A A. P. Kirilenko, V. V. Grishin, and L. N. Yefremov held second-rank posts; and N. V. Podgorny had the disadvantage of being Ukrainian. Brezhnev had unrivaled leadership experience in the party apparatus dealing with cadres, industry, agriculture, construction, and the defense sector; he had served in Moscow and in three different national republics; he had acquired significant experience in the conduct of foreign affairs; and he had the sort of conservative political style and instincts that Khrushchev was felt to have lacked so sorely." The situation was not at all comparable to that which existed at Stalin's death, when-in addition to Khrushchev-there had been at least one clear alternative (G. M. Malenkov), with several other less possible but still conceivable candidates in the wings. in decision-making, and that the First Secretary should be accountable to the "collective leadership." Finally, there seems to have been an agreement that a stricter division of labor be enforced between state administrative agencies and party organizations, particularly between the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee apparatus. other matter. As we shall see below, Brezhnev's opportunities to build his own role as Leader were highly conditioned by these specific features of his accession to office. On the list of such contingent conditioning factors one usually finds what is commonly called the "succession struggle." In this regard, it is essential to distinguish between resistance to the pretensions and policies of the incumbent Leader and outright competition for his post. The rise of Brezhnev While Brezhnev thus benefited from the absence has unquestionably been accompanied by repeated of a suitable alternative candidate for the post of manifestations of resistance, which continue to the Leader, his accession was accompanied by another present day," and there is not the slightest doubt important contingency. As T. H. Rigby has noted, at that policy differences have constantly simmered the time of Brezhnev's accession the party leader-within the leadership." Competition, however, is anship seems to have agreed to a "veritable charter of oligarchy" or "implicit compact" involving a commitment to a policy symbolized by the phrase, "stability of cadres." What this entailed, in effect, was the imposition of certain "conditions" upon the freedom of maneuver of the chosen successor. The most important of these was an explicit prohibition against the First Secretary's simultaneously occupying the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Rigby goes on to argue plausibly that it was agreed that seats in the party Presidium and Secretariat and in the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers be doled out "in such a way as to avoid dangerous patterns of overlap" and that patronage be reduced. Another element of the "stability of cadres" policy evidently involved the restoration to their old jobs of many prominent officials victimized in the later Khrushchev years. Turnover at lower administrative levels was to be cut down, and "parachuting" of cadres into local organizations discouraged. In addition, it is clear that there were stipulations that the "collective" was the ultimate authority, that the Presidium membership should regularly participate 19 For a well-balanced biography of Brezhnev, see Paul A. Smith, Jr., "Brezhnev: Ascent to Power," Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1971, pp. 576-608. 20 Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership . . .," p. 175. A recent Soviet émigré with access to Central Committee circles told the present author that the decision to keep the two posts in separate hands took the form of a closed circular letter issued by the CPSU Central Committee. The dearth of alternative candidates at the outset produced a succession that appears-on the basis of available evidence to have been almost "struggle-free" in the competitive sense. As far as I am aware, no evidence has ever been brought forward suggesting actual competition for the appointment to the post of First Secretary in the days preceding the October 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee, particularly on the part of the much-heralded (in the West) "counter-heir," Podgorny. And if A. N. Shelepin became a potential competitor, it was only after his promotion from nonmember to full member of the Presidium in November 1964, when Brezhnev already occupied the first secretaryship. Although much has been written about Shelepin's aspirations to be Leader, hard evidence on this score is difficult to find. A reading of Michel Tatu's authoritative work on the period leaves one uncertain as to whether Shelepin ever mounted a concerted effort to "seize" power in the period running from November 1964, through the dismantling of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in December 1965, to his transfer to the relatively obscure post of Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in Sep 21 For supporting arguments, see Terry McNeill, "Some Reflections on the Soviet Political Leadership," Radio Liberty, Dispatch (New York), RL 299/74, Sept. 20, 1974. 22 See, for example, the remarkably argumentative pleas that S. Trapeznikov made for the funding of Brezhnev's agricultural L 2 Membership in these three organs began before October 1964 and/or continued to March 1975 unless otherwise indicated by dates of accession and/or departure. [On April 16, 1975, Shelepin was removed from the Politburo.