of Communism MARCH-APRIL 1975 VOL. XXIV Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors (as well as geographical boundaries and names used in articles and illustrations) do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Communications on all matters except subscriptions should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547. SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of Problems of Communism may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Price per copy: $1.60. Subscription price: $9.35. 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INDEXING: Articles in Problems of Communism are indexed, inter alia, in the Social Sciences and Humanities Index, the Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all sections), and ABC POL SCI. EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr. MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall, David E. Albright DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith 2 Succession Contingencies In the Soviet Union By Grey Hodnett 't is appropriate now, a decade after the ascent of L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin to the offices vacated by an ousted Nikita Khrushchev, to reconsider the problem of succession in the USSR in order to see what lessons can be drawn from what has been in comparison with the recent experience of other major powers and past Soviet practice-a period of unexpectedly great leadership stability and outward unity. The succession problem is of particular interest in that it poses in concentrated form many of the central issues involved in the study of Soviet politics, including the nature of the connections between the leadership, the political system as a whole, and Soviet society. Western scholars who have examined the question of succession in the USSR have tended to stress the tight integration of these three elements, although from different perspectives. The predominant view in the past, which Myron Rush has termed the "cyclical theory of Soviet politics" and whose origins may be traced to the totalitarian model, has emphasized integration from the top down through domination.' Alternative views have by and large stressed intergration of the elements from the outside in, through functional "imperatives" imposed upon a reactive Mr. Hodnett is Associate Professor of Political Science, York University (Downsview, Ontario). His articles on Soviet politics have appeared in these pages and in Soviet Studies, and he is author of Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1955-72: A Guide to Posts and Occupants, 1973, and coauthor of The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis, 1970. The author would like to thank Seweryn Bialer, Franklyn Griffiths, and William Zimmerman for their useful comments on issues raised in this article. leadership by an entrenched bureaucracy or by an active industrialized society." The present article, in contrast, posits that the paths of influence among the three elements are multidirectional, that the delineation of linkages is problematic, and consequently that an approach which directly confronts the "contingencies" of succession may be useful. Such an analytical strategy highlights the "contingent" nature of the factors that may influence a succession-their tendency to be changing continually, though at varying rates, within varying limits. It also presupposes that relevant factors may assume a different character in different successions; that while the values of some factors (e.g., age or experience) may be ranked in probability terms, the rankings are within limits-subject to alteration; and that interactions among relevant factors link together in "probabilistic" rather than "causal" chains. In short, it treats the succession as a highly complex stochastic process governed by a series of factors-some stable, others dynamic; some taking place within the leadership, others outside it; some quantifiable, most not.' 1 See Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. 2 See Richard Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away," Problems of Communism (Washington, DC), January-February 1965; Seweryn Bialer, "Soviet Leadership: Some Problems of Continuity, Structure and Cohesion," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1966; Jerome M. Gilison, "New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership," World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. 19, July 1967, pp. 563-81. 3 It is a sobering thought that the most sophisticated contemporary approaches to the predictive "modeling" of stochastic social processes do not begin to come to grips with the kind of complexities involved in the succession problem. For example, see Harrison C. White, Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. leadership were both simultaneously part of Soviet political reality not only before but also after his vic An examination of the post-Khrushchev succession process may help further to clarify the question of the Leader's role and at the same time suggest other contingent features of the succession process. The relevance of a "contingency" approach be- One is struck, in reading the late Soviet leader's comes apparent if we ask the question, "Succession reminiscences about his own role, by the counterto what?" What is the destination toward which "the point between the dominant theme of his own persuccessor" moves, and when does he "arrive"? In sonal power and the supporting theme of participathe scholarly literature, the role involved has vari- tion by "the leadership."" If we are to judge by ously been described as: (a) "supreme ruler," "sov-Khrushchev's words, one-man rule and collective ereign power," "personal dictatorship," "limited dictatorship," "dictator"; (b) “monocratic leadership"; (c) "personal rule," "individual rule"; (d) "limitedtory over the "anti-party group" in June 1957. personal rule"; (e) "dominant leader role"; (f) "political boss"; (g) "limited and insecure superiority" 10; (h) "modified collective leadership""; or "erosion of the collective principle." The variations in these description mirror the substantial differences of opinion among Western analysts (as well as the evolution of the thinking of certain analysts over time) about how much power Khrushchev exercised in comparison with Stalin," but they also attest to an important reality: that the degree of power associated with Khrushchev's role was not something constant but changed through time. This fact poses a major methodological dilemma when one attempts to conceptualize the Leader's role. Similarly, the assumption—implicit in most of these formulations-that the relationship between the Leader and the rest of the political leadership can adequately be characterized in simple "either/ or" terms may well be misleading. Certainly, it is not the sort of picture that Khrushchev himself gave us of his rule. From Khrushchev to Brezhnev There are four conceivable circumstances under which a succession may occur: the death of the former leader; his incapacitation through illness; his resignation; or his expulsion from office. Each has different political consequences, and each is possible in the future. Khrushchev, as we know, left by the last route. Indeed, he lost his job when he was out of town. The arrangements for his removal were made conspiratorially, and his own movements and communications were physically constrained. To accomplish these ends, Khrushchev's opponents-probably a majority of the members of the Communist Party Presidium-had to gain the sup 4 Rush, Political Succession in the USSR, pp. 104, 105, 108, 111, 114, 193, 229. 5 T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," Survey (London), January 1964, pp. 187-88. 6 Rush, Political Succession in the USSR, pp. 141, 148. 7 Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," Problems of Communism, July-August 1971, p. 10. a Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership: Towards a Self-Stabilizing Oligarchy?" Soviet Studies (Glasgow), October 1970, p. 169. 9 Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" Problems of Communism, March-April 1972, p. 43. 10 Bialer, "Soviet Leadership . . .," p. 16. 11 Gilison, "New Factors of Stability ," p. 571. 12 Sidney Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism, May-June 1970, p. 6. 13 For a judicious evaluation of this debate, see Abraham Brumberg, "The Fall of Khrushchev-Causes and Repercussions," in John W. Strong, Ed., The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin, Toronto, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, pp. 1-15. 14 See Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbot, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974. In these memoirs we find, on the one hand, such statements as: "When I say 'we,' I mean myself and the other members of the Presidium--although, of course, as the Chairman I held a post that gave me a voice which was to a certain extent decisive, as long as I had the support of the others" (p. 27); "... during my years first as a member, then as head of our country's leadership" (p. 107); ". . . when I was active at the .. head of the Party and the State" (p. 135); "I was completely within (p. 290); "Even though I'd just returned home from Washington, my 4 A portion of the Soviet leadership shown at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971: in the front row, from left, M. A. Suslov, L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgorny, and A. N. Kosygin; in the rear, from left, M. G. Solomentsev, F. D. Kulakov, V. V. Shcherbitsky, Yu. V. Androprov, V. V. Grishin, P. N. Demichev, D. A. Kunaev, and P. M. Masherov. port of secret police chief V. Ye. Semichastny and his immediate subordinates in the KGB (Komitet po Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti-Committee on State Security), and the acquiescence of the military leadership assistance which KGB chief I. A. Serov and Marshal G. K. Zhukov had not been willing to render the Presidium majority in 1957. But it is only in this specific sense that physical force played a role in the Brezhnev accession. Neither the KGB nor the army compelled other members of the Presidium to accept the justification for Khrushchev's removal and the nomination of Brezhnev and Kosygin to fill the key posts that he had held, nor did either induce the Central Committee membership to accept the Presidium's explanation and confirm the changes. These were purely political acts. -TASS via Sovfoto. important to note, only a portion of the leadership participated in the succession decisions from the outset. This would not necessarily be the case under different conditions-such as the death of an incumbent General Secretary. Then, the views of all the voting members of the Politburo would be crucial. One cannot characterize an accession, however, by looking merely at the "how"; it is necessary to pay attention to the "why" as well. In the case of Khrushchev's removal, those who label it a "coup d'état" tend to minimize this consideration, arguing, for example, that "the removal of Khrushchev was not occasioned by policy issues" but was "designed to restore rule by 'pure' oligarchy." In support of this argument, they adduce such