The State Department draft treaty provided that the signatories agree not to use force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other signatory state. In the event of a violation, the other signatories would withhold all economic and military assistance to the offending state. In the event of an armed attack against any of the signatories within the treaty areadefined as the territory of the signatories within continental Europe south of a line drawn along the southern boundary of Denmark, thence to Memel and Moscow, and west of a line drawn from Moscow to Sevastopol-the signatories would act to meet the common danger according to their constitutional processes.

To lessen the likelihood of hostilities, the draft treaty provided that each party to it would refrain from maintaining armed forces in the territory of any other state within the treaty area without its consent. It provided further that the parties to the treaty who were also parties to the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Paris Protocol of 23 October 1954 would not increase their forces in the treaty area above the levels in effect thereunder without prior notice. Parties to the treaty not limited by the Brussels Treaty would agree to a similar limitation as specified in a schedule, to be supplied later. In fulfillment of the President's Open Skies proposal, within 30 days of the coming into effect of the treaty, each party would notify all the others of its military establishments, land, sea and air, located on or based upon the treaty area. To verify this information and to detect changes, a system of aerial reconnaissance of the treaty area would be established.

On 24 August 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that, subject to clarification of two points and a substantive change in a third, they were of the opinion that the draft treaty should not prove prejudicial to the security interest of the West. As clarifications they recommended: (1) that the boundaries of the treaty area be made to conform to readily identifiable political and geographic features so selected as to include the Baltic states; and (2) that the military information to be exchanged be defined more precisely. The substantive addition was to provide for ground observers stationed at key locations in each country as a supplement to aerial inspection. This corresponded to a proposal that had been offered by the Soviet Union on 10 May 1955. It had not yet formally become a part of the US position but was destined to be adopted by President Eisenhower on 11 October.

In the past the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed various schemes for a European security pact. The apparent change of view indicated by their general approval of the State Department's draft treaty they explained by pointing out that the current text avoided two features they had found objectionable in previous proposals: inclusion of elements of a regional disarmament plan and a requirement to withdraw allied forces from Germany.41

On 25 August the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), in a letter to Secretary of State Dulles, endorsed the JCS views as those of the Department of Defense. The State Department incorporated two of the JCS proposals in a revision of the draft treaty-those having to do with ground inspection and the more precise definition of the military forces to be reported.42

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received a further inquiry concerning the draft treaty on 7 September, when the Assistant Secretary of Defense requested their views

on questions raised by the State Department. Would the United States withdraw nuclear weapons from the treaty area, the State Department wanted to know, if such weapons were included among those to be covered under the disclosure and verification provisions of the treaty? If the United States were to withdraw these weapons, how would NATO strength be affected? Rather than reveal or withdraw them, would it be preferable to exclude nuclear weapons from the provisions of the treaty? 43

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 16 September, explained that they did not plan to withdraw atomic components voluntarily from the proposed treaty area. Any reporting and inspection of atomic weapons, they said, should be of a very general nature, limited perhaps to the location of storage sites. If the reporting was held to this level, there was no need to exclude nuclear weapons from the treaty's coverage. Should later circumstances require a choice between release of sensitive data on atomic weapons or their withdrawal from the area, the decision should be made in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time. As for the effect of withdrawing nuclear weapons from the treaty area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed such a move would weaken NATO even after taking account of concurrent withdrawal of Soviet troops at least into Poland and the rearming of a reunified Germany allied with the West.44

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not objected to the draft European security treaty except in minor details, they found the State Department's timetable for placing it into effect to be militarily unacceptable. The timetable, referred to them for comment on 10 October 1955, provided for two phases. In the first, beginning when a reunified Germany adhered to the treaty, all clauses of the treaty would go into effect except the one calling for appropriate action by the signatories in the event of armed attack by one party on another. This provision would become effective in phase two, which would begin when a reunified Germany joined NATO and WEU.45

Replying on 12 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that their earlier approval of the State Department's draft treaty was premised upon the prior accession of a reunified Germany to NATO and WEU and the withdrawal of Soviet forces (and not Allied) from her territory. If these assumptions were altered it would appear necessary to change radically the military provisions of such a treaty.46

They realized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, that it would not be practical to obtain, in advance, agreements which would be binding upon a reunified and sovereign Germany. This made it imperative that Phase I of the proposed security arrangement should contain no provisions which might serve to weaken in any way the ties of Germany with the West and influence her to adopt an independent role. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would find "militarily unacceptable the inclusion of any agreement in Phase I to: withdraw forces upon the request of the host country; accept provisions designed to stabilize forces within a specified area; and accept provisions for inspection and verification within that area." The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were adopted as the Department of Defense position, and the Department of State was so informed on 12 October.47

In London, meanwhile, the British Government had also been engaged in preparations for the meeting of foreign ministers. An indication of the approach the British were taking came on 18 August when their ambassador gave the State Department three Foreign Office papers on European security arrangements, which were offered as working papers without commitment. The State Department requested comments on them from the Department of Defense, and on 1 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to take under advisement the military implications of these documents and furnish their comment to the Secretary of Defense.48

