pending to a large extent on the shifting balance of power between the radical and moderate groups in the central leadership. As the power pendulum in Peking swung in one direction or the other, the instructions issued to the army not only varied greatly over time but were often contradictory. Local army commanders, embroiled in incredibly complex factional struggles, frequently had to fend for themselves. Their actions differed from locality to locality, but by and large they tended to come down on the side of order, stability, and control and to display increasing forcefulness in cracking down on the radical Red Guard organizations and maneuvering to restrict the representation of such organizations in local Revolutionary Committees. By the time the curtain was rung down on the Cultural Revolution in April 1969, the Red Guard organizations had been largely broken up, and the power of the radical group in Peking had been considerably diminished. For the most part not of its own volition, the army emerged from the upheaval not only as the dominant political and administrative authority in the provinces but also consequently as a powerful force in the central policymaking councils. The army's greatly increased political power was strikingly apparent in the composition of the most important organs of regional authority. Of the chairmen of the 29 province-level Revolutionary Commit tees, 21 were military men, while 235 of the 479 standing committee members, or almost 50 percent, came from the army." Moreover, the army's share of representation increased shortly after the Cultural Revolution as regional leadership organs were reorganized. Local-level administrations were dominated by the military. The enhanced power position of the military at the provincial and local levels was reflected in the top-level national policymaking organs. Of the 170 full members of the Central Committee, about 45 percent were military men, while about half the members of the Politburo could be classed as having a primary identification with the military. The close connection between the growth of the military's regional power and its strengthened position at the national level was evidenced by the fact that about 65 percent of the military representatives in the Central Committee (about 28 percent of the total Committee membership) came from the provinces.1 These developments had far-reaching political 14 On the army's representation among the standing members of provincial Revolutionary Committees, see Jürgen Domes, "Party Politics and the Cultural Revolution," in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, Eds., Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty Year Assessment, New York, New York University Press, 1970, p. 90. 15 The data cited in this paragraph are based on research done by Gerald Segal at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A scene at an enlarged meeting of the standing committee of the Shansi Provincial Revolutionary Committee in 1967: in the foreground, Chang Jih-ching, political commissar of the Shansi Military Command and Vice-Chairman of the Committee; seated to his right, Liu Ke-ping, Committee Chairman. -China Pictorial (Peking), No. 7, 1967, p. 27. Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, then Minister of Defense, pictured on the rostrum at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969. The Congress officially designated Lin as Mao's successor. Camera Press. implications. The regional predominance of the military, with its strong reflection at the center, meant not only that regional interests would have increased weight in the formulation of national policy, but more importantly-that the regional military commanders, holding the levers of political power in the provinces, would in effect be able to control how national policy would be carried out in their respective areas. In sum, if the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution resulted in a pronounced shift of political power to the military, it was the regional commanders within the army who were the main beneficiaries of the shift. The new situation raised critical questions with respect to the future role of the regional military in Chinese politics. As a consequence of the extraordinary conditions that had arisen in the course of the Cultural Revolution-i.e., the weakness of the center, which was divided among conflicting viewpoints and consequently issued vague and sometimes contradictory directives; the entanglement of the military authorities on the spot in local factional conflicts which often forced them to make difficult political decisions on the basis of their own judgment; and the virtual elimination of the party apparatus as an effective mechanism for exercising control over the actions of army commanders in the localities-the regional military authorities came to enjoy a large degree of de facto autonomy vis-à-vis the center, and in many instances they used their autonomy to circumvent or reinterpret central directives that they perceived to run counter to local interests and needs.1 This tendency prompted some observers to evoke the specter of China's reversion to a system of military governerships akin to the "warlordism" of the early republican period. Such a view, however, overlooked the fact that the autonomist tendencies of the regional military authorities remained subject to important limitations. For one thing, the center, whatever its weaknesses caused by internal dissension, still remained the repository of national authority and as such commanded the basic allegiance of the military as a whole. For another, the regional army commanders themselves, because of their strong sense of professional discipline and their commitment to national unity, felt impelled to restrain themselves from taking any action, even if they had the opportunity to do so, that would endanger national unity or cast doubt on their loyalty to the center." At the same time, the army's injection into the political arena had important side-effects in another 16 Karnow, op. cit., Chap. 13. 17 See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 95-98, and Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), December 1972, pp. 1008-10. strengthened its domination of the regional power structures. These processes took place primarily in the course of the reconstruction of the party organi sensitive area that of intramilitary politics. It is axiomatic that when an army enters politics, politics enter the army-and the PLA has been no exception. Although internal cleavages and conflicts had char-zation, which began after the end of the turmoil.2o acterized the Chinese Communist military to some degree throughout its history, such divisions were revived and sharply intensified within the PLA in the heat of the Cultural Revolution struggle, and new ones crystallized. The post-Cultural Revolution cleavages ran along a variety of lines: centerregional, bureaucratic-vs.