Union was apparently supporting with the expectation of controlling it. “The United States and the Western World have no effective defense arrangement which would counteract such an alliance," the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out. Joining the Baghdad Pact would provide an opportunity to establish a military position in the area, if it should later prove desirable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also maintained that US membership would serve to check, and ultimately to reverse, the growing power of Nasser. Conversely, "without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact.” 53

Emergence of the Eisenhower Doctrine

The urgent recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense proved unacceptable to President Eisenhower. He recognized the gravity of the situation in the Middle East but preferred other measures for meeting it than adherence to the Baghdad Pact. His approach which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was presented to the Congress on 5 January 1957, in the form of a request for a joint resolution authorizing him to offer military aid to any country in the Middle East requesting it, with the objective of helping those countries maintain their independence from communist domination. He also requested authority to use the armed forces of the United States as he deemed necessary to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern state requesting help when faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. The Congress subsequently granted the President's request and Eisenhower signed the resulting joint resolution on 9 March 1957.54

Secretary Wilson recognized that his request for early NSC consideration of US membership in the Baghdad Pact had been superseded by President Eisenhower's proposal to the Congress. At his recommendation, and with the President's approval, the item was removed from the NSC agenda.55

Now the search for a policy to safeguard US interests in the Middle East had been concluded. But the policy finally proposed and adopted, in the span of a few weeks, was different in both form and scope from what had been under consideration for nearly five years. During those years the United States had sought to enlist various Middle East states in a united resistance to Soviet aggression by developing collective military defense arrangements such as MEDO and the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower Doctrine, however, was a unilateral offer of US military assistance to countries coming under attack not only by the Soviet Union but by any state controlled by international communism.

The Arab-Israeli Dispute

9

A major obstacle to the erection of a common defense of the Middle East against communist expansion was the continuing antagonism between the Arab states and Israel. Ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish national homeland, Arabs everywhere had regarded the new state as an alien intruder, whose policy of welcoming Jewish immigration threatened a further territorial expansion at Arab expense. The armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon had attacked Israel shortly after its founding, in hostilities that were ended by the Armistice of 1949, which included the drawing of a new boundary line. Thereafter, the Israelis, claiming to be threatened by vastly superior numbers of Arabs, reacted strongly whenever they perceived any possible threat to their security. As a result, there was continuing violence along the armistice line as Arabs and Israelis engaged in raids and counterraids.

This situation was not favorable to the establishment of a system of common defense against communism. To Arabs, the existence of Israel was the central issue, and it relegated the danger of communist aggression to the background. Also, resentment over the prominent role the United States and the United Kingdom had played in the creation of Israel contributed strongly to the Arab aversion to joining a defense arrangement under the leadership of the Western powers. Israel might have been willing to join a Western-sponsored defense pact, but her inclusion would have completed the alienation of the Arab states.

To resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute became a major long-range policy objective of the United States and its allies. To deter or prevent hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbors became an immediate goal. To this end, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had issued a tripartite declaration on 25 May 1950, stating that they would “immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations," to prevent the use of force or threat of force between any of the countries in the area. Also, the three powers would try to prevent an arms race between the Arab states and Israel by requiring each recipient to renounce aggression against any other state before being supplied with arms.' To spell out what was meant by "immediately take action," President Eisenhower on 23 July 1954 approved a "Supplementary Statement of Policy on the

Arab-Israeli Problems." This statement, issued as part of NSC 5428, the basic Middle East policy document, called for economic reprisals by the United States against the party it judged to be the perpetrator of an armed attack. The reprisals listed were discontinuance of US aid, an embargo of US trade, and a blockage of the transfer of funds from any source in the United States to the aggressor. In the event economic reprisals failed to end the hostilities, the Supplementary Statement called for the United States to consult with the United Kingdom and other powers on whether to impose a blockade on the aggressor or, further, to "use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders." To support these measures, the policy contemplated the preparation of military plans in collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey. In pursuing these courses of action, the United States was to seek UN sanction and support but would act promptly without it if timely UN action appeared unlikely.2

Revising US Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

During 1955, continued violence along the Israeli-Arab borders raised the possibility that the actions listed in NSC 5428 might be carried out. Except for a few brief respites, the year was characterized by a series of border violations, bombings, and commando raids as both sides engaged in acts of provocation and reprisal.

