important given increased Sino-Soviet tensions, and consonant with Soviet political strategy in Europe as well;

(5) There were measures which the Soviet Union and the United States could take that would reduce the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war, and SALT could serve as a useful and appropriate forum to raise and consider such matters.

Of these, the second point was undoubtedly of highest importance to the Soviet military leaders. They remained suspicious of US intentions in SALT but saw possible advantage if strategic parity would be accepted by the United States and if limitations could be agreed on that would prevent a new US surge in strategic deployments threatening the newly-won and still precarious Soviet prospect of achieving strategic parity.

Throughout the SALT negotiations (including the period since the 1972 SALT agreements were reached), foreign analysts have cited Soviet military statements warning of the possibility of nuclear war, of American aggressive intentions, and of the need for vigilance and for continued efforts to maintain Soviet military might. (Soviet authors have done the same in reverse, the most extensive being a 1971 book called Pervy Udar," reviewing American military statements and weapons programs and alleging a US proclivity to seek a first-strike capability.) These statements in support of the Soviet military effort no doubt reflect in part real continuing Soviet military concerns; in part they probably are rationalizations for desired programs; and in part they may represent instruments in bureaucratic maneuver by those opposed to SALT or at least to far-reaching Soviet moves in SALT.

It is evident from the virtual absence of references

• In particular, see: Leon Gouré, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy, Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press, 1974, passim; Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Paper No. 75, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, esp. pp. 6-19; C. G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy, Glasgow, Robert Mac Lehose & Co., Ltd., 1972, pp. 71-121; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," Problems of Communism (Washington, DC), September-October 1970, pp. 1-10; Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 273-77, 437-41, 499-510; "Soviet Interests in SALT," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Eds., SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's, Pittsburgh, Fa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973, pp. 21-54; and "Soviet Interests in SALT: Institutional and Bureaucratic Considerations," in Frank B. Horton III, Anthony G. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III, Eds., Comparative Defense Policy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, pp. 113-20.

5 Yuri N. Listvinov, Pervyi Udar (First Strike), Moscow, IMO, 1971, pp. 183.

to SALT in Soviet military publications and in most statements by military leaders that there has been a strong current of reserve and reluctance toward SALT among the military. Much of the explanation may lie simply in concern at undercutting the case for maintaining a strong military posture—a concern which continues since the SALT agreements have been reached. When Army General Viktor G. Kulikov, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, endorsed the SALT I agreements before the Supreme Soviet in August 1972, he coupled this support with a reference to the fact that the party and government at the same time "display constant concern for raising the defense capability of the Soviet Union," affirming that the "Soviet Armed Forces possess everything necessary to reliably defend the state interests of our Motherland." He also noted (as did other speakers) that "the ABM Treaty halts the further buildup of ABM systems in the USSR and the USA, preventing the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms." Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei A. Grechko stressed this same point on the occasion of the ratification of the ABM Treaty by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a month later,' underlining the arms control aspect of greatest significance to the Soviet military (as well as political) leaders.

Soviet Objectives in SALT

A number of foreign policy, economic, strategicand bureaucratic-considerations have been noted by various observers as contributing to the formulation of the Soviet positions and objectives in entering SALT.'

The Soviet political leaders have been particularly concerned with political, economic, and diplomatic objectives, but they have also shared the interest of the military leaders in military considera

• As quoted in "In the Interest of Strengthening Peace: Joint Session of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet," Izvestia (Moscow), Aug. 24, 1972.

7 As quoted in "Important Contribution to Strengthening Peace and Security: Session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," Pravda (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1972.

• In addition to the writings cited in footnote 4 above, see in particular the excellent discussion by Marshall D. Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, Eds., SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, New York, The Free Press-Macmillan, 1974, pp. 101-21; and David Holloway, "Strategic Concerns and Soviet Policy," Survival (London), November 1971.

tions and objectives. The most fundamental political objective has been American recognition of parity❘ of the USSR with the US-parity in the broadest political and political-military as well as strategic sense, spelling an end to the USSR's inferiority in its relations with the United States. The SAI.T agreements reached in May 1972 reinforced in Soviet eyes the "Basic Principles on Relations between the USA and the USSR" signed by President Nixon in Moscow at that same time. In a political-military context, these agreements reflected and bore witness to American recognition of the fact that there exists a military parity in the broad sense of inability of either side to prevail militarily over the other, and hence an inability to coerce the other side; in terms more familiar in the West, it reflects an equal vulnerability of both sides and therefore a state of mutual deterrence from nuclear war. Soviet commentaries since May 1972 have consistently stressed this parity and have refrained from any discussion (even from publication) of asymmetrical specifics in the numbers of strategic missile launchers allowed under the Interim Agreement, even though those numbers favor the Soviet side; they know that other asymmetries favor the US, and they do not wish to engage in debate over pluses and minuses on matters of relative detail which do not affect basic parity.

