Communists have always played down the collectivist elements of their own faith: nevertheless, recognizing that most of the country's economic activities originally began as branches of Danish state monopolies, long before the advent of an organized labor movement, and that broad sectors of the population seem to take state ownership for granted, they have pushed for state ownership of much of industry and of other major economic ventures. The Communists have also sought consistently to validate their nationalist credentials, and they have acquired a reputation as one of the most nationalistic political forces in the country.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Icelandic Communists' approach, however, has been a willingness to participate in coalitions with other parties. From its very inception in 1930, the Icelandic party has followed this course. In 1938, it even reorganized to include the left wing of the Social Democrats, adopting the name of the United People's Party-Socialist Party (Sameiningarflok

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kur altydu-Sosialistaflokkurin, or SA-SF). Though the SA-SF was dissolved in 1968, another party consisting of several groups but with the Communists as the dominant force was formed. This group took the name the People's Alliance (Altydubandalagid, or AB).45

In sharp contrast to the Danish and Norwegian Communist parties, the various Communist-dominated alliances in Iceland have substantial political accomplishments to their credit. During the 1944-47 and the 1956-58 periods, the SA-SF participated in national coalition governments. In the two parliamentary elections of 1963 and 1967, it received 16.0 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively, of the total vote and won 8 seats and 10 seats, respectively, in the 60-member parliament. The new coalition party, the AB, polled slightly more than 17 percent of the total vote in the 1971 parliamentary election, and in that year it entered into a coalition

45 Thjodviljinn (Reykjavik), Nov. 5, 1968.

government with the Progressive Party and the Organization of Liberals and Leftists (Samtok Frjalslindra og Vinstra Manna, or SFVM). The SFVM, incidentally, had split off from the former SA-SF in 1968, prompting the reorganization of the SA-SF as the AB.)"

Not only have the various Communist-led coalitions won considerable electoral support, but they have also done well on other fronts. For example, they have enjoyed a stable membership of 1,0001,500 card-carrying members out of a total national population of about 200,000. Communist influence in the 35,000-man-strong trade union federation (Altydusamband Islands or ASI) was predominant until 1968. That year, Hannibal Valdimarsson, a nonCommunist left-winger, captured control of the ASI and established his own party, the SFVM. However, the Icelandic Communists still have a good deal more influence in their local unions than any other Nordic Communist party except the Finnish party.""

No less important, the SA-SF and the AB have maintained a firm grip on the left-wing ideological movements. Consequently, political fragmentation on the left-so much a factor in Norway and Denmark-has been minimal in Iceland. Aside from the AB, the Left consists of the SFVM (already mentioned), a small pro-Soviet faction called the Organization of Icelandic Socialists (Barattusamtok Sosialista, or BS), and a recently-surfaced group with Maoist views known as the Communist Organization of Marxists-Leninists.48

Reasons for Successes

The explanation for these appreciable achievements is complex, but one can single out several key factors. First, the SA-SF and the AB have been pretty much in the mainstream of the political life of their country rather than on the fringes of it. For example, the Icelandic Communists have staked out a strong nationalistic position on a variety of issues of broad popular concern, such as the territorial fishing limit, the reduction of foreign bases on the islands, and the need to preserve Icelandic culture in the face of "Americanization" and the spread of other alien cultural phenomena. The

46 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1973, p. 184. 47 For a discussion of the Finnish party, see Hodgson, "Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics," loc. cit.

48 Visir (Reykjavik), Aug. 9, 1972.

Ludvik Josefsson, Member of the People's Alliance and Iceland's Minister of Fisheries, at a July 17, 1972, press conference announcing the breakdown of Anglo-Icelandic talks concerning his country's extension of territorial fishing limits to 50 miles.

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stances of the SA-SF and the AB on these questions have been at least as nationalistic as the views expressed by any of the "bourgeois" parties." Indeed, the Communists have some basis for referring to themselves as "the real nationalists" in the country, though they at the same time derive an added plus from their emphasis on the need for greater economic equality and social justice. In short, there is no widespread feeling in Iceland as there has been in Norway and Denmark during most of the postwar period with respect to the NKP and the DKP-that the local Communists are in any way alien elements.

