They pointed out that, while the proposed line would increase initial warning time and would reduce the length of the overwater link, it could more easily be subjected to an end run than the Hawaii-Kodiak line. A further objection was that limited land areas on Midway would make it necessary to perform major aircraft overhaul and repair at Hawaii, thus increasing the time when aircraft would not be available for duty on the barrier line. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, however, that the Panel's proposal should be studied so long as it did not hold up the construction of the Kodiak-Hawaii line.

In addition to commenting on the recommendations specifically assigned to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also volunteered views on a number of the other recommendations of the Killian group. These were the ones intended to create effective defenses against attack at low and very high altitudes, only one of which had been assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action. All of these additional recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff found to be acceptable with one exception-the one calling for the evolution of a radar net to meet the capabilities of the SAGE system. This recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, would limit the evolution of the radar net to the capabilities of only one system, which ultimately might not be adopted. The radar net, they maintained, must be compatible with CONAD's needs and capabilities.8

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated into the Defense Department report on the Killian Panel recommendations. In it, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that most of the programs called for by the Panel were familiar to or under consideration by the Department of Defense, but that additional effort or change in emphasis was called for in some instances in the light of the Killian Panel's findings. There were also some operational and technical problems raised in the report that the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering in greater detail. To carry out all the recommendations, the Secretary said, would cost many billions of dollars, but the exact additional amounts over current appropriations had yet to be determined. He therefore proposed to keep all the recommendations under continuing study and evaluation and to seek only the additional funding flexibility required to meet individual situations as they developed in the first half of FY 1956. To attain the necessary flexibility, the Secretary of Defense proposed to ask Congress to increase the emergency Defense Department research and development funds and to give him limited authority to transfer funds from one appropriation to another. If during the next six months these steps proved inadequate, the Secretary would then seek presidential approval to ask Congress for supplementary funds for FY 1956. In like manner, the Defense Department's FY 1957 budget proposals would be reviewed before final submission to see if additional funding was required to meet the situation highlighted in the Killian Panel report.9

The National Security Council noted the reports of the Defense Department and of other executive departments and agencies on 4 August 1955 and agreed that implementation of the various programs should be guided by the strategy contained in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5501). Final determination on budget requests would be made by the President after normal budget review. On 8 September, the Secretary of Defense directed each military department to

implement the applicable programs as indicated in the Defense Department report, "within the context of funds, technical skills, and other resources available to the Departments where possible; and when developments so indicate, to submit requirements for additional funding beyond those currently contemplated for FY 1956 and FY 1957 to the Secretary of Defense." 10

DEW Line Extension

or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the only action item to emerge from the reappraisal

by

do with the extension of the DEW Line into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." In the case of the Atlantic extension, the Killian Panel had recommended a northerly route extending from Greenland via Iceland and the Faroes to join the NATO air defense system at some point recommended by SHAPE. As the matter was under active consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reserved judgment regarding the actual route.

On 14 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the location of the DEW Line across North America, as recommended by a combined US-Canadian Location Study Group. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee gave its approval on 8 March. The Study Group had been unable to agree on a location for the Atlantic extension, however, and had recommended further study.12

Even before final approval of the continental portion of the DEW Line had been obtained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had turned their attention to the extension of the Line into the Atlantic. On 7 October 1954, they had directed the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations to study the feasibility of such an extension and to develop a US position thereon. A Joint Air Force-Navy Feasibility Study Group submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 March 1955.

The Joint Feasibility Study Group had examined various Atlantic routes in terms of operational suitability, political implications, meteorological and hydrographic conditions, facilities required, manpower requirements, and estimated costs. It had agreed to an extension from Cape Dyer on Baffin Island to Holsteinborg on the west coast of Greenland, but the Group had split along Service lines over the remainder of the route.

