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ted a detailed plan for an early warning system for NATO Europe to the Standing Group for approval. This plan called for inclusion of the British radar installation in the Shetlands and construction of another in the Faroes. Funding of this last facility had been recommended by SACEUR in his proposed 1957 NATO common infrastructure program, and he had initiated negotiations for it with Denmark.

Formal base rights negotiations with the various governments concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained, were not called for at present but should be undertaken, either bilaterally or through NATO channels, when certain conditions had been fulfilled. These were: completion of site surveys on Greenland; stabilization of the political situation in Iceland; submission of cost estimates for the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line to the Secretary of Defense; and completion of SACEUR's negotiations with Denmark for a radar site in the Faroes. None of these conditions had been met by the end of 1956.23

Pacific Extension of the DEW Line

t the time the Killian Panel made its report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

ACanadian Chiefs of Staff Committee had already agreed on the siting of the

Pacific extension of the DEW Line. In decisions reached in January and February 1955, they had approved recommendations made the previous November by the Canada-US Location Study Group. This group recommended, without suggesting alternatives, a line from Kodiak, Alaska, to Hawaii, which would employ radar picket ships and AEW aircraft.24

The Killian Panel, it will be recalled, had recommended the shifting of this extension northward to an Adak-Midway line, with a connection by fixed radars along the Aleutians to the already-programmed Alaska warning system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised certain objections to the Panel's proposal but had agreed to study it. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed a joint study. Upon its completion they concluded that the Aleutians-Midway line was technically feasible and would cost approximately $9.3 million less and require about 2,429 fewer personnel than the Kodiak-Hawaii line, but they felt that the views of the commanders of the unified commands involved should be ascertained before a final decision was made. An early decision was necessary, they pointed out, in order to take the necessary budget actions in the FY 1957 military construction program. They accordingly recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff solicit the views of CINCPAC, CINCONAD, and CINCAL and refer the replies, along with the joint Navy-Air Force study, to the Joint Staff for review in the light of overall air defense problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these recommendations on 2 November 1955.25

In his reply on 15 November, CINCAL enthusiastically endorsed the shifting of the Pacific extension from Kodiak-Hawaii to Adak-Midway. The latter, he said, was clearly superior because of lower cost and longer warning for Alaskan bases. The former line "adds nothing to our warning system here in Alaska." Furthermore, Kodiak was of doubtful value as an anchor to a warning line because it

was highly vulnerable to enemy attack. CINCPAC also endorsed the proposed shift. He concurred in CINCAL's observation as a "masterly truthful presentation of the fundamental facts" and added a further justification for the change-the need to protect Hawaii from air attack.26

On the other hand CINCONAD was not so enthusiastic. He pointed out the disadvantages of placing an action line too far from the shores of North America and the attendant danger of enemy "spoofing," which could trigger the air defenses unnecessarily. He also stressed the need to complete the early warning system as soon as possible, an objective that would not be attained by a shift of the Pacific extension to a line where the land-based radars had been neither programmed nor budgeted. If the disadvantages he had outlined were found acceptable in Washington, however, CINCONAD would not oppose the shift to the Adak-Midway line.27

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, after reviewing these messages and the joint Navy-Air Force study, recommended that the Pacific extension of the DEW Line be relocated from the line Kodiak-Hawaii to the line Adak-Midway and an extension of contiguous radar coverage be considered as a means to provide CINCONAD with "timely and positive indications of hostile intent against the continental United States." The Joint Strategic Plans Committee also recommended a study of further extension of the line beyond Midway for the purpose of detecting end runs by the latest Soviet long-range turbo-prop bombers, which had the necessary range to circle south of Midway and Hawaii en route from bases in the Maritime Provinces to targets in the continental United States. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, while in agreement with the recommendation to relocate the Pacific extension, opposed consideration of extending the contiguous radar coverage because of the excessive cost-$980 million initial capital investment for a 1,000-mile extension of the currently planned coverage.28

The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the JSPC report to accommodate General Twining's objection and to add an acknowledgment and acceptance of "the degree of equivocality of warning inherent in placing the line further from the Continental United States." With these revisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report on 16 December 1955. In recommending the change in the location of the line to the Secretary of Defense, they advised him that in addition to the operational advantages, relocation of the Pacific extension would result in net initial savings to the Department of Defense of approximately $80 million. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to concur in the relocation. They did so on 12 January 1956.29

Four days later, however, the Secretary of Defense returned the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an indication that their justification for the change provided an insufficient basis for decision. He requested them to supply cost and effectiveness data adequate to permit an evaluation of the current and proposed locations of the Pacific extension and to indicate the relationship of the proposed extension to the other sections of the DEW Line. Because of "uncertainties in the present proposal," the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be prepared to make a detailed presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Council and the National Security Council.30

On 10 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense announcing their readiness to present the briefing and giving additional justification for the recommended shift in the Pacific extension. Besides elaborating on the obvious advantages of the Adak-Midway line, such as longer warning and greater use of land-based radars, they presented in greater detail the problem of spoofing and supplied fuller and more up-to-date cost data. Admittedly, the Adak-Midway line, being closer to Soviet bases than the KodiakHawaii line, was more susceptible to spoofing, but to be effective the Soviet maneuver would have to be carried out by raid-size numbers of aircraft. During a cold war period, responsible commanders and appropriate governmental authorities would be able to weigh indications from all sources to determine whether a penetration of the warning system might develop into an actual attack. The longer warning time provided by the relocated line would assist in this process. In a period when international relations were in a critical state and the possibility of hostilities great, a potential enemy would be discouraged from spoofing by the knowledge that it might trigger US retaliation. The cost data, covering capital and operating costs of both the Kodiak-Hawaii and Adak-Midway lines, showed that adoption of the latter would result in savings of $280.4 million.31

On 14 March 1956, following a joint Navy-Air Force presentation of the various cost and effectiveness factors before the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Secretary of Defense approved the relocation of the Pacific extension of the DEW Line to the line Adak-Midway,32

To deal with the problem of end runs of the newly oriented Pacific extension of the DEW Line, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to study extending the line beyond Midway. The Committee, after considering eight alternative extensions, concluded that the most feasible was to employ two PG-3W airships operating on a route from Palmyra Island to Johnson Island to Midway and return to Palmyra, then south about 1,000 miles and return to Palmyra. On 19 June 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded this study to CINCONAD and CINCPAC, requesting the two commanders to submit recommendations on the subject. They replied during February 1957 that the further extension of the DEW Line in the Pacific was of lower priority than the improvement and extension of existing air defense systems on the North American continent and its seaward approaches. None of the limited funds available for continental air defense, the two commanders recommended, should be diverted to extend the Pacific extension of the DEW Line south of Midway. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 April 1957, dropped consideration of the matter.33

Continental Defense at the End of 1956

y the end of 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed on the locations of the

Bio seaward extensions of the DEW Line and had initiated some of the

actions necessary to bring them into being. Other continental defense programs also showed some modest progress. Antiaircraft and interceptor forces

approached planned levels and also showed substantial qualitative improvement as the result of the introduction of new types of aircraft and increasing numbers of Nike missiles. The fixed radar systems were also nearing their objectives, and the DEW and mid-Canada early warning systems were destined to become operational by mid-1957. (See Table 13.)

While noting these improvements, the Department of Defense cautioned the NSC that Soviet offensive capabilities had also improved. The result, in the opinion of the Defense Department, was that the United States seemed little more safe from Soviet attack than at the beginning of 1955.34

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