention of the military authorities of both countries. The present article discusses attitudes of the Soviet military toward SALT and military objectives in SALT, the role of the Soviet military in SALT, the Mr. Garthoff is the author of numerous writings on interaction of SALT to date with the Soviet military posture and military thinking, and finally some thoughts on the effect of SALT on evolving Soviet political-military relationships. Soviet Attitudes Toward SALT When, in December 1966 and January 1967, the United States first advanced, in private, a proposal for bilateral talks on limiting strategic armsspecifically anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systemsthe Soviet response was cautious, noting that the question deserved attention, and not rejecting the idea, but couched in terms which left open options either for serious negotiation or for retreat to propagandistic embrace of drastic reductions by both sides down to a minimum deterrent "nuclear umbrella" (an idea earlier championed by the Soviets in Geneva). For the next 18 months, the Soviet side declined to agree on a time and place for beginning substantive discussions, despite repeated American importuning.' The precise role of the Soviet military leaders in this initial pre-SALT phase is not known, but it is highly likely (and in accordance with published Soviet military statements) that their predominant reaction was a compound of suspicions-suspicion both of disarmament and of arms control; suspicion of the United States in general, and in particular what it was up to in proposing SALT; suspicion that arms budgets would be reduced; and suspicion of likely further involvement of Soviet political leaders and political considerations in decisions on military affairs. These military attitudes reinforced the wariness of the Soviet political leaders, but did not override the readiness of the latter to keep the possibility of SALT open and under continuing consideration. The first substantive position taken by the Soviet side was a firm statement at the very outset of the exchanges that strategic offensive arms, as well as anti-ballistic missile systems, must be included in any talks. This position, made known in January 1967, was promptly accepted by the US (perhaps to the surprise of the Soviet side). We do not know whether this position was advanced by the Soviet military or (as the author believes more likely) by the political leaders to provide a basis for "outbidding" the US in moving to the propaganda high ground of proposing drastic nuclear disarmament in case the course of the talks threatened to reveal Soviet unreadiness to agree on apparently reasonable limitations owing to the relative weakness of Soviet strategic forces at that time. A second Soviet position which became clear in the 1967 diplomatic exchanges was a strong stand eschewing an approach based on freezing the existing strategic balance. The Soviet leaders, political and military, were wary that the US might call for a rigid "freeze" of force levels at a time when the US had a heavy strategic preponderance in all categories of intercontinental forces-ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. In January 1967, when SALT was proposed, the US had operational 1,054 ICBM's, 576 SLBM's, and 650 B-52 heavy bombers, while the USSR had only 500 ICBM's (many in "soft" deployment), 100 old short-range SLBM's, and 155 inferior heavy bombers.2 The US total of 2,280 was thus more than three times the Soviet total of 750 1 For an account of the US proposal, its background and origins, and initial Soviet reactions, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, New York, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, pp. 86-95. operational units (and still nearly twice the Soviet total of 1,200, if the additional ICBM and SLBM launchers then under construction in the USSR were counted). Concerning strategic defensive systems, the problem from the standpoint of the Soviet military and political leaders was different: they were reluctant to accept limitations on their own freedom of action. ABM deployment at Moscow, publicly disclosed by Secretary of Defense McNamara immediately preceding the American overtures on SALT and the concomitant step toward ABM deployment in the US (marked by the January 1967 administration request for "contingent" funding for such deployment), was not yet operational, although it had been under construction for over two years. The Soviet ABM system was cumbersome and costly; hence it was being deployed only around Moscow (as had been the case with the billion-dollar deployment of the pioneer Soviet air defense missile system, the SA-1, around Moscow-and only around Moscowa decade earlier). But Soviet military doctrine, and related political-military commentary in the press (such as Major General Nikolai A. Talensky's articles since 1964), was based on the assumption that deployment of all means of strategic defense was morally and politically justified, and strategically sound and stabilizing. This was challenged implicitly by the US proposal (which initially focused exclusively on ABM systems). Moreover, a ban or sharp limitation on ABM deployment, coupled with growing American strategic offensive superiority (or an arms control freeze of the existing US superiority), would have consigned the Soviet Union to permanent inferiority and one-sided vulnerability. In an unconstrained arms race, the Soviet Union at least had a good chance of achieving mutual vulnerability, and of mitigating the nearly complete nakedness of the Soviet Union to American missile attack. Hence the Soviet military insistence on coupling possible strategic offensive limitations with ABM limitations, and hence, too, the Soviet reluctance to become committed to SALT until their 2 These figures on US and USSR strategic force levels, and others cited later, are drawn from authoritative sources, including the annual "Posture Statements" of the US Secretary of Defense, and the unofficial but well-informed annual publication Strategic Balance, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, including refinements and corrections presented in later years as well as those current for the dates indicated. 