desh could not deliver goods in which the Russians were interested, and deliveries of Soviet capital goods were frequently delayed-partly because the output of Russian factories lagged behind schedule, but more often because Bangladesh was not ready to construct planned industrial units."

On the political side, Moscow's broader geopolitical strategy precluded an obtrusive Soviet presence in the new republic. In the first place, India, having after all liberated Bangladesh, regarded its fledgling neighbor as its natural and legitimate sphere of influence, and the USSR was quite willing to indulge India's assertion of strategic sway over the country. Moreover, the rationale of Indian intervention had been the possibility that the development of a radical situation in East Pakistan would endanger the entire eastern flank of India-especially Calcutta, economically the industrial hub of northern India and politically the capital of the most radical of Indian states.

The Russians therefore suggested a political model for Bangladesh essentially similar to that which they advocated for India-that is, political collaboration between the "progressive" elements of the national bourgeoisie and the "democratic forces" (a euphemism for Communists and their allies) for the construction of a "state of national democracy." " The main problem was that the Awami League was not really a political party but a poorly-organized political movement, a loose and flabby coalition of a deeply-entrenched landed gentry and a relatively small urban middle class. Some 70 percent of the legislators who had been elected to the Pakistan national assembly and the East Pakistan provincial legislature on the Awami League ticket in December 1970 were erstwhile "basic democrats" of the Ayub Khan period (195869).20 Mujibur Rahman himself was a moderate nationalist who had been driven to an extreme nationalist position by the avalanche of events. Given a free choice, he would probably have been satisfied with a largely autonomous Bangladesh within Pakistan; however, the determination of the Bhutto

18 Interview with officials of the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Trade in December 1974.

19 For an elaboration of the Soviet development model for India, see this author's "India's Rival Communist Models," Problems of Communism, January-February 1973, pp. 1-15.

20 During the Ayub Khan period, the "basic democrats" constituted the electoral college for the election of the President and members of the National Assembly. Most of them were big or middle landlords and former local leaders of the Muslim League.

the fruits of its massive electoral victory, plus the volatile pressure of the students and youth of Dacca, had forced him to demand independence in the fateful days of March 1971." As the leader of the new nation, Rahman proclaimed socialism as one of the country's four guiding principles, but this socialism was at best that of the British Labor Party and the Indian National Congress.22 His regime stood for gradual, incremental change, not for rapid, radical social transformation. While it started with a sweeping nationalization program, the institutions and industries affected-banking, insurance, the jute plants, and so on had all been under West Pakistani ownership; furthermore, it attached relatively little importance to land reform on the ground that no big landlords supposedly existed in Bangladesh.23

If the Awami League was not a cohesive, purposeful political party, the "democratic forces" in Bangladesh were rudimentary. The Bangladesh Communist Party (BCP) had been banned for 20 years, and in 1971 it boasted only a skeletal, underground urban organization, although the Communist Party of India (CPI) had tried to give military training to newlyrecruited youthful cadres of the BCP in the latter half of 1971 because both groups were eager for the BCP to play a significant role in partisan warfare against the Pakistani army. More active and prominent was the BCP's front body, the pro-Moscow National Awami Party faction (NAP-M) led by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed.

Prior to Bangladesh's acquisition of independence, the CPI, presumably with Moscow's approval, had urged the Indian-based Awami League leaders to form a coordinating committee with the BCP as

21 During the political crisis of March 1971, Rahman was in effect cast in the role of defender of the unity of Pakistan-albeit with an autonomous Bangladesh-and Bhutto in that of splitter of the country. The prospect of East Pakistan's ruling over the whole of Pakistan by virtue of its numerical strength became a nightmare for Bhutto. Confirmation of this point comes from interviews with several Bangladesh leaders who had discussions with Bhutto in December 1970 and March 1971. An eminent Bangladesh barrister who tried to mediate between Rahman and Bhutto also told the author of a conversation he had with the Pakistani leader in January 1971 during the course of which Bhutto remarked with bold candor: "This geographical absurdity of Pakistan must be ended."

22 The other three guiding principles were nationalism, democracy, and secularism.

23 The Awami League election program included a promise

of land reforms, but there has thus far been no distribution

of land to the landless peasants, who make up some 20 percent of the population of Bangladesh.

a forerunner of a coalition after "liberation." While leaders of the Bangladesh government-in-exile had rejected the proposal in that form, they had agreed to set up a cabinet-level consultative committee representing a broader spectrum of groups, including the BCP and the NAP-M; however, when Rahman returned triumphantly from solitary confinement in Pakistan and took over command of the government in Dacca, he refused to accord the BCP and the NAP-M even an informal association with the government. Moreover, the Awami League press failed to recognize any role of the Communists in the "liberation struggle." The CPI and the Soviet mass media, in contrast, tried to boost the image of the BCP by circulating highly inflated accounts of its exploits during the liberation war.""