The Navy members favored a route across the Greenland ice cap to the Kangerdlussuag area on the east coast, thence to Iceland, to the Faroes, and to the United Kingdom. This route, the Navy members maintained, was the cheapest, most reliable, gave the longest periods of warning, and could be easily integrated with an antisubmarine line along the same route; it tied in with European warning systems and therefore would not be open to an end run.

The Air Force members favored a line running southward along the west coast of Greenland to the Cape Farewell area and thence to the Azores. Disputing the Navy contention that the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes line would provide the greatest warning of approaching hostile aircraft, the Air Force members pointed out that attackers following the most direct routes (a great circle route from Mur

mansk to New York, for instance) would be detected with about the same warning time by a Cape Farewell-Azores line. The Air Force members conceded that the Navy proposal would be less expensive, but they pointed out the technical problems and logistic difficulties in maintaining radar stations on the Greenland ice cap. Other objections to the Navy route were the ease with which Soviet aircraft could "spoof" this line because of its proximity to Soviet bases, and the fact that Soviet penetrations at the eastern extremity would not give a reliable indication of a Soviet intention to attack the continental United States. The Cape Farewell-Azores line would avoid both these problems. As a means to reduce the unfavorable cost factor of their line, the Air Force members proposed to drop the Navy-programmed extension of the mid-Canada line from Argentia to the Azores, which they considered would not give a sufficiently timely warning of Soviet air attack, and shift the AEW aircraft and radar picket ships programmed for it to the Cape Farewell-Azores line.13

During JCS consideration of the report the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations supported the positions taken by their respective representatives on the Joint Feasibility Study Group. Admiral Carney, however, recognized that the Air Force contentions might have some merit. He accordingly initiated studies to determine the feasibility of using the forces programmed for the seaward extension of the mid-Canada line to establish a monitor line from Cape Farewell to the Azores and to provide area surveillance of the approaches to the northeastern United States. At the suggestion of General Twining, the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed consideration of the DEW Line extension into the Atlantic until these studies were completed. They directed the Chief of Naval Operations to expand his studies to include consideration of concurrent development of a land- and ship-based system between Greenland and Norway.14

On 4 June 1955, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended against the Greenland-Norway line and reiterated his support for the route terminating in the United Kingdom. Ending the line in Norway, Admiral Carney maintained, was objectionable on several counts: there was no NATO air defense system into which a line terminating in Norway could be integrated; even if such a system was in existence, the North American air defenses should not be complicated by involvement in the NATO air defense system at that time; the line extended to the United Kingdom could be more easily adapted to eventual exclusive employment of land-based radars than the longer line ending in Norway; and the extension to the United Kingdom paralleled "sound surveillance coverage being planned on a tripartite basis between Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States." 15

After hearing briefings by CINCONAD and CINCLANT on the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line, the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for further study. This Committee proved unable to resolve the divergent views of the Air Force and Navy. Its report, in which the Army member espoused the Air Force view, restated the arguments already offered. It was broadly accepted that the Navy-sponsored line to the United Kingdom would provide "the earliest practicable detection" of enemy aircraft while the Greenland-Azores line favored by the Army and Air Force would pro

vide the most unequivocal indication that the aircraft were bound for North America. To meet CINCONAD's need for definite warning on which to base operational decisions, without sacrificing the early detection feature, the Navy member had suggested adding a back-up line to the Navy-sponsored line. It would use the picket ships and AEW aircraft already programmed for the Argentia-Azores extension of the mid-Canada line, operating somewhat farther offshore than originally planned.16

The Chief of Naval Operations on 29 August submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an estimate of the forces required to implement an effective GreenlandAzores barrier. On the basis of a continuous operation giving an 80 percent average probability of detection, the force required would be 18 ships, 57 aircraft, and 14 shore radar stations. These force requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations concluded, were unrealistically high. Consequently, he reaffirmed his previous position that "the Greenland-Iceland-UK route... should be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that the problem of providing CINCONAD an 'action line' should be given further study by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee." 17

The Air Force did not respond until 16 January 1956, but the reply represented an acceptance of the main elements of the Navy position. General Twining proposed JCS acceptance of the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-United Kingdom line, backed up by an airborne and seaborne "action line" from Greenland to the Azores. His change of view, he explained, resulted from several developments: appreciation of the limitations of radar coverage by ships and aircraft, particularly in conditions of rough seas, high winds, and sea ice; the demonstrated feasibility of locating radar stations on the Greenland ice cap; and the improvement in communications resulting from new tropospheric and ionospheric scatter equipment.

