of Communism MAY-JUNE 1975 VOL. XXIV Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors (as well as geographical boundaries and names used in articles and illustrations) do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Communications on all matters except subscriptions should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547. SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of Problems of Communism may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Price per copy: $1.60. Subscription price: $9.35. 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INDEXING: Articles in Problems of Communism are indexed, inter alia, in the Social Sciences and Humanities Index, the Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all sections), ABC POL SCI, and Iternational Political Science Abstracts. EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr. MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, China in 1975 EDITORS' NOTE: Early 1975 brought some major developments in the People's Republic of China. For the first time in nearly a year and a half, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee met in plenary session, and shortly thereafter the first National People's Congress since 1965 took place. This Congress approved a new State Constitution to replace that of 1954. The following two articles explore the meaning of these events and their aftermath. Mr. Lieberthal looks at the implications of what occurred for the internal political situation in China, and Mr. Hsueh analyzes the character of the new Constitution. The Internal Political Scene By Kenneth Lieberthal n January 1975, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership gathered in Peking for the first plenary session of the party Central Committee in 16 months, and a few days later the first National People's Congress (NPC) to be convened in a decade opened a five-day session in the Chinese capital. These meetings signified that the leadership in Peking had achieved somewhat greater unity than had characterized Chinese politics throughout 1974, a year of tension highlighted by the campaign to criticize the late Lin Piao, once Mao Tse-tung's designated successor, and the Chinese philosophersage, Confucius. Fundamental issues, however, still divide the Chinese leadership-issues centering on the strategy Mr. Lieberthal has recently become Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) after teaching for four years at Swarthmore College. He is author of the forthcoming Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in the People's Republic of China, 19491975. of economic development for the last quarter of this century, the foreign policy most likely to ensure China's security, and the composition of the governing organs themselves. Given the importance of these problems, it is not surprising that evidence of friction surfaced even during what was trumpeted as the "Congress of unity [and] . . . victory." A quiet issue, moreover, continues to lurk behind the scenes of Peking politics-the question of the intentions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the post-Mao era and the measures the leadership should take to limit the chances of Bonapartism in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao has sought to maintain competition among the different civilian groups in the governing apparatus, and it appears that this tension may now be limiting the capacity of the party to act decisively to subordinate the military as a force in Chinese politics during the coming years. 1 The Second Plenum convened on January 8-10, 1975, and the NPC met January 13-17, 1975. 2 Designation used in the press communiqué of the NPC. See Peking Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 7. To place the January meetings of the CC Plenum and NPC in perspective and facilitate analysis of their import for the near-term future of Chinese politics, therefore, we must first examine the prior evolution of party-military relations in the PRC and of the major economic, foreign policy, and governmental-organization issues facing the Peking leader ship. The Background Party-military relations have remained a thorny issue in China in recent years. The CCP's military path to power left as its legacy a greater proclivity to utilize the army in civilian political and economic tasks than has characterized any other Communist country. The actual degree of military involvement in civilian responsibilities has changed over time: it was high in the early 1950's, low in the mid1950's, and increasing during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Cultural Revolution of 1965-69, however, created an unprecedented situation when the military, in the wake of the destruction of the party apparatus, literally assumed administrative control over the entire society. The Party Constitution' adopted by the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969 designated Lin Piao, China's Minister of Defense, as Mao Tse-tung's successor at the same time that it reaffirmed the principle of party control over the army. Thus, the party rules actually reflected the major contradiction inherent in Chinese politics at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Tension over the issue of military versus civilian rule has saturated Chinese political life ever since. The leadership's subsequent efforts to redress the civilian-military balance have given increased importance to two related questions: Who should assume the power given up by the military as it withdraws from politics? And how far should the party go in taking punitive measures against those military leaders who have opposed the reestablishment of civilian rule? Four major known events have punctuated the process of reasserting civilian control since the Ninth Congress. First, at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in August-September 1970, Lin Piao attempted to consolidate his position and increase his future leverage over such civilian political leaders as Chou En-lai, but he immediately 3 Text in ibid., Vol. 12, No. 18, April 30, 1969, pp. 36-39. encountered strong opposition from Mao. Second, in August 1971 Mao toured the provinces and indicated in his talks with provincial leaders that he planned to confront Lin and force him to step down. Anticipating this, Lin planned a decisive move to reverse the situation (purportedly, an assassination attempt against Mao), but the plan failed, resulting in Lin's flight and death in a plane crash in Mongolia in early September. The whole incident touched off a purge of high-level military commanders with close ties to Lin. Third, the Tenth Congress of the CCP in August 1973 formally revised the Party Constitution, omitting the designation of Lin as Mao's successor and reaffirming the primacy of the party over the military. Fourth and last, in January 1974 China's eight most important regional military commanders were ordered to relinquish their posts, which in most cases they had occupied for years, and to assume command of other military regions, taking only a few personal aides with them. Besides their military posts, many of these commanders had held important political positions in their former regions, but none was appointed to a similar position in his new location. In short, the 1969-74 period witnessed an uneven and in some instances violent process aimed at reestablishing civilian control. By the eve of the January 1975 National People's Congress, progress toward this objective had been substantial, but China still remained without a Minister of Defense, a PLA Chief of Staff, or a head of the PLA General Political Department. The January meetings of the party Central Committee and the NPC thus came at a time when a further step in the consolidation of civilian power could be expected. In the economic sphere, the critical issue facing the Chinese leadership has been the question of the best strategy for achieving maximum efficiency in the utilization of the country's scarce resources. Considerable importance also attaches to the social and political implications of any strategy adopted. * On these events, see Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," China Quarterly (London), No. 55, July-September 1973, pp. 427-49; Michael Y. M. Kau, The Lin Piao Affair, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975, pp. xix-lxxvii and 55-123; Edward Rice, Mao's Way, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1974, pp. 499-513; and Harry Harding, "Political Trends in China Since the Cultural Revolution," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), Vol. 402, July 1972, pp. 67-82. 5 See the text of the revised Party Constitution in Peking Review, Vol. 16, No. 35-36, Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 26-29. 6 Curiously, the shift involved an exchange of regional commands between four pairs of military commanders, a pattern whose rationale and significance remain a mystery. |