In the ensuing months, both the BCP and the NAP-M became critical of the government for its nonradical policies and its acceptance of American aid. But when elections to choose a new 300member National Assembly were scheduled for March 1973, the two organizations approached the Awami League with the prospect of a united "democratic" front. Turned down by the AL, each group fielded its own candidates-but neither won a single seat in the election. The Awami League swept the polls, capturing all but eight seats in the assembly. Calling the election results "an impressive victory for the major forces in the national liberation movement," Moscow Radio-in a formidable stretch of the imagination-described the NAP-M as the "runner-up" in the race, although its total vote was just over one-tenth of that polled by the AL.26

In August 1973, a delegation of the BCP went to Moscow to confer with leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. It was agreed that the BCP and the NAP-M would now concentrate their efforts on achieving the unity of "democratic and nationalpatriotic forces." " In subsequent weeks, the two groups again approached the Awami League to propose the formation of a "popular united front" among the party organizations, though outside the

24 New Age (New Delhi), organ of the CPI, claimed on April 11, 1971, that the Bangladesh Communist Party had emerged as a leader of the freedom struggle. The same line was elaborated in I. Shchedrov, "The Story of Bangladesh Communists," Pravda, Jan. 24, 1972.

25 See Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 23, 1972, and Jan. 15, 1973.

26 Radio Moscow broadcast in English, FBIS, op. cit.,

March 8, 1973. The Awami League received nearly 14 million votes and the NAP-M 1.5 million votes in the election. See Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1973.

27 Izvestia (Moscow), Aug. 19, 1973.

government. This time, Mujibur Rahman-beset by vitriolic criticism from a motley of pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistani elements-accepted the proposal and himself inaugurated the front in October. In reporting this development, Pravda observed:

The long and difficult struggle for freedom and independence convinced the people of Bangladesh that only the united actions of all national-patriotic forces made it possible to achieve national independence. The two-year period of independent developments [since] has shown that this unity is also necessary now, at the important stage of building a peace-loving, democratic, independent state. That is why the broad, progressive public in Bangladesh considers the creation of a united front of the three parties to be an important step on the road to strengthening the independence and social gains of the young republic.28

Since its inception in 1973, the united front has had little impact or influence on the politics of the Rahman government, but the BCP itself has taken advantage of its link with the ruling party, however tenuous, to rapidly expand its membership and organizational sweep. By December 1974, it had more than 30,000 card-carrying members; it had extended its organizational structure to most of the towns of Bangladesh; and it had set up a peasant front, called the kisan sabha, in four districts.29 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this growth in strength had come at the expense of the loss of the party's revolutionary image among the urban youth of Dacca. They now saw the party as a tail of the Awami League, which-because of widespread corruption and administrative inefficiency as well as the mounting crisis in the economy -had become highly unpopular with the general populace.

a

At the same time, the leadership of the BCP grew increasingly aware of the dangers inherent in too much of an identification with the Awami League and of the opportunities that the Bangladesh situation offered for the pursuit of a more radical course than it was following. In the latter regard, it was significant that on the third anniversary of the birth of the republic in December 1974 the national flag fluttered over only a few houses

28 Pravda, Oct. 23, 1973.

29 Interview with Moni Singh, the Chairman of the BCP, in December 1974.

in Dacca. There was a deep pall of gloom, a sense of anguished frustration-not just because most commodities were beyond the reach of the common man and the city authorities were burying some 200 "unclaimed bodies" every week, but mainly because the government seemed to have lost a sense of direction. The economy had virtually ground to a halt, the treasury was practically empty, relations with India were anything but warm, law and order was at a breaking point in much of the country, and factional infighting appeared to have robbed the Awami League of the dynamism it had possessed during the freedom struggle and in the first year of the regime. In response to these difficulties, Mujibur Rahman was known to be contemplating a presidential system of government.

Consequently, the BCP-evidently with Soviet approval came out in December 1974 with a new political model for Bangladesh. As Moni Singh, the leader of the BCP, explained this model to the author in the course of an hour-long interview, it was designed to generate political momentum for radical social change, vigorous mobilization of resources, increased production, and equitable distribution of national output. The model prescribed a presidential system of government. Under it, the President would appoint a cabinet of "progressive, efficient, and honest" persons drawn from the democratic parties. While there would still be a national assembly, it would have only limited power, and the cabinet would not be responsible to it. Speaking about the model, Moni Singh asserted:

Bangladesh has neither a strong capitalist class nor a class of big landlords. This makes it a very different society from that of India. We therefore need not live in a parliamentary system, which can only lead to stratification of the classes and which, in effect, legitimizes exploitation of the poor by the rich. The parliamentary system cannot but be a major roadblock to significant social change. What we need is an effective, efficient, honest, and ideologically sound government, a government of progressive and democratic forces under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Asked why he believed that Rahman would adopt such a political model and what the Communists would do if he did not, Mongi Singh replied:

We strongly believe that the force of circumstances will compel the Sheikh to adopt our model. The

economic and political problems of Bangladesh cannot be solved through the parliamentary system. We have told him that if he adopted our model, we would do our best to make it a success. If he rejects it, we will fight for it, whatever the consequences.

Moni Singh admitted that the BCP and its allies were still not strong enough to force a major political showdown in Bangladesh, but he argued that "our strength is growing in the districts, among the workers and peasants and the middle classes."

The capitalist powers, Moni Singh continued, were neither willing nor able to lift Bangladesh out of its economic travails. However, he said, there are the socialist countries, which will give us all the help we need if we follow the correct political line and are able to mobilize our own resources to the maximum." Formulations in the BCP's Bengali weekly during the latter half of 1974 leave little doubt that the party expected the Soviet bloc to underwrite the development needs of Bangladesh