There is impressive evidence that Mao sought to dissociate himself from the decisions taken in Peking in January. The Chairman's only two public appearances between November 1974 and the present time of writing (April 1975) took place away from Peking just at the time of the January meetings: he met Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff of Malta on January 9, when the Second Plenum of the Central

-Camera Press.

of former cadres and of those who rose to influential positions during the Cultural Revolution. Article 22 of the new State Constitution confirmed the revolutionary committees as the permanent basic organs of the government structure. Chou, however, referred to these committees as "composed of the old, middle-aged, and young," whereas Chang alluded to them as "formed on the basis of the revolutionary three-in-one combination." 30 Chang's formula, developed during the Cultural Revolution, required that the revolutionary committees be made up of three elements: old cadres, military personnel, and representatives of the revolutionary masses. This makes mandatory the inclusion of nonbureaucratic personnel, whereas Chou's formulation allows their exclusion.31

The preceding analysis suggests that the Congress of "unity and victory" in fact embodied the type of underlying dialectical tension that Mao Tse-tung has in the past tried to maintain in Chinese politics. Did

30 Chou's "Report," loc. cit., p. 21; Chang's "Report," loc. cit., p. 19. The author thanks James Reardon-Anderson for calling his attention to this point. Chang's formula is the more radical one used during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution, while Chou's is the more conservative one employed in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution when an effort was made to reduce the role of the revolutionary masses.

31 Chang's formula is one that is likely to appeal to members of the "military group."

Franz-Josef Strauss, head of West Germany's Christian Social Union party, on January 16, just at the mid-point of the NPC session. Both of Mao's meetings with the foreign visitors took place in Central China, and both received wide publicity in the Chinese media. They signaled to all concerned that Mao was avoiding the Plenum and NPC sessions by choice and not because of ill health. Moreover, none of the documents that emanated from the two sessions gave any explicit indication that Chairman Mao endorsed the proceedings or their results. Finally, Wang Tung-hsing, a full member of the party Politburo and a close associate of Mao's, also was conspicuously absent from both the Plenum and the NPC meeting, although the fact that he was listed among those who presented a wreath at the memorial service for Li Fu-ch'un on January 15" indicated that he had not been purged.

Further evidence tending to corroborate Mao's dissatisfaction has surfaced in the Chinese press since the January Congress, taking the form of prominently featured articles tantamount to only thinly-veiled attacks on many of the decisions taken there. The articles have focused primarily on the related questions of economic development strategy and foreign policy.

One of these articles-authored by Yao Wenyuan, a leading spokesman of the Shanghai group,

32 For the announcements of these meetings, see Peking Review, Vol. 18, Nos. 3 and 4, Jan. 17 and Jan. 24, 1975.

33 See ibid., Vol. 18, No. 5, Jan. 31, 1975, p. 6.

35

and published in Hung Ch'i, the theoretical organ of the party Central Committee"-appeared in connection with a new nationwide campaign, launched soon after the January Congress, to "study the dictatorship of the proletariat" and restrict "bourgeois rights." " In a critique patently aimed at the NPC's endorsement of Chou's economic development development strategy, Yao argued that the continued existence of substantial inequalities based on material incentives could over time corrupt the revolution by encouraging cadres to maintain the status quo rather than try to reduce the "three major differences" between workers and peasants, town and country, and mental and manual labor. He warned:

If we . . . call... for the consolidation, extension, and strengthening of bourgeois rights and that part of inequality it entails, the inevitable result will be polarization . . .and there will be a change in the nature of the system of ownership in certain departments and units which follow the revisionist line;

instances of oppression and exploitation of the laboring people will once again occur.

Yao, however, merely called for more study of the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to prevent this sort of deterioration-a rather mild remedy considering his view of the gravity of the problem."

While Yao and others have concentrated their fire on the potentially harmful effects of the economic strategy advocated by Chou and codified to a degree

in Articles 5, 7, and 9 of the new State Constitution, the related policy of détente with the United States has also undergone scathing criticism. For example, an article from the "Mass Criticism Group of the Military and Political College" asserted that "seeking peace through compromise and concession can only inflate the enemy's reactionary arrogance" and flatly declared that those who advocate such policies are mouthing "out-and-out words of national betrayal and surrender." " Quite obviously, the January meetings had not ended debate on the central foreign policy issue confronting the PRC.