evidence as the disparate character of the opposition to Khrush Under the circumstances of the expulsion, it is chev, the nature of the public charges made against 15 For a report that Serov and Marshal Zhukov, as well as Frol Kozlov, then First Secretary of the Leningrad Province Party Committee, played crucial roles in organizing Central Committee members on Khrushchev's behalf in June 1957, see Politicheskii dnevnik (Political Diary), Amsterdam, The Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1972, p. 107. him, and the failure of the new regime immediately to institute major changes in his policies. What was at issue, it is contended, was Khrushchev's quest for greater power and "the oligarchy's" desire to recoup 16 Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership ," p. 173. its former position. But while it may be granted with- | "catch-up" politics of organizational "solutions," out question that Khrushchev was struggling to retain or even increase his influence within the leadership, this does not explain why he found himself in such a position at that time. One may gain some perspective on this question by reviewing briefly certain policy aspects involved in Khrushchev's rise and fall. Khrushchev's Policy Failures Prior to his victory over the "anti-party group," Khrushchev had expanded his role essentially through piecemeal and pragmatic policy measures to meet the urgent problems that Stalin had bequeathed. For instance, Khrushchev had responded to shortfalls in agricultural production with the campaign to sow the Virgin Lands; to discontent of minority nationalities with a relaxation of oppressive controls; to the paralysis of fear with his secret speech to the 20th Party Congress; to hypercentralization with the creation of regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy); to the dead end in foreign policy with overtures to the West, etc. From the standpoint not only of the "anti-party group" but of many other high-level officials, some or all of these policies not only threatened individual careers but were (a) mistaken and (b) unsuccessful. By the spring of 1957, according to one inside source, Khrushchev's policies had "evoked serious doubts among a considerable section of the party and state apparatus."" This was the specific context of Khrushchev's attempt to extend his power in the first half of 1957 and of the reaction to his efforts by the majority of the leadership. purges, and transgressions against the outermost acceptable limits of personal rule, to extricate himself from failure. But stagnant agricultural output, declining industrial productivity, administrative chaos, erosion of ideological control, an exposed military-strategic posture, and serious strains within the Communist "commonwealth" thwarted his efforts. These were massive policy issues, and they cannot be considered mere background factors or pretexts for Khrushchev's removal. Not only did they contribute to the decision to remove the First Secretary, but they also could not help but define the tasks of the new Leader as visualized by those in the party leadership who chose him. Choice of a Successor The word "choice" is critical. Analysts sometimes leave the impression that there is no process of choice involved in the "emergence" of a Leader in the Soviet Union." However, it must be emphasized that Brezhnev was chosen for elevation to First Secretary-and hence launched as Leader-by his colleagues; as we have seen, no physical or organizational force came into play, and Brezhnev "clients" in the lower echelons of the hierarchy were in no position to lift him into the Leader's job. At best, their views were one of several factors taken into account by Brezhnev's peers in reaching their decision. In short, there was a choice, and the choice necessarily involved the application of some criteria -certain notions of the role that the First Secretary ought to play and the qualities that he needed to perform this role. In a later section of this article, I will advance detailed, if tentative, judgments about the will suffice for the moment to suggest that in September-October 1964 there was no serious alternative to Brezhnev among the realistically "eligible" full or candidate members of the CPSU Presidium. Even on the basis of such initial sorting criteria as health, posts then occupied, or ethnic origin, Brezhnev distanced the lot. Frol Kozlov suffered from serious heart trouble; G. I. Voronov, D. S. Poliansky, The important change after June 1957 was that Khrushchev began to elaborate a more or less coher-probable nature of the criteria of selection, but it ent and consistent set of policies to which he was committed for the rest of his regime and for which he was accountable. The foundation of this effort was the Seven-Year Plan (a blueprint for economic growth in the years 1959-65), for which the 1961 Party Program provided the ideological superstructure. The Seven-Year Plan was based upon unrealistic assumptions about what was achievable, especially in light of a concurrent increase in US defense spending. As the gap between results and plan targets reached increasingly alarming levels, and as his prestige dropped, Khrushchev strove desperately, through a 17 Politicheskii dnevnik, p. 106. 18 For example, we read: "In the USSR... the new ruler evidently comes to his office not by an orderly transfer of authority but by arrogating power to himself"; and elsewhere, "In the first days of the Khrushchev succession, Brezhnev was able to make himself First Secretary of the Central Committee" (Rush, Political Succession in the USSR, pp. 78, 141). |