-Eds.] Nov 71 tember 1967.23 There have been accounts of rumors to the effect that Shelepin, along with M. A. Suslov and K. T. Mazurov, wrote a letter criticizing Brezhnev's unpublished report at the December 1969 Plenum of the Central Committee-a time identified by others as a difficult one for the party leader." But this seems to be the extent of the evidence available that anyone actively "struggled" for Brezhnev's post. Seats of Power One of the basic reasons for the relative absence of a competitive "power struggle" during Brezhnev's incumbency has been, of course, the effect that the "stability of cadres" policy has had on turnover within the Politburo (as the party Presidium has been called since the 23rd CPSU Congress in April 1966). As Figure 1 shows, between November 1964 and April 1971 only two individuals were promoted to full membership in the Politburo (Mazurov and Arvid Pelshe), neither of whom were serious contenders or occupied posts that could be considered launching sites for the Leadership. Thus, the initial conditions under which Brezhnev came to office did much to protect his position. At the same time, however, these same conditions limited the opportunities for Brezhnev to extend his role. Although there have been rumors and speculation that on several occasions Brezhnev may have attempted to follow Khrushchev's example and establish himself as the head of the government as well as General Secretary of the party,25 he has not in fact acquired this post. It does appear that he has assumed the role of commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces through chairmanship of the Defense Council, but he lost another potential base of 26 23 See Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, London, Collins, 1969, pp. 503-08. Robert Conquest tells us that "since Tatu wrote, it has been reported in more detail and on better information that a serious effort was made as early as 1965 to put Shelepin in Brezhnev's place and Ustinov in Kosygin's, transferring Brezhnev to the titular role of Head of State-i.e., President of the Supreme Soviet" (Soviet Analyst [London], Nov. 14, 1974). No source is cited by Conquest, but the same information appears in "Rumors About Possible Changes in Leadership" in Politicheskii dnevnik, p. 50. The same source (pp. 243-44) also notes a report ("It is said . . .") that Shelepin still had pretentions to the position of Leader in the spring of 1967, at the time of the Six-Day War in the Middle East and of Semichastny's removal as Chairman of the KGB. 24 Politicheskii dnevnik, pp. 657-58. 25 For an account of rumors that Brezhnev may in late 1971 have attempted to gain control of the government through the proposed establishment of a "state council" that he would head, see John Dornberg, Brezhnev, London, André Deutsch, 1974, p. 264. personal power when the CPSU Central Committee's RSFSR Bureau, of which he was chairman, was liquidated in 1966. Equally important have been the limitations that the "stability of cadres" policy has placed upon Brezhnev's ability to eliminate from the top leadership those who have opposed him on policy grounds and to replace them with people of his own choosing. As T. H. Rigby has conclusively demonstrated," the pattern of staffing the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat and the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers is an important factor in any succession, and this pattern may differ from period to period. Compared with the fluid pattern of the Khrushchev years, that of the Brezhnev period has been comparatively stable. Since 1964, the Politburo has always contained at least one non-Brezhnevite member of the Secretariat-Suslov and at least one non-Brezhnevite member of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers-Kosygin. Not until the 24th Party Congress, in April 1971, did Brezhnev succeed in significantly increasing the number of his secure clients among the full members of the Politburo, and he still by no means enjoyed a majority." Despite the dramatic promotion of Yu. V. Andropov, Marshal A. A. Grechko, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to full membership in the Politburo and the removal of Voronov and P. Ye. Shelest in April 1973, Brezhnev remains-in my opinion-shy of his own majority, although a few more changes could tip the balance.29 In the Secretariat, Brezhnev may have gained a majority by the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, and almost certainly had it by April 1968. To the moment of writing, however, he has not managed to install his own ideologist in the Secretariat." Brezhnev's earliest "success," perhaps, was achieved where some might least have expected it-in that citadel of "the state," the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. For most of the time since December 1965, Brezhnev has probably had something 26 See Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, September-October 1973, p. 3, and Alain Jacob in The Guardian (Manchester), March 2, 1974. 27 See Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership . . . ." 28 This assumes that his firm supporters were Kirilenko, F. D. Kulakov, D. A. Kunaev, and V. V. Shcherbitsky. 29 This assumes that his firm supporters among the 16 full members of the Politburo are Andropov, Grechko, Kirilenko, Kulakov, Kunaev, and Shcherbitsky. 30 This assumes that his firm supporters were Kirilenko, Kulakov, I. V. Kapitonov, K. F. Katushev, and possibly D. F. Ustinov. 