The three British papers dealt with European security treaties, demilitarized zones, arms limitation, and inspection. The paper on security treaties discussed several types of pacts without recommending any one of them. Some of the pacts would go into effect after Germany had been reunified; others might be concluded in advance of that event. The paper on demilitarized zones and arms limitation discussed, again without a recommendation, a three-zone scheme consisting of western and eastern zones in which armaments would be limited, with a demilitarized zone interposed between them. The zones were not precisely defined: the western zone was described as including all or part of Germany and possibly Denmark; the eastern zone was described as comprising parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia; the demilitarized zone might or might not be confined to German territory. The armaments limitation, while not precisely defined, would conform to certain general rules: the ceilings on each side need not be identical so long as they resulted in a reasonable balance of forces between the two sides; initial ceilings must be high enough to maintain current levels of US, British, and Canadian forces in Germany and to allow the Germans to attain planned military strengths; and initial ceilings might be lowered progressively to conform to figures in a general disarmament plan. The paper on inspection proposed a pilot scheme limited to a strip running through the middle of Germany and extending 100 miles in either direction from the existing zonal boundary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply to the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, pointed out that the British papers contained proposals that they had already found to be unacceptable, namely the conclusion of a European security treaty before Germany had been reunified, a demilitarized zone confined to German territory, and a force reduction scheme that would constitute regional disarmament.49

The three Western powers unveiled their proposal on German reunification at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva on 27 October 1955. The Western delegations offered once again the reunification of Germany under the Eden plan, but coupled it this time with a measure intended to make it more palatable to the Soviet Union. Noting that the Soviet Government appeared to "fear that a unified Germany, established by free elections and free to choose its associates in collective defense would constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," the three Western powers offered to conclude a security treaty concurrently with agreement to reunify Germany under the Eden plan. Under the treaty's terms, parties thereto would renounce the use of force as a means to

settle international disputes, would withhold economic and military assistance from aggressors, and would limit military forces and armaments in a zone comprising areas of comparable size, depth, and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries. The limitation would be set at a level calculated to establish a military balance which would contribute to European security and help relieve the burden of armaments and which would be regulated by the provision by each country of information on its armed forces in the zone, verified by a system of inspection. Included in this system would be a radar net operated in the western area of the zone by the Soviet Union and in the eastern area by parties to the treaty who were also members of NATO. The treaty would come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed.50

The tripartite plan, as presented, deliberately left many details vague. It was, in fact, entitled an "Outline of Terms of Treaty of Assurance" and was in no sense a full text of a treaty that could be implemented. As a result, it is not possible to determine precisely whether it met all the conditions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In particular, the article calling for progressive implementation might or might not meet the JCS view that German adherence to NATO must take place before the placing into effect of a treaty. The proposal for a zone of limited armament, however, by specifying equal areas on both sides of the eastern border of a reunited Germany, clearly conformed to JCS views.

The Soviet Union refused the new Western offer in spite of the guarantees it included against aggression by Germany. Acting perhaps out of a realization that their East German puppet regime could not survive free elections, the Soviets fell back on their stock contention that the prime issue before the conference was not Germany but European security. They offered once again their scheme for an all-European security pact, a proposal that the West had already rejected on several occasions.

On other issues as well the conference rapidly became deadlocked, although the meetings dragged on until 16 November. So complete was the impasse that when the conference finally adjourned, the foreign ministers did not even attempt to preserve appearances by the usual device of referring questions in dispute to working groups or special committees for further study. The summertime spirit of Geneva, which had raised hopes that the great powers might be able to resolve their differences, had not survived the autumn frosts.

Hungary and Poland-Revolt in the Satellites

The

The death of Stalin raised hope not only among the noncommunist nations but among the peoples of the Soviet empire as well. Just as the citizens of the noncommunist countries looked for some modification of the communist drive for conquest, so the residents of the satellite countries hoped for a relaxation of the tyranny of the secret police and for economic reforms that would lead to a higher

standard of living. But it was not until early in 1955 that there were any signs that the police regime frozen on Eastern Europe might be beginning to thaw.

In May, the Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia for the express purpose of winning him back into the communist fold, from which he had been expelled in 1949. After making a confession of error on behalf of certain Soviet officials (now dead) for the original break between the two countries, the new Soviet leadership offered to normalize relations between the two states and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs not only of Yugoslavia but of other nations.

A more dramatic repudiation of the Stalinist reign of terror came early in 1956 when Khrushchev, addressing the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress, attacked the dead dictator for violating the true principles of MarxismLeninism by indulging in a cult of personality thereby presuming superhuman qualities of omniscience and omnipotence. Stalin was condemned as a leader who had abused his power by falsely accusing and unjustly convicting thousands of innocent and loyal party members.

During the first half of 1956 the US Government, in formulating its policies toward the Eastern European satellites, recognized that there had been significant changes as a result of Soviet introduction of collective leadership, acceptance of Titoism and "many roads to socialism," and denigration of Stalin. These changes, although they varied from country to country, involved certain developments common to all, such as a reduction in the role of the secret police, some open questioning of the policies of the communist regimes, and the emergence of identifiable nationalist elements within the satellite communist parties that might ultimately be disposed to challenge Soviet control over their countries.

Nevertheless, US policymakers concluded that Soviet control could not be seriously challenged and that successful internal revolution was highly improbable. Since to resort to war to eliminate Soviet domination of the satellites was judged not to be in the national interest, all that remained was for the United States to encourage "evolutionary change resulting in the weakening of Soviet controls and the attainment of national independence by the countries concerned, even though there may be no immediate change in their internal political structure." A policy statement to this effect, NSC 5608/1, was approved by President Eisenhower on 18 July 1956. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found it to be acceptable from the military point of view prior to its approval by the President.51

This evolutionary change seemed to be taking place in Poland during the months surrounding President Eisenhower's approval of the new statement of policy, although encouragement by the United States had had little or nothing to do with it. As in other Eastern European satellites, the end of the Stalin era had encouraged a resistance to domination by Moscow on the part of the government and a greater freedom of expression by the Polish people. There was, in addition, a rising expectation that the standard of living would be improved. When these expectations were not realized, workers in Poznan rioted during June. Troops of the local Polish garrison refused to fire on the rioters who were suppressed only when contingents of the Inner Army of special security troops chosen for their loyalty to the regime were employed. In spite of threats of severe punishment of