Basic National Security Policy 1 During 1955 and 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were engaged in the further implementation of the principles and concepts of national security introduced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration, which were commonly spoken of as constituting the "New Look." Fulfillment of the President's objective of providing forces and weaponry adequate to the nation's security needs at a cost that could be sustained over an extended period had been greatly facilitated by the cessation of hostilities in Korea. With the return of the military forces to substantially a peacetime basis, military budgets and force levels shrank, allowing the Joint Chiefs of Staff less leeway in the choices made regarding the allocation of resources and the deployments and strategies to be pursued. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed their recommendations on these matters with an awareness that Soviet military capabilities were increasing at a faster pace than estimated in earlier intelligence assessments and in the face of changing Soviet tactics on the world scene. As 1955 began, the incumbent Joint Chiefs of Staff were the group of officers President Eisenhower had appointed during his first year in office, under the stated purpose of providing Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson with an entirely new team that would be capable of taking "a new approach... without any real chains fastening to the past."1 Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman, General Matthew B. Ridgway as Chief of Staff, Army, Admiral Robert B. Carney as Chief of Naval Operations, and General Nathan F. Twining as Chief of Staff, Air Force, had formulated the initial military policy of the New Look period, in JCS 2101/113, and had contributed their thought to the development of NSC 162/2, the first basic national security policy statement of the Eisenhower administration.2 By mid-1955 the two-year terms of these JCS members were nearing completion. Two were reappointed; two were not. The President chose to retain Admiral Radford and General Twining for a further two years. Although Radford, as Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 1948-1949, had expressed strong doubts about a strategy based on atomic bombing, had helped make the Navy's case against the B-36, and had aligned himself with the critics of unification, he had, as Chair man, enthusiastically endorsed not only unification but also the New Look strategy with emphasis on massive nuclear retaliation. General Twining, too, had proved a strong supporter of the New Look and the administration. The President did not reappoint General Ridgway or Admiral Carney. The former considered massive retaliation an inadequate strategy and vehemently— but vainly opposed the resulting cuts in Army strength. Evidently both he and the President felt his usefulness had become impaired, and General Ridgway retired on 30 June 1955. His successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, had commanded the 101st Airborne Division during 1944-1945 and the Eighth Army during the final months of the Korean War. When General Taylor took office, Admiral Carney told him, “You're one of the good new Chiefs now but you'll be surprised how quickly you will become one of the bad old Chiefs." Like General Ridgway, Taylor proved a severe critic of massive retaliation. As Taylor wrote afterwards, his tenure was marked by "well-nigh continuous conflict" with his JCS colleagues and the Secretary of Defense as well as "increasing coolness" in his relations with the President.3 Admiral Carney, who had referred to himself as one of the bad old Chiefs, had earned the displeasure of the Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas. Carney, the Secretary said privately, had excluded him from key decisions, failed to keep him fully abreast of day-to-day developments, and relied too much upon old friends who seemed to lack vigor and imagination. Early in August, just before he retired, Admiral Carney sent the President eight pages of parting thoughts. He strongly recommended lengthening the two-year terms of the Service chiefs because "I find my own major plans... only just beginning to be felt as my appointment expires." Also, Carney argued, his JCS responsibilities interfered with the effective discharge of his Navy duties: Insistence on the presence of the Chief at virtually every JCS, [Armed Forces] Policy Council, and NSC meeting... tie up every week from Tuesday to Friday inclusive, leaving little or no opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge of the operating forces or to exercise personal leadership which is a legal responsibility, as well as an absolute essential in a military structure. Instead, Carney suggested, either his Vice Chief or his JCS Deputy could handle "a generous percentage" of interservice problems. Finally, Carney voiced apprehension about civilian intrusion into "virtually every operation of the Navy Department." What appeared true of the Navy Department, he concluded, appeared to be also true of the Department of Defense.5 The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, stood eightieth in seniority at the time of his appointment. Moreover, as Admiral Carney reminded the President, "no officer occupying a position of top responsibility in the naval establishment, nor in the Navy command system" was consulted about the selection. Even so, Admiral Burke brought with him a good reputation. In the South Pacific, during 1943, he had become known as "31-knot Burke" while commanding a destroyer squadron. Next, he served as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force 58. In 1951, at Panmunjom in Korea, he was a mem ber of the United Nations Truce Delegation. During 1952–1954, he served in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Strategic Plans Division, and then in January 1955, he assumed command of the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet. On 17 August 1955, Admiral Burke began the first of what would become an unprecedented three terms as Chief of Naval Operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, who was not a legal JCS member, had begun meeting with the Joint Chiefs in June 1952. The Commandant in 1955, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., served a statutory term of four years and had not been affected by the turnover in JCS membership during 1953. He was relieved in normal rotation by General Randolph McC. Pate, effective 1 January 1956. In 1955 the civilian leaders remained unchanged. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had entered the White House in 1953 with unrivalled experience in national security affairs, continued to oversee foreign and military affairs carefully. Naturally, therefore, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson-"Engine Charlie," the former president of General Motors-found himself overshadowed by the Chief Executive. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had proved a forceful figure, who had provoked much partisan criticism, but retained President Eisenhower's full confidence. The National Security Council under President Eisenhower esignated in the National Security Act as the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a definite role in the formulation of national policy in the Eisenhower administration. The central entity of the policymaking machinery was the National Security Council, on which President Eisenhower depended for recommendations on virtually all matters of policy. To many observers, the President's disposition to rely on the formalized procedures of the National Security Council reflected the influence of his long career as a military commander and staff officer. By 1955 the Council had become a smoothly operating agency for policy formulation, with clear lines of authority and systemized staff work. The Council consisted of five members designated by statute: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. It was fully within the discretion of the President, however, to invite any other official or expert to take part in the NSC deliberations. Notable among the persons who regularly attended in this status during 1955 and 1956 were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sat regularly at the NSC meetings. Officially, Admiral Radford was present as an adviser to the Council. In practice, he was a virtual participant in the action on any subject of defense interest, since the Council functioned without taking a formal vote." The National Security Council had two subordinate agencies, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Under chairmanship of the Presi |