trian internal security forces, and (3) enable Austria to make a substantial contribution to her own defense.

Although believing that some of these objectives could still be attained under current circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that others might have to be sacrificed in order to obtain the advantages that would result from the withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from Austrian territory. The new Soviet economic proposals, by removing Soviet managerial personnel who were operating Austrian oil and shipping properties, would eliminate a potential means for influencing and subverting the Austrian Government. On the other hand, it was essential that Austrian security forces become effective before the withdrawal of occupation forces. For this purpose at least six months would be required. The Department of State proposal that Austria be allowed to receive equipment for internal security forces from the Western powers was essential to Western security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared, and the three Western powers should agree, prior to signing the treaty, that deliveries of the equipment scheduled for Austrian forces would begin on the day the treaty was signed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded that covert defense planning with Austria was not feasible in the current circumstances and should not be attempted. They opposed US participation in a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality and territorial integrity but suggested that acceptable arrangements might be made within the framework of the United Nations. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it of the utmost importance not to link the Austrian treaty in any way with any future German settlement."

On 25 April the Secretary of Defense forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council, with a statement that he fully supported them. In addition, he cautioned against Soviet attempts to use negotiations for an Austrian treaty as a means to weaken the growing defense of Western Europe generally, and, in particular, to slow down or frustrate West German rearmament.10

When the National Security Council took up the matter of the Austrian treaty on 28 April, the only extended discussion concerned the length of time to be allowed for withdrawing occupation forces. General Ridgway, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anticipated no difficulty in the physical withdrawal of US forces in 90 days but advocated a six-month period so that Austrian security forces could be adequately prepared to take over before the occupation forces departed.

President Eisenhower pointed out that, since the draft treaty already specified a 90-day period, the Austrians might object to an extension, and Secretary of State Dulles added that getting rid of the occupation troops was the one big issue to the Austrians. As a compromise, Secretary Dulles offered to explain to the Austrians the advantages of a six-month period for troop training and to seek to change the treaty accordingly if they so desired. The Secretary of Defense then concluded that the point was not of sufficient importance to justify such an effort. He agreed to deletion of all reference to a six-month period from the negotiating instructions for Secretary Dulles.

With this matter resolved, the Council quickly agreed to the remaining instructions for Secretary Dulles, empowering him to negotiate an Austrian treaty on the basis of the existing draft, but with authority to depart from it

within certain limits. He would not agree to provisions that would preclude Austria's association with the economic community of Western Europe, prevent the Austrians from maintaining internal order, or deny the Western powers the right to provide Austria with financial or material aid for purposes of internal security and economic viability. He might commit the United States to recognize and respect a declaration of neutrality by the Austrian Government but not to any guarantee of Austrian territory or neutrality except through the United Nations. The Council also recommended taking all necessary steps to assure prompt delivery of US military aid to Austria once the treaty was in force."

The President subsequently approved these instructions, and meanwhile Secretary Dulles had advanced through the preliminary stages of negotiation on the basis of the general authorization given him on 21 April. After consulting the British and French, he had proposed preliminary talks in Vienna at the ambassadorial level beginning on 2 May to complete the treaty draft preparatory to signature by the foreign ministers. The Soviet Union accepted the proposal on 27 April.12

When the ambassadors met as scheduled, the Soviet envoy proposed a revision of the article on withdrawal of occupation forces to specify departure by 31 December 1955 rather than 90 days after the coming into force of the treaty. In Washington, the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were all quick to object that this condition could not be met if the Senate were to adjourn for the year without consenting to the treaty. The United States then made a new proposal, to which the other parties agreed, specifying withdrawal on 31 December 1955 or three months after the coming into effect of the treaty, whichever was later.13

With regard to the remainder of the treaty, the ambassadors quickly agreed to delete military articles limiting Austrian armed forces in such a manner as to have made the defense of a neutral Austria difficult. The Soviets, however, refused to revise the article on economic reparations, although they had previously agreed to do so in the discussions with the Austrians in Moscow. It was not until Secretary of State Dulles refused to come to Vienna to sign the treaty in its existing form that the Soviets relented and agreed to incorporate the Moscow economic agreement with Austria in the treaty.14

With this hurdle cleared, the Austrian State Treaty was signed in Vienna on 15 May 1955 by the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and Austria. It went into effect on 27 July 1955, the date when the last ratification, that of France, was deposited with the Soviet Union.15

In addition to the provisions for reparations and withdrawal of occupation forces that have already been described, the treaty reestablished Austria as an independent nation with the frontiers existing on 1 January 1938. It prohibited any political or economic union with Germany and barred Austria from possessing atomic weapons, guided missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and certain other types of armament. The four powers undertook to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Austria, without entering into a formal guarantee. The neutralization of Austria was not included in the treaty, but the Austrian Parliament adopted a constitutional law declaring the perpetual neutrality of Austria, backed by a policy of abstention from military alliances and

prohibition of foreign military bases. On 6 December 1955 the Big Four powers publicly announced their recognition of Austrian neutrality as defined in the constitutional law. 16

Withdrawal of US Forces from Austria

Olanning for evacuation of US forces from Austria began before the treaty was signed. Responding to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 May, submitted a 90-day phase-out plan and recommended that the troops withdrawn from Austria be organized into a special weapons task force to be stationed in Italy. The new unit would have a strength of about 5,000 men and be armed with Corporal missiles and Honest John rockets. Its mission would be defense of the vital approaches to Italy in the Villach-Ljubljana area. The unit would be assigned to USCINCEUR and earmarked for assignment to NATO for operational control on M-day, except that authority over nuclear weapons would remain with the United States.17 On 3 June, the Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendations and requested the Secretary of State to arrange with the Italian Government for appropriate amendments of existing base agreements.18 Withdrawal of occupation forces began soon after the treaty was ratified and was completed on 25 October 1955, the end of the prescribed 90-day withdrawal period.