-field army, inter-service, and political-vs.-professional." The most serious appeared to be the cleavage between the central military leadership and the regional army commanders. What significance do such cleavages have in the context of the army's role in politics? For one thing, they indicate that it is somewhat misleading to speak of "the army" as a unitary actor, since different groups are likely to have competing interests and perspectives and to act accordingly. Such groups, moreover, are apt to form coalitions-sometimes tacit rather than explicit with groups in the civilian hierarchies that have similar views and interests. One example may be found in the tacit cooperation that developed between regional army commanders and moderate elements in the Maoist leadership during the Cultural Revolution. A more recent example is the support which appears to have been given by some regional army commanders and professional military officers to the Mao-Chou group in its conflict with Defense Minister Lin Piao and the central military leadership in 1971"-about which more later. Given the veil of secrecy enveloping intra-army relations in China, a major problem that faces the analyst in this area is to identify factions within the military and to trace their activities. In any case, factionalism has to be taken into account in assessing the army's role in politics. Its impact should not be overrated, however, as internal army rivalries seem, generally speaking, to have been kept within bounds by recognition of a broader "military" interest as well as by the restraints of military discipline. Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution Although the army's involvement in politics was an outgrowth of the Cultural Revolution, the end of that upheaval did not lead immediately to a military withdrawal from the political arena. On the contrary, for some two years after the Cultural Revolution, the army consolidated its political position and The reconstruction of the party was marked by constant conflict between regional army leaders and remnant radical elements over the allocation of power in the revamped party organs, especially in the Party Committees at the provincial level. Since the reconstituted Party Committees were supposed to have higher authority than the army-dominated Revolutionary Committees, the radicals viewed the rebuilding of the party as an opportunity to regain the power that had been wrested from them by the army. The army commanders, however, showed no disposition to accommodate the radicals. Although many of them had been reluctant to become involved in the political turmoil in the first place, they displayed an even greater reluctance to hand over power to the same radical elements with whom they had clashed violently and whose policies they opposed. In fact, given the bitterness and hostility that had developed between the radicals and most local army commanders, the latter had good reason to fear that a reascendance of the radicals would bring retaliation against the army-a prospect that they were naturally unwilling to help bring about. Whether or not they would, at this stage, have been more ready to step aside in favor of veteran, conservative party officials whose basic views on national policy they shared is not certain. What is certain is that they were not prepared to step aside as long as the danger of a radical comeback persisted. Consequently, instead of giving up their political posts, the military commanders used these posts to ensure that the reconstruction of the party organs would not result in a reduction of their power. This they did primarily by supervising the process of reorganization, and the results were apparent in the composition of the reconstituted Party Committees, where the military was able to get its representatives appointed to positions paralleling those they had held in the Revolutionary Committees. Thus, 21 of the 29 first secretaries of the new Party Committees in the provinces were military officers 18 For the most thorough exposition of Chinese military factionalism, see William W. Whitson and Huang Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71, New York, Praeger, 1973. 19 See the author's "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," The China Quarterly (London), July-September 1973, pp. 472-73. 20 See ibid., pp. 464-68; also, Barnett, op. cit., pp. 83-84. PLA soldiers attending a mass criticism meeting during the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius in early 1974. The meeting took place in front of the Hall of Profound Learning of the Confucian Temple in Chufu, Shantung Province. -China Pictorial (Peking), No. 6, 1974, pp. 16-17. (commanders or political commissars), while 62 | September 1971 with the mysterious death of Lin percent of the members of provincial party secre- Piao and several close military associates in a plane tariats also were from the military-representing a crash in Mongolia while they were allegedly attempt12-percent increase over its share of such positions ing to flee to the Soviet Union.22 under the interim Revolutionary Committees." It seems probable, in light of these results at the provincial level, that the military retained its domi- Military Disengagement from Politics nant position in the lower-level party bodies and other reconstructed local organizations as well. However, the struggles that accompanied the reconstruction of the party apparatus apparently fueled a new conflict that now began to build up at the level of the central leadership. Many aspects of this complex conflict still remain obscure, but it appears that Mao, alarmed at the reluctance of the top military leaders to relinquish the political preeminence that they had acquired at the expense of the party during and after the Cultural Revolution, now swung his weight behind a coalition of moderate and radical elements in the leadership both of whom found the army's political ascendancy unpalatable-in a power struggle against Defense Minister Lin Piao and several top members of the army general staff. In this crucial confrontation, the Mao-Chou coalition succeeded in winning the support or acquiescence of those regional army commanders and professional officers who had been antagonized by Lin's excessive politicization of the army and by his alliance with the extreme radicals, especially Ch'en Po-ta, a veteran left-wing ideologue and driving force behind the Cultural Revolution, whom the military professionals had good reason to despise. The struggle reached its dénouement in 21 Same source cited in footnote 14. Although the "Lin Piao Affair" was a limited struggle at the center, its outcome marked an important turning point in the political role of the army and its relationship to the party. The elimination of Lin and his supporters removed a major obstacle to redressing the balance between the party and the army, and the central leadership proceeded-despite continued internal divisions on various issues -to mount a determined drive in that direction. As a result, the post-Lin Piao period has witnessed a gradual but marked disengagement of the army from the political arena and a reassertion of the party's political primacy. The disengagement process has had three main facets: first, a scaling down of the army's excessive involvement in civil affairs; second, a reaffirmation of professional military values within the army, at the expense of extreme politicization; and, third, a reduction of the army's position of strength in the national and regional organs of political power. 