The Weapons Revolution and
Service Functions

4

An essential element in all the military policies, plans, and programs of the 1955-1956 period was the revolution in weapon systems represented by the nuclear explosive and the rocket-propelled missile which would deliver it. To an increasing extent, the missile armed with a nuclear warhead was being adopted by all the Services for a variety of functions. In most instances, a Service attempted to adapt missiles to its own tradition and generally recognized missions. The Air Force and Navy sought air-to-air missiles as a substitute for aircraft cannon and machine guns, the Army and Navy sought missiles that would replace or supplement conventional shipboard, field, and antiaircraft artillery, and the Air Force aspired to missiles that could assume the roles of manned interceptors and strategic bombardment aircraft.

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

he development of the new weapons was primarily a responsibility of the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did submit a basic statement of military requirements that had a major bearing on the decisions made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more deeply and directly involved with the new weapons when called upon to recommend a resolution of conflicting claims among the Services for jurisdiction over the development of a given missile or for authorization to deploy and use it. This sort of question came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a translation into specific detail of their broader responsibility set forth in the National Security Act of 1947:

To recommend to the Secretary of Defense the assignment of primary responsibility for any functions of the Armed Forces requiring such determination.

The same paragraph appeared in DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," which the Secretary of Defense issued on 16 March 1954. This document gave the current definitions of Service roles and missions and modified those originally formulated in the Key West Agreement of 1948.' The basic criterion applied was an environmental one: the Army operated on the ground, the Air Force in the air, and the Navy on the sea. When questions arose regarding the weapons to be employed by each Service, however, the environmental division of functions often did not provide ready answers. This difficulty had frequently been encountered when dealing with the more conventional weapon systems, consisting of guns and aircraft; the introduction of missiles further complicated the matter. Guns and planes were obviously different weapons and could not conceivably be mistaken for one another, but it was not always clear whether a given missile was performing as a gun or a plane. When did a ground-to-ground missile cease to be an artillery weapon and assume the function of a bombardment aircraft? When did a surface-to-air missile change identity from antiaircraft artillery round to interceptor aircraft?

During 1955 and 1956, these problems became acute, largely because of rapidly advancing technology. Weapon systems that had existed on the drawing boards when earlier decisions on roles and missions were made were now entering or approaching operational status. And as the ultimate characteristics of the various weapon systems could not be accurately predicted at the time when roles and missions were originally assigned to the Services, some adjustment to operational reality became necessary. Three major categories were involved: surface-toair missiles, intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles, and short range surface-to-surface missiles. A fourth area of dispute between the Services over roles and missions during this period was less a matter of technological development than of conflicting Army and Air Force tactical strategic concepts. It had to do with the role, and therefore the characteristics, of Army aviation.

Although the questions at issue arose separately, Secretary Wilson regarded them as linked to one another because they all involved the allocation of roles and missions to the Services. He therefore handed down his decisions on all of them in a single memorandum for the Armed Forces Policy Council, dated 26 November 1956 and having the title "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense." In this memorandum, Secretary Wilson stressed the fact that he considered the existing basic roles and missions of the Services to be still valid. He was, he said, merely making a clarification and clearer interpretation of these roles and missions, necessitated by the "development of new weapons and of new strategic concepts, together with nine years of operating experience...." Secretary Wilson also took pains to point out that these clarifications and interpretations did not in themselves determine the weapons to be used by each Service, nor did the development of a weapon by a particular Service predetermine which Service would ultimately employ it. These decisions, he said, would be made by the Secretary of Defense after considering the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2

Surface-to-Air Missiles

The problem of assigning responsibility for development and deployment of

missiles were sought by the Army as a replacement for antiaircraft artillery, by the Air Force for employment as interceptor aircraft, and by the Navy to perform both functions in the defense of ships against air attack. Since the end of World War II, all three Services had engaged in the development of antiaircraft missiles. The Air Force had concentrated on Bomarc, a winged long-range air-breathing guided missile, which was in effect a pilotless interceptor. Originally scheduled to become operational in 1956, it encountered design difficulties and was not placed in the hands of operational units during the period of this volume. The Army, in extension of its traditional employment of antiaircraft artillery, concentrated on Nike Ajax, a rocket-propelled guided missile of 25-mile range, which became operational in 1953. Nike Hercules, an improved version with a range 75 miles, was under development during 1955 and 1956. For air defense of ships at sea, the Navy developed short-range air-breathing missiles. The first to become operational, Terrier, went into service with the fleet in 1956. Talos, an improved version, originally designed to have a range of 65 miles but later extended to 100 miles, was under development during 1955 and 1956.3

of

These missile programs reflected an assignment of responsibility to the Services by the Armed Forces Policy Council on 6 December 1949. Acting on a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Council had ruled that antiaircraft missiles that supplemented or replaced antiaircraft artillery would be an Army responsibility; missiles that supplemented or replaced interceptor aircraft would be the responsibility of the Air Force; missiles to protect the fleet against air attack would be a Navy responsibility.4

Nearly two years later, in October 1951, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, sought to reopen the question by proposing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Air Force be assigned responsibility for all air defense missiles. The Army Chief of Staff countered by claiming the total responsibility for his Service. These opposed views were not resolved until 13 November 1954, when Secretary Wilson approved a JCS recommendation that responsibility for point defense of cities and vital installations be assigned to the Army and responsibility for distant defense to the Air Force. To this end, the Secretary approved the JCS recommendation that the Army employ missiles with a range of 50 miles or less against enemy aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the target, while the Air Force would use missiles with a range of more than 50 miles in order to intercept attacking aircraft as far from the target as possible.5

Early in the following year, however, the debate was reopened, the question being whether application of the 50-mile rule should take precedence over claims to control of a missile derived from the basic functions assigned to a Service. The discussion arose from an Air Force proposal to procure the land-based version of the Navy's Talos. Development of the land-based version had been approved by the interservice Research and Development Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles on 21 May 1954. Under the terms of this committee action, the Army

was to arrange the financing of the land-based Talos and the Navy would continue technical development, assisted by the Army and Air Force. During the ensuing months, the Navy evolved a program for developing the land-based version employing an improved missile with a range up to 100 miles.

