employed in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union would probably undertake limited indirect military intervention by means of volunteer air crews and aircraft.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff never resolved these differing interpretations of Soviet capabilities and intentions. They merely referred both staff papers on 6 November to the JMEPC with instructions to undertake a continuing estimate of Soviet capabilities and possible courses of action in the Middle East.51

Concurrently, a Special National Intelligence Estimate stated that the USSR evidently wished to avoid general war. The Soviets, according to the Estimate, would not use nuclear-armed guided missiles in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and probably would not employ their forces on a large scale in the eastern Mediterranean. They might, however, make small-scale air or submarine attacks against Anglo-French forces in that area.52

The Soviet threats and actions of 5 and 6 November did, however, indicate the need to place US military forces in an improved state of readiness. On the morning of 6 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend the following list of nine specific readiness measures to the President: recall all military personnel from regular leave; improve the readiness of the Continental Air Defense Command by increasing the number of interceptor aircraft on advanced state of alert and five-minute alert; improve the readiness of SAC by deploying tanker squadrons to US bases and to Alaska, Goose Bay, Thule, and Harmon; and prepare to reinforce the Sixth Fleet by sailing the carriers Forrestal and Franklin D. Roosevelt, a cruiser, and the three destroyer divisions toward the Azores. Other measures included: improve the readiness of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets by augmenting picket ships on the DEW Line extensions and sending all anti-submarine warfare units to sea; deploy submarines to reconnaissance stations; reinforce the Seventh Fleet in the Far East with two CVAS, one CA, and one destroyer squadron, and prepare other fleet units to sail; improve the readiness of the Tactical Air Command by alerting all heavy troop carrier wings in the Zone of Interior and suspending all training and routine operations; improve US military readiness in the Persian Gulf area by sailing a Marine BLT, accompanied by two CVAS, one cruiser, and one destroyer squadron from Yokusuka to the Persian Gulf; send a general warning message to all US commands; and obtain authority to station an air task force from Europe at Adana, Turkey.53

Shortly after noon, President Eisenhower met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of State Hoover, and other high officials at the White House. Admiral Radford presented the list of measures recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President approved all the alert and deployment moves except the alerting of SAC, though he rejected the recall of personnel from leave. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then directed that the specific alert and deployment actions be carried out, and they informed the commanders of all unified and specified commands of the measures being taken.54

The Crisis Defused

The danger of immediate Soviet intervention receded somewhat on 6 Novem

Ifael, the United Kingdom, and cease-five as

proposed by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 2 November. Prime Minister Eden made the crucial decision to halt, and there can be no doubt that pressure from Washington played a major part in the decision. A heavy run on the pound sterling had occurred, fuelled by rumors of US economic sanctions. The cease-fire became effective at midnight on 6 November. By this time, French and British troops had seized the canal as far south as El Cap, a distance of about 20 miles from the northern terminus at Port Said. But they had been unable to prevent Egyptians from carrying out a carefully planned blockage of the canal. Prepositioned ships were sunk at strategic locations, so completely blocking the waterway that it remained closed to navigation until the following April.

The Assembly resolution of 2 November had called for withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt as well as a cease-fire. The British, French, and Israelis were reluctant to withdraw, however, until they had wrung the maximum practical advantages from their occupation of Egyptian territory. Rapid introduction of the prospective UN Emergency Force became desirable as a means to speed the departure of the invading forces.

Even before the UN General Assembly decided to organize an Emergency Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated a requirement for US forces to transport UN troops to Egypt. On 5 November, they agreed that the Chief of Staff, Air Force, should be prepared to provide airlift for four of five battalions in the event that the United Nations established an international force in the Suez area.55 On 9 November Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States had offered assistance in transporting and supplying the UN Emergency Force. He authorized them to direct appropriate commanders to make available the initial air and sealift to move advance elements of the force to Egypt, and to direct the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to coordinate the initial movements and to maintain direct liaison with the US delegation of the United Nations. Assistant Secretary Gray also requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a military department to serve as executive agent for assistance provided to the United Nations after the movement of the advance elements.56 The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied the same day, informing the Secretary of Defense that the Chief of Staff, Air Force, had been appropriately directed and also recommending the Department of the Navy as executive agent. On 12 November, the Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation.57

The United Nations, meanwhile, was busy organizing the Emergency Force, which eventually came to number about 6,000 men, made up of contingents from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Colombia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia under the command of Canadian Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns. To make good on the US offer to help support the force, the Secretary of Defense, on 23 November, directed the Secretary of the Air Force to honor a UN request to lift the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, Colombian, and Indian contingents to Naples. Meantime, the advance parties had already begun arriv

ing in Naples where they transferred to Swissair planes for movement to Egypt. The first Emergency Force units arrived at Abu Suweir, Egypt, on 15 November. To fulfill the offer of logistic assistance, CINCNELM negotiated an agreement with the UN authorities under which supplies were furnished the Emergency Force through the US Navy Support Activity Command in Naples.58

The introduction of the UN Emergency Force did not, however, lead to a speedy withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt. The three powers still attempted to gain such advantage as they could from their adventure, with the result that there were protracted negotiations before they finally began force withdrawals. This situation was aggravated by the Soviet Union, which had announced on 10 November that, if Britain, France, and Israel did not withdraw their forces in compliance with UN decisions, Soviet authorities would not "hinder the departure of Soviet citizen volunteers who wish to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for their independence." 59 In response, the United States protested strongly in the United Nations. Addressing the General Assembly on 16 November, Acting Secretary of State Hoover said that the United States would fully support action by the United Nations in resisting introduction of external forces into the Suez area.