Second, the combination of the continuing presence of cleavages within Iceland's socioeconomic structure and of a highly nationalistic culture has

49 This is especially clear in the case of the so-called "cod war" with Great Britain (over the limit of territorial seas and British fishing rights). The Icelandic Communists have been the most adamant proponents of a 50-mile limit, without concessions. For a discussion of this controversy, see the statement by the Icelandic Prime Minister, Olafur Johannesson, to the Nordic Council on Feb. 17, 1973, as reported in Arbeiderbladet, Feb. 19, 1973.

enhanced the potential appeal of a nationalistic party with a radical bent. The Communist leaders, in turn, have shown themselves excedingly sensitive to this combination of considerations by tailoring their policies to take account of both of them.

Third-and directly related to the two previous factors the SA-SF and the AB have stayed at arms length from the international Communist movement. In fact, perhaps no other Communist party in Western Europe has maintained such an isolationist position as the AB. It has not participated officially in international Communist conferences at either the global or the regional level, and on the few occasions that Icelandic "observers" have shown up at such meetings, the party leadership has later had to proffer extensive justifications not only to the rank and file but even to some of the party leaders.50 Furthermore, the SA-SF and AB have consistently stressed the "national road" and have dismissed the idea of one center of international communism as intrinsically absurd."1

Prospects

Having surveyed the differing fortunes of the Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic parties in recent years and the reasons for these differences, let us briefly summarize the implications of our analysis for the future of the individual parties.

no means dead or dying in the Nordic countries. Norway and Denmark have both experienced a significant rise in radical activity in recent years, and left-of-center forces continue to control a substantial portion of the electorate and the organized political party membership in Iceland.

Yet the health of the Communist parties in the three countries varies considerably. In Iceland, the local party has put together a combination of nationalism, radicalism, and unconcern over external debates (which the man-in-the-street regards as esoteric and of no importance) that augurs well for its ability to continue to play a prominent role on the local political scene. Perhaps the irony of the situation lies in the fact that this unique and strong left-wing movement maintains only a marginal relationship to the world Communist movement.

In Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, the prospects of the NKP and DKP appear dim. Both parties represent a peculiar form of conservatism. They persist in arguing for policies which other leftwingers have dismissed as "state capitalism." It is as if they are suspended between radicalism and revisionism, incapable of firmly and effectively embracing either. This situation ensures continued isolation. Moreover, even if the parties enter into organizational cooperation with others, their weakness seems to make amalgamation the most likely outcome of such a course.

It is true that many of the ideas that the two

50 An example of this isolationism is the resolution passed by the AB in October 1968 condemning existing contacts with the Soviet Union and many of the socialist states of Eastern Europe, and forbidding any association by AB members with those countries which had occupied Czechoslovakia. See Morgunbladid (Reykjavik), Oct. 8, 1968.

51 See, e.g., Thjodviljinn, Aug. 17, 1972. This article criticized not only events in Czechoslovakia in the post-1968 period but also developments in the Soviet Union and the split in the international Communist movement.

may have a brighter future. To be specific, some of their platforms may yet become important elements of political life in their respective countries if these models of welfare-state systems move, as appears to be happening, into an era of political instability, fragmentation, and polarization. Nonetheless, there are likely to be precious few card-carrying Communists around to enjoy such a development.

By John N. Hazard

RICHARD J. ERICKSON:

International Law and the

sea and again at the Geneva conference during the spring of 1975

SHAO-CHUAN LENG and

HUNGDAH CHIU: Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. JEROME ALAN COHEN and HUNGDAH CHIU: People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study. 2 Vols. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1974. MILAN ŠAHOVIĆ, Ed.: Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation. Belgrade, Institute of International Politics and Economics, and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. G. I. TUNKIN: Theory of International Law. Translation and Introduction by William E. Butler. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974.

THE COINCIDENCE of Soviet and US proposals at the 1974 Caracas conference on the law of the

likelihood of a convergence of the positions of the two great powers --and, by extension, of Marxist and Western states-regarding the role of international law. The argument goes that as the Soviet Union has grown in stability at home and prestige abroad, it has become a power favoring preservation of the status quo, and hence one for whom international law as a means of preserving the status quo-has become a useful instrument instrument of foreign policy. The USSR, no less than the United States, wants its naval vessels to traverse narrow straits without hindrance, and its fishing and merchant fleets to sail the high seas as freely as their counterparts under foreign flags.

Moscow's stance at Caracas and Geneva is but another example of an ever-evolving Soviet position. It is a long time since the earliest Soviet leaders denounced international law as a weapon of the bourgeoisie. Since the USSR entered the League of Nations in 1934, utilization of international law rather than its denunciation has become Soviet policy. By its entrance into the

United Nations as a charter member after World War II, the Soviet Union demonstrated that international law had become a major instrument of its policy, and it has expanded the training of skilled lawyers to participate in international diplomacy and international trade.