The Air Force Bomarc program, meanwhile, had encountered technical difficulties that were expected to delay attainment of an operational capability. The Air Force, on 18 January 1955, informed the Research and Development Coordination Committee on Guided Missiles that it now had a firm requirement to employ the improved land-based Talos to defend the United States against air attack and planned to procure it as soon as progress of the development program permitted. On 11 February, the Army informed the committee that it, too, had an operational requirement for land-based Talos.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) then proposed to the military departments that primary responsibility for financing and general administration of the program to develop the weapon be transferred from the Army to the Air Force. On 16 March the Army protested this proposal, claiming that land-based Talos was an antiaircraft weapon rather than an interceptor. As such it should remain with the Army and not be transferred to the Air Force. The 50-mile range limitation, said the Army, was "purely a short-term development approach and...range extension is an Army plan at all times" so that defenses could get adjusted to increasing range and speed of attacking aircraft. Further, the 50-mile decision was not irrevocable but was "a matter of determination at the time and subject to review and... such a review may be required at this time."

Faced with conflicting Service views, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) withheld action on transfer of land-based Talos to the Air Force and requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise whether or not the current roles and missions responsibilities were being revised in a way that would affect this case."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unable to resolve the differences between the Air Force and the Army, submitted divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 13 April 1955. Admirals Radford and Carney aligned themselves with General Twining. Their view was that the antiaircraft defense roles and missions decision of 13 November 1954 was still valid and fully supported transfer from the Army to the Air Force of responsibility for financing and general administration of the land-based Talos system.

General Ridgway opposed the transfer. He saw it as a direct intrusion into the Army function of providing antiaircraft forces. In making this argument, he acknowledged that the Air Force had been assigned overall responsibility for the air defense of the United States, a function discharged by providing interceptor and early-warning forces. Land-based Talos, General Ridgway maintained, was an antiaircraft system and not an interceptor even though its range might now be extended to 100 miles. Range, he argued, was not a valid criterion for distinguishing between antiaircraft and interceptor-type missiles. Accordingly, he recommended abandoning the 50-mile rule established by the Secretary of Defense in 1954 and returning to the previous standard that had been established in 1949: missiles intended to replace antiaircraft artillery were the responsibility of the Army; missiles intended to replace interceptor aircraft were the responsibility of

the Air Force. In general, Army missiles should defend specified geographical areas, cities, or vital installations, and Air Force missiles should provide blanket defense over wide areas for the interception of enemy aircraft and missiles enroute to attack important areas.

Secretary Wilson accepted the majority recommendation, and on 7 June 1955, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had transferred responsibility for general administration and financing of land-based Talos from the Army to the Air Force. In addition to reassigning the specific weapon, Secretary Wilson's action also had the effect of reaffirming his roles and missions decision of 13 November 1954.8

Differences over the employment of surface-to-air missiles by the Services continued, however. During the spring of 1956, the Army reopened the matter by challenging the assignment of Talos to the Air Force. The new challenge was in reaction to the Air Force announcement of plans to deploy the missile in point defense of SAC bases. Such an action, General Taylor informed a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, constituted an encroachment on the Army role in air defense."

The interservice conflict became more intense some two months later when a classified Air Force study appeared in the press. This document condemned the Army's Nike as unsuitable for the antiaircraft defense of the United States. It was claimed that Nike had never been adequately tested, could probably not intercept current high-speed bombers before they dropped their bombs, and was ineffective against aircraft firing air-to-ground missiles at distances greater than 50 miles from the target. Continental air defense, the Air Force maintained, should be supplied by a combination of early warning systems, long-range interceptor aircraft, Bomarc, and Talos.10

Secretary Wilson, aroused by this public display of interservice squabbling, called an extraordinary press conference the next day to put a damper on it. Flanked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of two Services, and the Under Secretary of the third, the Secretary of Defense deplored the leaking of classified staff papers advancing Service positions on roles and missions to the press. "Honest differences and reasonable competition between military Services are healthy and will result in a stronger defense establishment," he said. "It is not good, however, to have differences . . . aired on the basis of Service partisanship without giving the proper responsible officials the opportunity to weigh all the factors involved." Current roles and missions, the Secretary continued, had been determined by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had the matter continually under review, and any changes in roles and missions would be based on what was in the best interest of the country and must not be adversely influenced by the promotional activities of partisan Service representatives.

Taking their lead from Secretary Wilson, Generals Twining and Taylor denied that the Air Force and Army were at odds over surface-to-air missiles. General Twining praised Nike as the best weapon currently available. "It far exceeds anything we had in the standard antiaircraft artillery.... We welcome it." And General Taylor maintained that his criticism of Talos had been based on the fact that the