3 See, for example, Major General Nikolai A. Talensky, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," International Affairs (Moscow), October 1964, pp. 15-19. own strategic offensive force buildup had at least brought the Soviet Union within sight of parity with the United States in intercontinental capabilities. The US decision in September 1967 to deploy a nationwide ABM defense, despite Secretary of Defense McNamara's obvious reluctance and his efforts to rationalize it as directed against a potential Chinese threat, and despite renewed public and private reaffirmation of American desire to proceed with SALT, did compel the Soviet leaders to calculate seriously the impact on the strategic balance of a major US ABM deployment. The prior Soviet testing and developing of an ICBM had not prevented the US from leaping far ahead of the USSR in deploying a much larger and much more capable strategic offensive force, and if the same thing were to be repeated with ABM systems as well, it would seriously prejudice and could confound Soviet aspirations to achieve strategic parity with the United States. By mid-1968 the Soviet leaders decided to enter SALT and see what it would offer as against the alternative of an unrestricted strategic arms competition with the United States. By the time SALT was originally scheduled to convene, on September 30, 1968, the American strategic offensive force levels had long ago levelled off, while the Soviet buildup of modern silo-protected ICBM's was proceeding apace, and a modern SLBM production program was under way. Accordingly-in striking contrast to the situation at the time SALT had first been proposed by September 1968 the US had 1,054 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, and 565 B-52's, while the USSR had operational about 875 ICBM's, 110 SLBM's, and 150 heavy bombers. Counting additional Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers under construction, the overall totals were 2,275 for the US and 1,650 for the USSR. SALT was postponed for slightly over a year as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (on August 20, 1968, literally on the eve of the planned announcement of a forthcoming USUSSR summit meeting and the commencement of SALT), then the advent of a new American admin A December 1974 photo of a Soviet missile silo at an unidentified site. -A. Ovchinnikov for TASS via Sovtoto. istration, the decision of that administration to review its military policy and SALT position, and other delaying factors. But throughout that year the Soviet side reaffirmed its readiness to begin SALT. From the standpoint of developments affecting the strategic balance, the difference of that year was of some significance in two respects: first the US moved from initial testing (beginning in August 1968) to development of deployable MIRV's; and second, the Soviet ICBM and SLBM buildup had proceeded to an extent that now virtually assured parity in the bilateral strategic balance in numbers of missile launchers. As of November 1969, when SALT actually got under way, the US force level remained unchanged from September 1968, except for a slight decline in the number of B-52 bombers, while the USSR then had 1,140 ICBM's operational and some 380 more under construction, about 185 SLBM's operational and 175 more under construction, and 145 heavy bombers. Thus the totals, including Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's under construction, stood at 2,235 for the US and 2,025 for the USSR. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had virtually completed its ABM deployment under way, with only 64 ABM launchers at Moscow, while the US was launched on a major ABM program now called "Safeguard," somewhat reoriented from the "Sentinel" program of 1967 to stress defense of ICBM's, but still nationwide and with well over ten times the number of ABM launchers and interceptors comprising the Soviet deployment. The Soviet military leaders do not limit their view of "the strategic balance" to a comparison of US and USSR intercontinental strategic forces. As we learned from the first five years of SALT, they insist on considering, in conjunction with these elements, other US (and Allied) nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union. In this respect, it may be somewhat misleading to list only these intercontinental forces in comparing force levels. Nonetheless, the Soviets have recognized in the SALT agreements the key role these elements bear in the strategic equation, and it is important to bear in mind these developments in the changing intercontinental strategic balance, even though this summary does not cover many other important aspects of, and factors affecting, the overall strategic balance. Both the reality and perceptions of the strategic balance are, and have been recognized to be, important both in military and in political terms. During the critical gestation period of SALT, from 1967 to 1969, the Soviet military leaders (as well as the political leaders) came to realize several important things affecting their approach to SALT: (1) The United States remained interested in SALT under conditions of near-parity, and not only when it had a three-to-one superiority in strategic offensive forces; (2) The United States had demonstrated its capability and will to build up qualitatively and quantitatively superior forces rapidly in strategic bombers in the 1950's, and in ICBM's and SLBM's in the 1960's, and it could do so again with ABM's and MIRV's in the 1970's if strategic arms competition remained unrestrained; (3) The United States had indicated it was prepared to place maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification, in contrast to its earlier demands for on-site inspections to verify strategic arms limitation agreements; (4) Bilateral strategic arms limitations, if mutually acceptable terms could be negotiated, would contribute to a general lessening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, particularly |