34 Yao Wen-yuan, loc. cit., (fn. 18).

35 For references to this movement in various Chinese provinces, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of China (Washington, DC), Feb. 24, 1975, Section K; Feb. 25, 1975, Section H; Feb. 26, 1975, Section L; Feb. 28, 1975, Section J; and March 4, 1975, Section G.

36 There is evidence that this new campaign is already becoming all things to all people, as occurred with the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. In what was apparently intended to set forth the theoretical bases of the campaign, Jen-min Jih-pao (Feb. 22, 1975) carried a three-page section of quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the problem of bourgeois rights, reprinted in Peking Review, Vol. 18, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1975, pp. 5-12. However, the "message" of these quotations changed from group to group, stressing at different times (1) the importance of firm party dictatorship in order to restrict bourgeois rights; (2) the necessarily prolonged existence of bourgeois rights and the consequent importance of dealing with the problem patiently and gradually; and (3) the need to struggle against bourgeois rights due to the magnitude of the danger they entail. A military viewpoint was voiced by the "commanders and fighters of an anti-chemical warfare unit stationed in Chekiang," who stressed that "the People's Liberation Army... has great responsibility in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see ibid., Vol. 18, No. 6, Feb. 7, 1975, p. 7).

37 Ibid., Vol. 18, No. 8, Feb. 21, 1975, p. 7.

Yao Wen-yuan, a leading spokesman for the Shanghai group.

-John Burns/Toronto Globe and Mail.

making process, then, now resemble the "two headquarters" model of the period 1965 through early 1966? The answer is probably not that simple.

In an autumn 1974 talk with cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mao purportedly complained of being overwhelmed with questions of detail, indicating that he would further restrict his activities and deal only with major issues of principle; and Chou, who was also present, reportedly interjected that he, too, would pull back from detailed administrative work." These remarks were consistent both with Mao's prolonged stay in Central China and with Chou's even longer sojourn in a Peking hospital. In recent months, Teng Hsiao-p'ing has clearly assumed the type of day-to-day responsibilities that Chou formerly shouldered.

The fact that Chou has now largely removed himself from everyday policymaking in favor of dealing with more fundamental issues means that the Premier may now have assumed a role more nearly akin, de facto, to that which Mao has traditionally occupied. Although the major outlines of most of Chou's policies as enunciated at the NPC undoubtedly enjoy Mao's backing, the Chairman probably remains more concerned than Premier Chou about their possible social and political consequences. With both men anticipating their succession," moreover, each may be trying in subtle ways to nudge Chinese politics in the direction he believes desirable. Mao may, therefore, be encouraging the Shanghai group to voice its concerns over the policies of the Peking group.

Viewed in this perspective, the January meetings and the Shanghai group's response through the media may well demonstrate the types of leverage that the contending forces can exercise in the current Chinese political milieu. The Peking group under Chou has now secured a firm grip on the party and government apparatus, except for the organs concerned with culture." The Shanghai group retains access to the Chinese media and with Mao Tse-tung's backing-can stir up political campaigns that run counter to the policy interests of the Peking group.

What of the third major group-the military? It is readily understandable that under the present political circumstances neither the Shanghai nor the Peking group seems willing to act decisively to remove the military from politics, for fear of driving

38 Issues and Studies (Taipei), February 1975, p. 92.

39 In light of the January developments, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao appear to have emerged as the front-running contenders for the succession, with Teng occupying a superior position in all three of China's official hierarchies. It is tempting-but probably inaccurate to view Teng as Chou's "nominee" for the succession and Chang as Mao's favorite. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, Chang and Chou did voice conflicting views on basic policy problems at the NPC, and it seems likely that Teng represents Chou's preferred choice, while Mao may be insisting that Teng and Chang share power so as to achieve the mix of policies the Chairman desires.

40 Given the importance of cultural policy from the viewpoint of the Shanghai group, it is striking that the NPC virtually ignored this entire sphere. The omission may indicate that the "Shanghai group" will continue to control policy in the cultural area, although the

Airport in May 1975. Accompanying Mr. Teng is French Premier Jacques Chirac and, to the rear, General Jean Favreau, Military Governor of Paris.

somewhat equivocal in this regard. Yü Hui-yung, who seems to lean toward the "Shanghai group," was named to the post of Minister of Culture, but at the same time Chou Jung-hsin, a close associate of Chou En-lai, was given the Education Ministry, which remains critically important for training the specialists required to realize Chou's economic plans.