31 Although P. N. Demichev was removed from the Secretariat at the December 1974 Plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev was apparently unable to force through his own choice as a replacement, and Demichev's post was left unfilled. approaching a majority there," although one-manone-vote is in all likelihood not the operative principle in this body. But it should be noted that he achieved this success by "inheriting" Khrushchev's clients a phenomenon that might well not repeat itself in the future." (Brezhnev has also made steady progress in promoting old cronies and newer clients to prominent jobs in the territorial party apparatus, the Central Committee apparatus, and the central government bureaucracy; however, the moderate turnover in Central Committee membership at both the 23rd and 24th party congresses-a function of the "stability of cadres" condition placed upon his accession to office has compelled him to reason with this body rather than to use it as a rubber stamp.3) 34 Brezhnev's capacity to extend his influence through structural change has been severely restricted, too. To some extent, the bad example of Khrushchev's "organizational itch" has inhibited use of this strategy, but the leadership's insistence upon a more effective division of labor within its own ranks combined with restoration of the ministerial system and centralized economic management have imposed the most fundamental limitations on this potential source of power. While there is some evidence of top-level conflict over the breadth of the party apparatus' jurisdiction over administration of the state and the economy, too much should not be made of it." The speeches of the Soviet leaders themselves provide much evidence of controversy on other major issues, but they reveal little evidence of conflict along this presumed "party/state" axis of controversy at the top leadership level; and attempts to demonstrate it tend either to overinterpret these speeches or to turn into ingenious but questionable exegeses of the pronouncements of middle-level propagandists. Known attempts to expand the jurisdiction of party organizations either at the center (for example, by accentuating the supervisory powers of primary party organizations in ministries) or at the local level (for instance, by involving the provincial party committees in industrial consolidation or regional planning) should be interpreted as at best marginal in any impact they may have had on Brezhnev's influence. Policies and Power Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev at the outset found his power to influence policy matters severely limited by the parameters of the problems inherited from his predecessor. Brezhnev's initial policies were generally more conservative and "consensual" than those of Khrushchev and were largely responses to the disarray left by the latter. Brezhnev promoted the recentralization of industrial administration; he helped engineer a dramatic expansion of Soviet military might; and he lent his weight to a retightening of controls in the fields of culture and nationality affairs. Abroad, his "doctrine" and its application clamped a lid on the potentially explosive situation in Eastern Europe, while the tough policy that he favored toward China probably won support in many quarters. The only area in which he quickly took an innovating lead was agriculture, where he closely identified himself with major efforts to solve the Soviet food problem outlined at the March 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee. For several years, Brezhnev was able to sustain high levels of spending on both agriculture and defense and to contain pressures from some of his colleagues for greater production of consumer goods. But serious economic difficulties had begun to arise by 1967." The sheer magnitude of the Soviet GNP was not able, for various reasons (including the parasitic character of the defense sector), to overcome the deep-seated structural weaknesses of the 32 This assumes that his clients have incuded, at least, V. Ye. Dymshits, M. T. Yefremov, I. T. Novikov, Z. N. Nuriev, L. V. Smirnov, N. A. Tikhonov, and possibly V. N. Novikov. 33 On Brezhnev's inheritance of Khrushchev's clientele, see Bialer, "Soviet Leadership . . .," p. 7. 34 See Dornberg, Brezhnev. 35 See Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System ...," p. 32. This is not to say that Brezhnev has failed to increase the number of his clients in the Central Committee. On this point, see Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," World Politics, April 1972, pp. 385, 404. 36 By far the most interesting report of such conflict refers to the beginning of the succession period: "It is said that shortly after his appointment as Chairman of the [USSR] Council of Ministers, Kosygin raised the question of party organs not interfering directly in administering the economy, but of having all economic leadership be concentrated in the Council of Ministers. He proposed that branch [i.e., economic branch] departments in the CC CPSU, the CC Bureau for the RSFSR, and the CC's of the national Communist parties and the obkoms [provincial party committees] be liquidated. His draft was discussed but not approved. Recently, it seems, he has again raised this question, declaring that he can't 'pull up' the economy under the existing conditions of dual leadership (departments of the party organs and departments of the Council of Ministers)" (Politicheskii dnevnik, pp. 50-51). It seems implausible to this observer that a politician as experienced as Kosygin would have advocated such a radical solution as "liquidation" of the party departments, but it is conceivable that frustration might have provoked an indiscretion of this magnitude. 37 See Werner G. Hahn, The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-70, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, Chap. 9. |