The coming into force of the Austrian State Treaty and the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces were major changes that rendered the existing statement of US policy toward Austria obsolete. To replace NSC 164/1, the NSC Planning Board prepared a new policy statement and circulated it on 23 March 1956. Designated NSC 5603, it stated the objective of US policy to be the maintenance of an independent and stable Austria, encouragement of its continued pro-Western orientation, and resistance to communist pressures and subversion. Among the courses of action proposed were such military measures as the granting of military assistance to Austria and encouraging Austria to raise armed forces adequate to maintain internal order. In addition the proposed policy called for encouraging Austria to maintain close political and economic ties with the West.19

On 30 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they found 5603 acceptable from the military point of view. On 5 April 1956 the NSC adopted the statement of policy, and President Eisenhower approved it two days later.20

Ascent to the Summit

The successful settlement of the Austrian question was widely hailed as evidence of a shift in Soviet policies toward accommodation with the West. It raised hopes throughout the world that a relaxation of the tensions of the cold war might now be possible. Influential voices on both sides of the Atlantic began

calling for an early meeting of the heads of government of the four great powers in anticipation that they might be able to lessen tensions and prepare the way for settlement of outstanding differences. Sentiment for such a meeting found expression in France during the debate over the ratification of the Paris Accords, which provided for the admission of West Germany into NATO and the Western European Union. It was also expressed by the British Labor Party during the election campaign in the spring of 1955. In Washington, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed that the United States take the initiative in arranging a Big Four conference.21

The leaders of the Western nations had to weigh this sentiment against the experience of the past. Winston Churchill had first suggested in May 1953 a meeting at the summit at which heads of government would sit down without a fixed agenda and attempt to evolve the rudiments of a settlement of the world's major problems. The meeting of the foreign ministers at Berlin in the winter of 1954, however, had demonstrated that the Soviet Union was determined to block adherence to NATO by West Germany and was not prepared at that time to sign the Austrian treaty. The Western governments had therefore concluded that a summit meeting would not be productive until there was evidence of a change in Soviet policy. Even more to the point, the United States and Britian wished to postpone a conference until agreement had been reached in the West on rearming West Germany and admitting her to NATO. This condition was fulfilled with the final ratification of the Paris Accords, which took place early in May 1955. British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden now added his voice to those urging a meeting at the summit.22

President Eisenhower, though still skeptical regarding the value of such a conference, agreed to move ahead. As he later explained, he did not wish to "appear senselessly stubborn in my attitude toward a summit meeting so hopefully desired by so many." 23

Consultations among the three Western powers followed, leading to the delivery of a tripartite note to the Soviet Government on 10 May inviting participation in a meeting of heads of government. The purpose of this meeting would be to explore the sources of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West and to lay the basis for later detailed negotiation on specific issues. On 26 May, the Soviet Government accepted. Arrangements were then completed for a meeting of heads of government accompanied by foreign ministers, to convene in Geneva on 18 July 1955.24

The United States moved to develop positions on all major topics expected to come up at the summit conference and to coordinate them with the British and French Governments. On President Eisenhower's instructions, the NSC Planning Board undertook to draft policy recommendations for consideration by the NSC. Secretary Dulles had already assigned Douglas MacArthur II, the Counsellor of the Department, to supervise the preparation of the State Department position. The President directed Secretary Wilson to name an official in the Defense Department to perform a similar role, aided by military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The policy recommendations to be prepared by the Planning Board were to include the following:

(1) The general US attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the US would seek to achieve, taking into account: British and French objectives; estimated Soviet objectives, immediate and long term; existing or anticipated Soviet proposals and possible US proposals which might be introduced at such a meeting.

(2) Maintenance of a US posture of strength and confidence, before, during and after such a meeting.

(3) Disarmament.

(4) European security including the US position toward Germany; a neutral belt of European states and its impact on trade with the Soviet bloc; the status of satellite countries; and the activities of the international Communist movement.

(5) The US position on Far Eastern issues which might be raised, including the basis for US opposition to a Five Power meeting.25

Various studies had already been undertaken beginning in April in anticipation of a four-power conference, when progress toward an Austrian settlement made it apparent that such a meeting might occur. On 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff had received for comment six State Department position papers on European security arrangements and German reunification. They set out the general course to be followed by the Department's representatives at forthcoming working-level talks in London with the British and French. The State Department considered that the Western powers would probably have to adopt more advanced positions on German and European security than the ones adhered to at the 1954 conference of foreign ministers. In doing so, however, they should avoid any plan that would undermine NATO or prevent implementation of the Paris Accords.

The more advanced position on German reunification would be a modification of the Eden plan for all-German elections combined with a peace treaty reestablishing an independent and free Germany. Occupation forces would be withdrawn within six months after the treaty went into effect. The level of German armaments would not be specified in the treaty but would be dealt with under the general European security arrangement. As the basis for such arrangements, the State Department proposed adapting the arms limitation provisions of the Western European Union and extending them to Eastern Europe. Broadly stated, the WEU system involved setting limits on the forces and armaments of the signatory countries within a specified geographic area, with adherence to the limitations to be monitored by a system of international inspection and with enforcement by sanctions that would not require unanimity to be applied.26

On 22 April 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they had serious reservations concerning the State Department proposals. The suggested European security arrangement appeared to disregard the reasons for establishing NATO in the first place, namely that the threat to peace and security in Europe stemmed wholly from the aggressive military posture and political activities of the Soviet bloc, a danger that could only be met by a pooling of strength and resources by the threatened countries. To introduce the State Department's proposal for a European security arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of