Even more alarming to the United States than this continued violence was the conclusion in September of a barter deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt whereby Egyptian cotton would be exchanged for an undisclosed amount of heavy military equipment and munitions. This agreement might endanger the military balance between Israel and the Arab states, the preservation of which had become a major policy objective of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as stated in the 1950 tripartite declaration.

The National Security Council considered the impact of the arms deal on US policy on 7 October 1955, at a time when there was some concern that Israel might feel so threatened as to launch a preventive war. The NSC directed the Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of NSC 5428 "with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states." 3 The Planning Board immediately assigned to a StateDefense-JCS-CIA Working Group the task of preparing a draft report reviewing the validity of the courses of action in the "Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab-Israeli Problem" contained in NSC 5428.

On 13 October the Working Group submitted a report approving the existing provision for economic sanctions but recommending that the determination of the aggressor be made, if possible, by the United Nations rather than by the United States alone, as provided in the existing paper. As for the military courses of action to be taken if economic measures failed, the Working Group recommended amending the existing provision for consultation on possible establish

ment of a blockade to read, simply, "establish a blockade." The group could not agree on further military measures, however, and reported split views to the Planning Board. The State and CIA members favored prompt and direct military intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom against troop concentrations to check a major armed conflict "before it was fairly launched." The JCS and Defense members opposed any military action other than a blockade, believing that such actions would result in a maldeployment of US forces by committing them against noncommunists, would alienate the Arab states or Israel, could encourage other nations to call on the United States to guarantee boundaries, and would turn world opinion against the United States.4

The Planning Board was unable to resolve these divergent opinions and, in fact, elaborated upon them in reporting to the NSC on 17 October. On the subject of military measures beyond a blockade there was now a three-way division: JCS, Defense, and Budget representatives opposed any recommendations for such measures; Treasury and Disarmament representatives recommended that the United States consider providing military forces with congressional authority to respond to a UN resolution or a request from a victim of aggression; and the State representative would have the United States be prepared to provide military forces under these circumstances.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made their first formal comments on revision of the Supplementary Statement when they reviewed the Planning Board draft on 19 October. They supported the positions taken by their representatives on the Planning Board and Working Group. On the blockade question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that the policy should be clear with respect to whether a blockade would or would not be imposed. Supporting the position not to include reference to other military measures in the policy paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that forces engaged in a major conflict between Israel and the Arab states could number as many as 500,000. For the United States to intervene successfully in an operation of this magnitude under existing force levels would require large-scale withdrawal of forces from other commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not rule out military intervention under all circumstances, but they were of the opinion that a decision should be made in light of conditions at the time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended adding to the provision for combined military planning a requirement for US unilateral planning as well."

The National Security Council took up the Planning Board report and the JCS comments on 20 October but was unable to resolve the divergent views. The Council members were in general agreement that a blockade would be desirable but were not prepared to endorse further military actions. Accordingly, the report was returned to the Planning Board for "revision in light of the JCS views and NSC discussion in the meeting."7

The Planning Board incorporated the JCS proposal for unilateral planning but was still unable to agree on the military actions to be taken and again submitted split views to the NSC. The JCS and Defense representatives stood by their previous proposals, but the State representative had modified his position. He now proposed merely to "study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade." 8

In commenting on the revised report the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to support their previously expressed views. In opposing the new State position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that a study undertaken at that time with respect to military actions other than a blockade would necessarily be based not only upon many imponderables but also upon assumptions the validity of which would be open to question."

The National Security Council considered the revised Planning Board paper and approved the State Department recommendation. As finally recommended by the NSC on 27 October 1955 and approved by the President on 2 November, the revision of NSC 5428 read as follows:

COURSES OF ACTION

10. a. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

(1) Discontinue U.S. Government aid.

(2) Embargo U.S. trade.

(3) Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

b. Because the actions in paragraph 10-a above may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.

c. Take the following actions either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10-a:

(1) Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.

(2) Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

11. a. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in paragraph 10-a above.

b. Make the studies regarding military action referred to in paragraph 10-b above unilaterally. At such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, be prepared to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.10

After three weeks of urgent review, the NSC had produced a revision of the Supplementary Statement in which the courses of action were no more explicit than in the original. The Council had left the economic actions unchanged and, lacking agreement on specific military measures, had merely provided for study of the desirability and feasibility of employing force. It had passed the buck back down to the staff level by directing the preparation of studies regarding the military action referred to in the Supplementary Statement.