dum originated by General Taylor, they pointed out that the promised definition of procedures had still not occurred. As a result, no actual modernization of forces in Korea had yet been authorized, even though the NNITS had been absent from South Korea for three months. The need for modernization remained urgent because of the communist buildup in North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to obtain the concurrence of the State Department to suspend Articles 13 c and d of the Armistice Agreement and to authorize CINCUNC to begin modernizing his materiel in Korea by introducing items, approved by the Department of Defense, that he deemed necessary.

As items sanctioned by the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the following aircraft: 25 F-86 all-weather fighters as well as B-57s, RF84-Fs, F-100s, F-102s, and C-130s in quantities desired by CINCUNC. As for Army equipment, they wanted: one battalion each of 280mm and 155mm artillery; 18 75mm and 64 twin 40mm antiaircraft guns: one battery of Honest John rockets; one battalion of Nike antiaircraft missiles, and other miscellaneous items.

In making their proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically recommended that an atomic capability be included in the modernization program. They based their recommendation on the logical assumption that communist aircraft possessed such a capability, or that the enemy could deploy atomic-capable units to North Korea on short notice.35

State Department Opposition to Nuclear Weapons

The JCS recommendations were discussed by Secretaries Gray and Robertson,

Tadmiral Radford, and legal advisers of the State and Defense Departments

on 11 September 1956. It quickly became apparent that the State Department was not prepared to accept the JCS views on introduction of weapons with an atomic capability or on suspending Article 13 d. State preferred to limit the new weapons introduced to types consistent with a liberal interpretation of that article, while leaving it in force. The conferees decided to refer the JCS list of equipment to legal experts of the two departments for such a determination.

Agreement was quickly reached by the lawyers on all the listed items except Honest John, the 280mm gun, and Nike. The first two of these weapons possessed an atomic capability, and the State Department spokesman took the position that their introduction could not be justified except possibly on a showing that the communists themselves had introduced such weapons. Mr. Gray asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 September for any evidence of such action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on 19 October that they could not substantiate the presence of communist atomic warheads or atomic ground delivery systems in North Korea. Nevertheless, they continued to maintain that the presence of communist aircraft with an atomic delivery capability in North Korea, coupled with the ability to introduce additional atomic delivery systems, fully justified supplying atomic weapons to CINCUNC.36

Repetition of this JCS opinion did not appreciably strengthen the Defense Department's case, but in subsequent conferences the area of disagreement over what could properly be introduced into Korea without suspending Article 13 d was narrowed somewhat farther. By 29 November 1956 the two departments had agreed to the entire JCS list of new weapons and equipment except for the two weapons with atomic capability-the 280mm gun and the Honest John. The Defense Department position, as expressed by the General Counsel, was that introduction of the two weapons without nuclear components and solely as replacements for conventional weapons was legally justified under Article 13 d. The State Department's legal adviser maintained that the Honest John and the 280mm gun should not be introduced because they were atomic weapons in the eyes of the world. This, he admitted, was a political rather than a legal question and should be decided by the President. Accordingly, Assistant Secretaries Gray and Robertson and Admiral Radford met with Secretary of Defense Wilson on 29 November and recommended that he take up the question of new weapons and equipment with President Eisenhower.37

The question of introducing new weapons and equipment into Korea was not to be resolved before the end of 1956. In fact, it was not until 13 June 1957 that introduction of the conventional weapons on the JCS list received presidential approval.

Containment in Southeast Asia

13

The years 1955 and 1956 saw continuing efforts by the United States to seal the breach in the wall containing communist expansion that had resulted from the Viet Minh victory in Indochina. In the Indochina war, which had been concluded on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference, the communists had scored major gains. Not only had they brought all of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel under their direct control, but they had removed all effective noncommunist military power from Laos and Cambodia as well. From the salient they had gained in North Vietnam, the communists were in a position to bring pressure to bear on the other weak and unstable countries of the area.

Communist domination of Southeast Asia, the United States believed at the beginning of 1955, "would endanger in the short term and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. It could lead to alignment with Communism by India and the Middle East, with serious consequences to the stability and security of Europe." It would also, if combined with communist domination of Indonesia, "threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain" and "could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to Communism." 1

To counter this threat to its national interests, the United States planned forceful action, including the use of its military power. "In the event of Communist overt armed attack in the area covered by the Manila Pact prior to the entering into effect of the Pact," read NSC 5429/5, the definitive policy statement on the Far East, the United States should "take actions necessary to meet the situation, including a request to Congress to use U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and feasible. When the Pact is in effect, be prepared to oppose any communist attack in the treaty area with U.S. armed forces, if necessary and feasible, consulting Congress in advance if the emergency permits." 2

The US Military Commitment to SEATO

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (or Manila Pact) had been signed

Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Following ratification, it entered into force on 19 February 1955. Under its terms the parties agreed to respond to armed attack on any one of them "in accordance with... [their] constitutional processes" and to meet threats other than by armed attack by means to be agreed in mutual consultations. Attached to the Manila Pact was a protocol designating Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as additional areas where the occurrence of armed aggression would be recognized as a threat calling for action under the treaty.

Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty did not provide for elaborate international machinery or for a permanent standing military organization. It merely established a SEATO Council, composed of political representatives of the signatories. Among other duties, the Council was to "provide for consultation with regard to military planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require." The area covered by the treaty included not only the territories of the Asian member states but also the general areas of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific up to the northernmost point of the Philippines.3

Although the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty did not provide for an extensive organizational structure of the NATO type, interest in developing such an arrangement was strong among most of the parties except the United States. Such a structure would bind the military plans of the smaller members to those of the United States and was likely to obligate the United States to pursue specific courses of action and to make specific military force commitments in support of them. This was precisely what the United States sought to avoid. With multiple commitments elsewhere in the Far East and around the globe and with limited forces available to meet them, the United States preferred a flexible strategy based on ready, mobile forces available for use as the need arose but not committed to a specific area beforehand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had strongly endorsed this policy. In fact, they felt that the nonapplicability of the treaty to Nationalist China, Japan and Korea, with whom the United States had bilateral arrangements, made it imperative that the United States not be restricted by force commitments in the SEATO area.1

Up to the end of 1954, however, the United States had not decided just how its forces would be applied if the Manila Pact were invoked. Since the foreign ministers of the SEATO nations were scheduled to convene in Bangkok in February, the need to define the US concept more clearly was becoming urgent.

On 6 January 1955, Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, to meet a request from the Secretary of State, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish a concept for application of US military power under the Manila Pact. This concept should create a deterrent to overt aggression by Communist China or other communist nations against Southeast Asian countries, using US forces with at least token participation by the other treaty members. The concept should also provide, in

the event deterrence failed, for defeat of the aggressors by US military power, aided by the SEATO forces. The military actions contemplated should be designed to avoid expansion into general war unless the aggressor state chose to widen the area of conflict. Mr. Anderson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the concept under alternative assumptions that nuclear weapons would and would not be used. He also asked for broad outline plans based on the concept and for a statement of the readiness of US forces in the next few years to conduct operations in implementation of the treaty.5

The first attempt of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) to prepare a reply disclosed a fundamental disagreement over the nature of the operations required, and hence the type of forces to be employed, when responding to aggression under the terms of the Manila Pact. The result was a split report by the JSPC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January, in which the Army advocated balanced forces of air, ground, and sea units while the other Services maintained that only naval and air forces should be used.

In his exposition, the Army member pointed out that communist aggression against the SEATO area might take the form either of an overt attack by Communist China or the type of operations executed in Indochina by the Viet Minh, with Chinese Communist support and assistance. In either case, the Army member maintained, the communists must be defeated on the ground and in the area of attack. Extensive land operations, supported by air and naval actions in the area of operations and against military targets in Communist China, would therefore be necessary. As to the magnitude of the forces required, the Army member estimated that to defeat a Communist Chinese attack would call for the equivalent of 20 US divisions. Of these he hoped that the United States would have to supply only 33 divisions; the remaining 163 divisions would come from the other treaty members. To deal with an armed attack by indigenous forces without overt Chinese participation, the Army member did not indicate an order of magnitude for the defensive forces, but he maintained that the United States should be prepared to make up any deficiencies in the ground forces committed by the other SEATO countries.

Turning to the question of deterrence, the Army member contended that there was no effective existing deterrent to communist aggression. To create one, he continued, would require a US commitment to contribute forces, including ground forces, to the defense of Southeast Asia and the deployment of a balanced mobile striking force to the immediate area. Included in this force would be an Army corps of two divisions to be stationed in the Philippines. The Army member concluded, finally, that his proposals were valid whether or not atomic weapons were used.

The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps members of the JSPC took issue with their Army colleague. They maintained that immediate and direct counteraction by US naval and air forces would be sufficient to defeat the aggressor. Such counteraction would consist, in the case of overt aggression by Communist China, of "attacking promptly and effectively [by air] and with unmistakable intent as to purpose those selected targets on mainland China which are used to support the