Breakdown in Combined Planning

Thus the effort to plan for military action to deter or terminate hostilities

Tbetween the Arab states and Israel was largely unsuccessful. After a promis

ing beginning, combined planning with the British had finally to be suspended. The US unilateral planning, while carried to completion, was not finished until 12 days after Israel invaded Egypt in October, thus precipitating a crisis of the sort the plans were intended to meet.30

The nature of the conflict that actually occurred in the Middle East made combined tripartite military action impossible, in any event. The British and French, far from acting impartially to preserve the status quo in the area, attacked Egypt in collusion with Israel. And the United States could hardly have put its own unilateral plans into effect to resolve a conflict involving not only Israel and the Arab states but also Britain and France.

The Suez Canal Crisis

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The long-expected renewal of hostilities in the Middle East began on 29 October 1956, when Israeli troops invaded Egypt. The invasion, however, was only a part of a much larger crisis that had begun on 26 July 1956 when the Egyptian Government nationalized the Suez Canal. Since 1869, the canal had been operated by the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, or Suez Canal Company. In 1875, the British Government purchased Egypt's shares in the company and thereby gained a controlling interest. Since 1888, the international status of the canal had been regulated by the Constantinople Convention signed in that year by France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey (Egypt being part of what was then the Ottoman Empire). This Convention decreed that the canal must remain open to vessels of all nations in time of war as well as peace. In practice, however, Britain had exercised actual control over the Suez Canal and had closed it to shipping of her enemies during both World War I and World War II. Since 1948, Egypt had restricted the passage of goods bound for Israel.

Egyptian Seizure of the Canal

Th

The immediate cause of Egyptian seizure of the canal was the withdrawal on 19 July of a US offer to help finance a new high dam on the Nile near Aswan. One of the most cherished objectives of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Aswan Dam would increase the cultivable area of Egypt by 30 percent and provide all necessary electric power to the Nile delta. To build such a dam would cost an estimated $1.4 billion—a sum far exceeding Egyptian resources and therefore necessitating outside assistance. The Western powers, perhaps influenced by a Soviet expression of willingness to consider giving aid to Egypt for construction of the dam, made Egypt a specific offer of financial assistance. The United States proposed to lend Egypt $56 million; Britain followed suit with an offer of $14 million and the World Bank with $200 million. These offers were made with a stipula

tion that Egypt would set aside counterpart funds for the construction of the dam, would give it priority over other projects, and would not accept Soviet aid.

Displeased by these conditions, President Nasser delayed acceptance, probably in the expectation of a more favorable offer from Moscow. Meanwhile, the controlled Egyptian press carried on a vituperative campaign against the Western nations for their sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact and for their alleged partiality to Israel and hostility to Arab national aspirations. As if to accentuate his defiant attitude, Nasser recognized Communist China on 16 May 1956.

Nasser's delay in accepting the Western offer was disturbing to US leaders because of the impression he gave that he was playing off East against West. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, recalled that this threat of blackmail appeared certain to make congressional approval of the US contribution extremely difficult to obtain. Influential members of the administration were also beginning to doubt the wisdom of financing the Aswan Dam on other grounds. Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey was of the opinion that the Egyptian Government would be unable to repay the loans because of the drain on its resources resulting from the extensive arms purchases it was negotiating. Secretary of State Dulles feared that, because of the burdens the construction of the dam would impose on the Egyptian people, any outside nation associated with the Aswan Dam project would garner only unpopularity among the Egyptians.

The United States nevertheless still felt obligated to help finance construction of the dam. On 20 June 1956, Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, went to Cairo to brief Nasser on a final Western offer. Nasser countered with proposals that were unacceptable to the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles interpreted Nasser's action to mean that he was no longer interested in working out an agreement with the West, and they concluded that rumors of a substantial Soviet offer were probably true. They considered the matter dead for all practical purposes.1

Congressional opposition, meanwhile, was stiffening. The Senate Appropriations Committee passed a resolution directing that there should be no support for the Aswan Dam without the approval of the Committee. Secretary of State Dulles, while he doubted the constitutionality of the action, nevertheless believed it indicated a congressional attitude that would make financing of the dam by the United States impossible.2

On 13 July, Secretary Dulles informed the President that he had warned the Egyptians that congressional opposition would make the consummation of a loan agreement impossible at that time. He also advised them that the United States had altered its views on the merits of financing the dam. In spite of this warning, the Egyptian Ambassador called at the State Department on 19 July and made a new request for a huge commitment over a period of ten years. The Secretary replied that the Western powers had long since interpreted Egypt's delay in responding to their offer and its unacceptable counterproposals as indicating a lack of interest. The Western powers considered the offer withdrawn.3

Nasser's reaction was swift and drastic. On 26 July he proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and announced that the canal revenues would be used to build the Aswan Dam.

