19 combat-ready, or mobile, divisions the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended earlier were to drop to 15 by 30 June 1955 and to 13 by 30 June 1956, continuing at that level thereafter. The total number of divisions listed was larger than this, however. Beginning in 1955, the roster would show several static and training divisions, created by grouping certain Army units in the United States in divisional organizations. For 30 June 1955, two static and three training divisions, plus the 15 mobile divisions, would yield a total of 20. Reduction by two mobile divisions by 30 June 1956 would make the total figure 18, and deletion of one static division during the following year would lower the total Army divisions to 17 by 30 June 1957.

Under the JCS recommendations, the Marine Corps was still to maintain three ground divisions, three air wings, and combat support forces consisting of artillery, tank, and engineer units. The losses in personnel were to be applied to these supporting units, whose manning levels would drop to 58 percent by 30 June 1957. The divisions and wings would be maintained at full war strength. The effect, as General Shepherd explained to the Senate Appropriations Committee, was that the Marine Corps would not have the combat and logistic support necessary for its three divisions and wings in sustained combat.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended for the Navy a decrease in ships from the 1,131 previously recommended to 1,066 to be achieved by 30 June 1955. By the end of the next fiscal year the number of ships would decline to 1,001. By 30 June 1957 the figure would have risen slightly, with the Navy attaining a strength of 1,010 ships, of which 414 were to be major combatant types. Without waiting for the detailed report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson gave general approval to their interim recommendations on 18 January.1o The JCS recommendations for and the Secretary of Defense decision on the force structure for FY 1955 as well as for the successive three fiscal years are shown in Table 1.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 March 1955 submitted their detailed recommendations, which reaffirmed their earlier estimates. In this submission they pointed out that certain of the reductions in the Navy and Air Force involved calculated risks. The Navy's amphibious capabilities had been reduced by about one-third in order to maintain strength in antisubmarine and offensive strike forces. In the case of the Air Force, troop carrier wings were to be reduced from 16 in existence on 20 June 1954 to 11 by 30 June 1957, in order to apply available resources primarily to forces needed to counter the threat of Soviet atomic attack.

The Army and Marine Corps found these calculated risks unacceptable. During the development of the JCS recommendations, both Services objected to the limited amphibious lift planned by the Navy. The Army also opposed the reduction in the amount of airlift to be provided. With regard to amphibious lift, the Army contended the Navy plans were inadequate to meet the requirements of NSC policy, international agreements, and war plans for the Army to deploy and support 73 divisions by D+24 months of a general war. The Marine Corps, while not mentioning a specific number of divisions requiring support, contended that amphibious forces as planned by the Navy would restrict the surface forces largely to protected and undamaged port destinations, thereby imposing a serious restriction on the overall strategic capability of US and Allied forces. As for

Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, pp. 7–8.

d App A, B, and C to JCS 1800/241, 13 Sep 55.

Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 4, 762. Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 904.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military and Other Requirements for our National Security," 12 Mar 56. & Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 7.

the planned airlift capabilities, General Ridgway claimed they would not meet Army requirements in general war, which he stated to be tactical airlift for three divisions in airborne assault during the initial phase.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, however, to defer consideration of these disagreements and to submit to the Secretary the figures supplied by each Service. The recommendations submitted on 18 March did not include the specific Army and Marine Corps dissents but merely informed the Secretary that the two areas of airlift and amphibious lift were ones over which the Army Chief of Staff and Marine Corps Commandant had expressed concern and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to reexamine these areas in the near future."1

On 18 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff resolved the disagreement over amphibious lift by approving a proposal worked out by Admiral Carney and General Shepherd. The Marine Corps accepted the Navy's conclusion that an increase in amphibious shipping was not feasible and agreed to a substantial reduction in its assault troop list by deleting certain tank, engineer, and artillery units usually included. General Shepherd's acceptance was conditioned on there being adequate follow-up shipping available and was given on the understanding that the reduced troop list would not be applicable in situations requiring optimum combat reinforcing units. With the austere troop list in effect, the Navy would be able to lift the assault elements of two Marine division/wing teams. The same lift would accommodate the assault elements of at least two Army divisions since their requirements were less. 12

The disagreement over airlift, however, was one the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve. After having it under consideration for about nine months, they submitted divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 9 December 1955. The Army position was that the Air Force should expand a currently inadequate airlift so as to be able to conduct peacetime training for three Army airborne divisions, be prepared for possible emergencies short of general war, and maintain a capability for D-day airborne operations by the assault echelons of one airborne division and one airborne regimental combat team. The other three Service members considered that the airlift planned by the Air Force-scheduled to reach the D-day capability desired by the Army by the end of FY 1960—was generally adequate for current strategy.