-Keystone.

the PLA into the arms of its opponents in a succession struggle that can start at any moment. This common feeling among the leaders of both civilian groups that each may in the future need military support seems likely to guarantee that the PLA will remain a major potential force in Chinese politics. Finally, during the succession, all these complex

considerations of factional power will most probably make it still more difficult to resolve the substantive disagreements that continue to exist beneath the surface of Chinese politics over how best to deal with the pressing problems that the PRC faces in the realms of economic development, foreign policy, and the composition of the organs of leadership.

By Chun-tu Hsueh

T

he new Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) adopted by the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) on January 17, 1975,' is reflective of the vast transformations that occurred in China's politics, economy, and culture over the intervening 20-odd years since the adoption of the Constitution of 1954. The new document mirrors important changes in the socioeconomic bases of the Chinese political superstructure as well as ongoing conflicts over basic policy issues within the nation's leadership. While "legitimizing" various institutional innovations and "new thngs" created during the Cultural Revolution, the new Constitution formally reestablishes many of the political and administrative structures that were shattered by that upheaval, and it explicitly affirms the principle of centralized and direct party rule. over the government and the armed forces. Finally, looked at in conjunction with various important political and military appointments shortly before and after the convocation of the NPC, it provides some clues to the framework for Chairman Mao Tse-tung's succession. The present article attempts

Mr. Hsüeh is Professor of Politics at the University of Maryland (College Park) and Chairman of the Washington and Southeast Regional Seminar on China. He is author of Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, 1961, and editor and coauthor of Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China, 1971.

to analyze the new Constitution with a view to determining what insights it affords into the political process in China and institutional perspectives affecting the resolution of policy conflicts in the PRC today.

Western observers sometimes tend to dismiss the constitutions of Communist states as meaningless because of the discrepancies between what the late scholar of Soviet affairs, Merle Fainsod, called "constitutional myth and political realities." While it is true that some constitutional provisions under Communist rule have often been ignored or violated, the same may also be said of politics in non-Communist states. It is, in fact, too simplistic to consider the Communist constitutions as camouflage for oppressive rule. The new Chinese Constitution performs some functions which are common to constitutions everywhere. It legalizes the existing social order and makes explicit its ideological principles; it establishes a framework of government and administration; it regulates social and institutional behavior; and it enumerates Chinese goals and aspirations. It is "confirmatory" as well as "programmatic," and "normative" rather

1 For the official English text of the Constitution, see Peking Review (Peking), Jan. 24, 1975, pp. 12-17. The Chinese text and other related NPC documents may be found in Hung Ch'i (Peking), No. 2, 1975, pp. 5-41.

2 Chapter 11 of Fainsod's How Russia Is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, bears this title.

3

than "nominal" or "semantic." It is also a "flexible" constitution in the sense that it requires no special procedure for its amendment. Finally, though similar to the "parliamentary-executive" type of constitution, it rejects the concept of separation of powers.

There are marked differences between the new Chinese Constitution and the old. In part, these stem from the different circumstances under which the two were adopted. In the period from the establishment of Communist rule in October 1949 until enactment of the PRC's first Constitution in 1954, two documents served as a sort of provisional con

3 "Confirmatory" because it legitimizes existing political arrangements, and "programmatic" because it sets forth certain aims for the future. A "nominal" or "semantic" constitution would be one which merely expresses "a far-from-realized ideal or seeks to camouflage the actual situation" rather than fixing norms based on realities. For a discussion of the classification of constitutions, see Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Ed., Constitutions of Modern States: Selected Texts and Commentary, New York, Praeger, 1968, Introduction.

-Keystone.

stitution the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. In those years, the Peking leaders consolidated their power, carried out land reform, and moved to rehabilitate the national economy, thereby preparing the necessary preconditions for establishing a planned economy and beginning the gradual transition to a socialist society. The 1954 Constitution set down in legal form the central tasks of the country in that period of transition, and the nationwide preparation and discussion which led up to its adoption by the First NPC were earnestly reported.*

4 For the background of and discussions on the 1954 Constitution, see Arthur Steiner, "Constitutionalism in Communist China," The American Political Science Review (Washington, DC), March 1955, pp. 1-21, and Franklin W. Houn, "Communist China's New Constitution," The Western Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City, Utah), June 1955, pp. 199-233.