As 1956 drew to a close, the high hopes for a relaxation of tensions and thaw in the cold war in Europe had largely been dashed. The ascent to the summit in mid1955 had been followed by a descent, in subsidiary negotiations, to the same levels of deadlock between East and West on European questions that had existed before. The following year had seen stirrings of dissent within the satellite empire, culminating in Hungary in ruthless suppression by the Soviets. Under the circumstances, the only prudent course for the United States and its allies was to look to their defenses as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO: Implementing the Nuclear Strategy

7

During 1955 and 1956 the United States remained firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, and participation in the treaty's affairs continued to provide a primary means of expressing the US policy toward Europe. In January 1955 the other members of the defensive alliance were the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. The first five of these powers were also linked in the Western European Union, created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948.

It remained to add the Federal Republic of Germany to complete the roster of nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty as it existed during 1955 and 1956. To consider rearming a former enemy so soon after Germany's defeat was a step the treaty members had not taken lightly, but it was obvious to most of them that effective defense of their territories could not be conducted without the help of German manpower. After intensive negotiations, during which French misgivings and reservations were the chief obstacle, a formula was found to encompass the rearmament of the Federal Republic and the incorporation of German forces in the defense of Western Europe. By agreements signed in Paris on 23 October 1954 and ratified by the governments by May 1955, West Germany was permitted to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty and was admitted to a Western European Union modified to integrate it into the treaty's framework.1

By the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, the signatories committed themselves not only to mutual defense but also to the establishment of permanent international machinery that would enable them to meet this obligation—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 By the end of 1954, NATO had made substantial progress in providing for common defense. It had created a military organization consisting of institutions similar to those of individual nations. At the top was the North Atlantic Council, which functioned roughly as an international ministry of defense. It gave political guidance to the military authorities and attempted to provide the manpower and logistic support required to defend the NATO area.

Advising the Council on military matters in the manner of a national chiefs of staff committee was the Military Committee consisting of the chiefs of staff, or their designated representatives, of all the member countries. Because meetings of the Military Committee took place infrequently, day-to-day work was entrusted to a three-member executive agency called the Standing Group. It was composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, supported by a small planning staff drawn from the same nations. To keep the countries not represented on the Standing Group informed of its actions, a permanent group called the Military Representatives Committee was established. It consisted of the members of the Standing Group and one member from each of the other countries.

Receiving the orders of the Military Committee were three supreme Allied Commanders in Chief who were roughly comparable to national theater commanders. Each presided over one of the three major NATO commands: Allied Command Europe; Atlantic Command; and Channel Command. Allied Command Europe and the Atlantic Command were, in turn, subdivided: the former into Northern, Central, Southern, and Mediterranean Commands; and the latter into Western and Eastern Atlantic Commands. A third division of the Atlantic Command, the Iberian Atlantic Command, had been planned but had not yet been established pending settlement of differences over the nationality of the commander.

Like the governments of many of its member nations, NATO conducted its business on an annual cycle. At the heart of the NATO cycle was the annual review, which was the process for arriving at goals for the buildup of forces that were within the political and economic capabilities of the member governments and that they would accept as national commitments. The annual review was prepared by the NATO staff on the basis of replies to questionnaires sent to member governments and was given final approval by the North Atlantic Council, meeting in ministerial session in December. At the same session, the council approved military policy papers submitted to it by the Military Committee and the annual portion, or slice, of the NATO Common Infrastructure Program for the construction of logistic support facilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff participated in the work of NATO in two general ways. First, they supplied the answers to the questions on US military force levels in the Annual Review Questionnaire. Second, they gave guidance to the US representative on the Standing Group on all significant matters coming before that body. Of primary concern to NATO during 1955 and 1956, and therefore to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in dealing with NATO affairs, was the implementation of the nuclear strategy adopted by the Alliance at the end of 1954.

A Nuclear Strategy for NATO: MC 48

t its meeting in December 1954, the North Atlantic Council, by approving

AMC 48, had adopted a strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear

weapons and combat-ready forces in being. By this action the Council endorsed

the results of a new approach to NATO's strategic problems, instituted during 1954 and broadly similar in purpose to the New Look planning pursued by the Eisenhower administration in the United States.3 Under the new strategy, NATO's standing purpose remained the same: to deter Soviet aggression or, if deterrence failed, to defend in Europe from forward positions well to the east of the Rhine-Ijsell River line and ultimately to defeat the Soviet Union.

Any prospect that the strategy called for by MC 48 would make possible an overall reduction in the forces to defend NATO Europe was quickly dispelled when the military authorities of the alliance presented their estimate of the required force levels: 583 ground divisions; 8,810 aircraft; and 1,197 naval vessels at M-day and a total at full mobilization of 126 divisions; 8,810 aircraft; and 2,724 vessels. To attain these figures, NATO military authorities assumed a German contribution of 12 divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 164 naval vessels, not expected to be available before the end of 1956. Of these forces 643 divisions and 7,043 aircraft were allocated to the vital central front, with all the aircraft and 303 of the divisions to be available at the beginning of hostilities.4

At the time MC 48 was approved, the NATO countries were not willing to furnish forces of this magnitude. By approving the 1954 annual review, the NATO powers committed themselves only to attain the following level of forces by the end of 1955:

These goals failed to meet MC 48 M-day levels by 143 divisions, 1,886 aircraft, and 143 naval vessels. The shortfall consisted of the complete German contribution (not to be available until later years) and three divisions and 590 aircraft attributable to the remaining NATO countries. After mobilization had been completed, under the commitments made for 1955, the shortage would be 10 divisions, 1,886 aircraft, and 517 ships.5

The task facing the NATO countries at the beginning of 1955 was greater than these figures suggest because a substantial portion of the forces actually available were not fully ready for combat. At the end of 1954, SACEUR had reported that more than one third of the M-day ground units and over half the air force units were not fully combat-effective."

1955 Annual Review: MC 48 Goals Not Met

the member countries submitted their force plans for 1956 to the NATO

Astaff in response to the 1955 Annual Review Questionnaire, it became appar

ent that not only were the MC 48 goals not going to be met by the end of the year,