The primary radar warning line, as recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, would consist of a high-powered radar site at Holsteinborg on the west coast of Greenland, two radar stations evenly spaced on the ice cap, a highpowered radar at Ikateq on the east coast, and another such radar farther north along the east coast at Kap Raun. This last site would provide radar coverage across the Denmark Strait to overlap an already programmed site on Iceland. A high-powered radar site on the Faroes would complete the chain of fixed radars. Picket ships stationed between Iceland and the Faroes and in the final span of ocean from the Faroes to Scotland would complete the system to the United Kingdom. There would, however, be low-altitude gaps at a point midway between Greenland and Iceland, between Iceland and the Faroes, and the Faroes and Scotland. These gaps would be closed by AEW aircraft. A detachment of five US aircraft would close the gap in the Denmark Strait. Coverage of the other gaps and the operation of the Faroes station and the picket ships would be a responsibility of the United Kingdom. To provide an action line for CINCONAD, the Air Force Chief of Staff proposed a high-powered radar site at Cape Farewell in southeastern Greenland and employment of the picket ships and AEW aircraft already programmed for the extension of the mid-Canada line to provide continuous high-level coverage between Cape Farewell and the Azores.18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal on 31 January and directed the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to conduct detailed

site surveys, prepare data to be used in base rights negotiations, and perform other necessary explorations in order to submit a detailed breakdown of costs as soon as possible. The goal was to begin budgeting for the extension of the DEW Line in FY 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time asked the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee to concur.19

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff gave their approval on 17 April 1956. And on 31 August the Danish Government gave its consent to initial surveys of radar sites on Greenland, with the understanding that it reserved its position as to actual location, construction, and operation of the facilities.20

Approaches to obtain approval for terminating the DEW Line extension on British territory were then undertaken on the recommendation of the CanadaUnited States Military Study Group. On 21 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs of Staff of the action taken by the United States and Canada, offered to share the information obtained with the British, pointed out the desirability of terminating the DEW Line at an established radar station in the northern United Kingdom, and asked their views on the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not, however, suggest to the British that they operate the radar stations in the Faroes or provide picket ships and AEW aircraft for that portion of the early warning line east of Iceland.

On 1 October, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to terminate the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line in the United Kingdom but made clear that they were not committing themselves to provide AEW aircraft or radar picket ships.21

At this stage in the proceedings, it became necessary to consider the future course of diplomatic negotiations for the base rights necessary to complete the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line. Already the Department of State had expressed its concern over the matter. Writing to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray on 10 September, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs C. Burke Elbrick noted the formal approach made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff and requested interdepartmental consultations before any further military-level negotiations were undertaken with the United Kingdom or other nations concerned. The sensitive nature of this project, involving several NATO nations, Secretary Elbrick said, made such consultations desirable. Important factors to be taken into account included the Danish sensitivity regarding base rights in the Faroes and Greenland, the political situation in Iceland, where two communists held cabinet portfolios, and the delicate status of negotiations with Portugal for continuation of US military facilities in the Azores. Noting also that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had referred to the possible construction of a site in the Faroes as part of the SHAPE early warning chain, Assistant Secretary Elbrick asked how this chain would relate to the North American early warning system.22

The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied information for the reply on 21 November. They considered the approach to the British Chiefs of Staff an "exploratory action" to determine the military feasibility of terminating the DEW Line extension in the United Kingdom, which did not require formal consultation with the Department of State. With regard to the inclusion of a radar site in the Faroes in the SHAPE air defenses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that SACEUR had submit