ogy into large communes, discouraged the use of any but the Han language, and in the name of efficiency dictated a negative attitude toward even the more trivial manifestations of ethnic differences such as hairstyle and details of costume.' At the same time, class struggle, heretofore muted, was introduced in an extreme form. The gradualist, pluralistic policy which had characterized the early years of Communist rule was replaced by one of radical assimilationism.

The economic shortages and social disruption unleashed by the Great Leap Forward were much the same in the minority and the Han areas of China, but there was a salient difference. In the minority areas, the Great Leap policies and their consequences were perceived as having been imposed by a nonindigenous group bent on assimilation and acting in direct contravention of its own past promises. Minor revolts occurred in Hui and Yi areas, while major ones erupted in Tibet and Sinkiang. The latter two were particularly serious in that they resulted in the emigration of thousands of persons, including the Dalai Lama himself, out of China. Many of these refugees relocated to the border regions of an increasingly anti-Chinese India and of the Soviet Union, creating a threat of potentially dangerous proportions."

The upper echelons of the party soon realized the serious consequences of the abrupt change in policy, and many aspects of the Great Leap which

minorities had found most objectionable were rescinded. It was decided, for example, that "mechanical application of the methods used in other parts of China, neglect of nationalities' special characteristics, and neglect of historical nationality barriers will all lead to disputes among the nationalities," and that "exclusive emphasis on class struggle" was to cease. Minority customs were not to be reformed except by the minorities themselves, and the upper strata of the minority nationalities were promised "a bright future." 10 The reorganization of the com

7 See, for example, Wang Kuo-hsuan, "Fraternal Nationalities of Hunan Province and Elsewhere Vigorously Abolish Decadent Customs," MTTC, No. 7, 1958, pp. 8-10.

8 According to some sources, the US Cental Intelligence Agency had contacts with the Tibetan émigré community in India and provided aid that enabled the refugees to carry out guerrilla raids into Tibet (see Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, New York, Dell, 1973, pp. 130-31). The Soviet Union has employed Uighur and Kazakh refugees from Sinking in its propaganda denunciations of China (see e.g., "Interview with Balkhash Bafin" in Sotsialistik Kazakhstan [Alma Ata] Sept. 27, 1963, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service [JPRS], Communist China Series, No. 21,735; and "Interview with Former Sinkiang Culture Minister," Kurier [Vienna] May 8, 1967, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], Daily Report, Far East, May 12, 1967). It has also been alleged, quite plausibly, that the Soviet Union has used some of these refugees in more covert anti-Chinese activities.

9 Yuan Po, "Seriously Carry Out Socialist-Communist Propaganda Education in Cultural Work Among the Nationalities," Yunnan Jih-pao (Kunming), Dec. 24, 1958, trans. in Survey of Mainland China Press (SCMP—Hong Kong), No. 1982, p. 22.

10 Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), June 14, 1959.

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munes in 1959 permitted the reseparation of ethnic groups which had been merged together with others in some communal units, and in some areas, such as Szechwan and Yunnan, certain communes were disbanded completely, with the inhabitants returning to lower-level cooperative agricultural units.

While the concessions did not amount to a complete return to the minority policy of the early 1950's, the resultant policy was closer to the gradual, pluralistic approach of that period than it was to the radical assimilationist position of the Great Leap interlude. Apparently the party leadership was divided over the policy shift, with some opposing it as a regressive step holding up China's progress toward a common proletarian culture, but at least in 1959 a majority of the leadership seems to have agreed that the pace of reform in minority areas would have to be slowed down."1

That those who opposed retreat acquiesced in the decision to progress more slowly toward homogeneity did not at all mean that they had surrendered to the status quo. This became evident during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution when the radical assimilationists leveled charges of backsliding against party leaders who had been associated with undoing the Great Leap reforms. Many of the latter were now purged. Prominent among the allegations made against Li Ching-ch'uan, formerly First Secretary of the Southwest Party Bureau, and Yen Hungyen, previously First Secretary of the Yunnan province party organization, was the charge that they had actively sought the disbandment of communes in minority areas and had cooperated with the traditional upper strata of minority groups. Ulanfu, First

12

11 The split within the party elite over policy in the aftermath of the Great Leap did not become public knowledge until the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. According to revelations made then, the First Secretary of the CCP's Southwest Bureau, for example, had refused in 1959 to transmit a letter of instruction from Mao Tse-tung intended for minority areas because he was afraid it might "create sideeffects." Later, when obliged to forward the letter, he appended the comment that "people should treat Chairman Mao's instructions from an objective point of view." This official was said to have complained that setting up communes in minority areas amounted to allowing babies to play with fire, and when the deficiencies of the Great Leap became apparent, he allegedly took it upon himself to compensate upper-class persons for property confiscated from them during communization, even in cases where they had participated in rebellious action (see Tien Pao, loc. cit.). Similarly, Ulanfu was accused of having opposed Mao's views on class struggle by "arbitrarily quoting" the Chairman as saying that "the heart of the nationalities problem is unity as well as the development of production" (see Inner Mongolian Red Guard newspaper Kung-jen chan-pao [Huhehot], n.d., trans. in JPRS, Communist China Series, No. 42,933, Oct. 12, 1967.