The Chairman disagreed in a more fundamental way, since he did not consider that there was a valid requirement for airlift of Army forces in the early stages of a general war. Admiral Radford believed it "unlikely that conditions. would exist on D-day or for sometime thereafter in which the situation in the air or... on the ground would allow for airborne operations," and he did not read the current JSCP as calling for such operations. He recognized that deployment of airborne units might be required in emergencies short of general war but foresaw no need for simultaneous airlift movement of Army units in excess of one division. Accordingly, the Chairman held that the current Air Force program provided more than adequate airborne lift. Almost a year later, on 26 November 1956, the Secretary of Defense indicated his general concurrence with the views of the Chairman.13

Congressional Action on the FY 1956 Military Budget

The budget recommendations for FY 1956 that the President submitted to Congress translated Secretary Wilson's general personnel ceilings and his approval of the JCS force structure into specific requests for the necessary funds. The figure requested was $32,204,815,000: $7,573,980,000 for the Army; $9,152,157,000 for the Navy; $14,783,678,000 for the Air Force; $12,750,000 for OSD; and $682,250,000 for interservice activities.14

These recommendations, President Eisenhower informed Congress, were intended to implement the new military policy that had been under development for the past two years. The main elements of the new policy were restated in a letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense, which Mr. Wilson read into the record during his appearance before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. The President's letter expounded the basic aims and principles of what had come to be known as the New Look.15

In Congress the basic principles of the New Look military policy were not challenged, but there were members who questioned the force levels proposed by the President for carrying them out. The congressional misgivings centered on the adequacy of the proposed reduced ground forces, Army and Marine, to carry out their assigned missions. General Ridgway, under close questioning by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, admitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed substantially higher figures than had finally been approved by President Eisenhower and his civilian advisers. Pressed further, General Ridgway and General Shepherd stated that they would prefer strengths of about 1,173,000 and 215,000 in their respective Services-the figures originally proposed for FY 1956 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress took no action to increase Army manpower but did appropriate funds in excess of President Eisenhower's request for the specific purpose of providing a Marine Corps of 215,000 men. The total appropriated for the Department of Defense for FY 1956 was $31,893,233,626, including $46,000,000 for the additional Marines. The Secretary of Defense declined to spend the full amount but did approve a temporary increase in Marine Corps authorized strength to 205,000. He intended that this figure would be subjected to review during the deliberations on personnel strengths and force levels for fiscal year 1957, which were just beginning.16

Force Structure and Personnel Strengths for FY 1957

Whe

Then preparation of the military budget for FY 1957 began in the summer of 1955, it was apparent that the Eisenhower administration was not contemplating any upward revisions in the military force levels. The disposition to hold the line was evident in Secretary Wilson's request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 August for their views on force structure and personnel strengths for FY 1957. In making their recommendations, the Secretary instructed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to take into account improvements in weapons design and availability,

together with known strategic requirements. Any considerable degree of variation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from currently approved force levels should be supported by a statement of their reasons for the change.1

On 13 September the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff containing force structures and personnel strengths prepared independently by the Services. All except the Air Force requested personnel increases over the levels provided for in FY 1956 in order to improve combat capability, to staff new functions, and to deal with technological innovations.

The Army requested a personnel increase of 20,750 over the FY 1956 figure, for a total of 1,045,750. Of this increase, 16,812 were to train an estimated 50,000 reservists under the Reserve Forces Training Act of 1955; the remaining 3,938 were to support the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line project, which was a vital component of the continental defense system.

The Navy requested an additional 15,000 personnel, for a total of 672,000, in order to restore partially the combat readiness of operating forces. Fleet units had been reduced to unacceptably low manning levels because of the unanticipated continuing deployment of major carrier task forces to the Western Pacific in response to the Taiwan Straits crisis and a variety of other manpower requirements. The latter included: 12,000 to support the antisubmarine sound surveillance, distant early warning, and contiguous radar systems; 3,000 to conduct an Antarctic expedition; 12,000 to provide for increasingly complex naval aircraft, weapon systems, and propulsion plants; and 3,000 to expand overseas naval bases. The Marine Corps requested 12,735 additional personnel, for a total of 205,735: 12,000 to maintain combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps and to offset a high personnel turnover in FYS 1956 and 1957; 735 to train reservists under the Reserve Forces Training Act of 1955.

In this JSPC report of September 1955, the force structures recommended by the Services differed only slightly from their recommendations of January, the main exception being the Army, which now estimated that a 19-division structure would be supportable if the personnel increases were approved. The two divisions additional to the 17 recommended in January would be mobile divisions.

The JSPC was unable to agree on the action to be taken on the Service submissions. A majority consisting of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members favored a JCS recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to accept the Service submissions. The Air Force member, however, maintained that there should be no increases in the strength or composition of the Services over those approved for FY 1956. In taking this position, he conceded that the Soviet Union had increased its armed might both in quantity and quality. But he held that these gains had been offset by the progress made by the United States and its allies in the development and production of atomic weapons and weapon systems.18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they took up the JSPC report, also expressed divergent views. There was agreement that, because of the growing communist threat in the Far East and the failure of Germany and Japan to build up military forces to expected levels, the United States should not reduce the present major forces of the Services through FY 1957. Further, the combat effectiveness of these forces should be preserved at all times through provision for adequate numbers