This development has naturally attracted the attention of scholars in both the Marxist and non-Marxist worlds. Marxist authors attempt to define current Soviet policy and to place it within a framework which will continue to attract the support of leaders in the Third World. Non-Marxist authors attempt to assess the writings and actions of Marxists to determine to what extent the disrupting influence of the Communists noted during the early years has faded from the scene.

The books under review fall within these parameters. The Soviet and Yugoslav authors attempt to explain what they mean by espousing a law of peaceful coexistence as general international law. The non-Marxists attempt to evaluate the practice of the USSR and the People's Republic of China to determine whether it shows sufficient stability of policy and acceptance of longstanding

international legal principles to merit including such states among those which can be expected to adhere more often than not to traditional legal norms.

Of course, all of the authors are sophisticated enough to recognize that no state, whether Marxist or non-Marxist in orientation, considers itself bound in every detail by what is called international law. Indeed, much of international legal doctrine has been in dispute during recent decades as the West European states which were its original formulators have lost their worldwide hegemony. Today, it is the bold author who claims to know with certainty just what norms constitute international law.

Every legal specialist also knows that statesmen of every country from time to time ignore the rules that are called law when they think national survival is threatened and sometimes they ignore the rules when much less than survival is at stake. In short, international law is often regarded by world leaders as no more than an instrument of politics. Cynics claim that foreign ministers say to their legal advisers, "Tell me not what I cannot do, but how I can do what I want to do and maintain the image of one who is acting within the law." To the informed analyst, the existence in fact of a violation of international law is frequently self-evident. Such being the case, the decisive question in assessing conformance to international law is not whether a certain state is in violation of the law, but how often this occurs and how serious the violations are.

Students of power politics often suggest that rules of international law are recognized and respected primarily when practice requires such recognition in order to make international intercourse possible.

Thus, foreign diplomats must be protected in their activities if one's own diplomats abroad are not to be harassed, insulted, kidnaped, and murdered. Citizens of foreign states must be accorded fair trial if one's own citizens abroad are to receive similar protection from host states. The property of foreigners must be respected if further investments of funds are to be sought successfully from capital-rich nations. Brief consideration of these facts indicates that national self-interest becomes a major sanction of international law so long as states feel interdependent. The golden rule must be observed unless a state is so isolated as to have no interests abroad to protect.

IN PROBING the degree of Soviet conformity to international legal norms, Richard J. Erickson focuses particularly on the area of customary international law, because it is here that Soviet authors have been most inclined to accept or reject established Western

Reviewers in This Issue

JOHN N. HAZARD -Professor of Public Law, Columbia University (New York); author of Communists and Their Law, 1969, and other works.

HARRY ROSITZKE-retired veteran of 27 years with the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency; author of The USSR Today, 1973, and numerous articles on intelligence matters.

ALFRED ERICH SENN-Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin (Madison); author of The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, 1914-1917, 1971, a study of Tsarist political émigrés in Switzerland during World War I.

norms as Soviet circumstances have dictated. The author points out that for decades Soviet diplomats have questioned custom as a desirable source of law because they viewed its evolution as closely tied to private enterprise and colonialism: they have tended to see custom as something tarred with a capitalist and imperialist brush. To protect themselves against what has seemed to be a hostile world, Soviet legal scholars have argued instead that the primary source of international law is the treaty, since it represents a conscious effort to reach a meeting of the minds and to create law. A state that signs a treaty indicates its conclusion that the law embodied in the treaty is beneficial to the signatory's interests.

Despite these Soviet predilections, Erickson's studies lead him to conclude that in the main Soviet international policy today relies heavily on established custom in its implementation. He feels that Western diplomats and

ROLAND SCHÖNFELD_head of the export-import division of a family business in Regensburg, German Federal Republic; lecturer and author on economic history and foreign trade policy, with contributions appearing in Osteuropa, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, and Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.

STEPHEN R. SACKS-Assistant Professor of Economics, The University of Connecticut (Storrs); author of Entry of New Competitors in Yugoslav Market Socialism, 1973.

K. C. YEH Senior Economist, The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California); coauthor of Economy of the Chinese Mainland, 1965, and contributor to The American Economic Review.