22 For accounts and interpretations of the "Lin Piao Affair," see Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," The China Quarterly, July-September 1973, pp. 427-49; this author's "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution," loc. cit., pp. 468-77; Joseph Lelyveld, "The Ghost of Lin Piao," The New York Times Magazine, (New York), Jan. 27, 1974; Ying-mao Kau and Pierre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup," Asian Survey, June 1974, pp. 558-77. Evidences of the first of these facets have been largely indirect and have taken various forms. One reflection was a renewal of exhortations and instructions to the military to subordinate themselves to the leadership of the party;23 to display modesty and prudence in their relations with civilian cadres and the masses; to observe military discipline and concentrate on army affairs.25 Another was an increasing flow of publicity about the rebuilding of party organizations and their resumption of "normal" operations," accompanied by the virtual disappearance of reports which earlier had flooded the media❘ describing the involvement of military units in civil functions. Further reinforcing these developments was the gradual reappearance in public life of veteran party cadres who had dropped out of sight under radical assault during the Cultural Revolution." To what extent these manifestations mirrored reality is difficult to judge, but-taken cumulatively -they definitely suggest a significant lowering of the army's profile on the political scene. This is not to say that the army ceased to play any role in civil affairs, but only to indicate that there was a gradual reversion to its former role-i.e., noninterference in politics and the performance of limited nonmilitary tasks under the direction of the party rather than in competition with it. These tasks obviously include the maintenance of public order, as was demonstrated by the dispatch of troops to factories in Hangchow in July 1975 to restore production disrupted by factional strife. The second facet of the disengagement process was the cultivation of a renewed emphasis on professionalism and military proficiency within the armed forces. In a concerted effort to redress the 23 E.g., Szechwan Provincial Radio (Chengtu), Dec. 26, 1971; Anhwei Provincial Radio (Hofei), Jan. 9, 1972; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio (Harbin), June 16, 1972; Hunan Provincial Radio (Hunan), Feb. 17, 1973; Kirin Provincial Radio (Changchun), Nov. 20, 1974; and Kiangsu Provincial Radio (Nanking), Jan. 22, 1975. All radio reports cited in this article may be found in English translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China (Washington, DC). 24 E.g., collection of articles in Union Research Service (Hong Kong), Vol. 66, No. 5, Jan. 18, 1972; also, Szechwan Provincial Radio, April 27, 1972; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio, June 21, 1972; Hainan Island Radio (Haikow), Jan. 26, 1973; Anhwei Provincial Radio, Aug. 25, 1973. 25 E.g., Peking Radio, Domestic Service, Sept. 13, 1971; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio, Nov. 6, 1971. See also "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," translated in Issues and Studies (Taipei), Vol. 10, No. 10, July 1974, p. 97. 26 See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 47-66. 27 See Parris H. Chang, "Political Rehabilitation of Cadres in China: A Traveller's View," The China Quarterly, April-June 1973, pp. 331-40. balance between politicization and professionalism in the military establishment, the central leadership subjected the policies of the late Lin Piao to severe attack on the ground that they had neglected the military functions of the army in favor of excessive politicization, and it called upon army leaders to concentrate their energies on raising professional military standards." It also proceeded to effect the rehabilitation of a number of professional officers who had been purged in the Cultural Revolution, the most notable example being Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had been forced out as PLA Chief of Staff because of his emphasis on a highly professionalized defense establishment and the need to mend relations with the Soviet Union as a source of advanced military technology. This reordering of the army's priorities doubtless coincided with the views of a great many professional officers who had been unhappy about the army's entanglement in politics from the start. Its rationale in the context of the regime's perception of the army's proper role was quite clear: soldiers who concentrated on improving their specialized military skills would be less likely to wish to involve themselves in politics. The third facet of the army's disengagement from politics-i.e., the reduction of military political power as measured by the army's representation in national and regional ruling organs"-proceeded more slowly. This was especially true at the regional level, where the overwhelming majority of the top military leaders held on to their concurrent political and administrative positions of authority for more than two years after the fall of Lin Piao. In part, this probably was the price paid by the Mao-Chou coalition for the support of the regional commanders in the struggle against Lin and his supporters; in part, it may have derived from the desire of the leadership to avoid disruptions after the trauma of the Lin Affair; and, in part, it doubtless reflected the simple reality of the army's dominant power position in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. 28 E.g., see the collection of articles in Union Research Service, Vol. 66, No. 3, Jan. 11, 1972; also, Fukien Provincial Radio (Foochow), April 12, 1972; Lhasa Radio, April 27, 1972; Shanghai Radio, July 26, 1972, and July 31, 1974; Peking Radio, Domestic Service, April 29, 1973; and Yunan Provincial Radio (Kunming), May 7, 1973. It should also be noted that the buildup of the urban militia in the post-Lin period may have been intended in part to relieve the army of many of its nonmilitary, civil duties (see Parris H. Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," Asian Survey, October 1974, p. 883). 29 Representation in ruling organs is, of course, only one component of "political power." |