istered some gains, the support of the public has not been won over, as many of the protest messages testify. Material comfort, it turns out, is not a substitute for dynamic, principled leadership; and Husak and his cohorts, themselves entirely dependent on Moscow, are hardly charismatic types to whom the masses can relate and respond. Nor can the leaders fall back on ideological appeals: as Smrkovsky put it, Marxist-Leninist beliefs "are to them only phrases which must be mouthed on certain occasions. They know well that the ideology has no social effect [any more], that people simply do not believe in it. It is a game whose rules all know, no one disputes them, and everybody cheats. . . . The few believers in the party are considered either naive, primitive, or stupid." 29

The Power, the People, and the Party

The power of the leadership is hence based not in the society but in the apparat. It is the bureaucratic apparat that controls the chain of command at all levels and in all areas and sectors of political and social life-including the party itself, the ministries, the military, the police, the trade unions, the youth organization, and other institutions. Perhaps a quarter-million strong (out of a total population of over 14 million), members of the apparat, or apparatchiks, are carefully selected by the supreme powerholders to enforce the dictates of the regime.

Yet the apparat is far from homogeneous. Many apparatchiks are simply opportunists who have kowtowed to the new regime and if necessary recanted past "sins" in order to keep a foothold in the power structure. Others got into the apparat by sheer chance and are afraid to back out for fear of the consequences. The ultra-conservatives, mostly in top positions, are more pro-Soviet than the Soviets themselves and give Husak a difficult time. Finally, there are apoliticals who have never trafficked in politics, are without opinions, and thus have survived all the tests of the post-invasion checkups. Willingness to adapt and to obey is their virtue. Generally underlings, they have little ability, experience, knowledge, or skill. All the apparatchiks share one common denominator: fear. They support the regime because their own welfare depends on it. They have

existentially grown into the regime-in power, they are everything; without it, nothing.

29 Teren, loc. cit., p. 414.

The other social strata, however, appear to be almost universally against the authorities. According to all indications, the workers by a large majority do not regard either the party or the government as theirs; on the contrary, they view the regime as hostile. Cooperative farmers appear to be indifferent, concentrating on their own economic and social problems and on their special interests. The economic and technical intelligentsia tend to consider the regime to be without expertise; they work for it because they have no other alternative. The creative and scientific intelligentsia at least those who made it through the massive checkups and purges know well for what kind of system they work. Most of them are ashamed that in order to hold onto their positions they lied about their views, while their less

compromising colleagues-in many cases including the cream of the crop in particular fields-now dig ditches, if they have jobs at all. The white-collar employees in services such as commerce, trade, health, and transportation do not seem to favor the regime either. As for the youth, practically all of them appear to be hostile. So, too, do the many ex-party members. The first and major wave of purges within the KSC was concluded by the fall of 1970, and Gustav Husak announced its results at a December 1970 Central Committee plenum: the party had declined by 473,731 members, or 28 percent; of these, 326,817 members (almost 22 percent) had been expelled, and the rest had quit." Since 1970, additional expulsions have taken place; the total, accordto all accounts, is now well over 500,000 people, or almost one-third of the 1968 membership. In many cases, loss of party cards has meant loss of jobs as well. This is a large force, potentially a dangerous one. It is composed of people with special political experience, many of whom are highly educated, knowledgeable in the intrigues of the apparat, and on friendly terms with some of its remaining members. By all reports, they despise the regime. Could this be the nucleus of an opposition movement in Czechoslovakia? Not at all, according to Smrkovsky: "Undoubtedly, it is a great force which the regime fears. But to speak of it as an opposition is nonsense; it is unorganized, fragmented, watched, and as a whole, powerless." Many of the ex-party members are under surveillance, their telephones are tapped, their mail opened, their visitors photographed, their apartments bugged."