The United States also took an additional military preparedness measure at this time. On 14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a decision cleared with the Secretary of Defense, directed the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to place SAC in a state of increased readiness and to deploy tanker aircraft to Labrador, Newfoundland, and Greenland.60

Under intensive pressure from all sides, the British and French Governments announced on 3 December that they would withdraw their forces from Egypt without delay. Soon thereafter it was announced in Moscow that the departure of Soviet volunteers for Egypt was no longer in prospect.61

In view of this relaxation of tensions in the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now gradually returned US armed forces to normal status. On 7 December, TAC and SAC reverted to normal conditions of readiness; on 13 December, CINCNELM returned his flag to London and the Sixth Fleet resumed normal operations; on 21 December, the alert status of the RCT in Europe was cancelled. The situation remained volatile. Admiral Radford told a State Department official that he was desperately concerned that the Middle East situation was going "to bog down and disintegrate and that if it did so, the military had to be in a position to act if hostilities spread." President Nasser, he worried, would "start to do all kinds of things after the British and French withdrawal when there were no longer any strings on him." 62

Many months were to pass before the settlement of the Middle East war was completed, but the conflict had passed the crisis stage once Britain, France, and Israel agreed to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. But even though the immediate crisis was resolved, the power relationships in the area were drastically altered. Great Britain, a dominant power there since the end of World War I, now found its influence reduced to insignificance. Within a few months Jordan, a state created by the British after World War I, abrogated its treaty with Great

Britain and entered into agreements with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to replace the British subsidies lost as a result. A power vacuum developed in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, which had already gained a foothold by supplying arms and moral support to Egypt, was eager to fill it.

For the United States, the Suez crisis had posed difficult questions of how best to secure its vital interests. Should the United States support its major allies, Britain and France, in their attempt to maintain control by force of arms? Or should it seek the favor of the Arab states and oppose the colonialist imperialism of Britain and France? For a number of reasons President Eisenhower chose the latter course, and at his direction the United States had actually taken the lead in gaining passage of a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling on the aggressors to withdraw their force from Egyptian territory.

During the period before the Israeli drive into Egypt began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the opposite view on military grounds. They had advocated giving logistical, political, and economic support to Britain and France, basing their recommendation on the belief that Nasser, if unchecked, would unite the Arab world and use his newfound power to threaten vital oil supplies and military bases of the United States and its allies. Though the established procedures for policy determination centered around the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been given an opportunity shortly after Nasser nationalized the canal to express their views through the Secretary of Defense and before the NSC. Again, in keeping with established procedures, the NSC directed further study by a State-Defense committee, which reached the same conclusion as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the established policymaking procedures, employed immediately after the Egyptian seizure of the canal, were abandoned as the crisis intensified. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were no longer called upon to express formal views. Instead, Secretary of State Dulles launched a series of diplomatic moves, initiated by himself and approved by President Eisenhower. The ultimate decision to condemn Britain, France, and Israel as aggressors was debated by the NSC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, though not formally consulted, were represented at the critical meetings by Admiral Radford. In any event, the final resolution of the Suez crisis, resulting as it had in the liquidation of British power in the Middle East and in an increase in the influence of the Soviet Union in the area, posed new problems for the makers of US foreign policy in the years ahead.

Containment in the Far East: Taiwan and the Offshore Islands

11

At the beginning of 1955 a revised statement of US policy toward the Far East, NSC 5429/5, had just been approved. The containment of Communist China continued as its central theme. "The primary problem of U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the serious threat to U.S. security interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland China, North Korea, and... the northern part of Vietnam." NSC 5429/5 defined the US objective in Asia as being to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the noncommunist countries in the area against further communist expansion or subversion, while taking measures to strengthen these countries economically, politically, and militarily. At the same time, the United States would seek to reduce Chinese communist power and prestige and to disrupt the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Unique Problem of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands

The

The countries and territories to be preserved from communism included South Korea, Japan and the Ryukyus, Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and the portions of Southeast Asia covered by the SEATO treaty. Of these areas, Taiwan and the Pescadores were most directly threatened by communist aggression in 1955 and 1956.1

Of all the Asian land areas described in NSC 5429/5 as having strategic importance to the United States, Taiwan was unique in that it had special value also to Communist China. To the United States, Taiwan was a major link in the island security chain on the approaches to the Asian mainland. It was also of special political importance as the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, whose existence kept alive the claims and entitlement of a noncommunist China. To Mao Tse-tung, the continuation of Chiang's rival government on Taiwan was a potential source of military and political danger and an embodiment