Progress in Planning, 1955-1956

'n terms of meeting the schedule of the joint program for planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff achieved little if any improvement during 1955 and 1956 over their performance during the preceding period. According to Policy Memorandum 84, they should have completed during these two years: two Joint LongRange Strategic Estimates, two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, and two Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans. By 31 December 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed only one of these scheduled plans, a JSCP originally intended for fiscal year 1957 but extended because of time lag through fiscal year 1958. They had also taken final action on two plans, JMRWP-57 and JSCP-56, that should have been finished by the end of 1954.

Basic disagreements among the Services over strategic concepts had contributed in large measure to these shortcomings in planning. In existence at the beginning of 1955, the disagreements were, if anything, more intense by the end of 1956. Although it was now accepted that general war might grow out of a series of minor clashes as well as result from a sudden Soviet nuclear onslaught, the Service differences over the nature of general war and the forces necessary to wage it remained.

With regard to the type and size of forces needed for limited war situations, the differing opinions of some of the spokesmen had been further delineated. General Taylor called for developing forces of all Services with the capability of waging limited war with conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons, but in numbers sufficient to allow conventional warfare to remain an available alternative, and indeed the preferred one. In contrast, Admiral Radford wanted a reduction in total numbers and favored waging conflicts of this type with small nuclear-armed task forces. General Taylor strongly opposed this concept, and for other reasons the Chairman's proposal was not pursued to a decision, but it appears doubtful that any of the other JCS members were prepared to endorse it fully in mid-1956.

Yet Admiral Radford's conception was readily defensible in the light of the pronouncements the Secretary of Defense had made on 23 May 1956, after consulting the President. If the United States were to rely on nuclear weapons to the degree suggested in the Secretary's guidance, then the Chairman's proposals represented a logical reordering of the US forces in conformance with it. General Taylor's opposition, in turn, was based on considerations that he judged would increasingly inhibit a decision to resort to nuclear arms. Although these considerations had already received some mention in the basic national security policy, in his opinion their implications were not yet being given due weight.

General Ridgway, in a final letter to the Secretary of Defense in June 1955, had looked to an approaching situation in which mutual deterrence might be expressed "in terms of mutually limited use; or, finally in common refusal to use nuclear weapons at all.” In the light of this major possibility for the future, he wrote, "it is at least debatable whether the United States really has the freedom to rely preponderantly on nuclear weapons to exert its military power." 41

By mid-1956 the debate General Ridgway had anticipated was in its opening stages, with his successor as Army Chief of Staff assuming a principal role. Looking forward to a period of substantial nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was already coming within the range of JSOP planning, General Taylor had begun to stress the growing unlikelihood of full atomic warfare, the declining credibility of massive nuclear response as a deterrent to other types of Soviet incursions, and, hence, the need for greater emphasis within the US defense establishment on the development of forces capable of dealing with the local aggressions and communist-supported insurrections that seemed the most likely type of conflict in the future. This line of thought and the world conditions to which it related would pose an increasing challenge to some of the well established precepts of the New Look, and debate on these issues would carry on well into the years beyond 1956.

Force Levels for the Budget

3

The broad statements of basic national policy and the strategic plans drawn up to support them were, by themselves, merely statements of intent. Until Congress had appropriated the necessary funds and the military establishment had converted the funds into forces, none of these policies or strategies could be carried out. The formulation of the military budget was, therefore, a critical operation in determining military policy, but it was one in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff played only a secondary role. They did not participate directly in preparing the money requests, a function assigned under the National Security Act of 1947 to the three military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The sole listed function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this area was to "prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon United States strategic considerations, current national security policy, and strategic war plans.” 1

The Secretary of Defense, on the basis of such a JCS statement and in the light of political and economic considerations expressed by the President and the Bureau of the Budget, transmitted guidance to the military departments, which then prepared the budget estimates. These estimates were reviewed and refined by the Department of Defense Comptroller, working closely with the Bureau of the Budget, and then sent forward as the Department of Defense Budget for presentation by the President to Congress.

New Look Force Levels

The Eisenhower administration, when it entered office in January 1953, inher

been built up to meet of Korean

conflict. These forces, and the major combat units into which they were organized, were as follows:2

President Eisenhower and his leading advisers believed these forces to be excessive in size and cost to peacetime needs. In the New Look at military policy taken during 1953, one result was NSC approval in December of JCS recommendations for scaling down the armed forces. These recommendations, contained in JCS 2101/113, called both for an overall reduction in personnel and for a reapportionment of Service strengths to reflect the New Look emphasis on nuclear airpower. The result would be a gain for the Air Force in both personnel and major combat units while the other Services declined. The new personnel ceilings and force composition, to be achieved by 30 June 1957, were as follows:3

A gradual reduction toward these force goals was scheduled to begin in the military program for FY 1955. By mid-1954, however, French reverses in Indochina caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the phasedown of military strength toward the objectives of JCS 2101/113 should be abandoned or at least suspended. They recommended, and Secretary Wilson approved, force levels for FY 1956 that permitted the Air Force to complete its planned expansion two years early, while the other Services continued without change from 1955. The personnel figures, to apply to both the beginning and end of FY 1956, and the major units they would support were as follows:4

This program, however, was never put into effect. On 9 December 1954, President Eisenhower announced a figure of 2,815,000 men for the Services for the end

of FY 1956. This was, of course, the JCS 2101/113 force level, but now it was to be reached a year earlier than originally planned. At the same time, the President announced revised personnel ceilings for end FY 1955 of 2,940,000, to be distributed as follows: 1,100,000 to the Army; 870,000 to the Navy and Marine Corps; and 970,000 to the Air Force.5

General Ridgway opposed the full planned reduction in Army forces and, with some support from Admiral Carney and General Shepherd, carried his appeal to the President. At a meeting with Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President agreed to raise the ceiling for all Services by 35,000 men, to be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 6 January 1955, Secretary Wilson approved a JCS recommendation that the additional manpower be distributed among the Services as follows:6

Implementing Accelerated Reduction: Revised Force Structure for FY 1955 and 1956

Presid

resident Eisenhower's decision to speed up the achievement of the New Look force goals made necessary a reduction of the force structure already approved for fiscal years 1955 and 1956. This process had been begun by Secretary Wilson on 9 December 1954, immediately after President Eisenhower's original announcement of the force reduction, with a request for JCS views on changes in FY 1955 and 1956 forces necessitated by the reductions and on the forces to be maintained during FY 1957.7

On 22 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a revised list of major units to the Secretary, but a week later Mr. Wilson sought fuller information. He requested recommendations on the deployment of US forces, as well as a "detailed analysis of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the composition of those forces, reserve as well as active, supporting as well as combat." 8 To meet the Secretary's deadline of 10 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim report listing the force composition that they believed represented the optimum combat effectiveness that could be achieved within the approved personnel programs for each Service.

To meet the cuts in manpower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for reductions in the forces they had recommended in August 1954 for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and no change in those planned for the Air Force. The Army would suffer a greater loss of effective combat units than any other Service. The