What has all this done to the Communist Party, the "leading progressive force" in Czechoslovakia? According to the message-writers, the KSC is not only an organization of the past-obsolete, regressive, stultified, and doctrinaire-but "a gross and insolent destructive force, an annihilator of human rights and civil liberties." People in an advanced socialist country such as Czechoslovakia have a different image of socialism than that presented by the party today. To them, socialism represents social justice, a modern socialist economy, and a means to achieve national and personal fulfillment. The party is not that. Even in the case of the "proletariat," the party is no longer representative of the workers' struggle for social progress, economic ad

30 Rude pravo, Dec. 15, 1970.

31 Teren, loc. cit., p. 423.

32 See ibid., pp. 420-21.

vancement, and other goals of socialism. It is a power organization, pure and simple."2

In this country of no real leaders and no real supporters, where everything of importance depends on Moscow but where the rulers keep up the pretense of ruling, where the system keeps running and people keep working and everything more or less keeps going, the citizens seem to feel that they are subject to a kind of historical fate against which any application of will is useless and ineffective. Widespread lethargy, social and political apathy, a mental state devoid of any alternative perspective, pervade the nation. The leadership knows this well. It understands that it has the support of no one except the apparatchiks. But it chooses to interpret the national mood of passivity as a political and ideological victory, maintaining that the population stands steadfastly behind the new socialist order."

Short- and Long-Term Perspectives

The leadership has attempted to shore up its position by fulfilling at least some societal demands. As pointed out earlier, its effort to raise the standard of living has been not unsuccessful economically but has proven ineffective politically. To achieve a compromise with the people, the regime would somehow have to salve their wounded national pride and restore a minimal feeling of national integrity-and that is precisely what the leadership cannot do. This is the dilemma of Husak the prisoner: his hands are tied. A relaxation of controls would be dangerous in a double sense; it could provoke a swift, negative response from the Soviet leaders, or it could start an avalanche at home which he would be too weak to contain. He is hemmed in, hobbled.

There is the further question whether the regime can continue to provide the economic palliatives upon which it has relied in its quest for viability and stability. To further increase the living standard, promote development, and solve a number of pressing economic problems, the government needs the contribution and cooperation of the working force. Yet it is plagued not only by a shortage of labor but by poor labor discipline-as indicated by widespread absenteeism, failure of workers to produce to capacity, and popularization of the motto, "the worse, the better." All this is hardly conducive to party goals. How can adequate popular support

33 lbid., p. 416.

E

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be elicited from a withdrawn and alienated society?

To an observer, it seems obvious that the Czecho:: slovak political system rests on thin ice. There is nothing to indicate that post-invasion "normalization" is succeeding, though at the same time it is clear that the system will not suddenly come apart. Developed political communities, whether socialist or capitalist, cannot do without the participation of their citizens, especially those with education, skill, and expertise, in the socio-economic and political process. But the developed polity must in turn provide an environment conducive to such participation. In Czechoslovakia today, many of those who stand apart are the articulate, the educated, and the expert. Their legitimate demands and needs are simply not being met. Yet, these are people the system cannot do without if it wishes to meet its developmental goals.

Can something be done to make the regime more humane, more responsible, more responsive to people's demands? Smrkovsky had some suggestions:

We must employ all legal means, from the Constitution to individual administrative orders, to insist on the fulfillment of laws. . . . Each citizen can take part in this struggle without great risk. This has nothing to do with anything illegal; this kind of activity is directly based on legality. We must behave with the dignity of citizens, must not retreat before illegal chicaneries, must protect ourselves and our families, utilize everything which can be of assistance in [terms of] legal norms. . . . To overcome fear is the first victory of a person over a system. I consider the moral stand of individuals, their inner strength and resistance to pressure, as most important [factors] in our struggle for the future..

It should not be possible to throw people out of work without their defending their rights. . . . One should protest a decision of a local national board (MNV), say, in a housing issue, which contradicts the letter and spirit of a law. People should not tacitly accept a decision forbidding their sons or daughters to study at a high school or a university because their father was expelled from the party. . . . One should fight such decisions directly, against the individuals responsible, in order that they be known, their names remembered, and they not hide behind the anonymity of collective organs in their illegal acts motivated by fear, opportunism, or vengeance. In this way, the regime would begin to realize the limits of its might. . . . As I see it, the main task of opposition [lies] not in organized illegal activity but

A poster portraying cordial relations between Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev and Czechoslovak party chief Gustav Husak at a Soviet exhibition in Prague in January 1973.

-UPI.

in the sustained unmasking of the actual powerholders at all levels, in letting the public know who is who among them, who are the worst, and what acts they have committed.""

This counsel would be sound if Czechoslovakia were a nation of saints. But it is not. It is a nation of ordinary people who would face the wrath, "the

34 Ibid., pp. 421-22.

chicanery," or "the vengeance" of the powerful on all levels. The risks are indeed great, Smrkovsky's wish to the contrary notwithstanding. A few may follow his advice and in fact have-but not many. Thus, as has been the case in the past (in 1918, when Czechoslovakia appeared for the first time on the map; in 1938, at the time of the Munich appeasement; in 1948, when the Communist coup d'état took place; and in 1968), any change, to be effective, has to originate outside the country rather than at home. It is in this respect that the Husak regime and the Soviet Union are most vulnerable. The letterwriters are right in directing their appeals abroad.

