Despite this buildup, there had been little action in the Taiwan Straits since the evacuation of the Tachens.51

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this course of events seemed to justify the policy of withholding any declaration of specific US intentions with regard to the offshore islands. A paper prepared for JCS action during May 1956 included the statement that, “thus far, the apparent effect of this policy has served United States interest." The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended it by adding, “Therefore, no change in U.S. policy as to defense of the off-shore islands is recommended at this time," but then decided merely to note the paper rather than forwarding its substance to the Secretary of Defense.52

Early in July, in view of the quiescence of the Western Pacific area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and Secretary Wilson approved, a reduction of the naval forces deployed there by one attack carrier and one hunter/killer group. At the time, this was scheduled to be a temporary withdrawal for the period 1 October 1956-1 April 1957, during which weather conditions would be least favorable to overt communist military action. On 29 November 1956, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal by the Chief of Naval Operations that virtually all the naval forces deployed to meet the crisis in the Taiwan Straits be returned to their normal assignment.53

As 1956 closed, the congressional resolution authorizing the President to use US forces to secure Taiwan and the Pescadores against attack remained in effect, and with it the specific policies and rules of engagement that had been developed during the period of tension in 1955. They would meet their next serious test in 1958.

Korea and the Problems of the Armistice

12

Although the greatest danger to the system of alliances and military bases by which the United States sought to contain Communist China occurred in the Taiwan Straits, conditions in Korea were also a cause for concern. As 1955 began, the military armistice terminating hostilities in Korea had been in effect for nearly a year and a half. Prospects for a permanent political settlement of the fate of that divided country were, however, exceedingly dim. A conference in Geneva between the belligerents in the Korean war plus the Soviet Union, held in the spring of 1954, had ended in deadlock when the communist powers rejected a proposal for reunification of Korea by free elections supervised by the United Nations.

Status of the Armistice

Of particular concern to the United States in view of the failure to achieve a

political settlement in Korea was the fact that the communists had proceeded with a major buildup and modernization of their forces there, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Articles 13 c and d of that document provided that commanders of the two sides would "cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel" and of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. Permitted actions included the rotation of personnel, so long as no overall increase resulted, and the replacement of destroyed, damaged, or worn out equipment, "piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type."

The primary agency that had been established to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement was the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), consisting of five officers representing the United Nations Command (UNC) and five from the communist side. Further, there was a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), charged with investigating alleged violations of the armisstice provisions. The NNSC was composed of four senior officers, two of them appointed by neutral nations nominated by the UNC, namely, Sweden and

Switzerland, and two appointed "by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia." Subordinate to it were 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) of similar composition to the NNSC. The duty of the NNITs was to inspect personnel and materiel entering or leaving Korea through 10 designated points of entry (five for each side) and to make spot inspections anywhere in Korea as requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side of the MAC.'

From the first, the communists disregarded the armistice terms and introduced increasing numbers of modern weapons and aircraft into North Korea. By the end of 1954, the North Korean Air Force, according to US intelligence estimates, had been built up from approximately 340 aircraft operating entirely from Manchuria to 450 aircraft, including 220 jets, all stationed in North Korea. In ground force equipment, the North Koreans had added some 10,000 artillery pieces and mortar tubes.2

The NNSC had proved totally incapable of detecting, much less preventing, this buildup in violation of the Armistice terms. Meaningful inspections in North Korea were either hampered by the Poles and Czechs on the Commission or blocked by the North Korean authorities. Only one mobile inspection team had been dispatched to North Korea by the end of 1954, and it was allowed to see only what the communists wanted it to see. Five subsequent requests for investigations by UN Command members of the MAC were refused by the NNSC. At the same time, the armistice was applied to the letter in South Korea. The NNSC insisted that replacement equipment for the UN forces be of the same type and subseries as the equipment replaced.3

Elimination of these inequities in the armistice procedures became the concern both of US military authorities and of the noncommunist members of the NNSC. On 14 April 1954, the Swiss and Swedish Governments addressed aides memoire to the United States, expressing dissatisfaction with the inability of the NNSC to function effectively. The two countries observed that if a peace settlement was not quickly achieved, they would have to reconsider their further participation in the supervisory effort. On 12 May and again on 26 August, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for eliminating the inequities by abolishing the NNSC altogether. According to this scheme, the UNC member of the MAC would introduce a resolution in that body to dissolve the NNSC and revoke Articles 13 c and 13 d of the Armistice Agreement. If the communists in the MAC rejected the proposal or failed to give a definitive reply in a reasonable time, the UNC would declare the proposed actions in effect unilaterally.4

While the course favored by CINCUNC was not taken at that time, the conviction was becoming general that a way must be found to end the disadvantages being suffered owing to the malfunctioning of the supervisory machinery. In the fall of 1954, representatives of the 16 nations that had fought on the United Nations side during the Korean conflict met in Washington, agreed that the NNSC had become ineffective because of communist obstruction, and proposed

that the United States, Great Britain, and France seek to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC.5

Korean Policy Revised: NSC 5514

10 bring national policy into line with these realities the United States revised its official statement on Korea. The new policy paper, NSC 5514, received the President's approval on 12 March 1955. It called for giving wide publicity to the fact that the communists, with the connivance of the communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, had violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement from the beginning. The United States would continue to observe the armistice terms, except in actions found necessary to counter communist violations that placed the UN Command at a significant disadvantage. In considering what measures to employ in the face of communist violations, the United States would weigh the improved position to be gained against the military and political disadvantages that might accrue, including possible disagreements with its allies. Prior agreement of the other nations contributing to the UN Command would be sought, but they should not be given a veto on US actions.

In other significant respects, NSC 5514 was similar to NSC 170/1 of 20 November 1953, the paper it superseded. Both papers stated that the long-range objective of the United States was to bring about the unification of Korea as an economically self-supporting, democratic state friendly to the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient to maintain internal security and to repulse attacks by any but a major power. Both papers described the current US objective as to assist South Korea so that it could make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area, to prevent any further communist advance in Korea by either subversion or aggression, and to develop the South Korean armed forces."

In its passage through the machinery of the executive branch, NSC 5514 had encountered no major objections. On 4 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the Secretary of Defense that it was acceptable from a military point of view, and they recommended his concurrence in its adoption. After a brief discussion on 10 March the National Security Council approved the draft unchanged.?

Meeting of the Sixteen UN Allies

'ven before the new policy had been adopted, there was another appeal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General Lemnitzer for revision of the armistice terms. On 31 January 1955 he again recommended measures to dissolve the NNSC and revoke the pertinent articles of the Armistice Agreement. He suggested that the new aides memoire that the Swiss and Swedish Governments had forwarded on 27 January created "a political atmosphere for positive action" along those lines.