In subsequent US public discussion of the Suez crisis it was often charged that withdrawal of the offer had been abrupt, unexpected, and unnecessarily wounding to Egyptian sensibilities. The State Department itself contributed to this widely-held impression by the statement it released on 19 July 1956, which revealed only some of the lesser reasons for the US action. In advising the President, Secretary Dulles held that the Egyptian leader could have been in no doubt that the US reply would be negative. Taking note of later remarks by Nasser that he had planned for some time to nationalize the Suez Canal Company but had been waiting for favorable circumstances, the Secretary wrote, "Nevertheless, he pressed for a definitive answer, and I suspect did so in order to create the 'occasion' for which he said he was looking." 4

The Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company produced a profound shock in the capitals of Great Britain, France, and the United States and set off a flurry of diplomatic activity among the leaders of those countries. British and French leaders were convinced that strong measures were necessary to protect their vital interests. The British reaction was summed up by Prime Minister Anthony Eden in a telegram to President Eisenhower on 27 July. Eden said that the members of the British Government were:

all agreed that we cannot allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements. If we take a firm stand now we shall have the support of all the maritime powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are all convinced, be finally destroyed.... As we see it, we are unlikely to attain our objectives by economic measures alone.... We ought in the first instance to bring the maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt. For this, apart from our own action, we should invoke the support of all the interested powers. My colleagues and I believe we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part, we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly.5

The attitude of the French was given by Foreign Minister Christian Pineau to US Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris the same day. Pineau said his government took a most serious view of the situation and likened it to Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland. The Foreign Minister believed that failure to act in opposition to Nasser's move would make likely the seizure of all pipelines in the Middle East within three months, which would place Europe's economy at the mercy of the Arab states. French military staffs were joining the British staffs in studying the problems involved in reoccupying the Canal Zone."

In a statement in Washington on 29 July, Secretary Dulles said that Nasser's action had struck "a grievous blow at international confidence" and might jeopardize the effective operation of the canal, but he stressed the desirability of finding a political solution. In a letter to Prime Minister Eden two days later, the President said the United States recognized the "transcendent worth" of the canal to the free world and the possibility that the situation might deteriorate to the point where the use of force became necessary to protect international rights. But President Eisenhower made very clear his belief that it could be demonstrated to world opinion that every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been exhausted.?

In pursuit of this policy, the President sent the Secretary of State to London on 1 August to consult with British and French officials. Secretary Dulles persuaded the British and French to agree to an international conference of 24 nations, including Egypt, to meet in London on 16 August and produce a plan for international operation of the canal.8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Suez Planning

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, had reacted immediately to Nasser's nationalization of the canal company. On 27 July, they directed the preparation of a study setting forth the arguments for and against the following courses of action: (1) participation by US forces with British forces in direct military action to seize control of the Suez Canal; (2) US support of British military action without direct participation by US forces; and (3) US support of British military action limited to diplomatic and economic measures.

In a study submitted the next day, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee concluded that US support of the British should be limited to the types of action specified in the third course. The first and second courses of action were considered undesirable because they would alienate the Arab states. The staff opinion was rejected by Admiral Burke, General Twining, and General Taylor, who all held that Egyptian seizure of the canal was militarily unacceptable to the United States. They called for a presentation of JCS views to that effect to the National Security Council.10

In a memorandum on 31 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered the Egyptian nationalization of the canal company to be so seriously detrimental to the United States and its allies from the military point of view as to require action by them that could "reasonably be expected to result in placing the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable date." If actions short of the use of military force could not reasonably by expected to achieve this result, they said, the United States should consider the desirability of taking military action in support of Britain, France and others as appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommended that the Secretary request the National Security Council to take up the Suez Canal question in order to determine whether the Western world could "expect to obtain the necessary results without recourse to military action by any western power." They wished the National Security Council to "appraise the desirability of a U.S. guarantee to give political and economic support to military action by the U.K...., of a prompt military commitment to prompt direct military participation by U.S. forces in the event that third parties intervene militarily on behalf of the Egyptians."

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On 31 July, during a NSC meeting, Admiral Burke said "the JCS are of the view that Nasser must be broken." Therefore, if the British resorted to force, "we should declare ourselves in support of their action." President Eisenhower, however, felt that Nasser "embodies the emotional demands of the people of the area