External Factors of Influence

In pursuing Soviet objectives and dealing with problems across a broad range of foreign-policy concerns including, inter alia, détente and the relaxation of tensions, international trade, world opinion, and the conflict with China-Moscow continues to rely on the support of the international Communist movement, or of as many Communist parties as can be mustered to its side. To have several Communist parties disagreeing with the wisdom of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia— and repeatedly bringing the issue up in public must, at the least, be disconcerting to the Soviet authorities. The parties in disagreement have been circumspect, but they have seldom left doubt where their sympathies lie. The Spanish CP (in exile) has been the most vocal in its denunciation of the occupation. But far more important, from Moscow's view, has been the reaction of the Italian CP, today perhaps the most influential nonruling party in the Communist movement. Although it has not entered into open argument on the subject with Moscow, the PCI has engaged in many public exchanges with the Husak government. L'Unità, the official PCI newspaper, condemned the Soviet invasion in 1968; deplored the purges and political trials of 1970-72; printed a speech which a representative of the PCI was not permitted to deliver at the Czechoslovak Party Congress of 1970; published a long, moving obituary upon the death of Smrkovsky in 1974; carried extracts from the Dubcek letter to Mrs. Smrkovsky; and so forth. In turn, the Husak-con

35

35 It is worth noting that the Spanish Communist Party's theoretical paper, Realidad, is published in Rome, apparently with the assistance of the PCI.

trolled press has printed attacks on the PCI and on individual members such as Davide Lajolo for their stand on Czechoslovakia, and the government has twice expelled L'Unità's correspondents from the country (in February 1972 and again in December 1973). Of additional interest, the Italian Socialist Party daily, Avanti!, reported that in 1973 Enrico Berlinguer, the Secretary General of the PCI, was asked to deliver a letter from Smrkovsky to Leonid Brezhnev urging liberalization in Czechoslovakia and to reiterate to Brezhnev the PCI's position with respect to the occupation and its negative effect on détente. According to the report, "... the PCI did do its part, without publicity. . . ." " Again, when Literaturnaia gazeta attacked Lajolo for the antioccupation statements in his journal, L'Unità defended him on the ground that he "expressed the [same] position that our party has adopted." " (The Italian Communists are, of course, crucially interested in détente, since it reinforces the PCI's independent line and promotes its political influence both at home and in the international Communist movement.)

36

Other parties have also continued to oppose the occupation, some more openly than others. In France, the Communists have been less vociferous than the Socialists in expressing support for antioccupation sentiments and forces; nevertheless, the PCF claims that it has not changed its negative view of the invasion. The British and Australian CPs

36 Luciano Vasconi, "Smrkovsky Is Dead," Avanti! (Rome), Jan. 16, 1974. In his letter, Smrkovsky reportedly told Brezhnev how delighted he was with the Soviet policy of détente. He could imagine, he said, that not all Soviet leaders were happy with the policy and likened its opponents to those who had insisted on military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. He then offered his opinion that détente could not succeed as long as Czechoslovakia was occupied. He maintained that while the Husak regime had had some success with the economy, it had failed to solve dire social and political problems that were causing widespread tension and increased anti-Soviet and anti-socialist feeling. Thus, Czechoslovakia was rapidly becoming an unreliable ally of the USSR and a weak member of the socialist community. For this reason, Smrkovsky recommended that negotiations be initiated among the Soviet leaders and representatives of both the Husak and Dubcek regimes without delay.

According to another source (quoted in Briefe aus der Tschechoslovakei, supra), Smrkovsky wrote this letter in July 1973. He was warned several times by the secret police not to have the letter published in the West. Apparently, he ignored the warning. For a later account, see Der Spiegel, Dec. 9, 1974. 37 L'Unità, Dec. 14, 1972.

38 Of interest, in November 1971, the Socialist Party held a two-day colloquium on Czechoslovakia and invited Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and Kriegel to attend. None of them was permitted to go, but Smrkovsky managed to send a letter in which he commented on his current situation and on the sad conditions in Czechoslovakia. See Le Monde, Dec. 1, 1972, and Unir-Débat (Paris), Dec. 10, 1972.