12 T'ien Pao, loc. cit.

Ulanfu, prominent leader of Mongolian nationality, in the mid-1960's, when he was Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission of the People's Republic of China. Purged in the Cultural Revolution, he has since been rehabilitated and frequently appears at state ceremonies.

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Secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and himself a Mongol, was accused of similar offenses and also of having encouraged study of the Mongolian language and cultural heritage, thus promoting "national splittism" and impeding the development of unity among all nationalities." In the Yenpien Korean Autonomous Chou," Chu Te-hai was also purged as a "national splittist." As a result of the charges and purge action against him, Yen Hung-yen committed suicide, and many other heretofore prestigious persons associated with minority

13 JPRS, Communist China Series, No. 42, 933.

14 A chou is the administrative level intermediate between county and province. In the present context, it is usually translated as "district."

policy underwent humilitating public accusation sessions and physical abuse.

In fact, what was involved in all this was far more than a disagreement over the conduct of ethnic minority policies. The entire concept of the united front came under attack, with the radicals criticizing even the 1956 party constitution on the ground that it undermined ethnic unity. In particular, they objected to the clauses that called for respect of the special characteristics of minority nationalities and for the implementation of social reforms in accordance with the wishes of the minority groups themselves, even when those wishes ran counter to the intentions of the party leadership and the requirements of socialist revolution. By emphasizing ethnic nationalism to the exclusion of national patriotism and internationalism, the party constitution had promoted national schism, the radicals charged, and they advocated a new party constitution based on Mao Tse-tung's statement that "national struggle is in the final analysis a question of class struggle." "5 Because he had defended the united front concept, even CCP Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing was accused of "capitulationism" and of "consistently filling the role of faithful representative within the party of the imperialists and their running dogs, the feudal serf-owners." 16 Red Guard groups vigorously advocated destruction of the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits) and the reintroduction of class struggle in the minority areas.

15

But while the Cultural Revolution, insofar as it bore on policy toward ethnic minorities, clearly represented an attack by radical assimilationists on gradualist, pluralistic positions, its outcome fell far short of the assimilationists' desires. Whether this was because Lin Piao, who emerged as the apparent chief victor in the Cultural Revolution, was less radical than some of his followers, or because Lin's own radical views were restrained by circumstances or by countervailing forces, is unclear. In any case, factional struggle was halted several times when it threatened to jeopardize security in border areas," and attacks on prominent minority leaders were also

15 Wen-ko feng-yun (Canton), No. 2 (February 1968, trans. in SCMP, No. 4151, p. 3.

16 Chih-tien chiang-shan (Canton), Oct. 27, 1967, trans. in SCMP, No. 4086, pp. 6, 10.

17 Tibet was a case in point. See "Important Instructions of Premier Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Other Leaders on the Question of Tibet," June 6, 1968, as reprinted in Canton Red Guard newspaper San-szu Chan-chi; trans. in Survey of China Mainland Magazines (SCMM-Hong Kong), No. 622, p. 2.

stopped on several occasions. Chou En-lai's role in curbing such attacks lends credence to his image as a moderate.1o

In fact, the Cultural Revolution produced a mixed bag of results as far as the confrontation between. the radical and gradualist viewpoints was concerned. Many persons associated with gradualist policies and many of the minority leaders who had been coopted into the united front many years before were purged, but others such as Chang Kuo-hua, who as both military commander and top party leader in Tibet had been associated with moderate reforms and cooperation with the native Tibetan upper strata, survived in good standing. So did Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the Tibetan noble whose army had been defeated by the PLA in 1950, and there were similar examples in other minority areas. Moreover, the united front soon reappeared, albeit in truncated form.

The new party constitution passed by the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969 mentioned minorities only once, declaring that the party must lead all China's nationalities in carrying out class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experimentation, and the struggle to consolidate and strengthen proletarian dictatorship." Though some of the minority figures who were newly elevated to Central Committee membership wore traditional costumes, they were carefully portrayed as having adopted Han-Chinese Communist norms: Paojihletai, for example, was described as a Mongol herdswoman who had dared to refute the class enemies' slander that grain could not be planted in grazing areas, and Ta Lo, a Ch'inghai Tibetan, was pictured as a former serf who had welcomed the opportunity the party had given him to attend veterinary school. While the exact processes of political decisionmaking in the People's Republic continue to elude outside analysts, it seems probable that these minority newcomers are token representatives rather than possessors of genuine political influence.

During the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the minorities' presence in China was low-key, and in general they were treated as Han by any other name. Where problems existed,

18 After Red Guards had ransacked the home of Saifudin, Uighur governor of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Chou reportedly issued a directive on May 2, 1968, forbidding further acts of this nature. See Hung-ch'i t'ung-hsun (Chiangmen), No. 14, May 26, 1968, trans in SCMP, No. 4201, p. 16.

