Results of the Force Planning, 1955-1956

Thile the successive force projections for coming fiscal years were being resolved, the actual strength of the armed forces declined at an accelerated pace substantially the same as the one the President had set for them in December 1954. By 30 June 1956 the military personnel goals he had announced for that date had largely been met. The force structure to be supported by this manpower, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense for the end of FY 1956, had also nearly been realized. In all Services, the combat units in being corresponded very closely to the approved figures. The following figures contrast the actual strength and force levels of 30 June 1956 with the figures approved for that date on 6 January 1955: 29

By the end of 1956, the Eisenhower administration's objective of reducing the size of the armed forces had clearly been achieved. From a figure of just over 3,500,000 at the beginning of 1953, the total of men under arms had been lowered to about 2,800,000. The cost of maintaining military forces, however, had gradually risen while the forces themselves were being reduced. Appropriations, which had totalled $28,766,070,486 for FY 1955, had grown to $34,698,523,000 for 1957. This upward trend, while undesirable in terms of the emphasis in the New Look on avoiding overburdening the economy, had still not reached a level that was considered to be unacceptable. The rising costs of new weapons encountered in preparing the FY 1958 budget, however, was a foretaste of the cost-squeeze that would develop in subsequent years. These declining force levels and rising appropriations are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

During this period the Joint Chiefs of Staff enjoyed indifferent success in obtaining approval for their inputs into military budgets. All of their recommended manpower levels were lowered by the administration. Their recommended force structures, however, were all accepted with only minor changes. A factor contributing to the rejection of their advice was the frequent inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on the forces or manpower levels to be recommended. The final recommendations for the FY 1956 budget were delayed for three months by disagreements over the proper level of amphibious lift and airlift forces. No agreement was found possible on airlift forces, and the question had to be resolved by the Secretary of Defense. For the FY 1957 budget, each of the Service members, except the Chief of Naval Operations, objected to the manpower increase proposals of one or more of his colleagues, and the Chairman opposed all of them. Once again, the Secretary of Defense was obliged to make the decision.

It was notable that in resolving disagreements of this sort the Secretary of Defense almost invariably endorsed the recommendation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strong bond of confidence and a close working relationship existed between Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, based on their mutual dedication to fulfilling the principles and concepts of military policy the President had enunciated. More than the Service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who understandably gave weight to other considerations, the Chairman prepared his recommendations with the singleminded intent of giving practical effect to such pronouncements as the President had included in his letter to the Secretary of Defense on 5 January 1955. Admiral Radford, like Secretary Wilson, took constant guidance from President Eisenhower's statement that "we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers of men."

Source: "United States Defense Policies Since World War II," H. Doc 100, 85th Cong, 1957, 1st sess,

p. 78.

с

OSD, “Department of Defense Military Functions Fiscal Year 1958 Budget Highlights,” pp. 29,

50, 75.

dJCS 1800/261, 31 Oct 57.

OSD

14,950,000

17,175,000

d Ibid., vol. 103, pt 10, 1 Aug 57, pp. 13261–13262.