As early as 1968, the Soviet side had agreed that the main objective of SALT would be to achieve and to maintain stable US-USSR strategic deterrence through agreed limitations on the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive arms. Soviet representations stressed then, and throughout SALT, that limitations must be so balanced that neither side could obtain military advantage and that equal security should be assured for both sides.

The military leaders in Moscow, while sharing or at least accepting these political and politicalmilitary strategic objectives, also continue to hold to a military doctrine which calls for preparing to

See Documents on Disarmament 1972, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1974, pp. 207-325, for the texts and other official documents relating to the SALT I agreements. Of greatest significance was the ABM Treaty, limiting the US and the USSR each to no more than two anti-ballistic missile defense sites with no more than 100 ABM launchers and interceptors at each, and further limiting development and deployment of ABM systems. The second SALT agreement, signed at the same time, was an Interim Agreement limiting the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launches each side cou.d have for a five-year period, during which negotiations would continue for a more comprehensive offensive arms limitation.

wage war if deterrence should fail. Also, they are naturally more concerned with the specifics of the strategic military balance, notwithstanding overall parity in a broad military-political sense.

Among the considerations leading to serious Soviet interest in SALT has been the pressure of an economic pinch." The Soviet leaders have not been compelled by economic pressures to become interested in SALT or to reach any particular arms limitations. But they have found an important economic incentive for dampening down unlimited military competition with the US. And the Soviet military leaders realistically recognize the constraints which competing economic needs have always placed on military programs in the Soviet Union. The economic situation of the USSR contributed to the initial Soviet decision to enter SALT, and growing economic pressures probably played an important role in leading to Soviet agreement to the SALT accords.

It is important to bear in mind that there are varied and sometimes competing interests among the military leaders (and among civilian militaryindustrial chiefs), since they have differing stakes in particular weapons programs and military forces. "The military" by no means always speak with one voice." But overall, the principal basic objectives of the Soviet military in SALT have been:

(1) to assure that the terms of any negotiated strategic arms limitation would result in no military disadvantage and, if possible, some advantage to the USSR;

(2) to preserve maximum leeway for Soviet military research and development and deployment programs, except when specific limitations are justified by limitations of comparable value placed on US military programs;

(3) to forestall an extensive US deployment of ABM systems, even at the cost of foregoing comparable Soviet ABM defense; and

(4) to preserve the right to maintain Soviet offensive and defensive forces required to counter thirdcountry forces, excepting only special cases where a US-USSR limitation was deemed paramount (i.e., ABM limitation).

In engaging in SALT, the Soviet military have also had certain specific second-order objectives:

10 See especially Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," loc. cit., and "Soviet Interests in SALT," loc. cit., pp. 24-28.

11 In addition to the writings of Thomas Wolfe cited in footnote 4, see Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielman, Jr., Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of US Perspectives on the Arms Race, New York, Praeger, 1972.

of the Soviet delegation was Colonel General (now Army General) Nikolai V. Ogarkov, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. For a man with this senior position and broad responsibilities to devote eight months in a 14-month period on a delegation abroad-in addition to time spent in Moscow in preparation for each round of negotiation-demonstrates the seriousness which the Soviet government and the Soviet military ascribed to SALT. In addition to General Ogarkov, Colonel General of the Engineering-Technical Service Nikolai N. Alekseev was a member of the Soviet SALT delegation in the first two rounds of negotiation in 1969 and 1970.

Succeeding Generals Ogarkov and Alekseev as the senior military respresentatives on the Soviet SALT delegation have been Lieutenant General Konstantin A. Trusov, a senior General Staff officer

with a background of work overseeing advanced weapons development, and Lieutenant General (now Colonel General) Ivan I. Beletsky.

A number of other Soviet officers, some of general-officer or flag rank, have participated directly in the SALT talks as "advisors" or (a less prestigious category) as "experts". As one would expect for a serious negotiation, the Soviet side has sent highly qualified specialists in the key areas under discussion: strategic missile experts, ABM experts, submarine and ASW specialists, and strategic bomber officers, all working under senior officers of the General Staff concerned with advanced weapon development and procurement.

In addition to military representatives, the USSR has included in its delegation two senior figures from the scientific-technological-military production field. Academician Aleksandr N. Shchukin, a highly

-Photo by P. Jarmo Hietarante/Lehtikuva.