19 For an English translation of the party constitution, see Peking Review, April 30, 1969, pp. 36-39.

collective study of the Thought of Mao was perceived as the solution; Lin Piao was much praised. Communes were reinstituted in minority areas where they had been disbanded, and they were established for the first time in Tibet. On the rare occasions when ethnic characteristics were mentioned at all, it was in the context of denouncing Liu Shao-ch'i for allegedly having encouraged the preservation of these characteristics.

Radio broadcasts in minority languages amounted to only a fraction of what had been offered prior to the Cultural Revolution, and even the broadcasts in Mandarin contained little information explicitly about ethnic groups and their members. With regard to the general attitude expected of minorities, a story published in the central party daily in February 1970 was revealing. It told of Aunty Jenchin, an elderly Mongol who had been a beggar prior to

liberation. She was sent to Peking for medical treatment, and while she was en route through the city to the hospital, she had Chairman Mao's residence pointed out to her. After completing her treatment, she refused to take a car and "doggedly walked❞ the several miles to Mao's home. There she seated herself reverentially in front of the gate and, chanting in Chinese, repeatedly wished Chairman Mao a long, long life.20

Weighing all these sometimes conflicting evidences, one is led to conclude that the results of the Cultural Revolution did, on balance, represent a victory for the radical assimilationist position with respect to minority policy. However, this was not to be the last swing of the policy pendulum.

Back Toward Gradualism

Indications of still another shift in policy vis-à-vis China's ethnic minorities began to appear in mid1971 and became especially strong after the purge of Lin Piao and many of those who had been associated with him. Eventually this new shift encompassed encouragement of the use of minority languages, a more positive view of the minorities' special characteristics, including their religious beliefs, and a drive to recruit more members of minority groups into party and government institutions. Changes in leadership preceded these changes in policy, with three of the five autonomous regionsInner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang-being placed under new party heads. Two of the three party first secretaries who were replaced had had close connections with Lin Piao." The Ninghsia Hui and Kwangsi Chuang autonomous regions retained their previous leaders.

Though the precise linkages between leadership changes and changes in minority policy cannot be clearly documented, it is a fact that evidences of a distinct shift in policy followed in the wake of the personnel changes in minority areas during the latter half of 1971 and in 1972. In Tibet, for example, a vigorous purge which had been under way in the spring of 1971 to eliminate those accused of "sabotaging the unity of nationalities and using religious superstitions in a vain attempt to restore the feudal serf system" "2 was brought to an abrupt end.

22

20 Jen-min Jih-pao, Feb. 8, 1970. Emphasis added.

21 Those replaced were Lung Shu-chin in Sinkiang and Tseng Yung-ya in Tibet. Current Scene, (Hong Kong), Sept. 7, 1971, p. 14. 22 Lhasa Radio report, April 20, 1971.

The trend back toward moderation continued in 1972, with the party undertaking repairs to monasteries and other historic buildings and easing restrictions on Tibetan religious practices and cultural activities. In July 1972, Lhasa Radio began referring to the party's policy of "four basic freedoms": freedom to practice religion, to trade, to lend money at interest, and to keep servants. Shortly thereafter, a series of mass meetings was reportedly held in several districts of Tibet, with higher-level cadres telling the people not to be "unduly excited or to show any abnormality if the Dalai Lama chose to return to Tibet" and blaming past Chinese policies of repression against the Tibetans on "anti-Mao revisionists." 23 Rumors began to circulate that the Chinese were negotiating with the Dalai Lama concerning the exact terms on which he might be persuaded to return to Tibet. For his part, the Tibetan leader was reported to have praised the Chinese for some of their recent modifications of policy in Tibet and to have stated publicly that he had "developed respect" for his former enemies, that he liked and admired Chairman Mao, and that he was hopeful of returning to his country soon.24

Other changes were evident in the content of the Chinese mass media. In May 1971, Peking Radio inaugurated broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh, and on October 1 the Kwangsi regional service resumed Chuang-language broadcasting, which had been interrupted several years before. A few weeks later, local broadcasts in Mongolian began in two Mongol areas which had been detached from the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in 1969 and added onto adjacent provinces. On November 1, the central party daily began a drive to recruit more cadres of minority ethnic groups into leadership positions and suggested instituting remedial study classes as a means of raising their skills to the requisite level.25 (The fact that the proportion of leadership positions held by members of the indigenous ethnic groups in the individual minority areas closely approximates the ratio of the minority to the total population of the area strongly suggests the institution of a quota system.) Similar efforts were launched in the media to draw more members of minority groups into the party, and there was also a new emphasis on training such persons for technical jobs.

23 Tibetan Review (Dharmsala), Vol. 8, No. 9-10, p. 21, reprinting a report originally published in the Calcutta newspaper Hindustan Standard, Oct. 25, 1972.

24 Ibid., p. 22.

25 Jen-min Jih-pao, Nov. 1, 1971.