his contention that most of the arrangements of the treaties of Vienna were destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced. But airectly Lord Palmerston's keen intellect played round the proposal he saw its absurdity. He pointed out in the House of Commons that unanimity was extremely unlikely, and that a single dissentient voice would upset every suggestion before the Congress. In a letter to the King of the Belgians he described the assembling of a Congress as a measure inapplicable to the present state of Europe. With regard to past modifications of the treaties, some, such as the independence of Belgium, and the creation of the kingdom of Italy, required no sanction; others, such as the annexation of Cracow by Austria, we should not care to sanction. With regard to the future, an infinite number of squabbles and animosities would arise, especially if possible changes of territory were taken into consideration-for instance, if France were to ask for the Rhine provinces, Austria for Bosnia or Moldo-Wallachia, Spain for Gibraltar. The Congress was, therefore, curtly declined by Earl Russell in the name of our Government, and the Emperor had to digest his mortification as best he could.

Thus, while the Northern Powers were united, those of Western Europe were hostile and divided. Bismarck had everything in his favour when he proceeded to tear up the Treaty of London and to force on the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Viewed by the light of later experience, it is impossible to pronounce that treaty to have been other than a mistake. It was drawn up without sufficient knowledge and precautions; it attempted to perpetuate a wholly obsolete state of affairs. In the end, the separation of the Duchies from Denmark was a benefit to Europe. But it would be

unjust to blame Lord Palmerston for not having foreseen the great things that Bismarck was to accomplish for Germany. There was nothing in the past of the new director of Prussian statesmanship which designated him as a man likely to emancipate his country from the unworthy policy which she had pursued since the Crimean war. Lord Palmerston may be forgiven for not having seen in Bismarck's treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein question any more elevated feeling than a desire to get Kiel as a German harbour, and for being, therefore, determined to maintain the integrity of Denmark at the cost of Prussia. Nor does the fact that he was wrong put the rest of Europe in the right. The treaty had been mainly the work of a Russian diplomatist, Baron Brünnow; though it had not been signed by the German Federation as a body, several of the States had afterwards acceded to it, and Prussia and Austria had signed as great Powers. He could hardly have foreseen that when the treaty was put to the test, Russia would shrink from her engagements, bought off by the co-operation of Bismarck in the suppression of the Polish rebellion; that Austria and the German Diet would blindly play into the hands of Prussia, and thereby bring upon themselves ultimate disaster and extinction. If English statesmanship was at a discount during this period, that of Austria and Saxony was so in a double measure; and it is difficult on any grounds to justify the support given by the German Diet to the Augustenburg candidate for the Duchies, the son of the one agnate who had expressly resigned his rights of succession. Bismarck alone knew what he was about.

If the Treaty of London was a mistake, the English Cabinet at all events tried to carry it out with the utmost good faith. It fully acknowledged the position

of Schleswig and Holstein as members of the German Federation; the King of Denmark undertook not to incorporate Schleswig with the rest of his monarchy, and guaranteed to the Duchies the continuance of their autonomy. And the efforts of Earl Russell to prevent the Danes from violating the treaty were unceasing. He protested again and again against the schemes of Frederick VII. for the "Danification" of the Duchies; he sent a special mission to dissuade him from the famous patent of 1863 by which he incorporated Schleswig in the kingdom of Denmark. When the German Diet decreed in consequence "" "federal execution in Holstein, the British Cabinet made no attempt to prevent it, and their offer of mediation was made in a purely friendly spirit. Earl Russell also warned Christian IX. against the consequences of following the evil example of his predecessor; but his counsellors refused to listen to good advice, and reaped the consequences of their obstinacy. If they had shown moderation, they would have put the German Powers entirely in the wrong, and Denmark would have kept the Duchies, at all events, for the time being.

The conduct of the Danes was undoubtedly actuated by a belief that England would draw the sword on their behalf. And at the close of the previous Session they had received a certain amount of countenance from Lord Palmerston, though not enough to justify their foolhardiness.

It is impossible [he said, in the House of Commons] for any man who looks at the map of Europe, and who knows the great interest which the Powers of Europe feel in the independence of the Danish monarchy, to shut his eyes to the fact that war begun about a petty quarrel concerning the institutions of Holstein would, in all probability, not end where it began, but might draw after it consequences which all parties who began it would be exceedingly sorry to have

...

caused. We are convinced-I am convinced at least-that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow these rights and interfere [with the independence of Denmark], those who made that attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend.

Lord Palmerston, as is well known, afterwards explained that what he had intended to convey was not a threat of intervention, but a prophecy that some Power or other would intervene. The explanation was, of course, plausible; but whatever the meaning of the utterance, it was certainly rather injudicious. Still Count Beust has recently shown that Lord Palmerston was less the cause of their stubborn resistance than Bismarck, who, to further his own ends, had mendaciously assured the Danes that England had actually threatened Germany with intervention, if hostilities should be opened.* When Lord Palmerston spoke, he reckoned upon Russia and France; but when the war broke out, he found that Sweden was the only ally upon whom England and Denmark could depend. Russia had been bought off; and Napoleon, piqued by the refusal of England to attend his Congress, declined to stir in the quarrel, though definite overtures were twice made to him. Those overtures would have confined the war to the assistance of Denmark, for Lord Palmerston, even to save the Danes, would not sanction the conquest of the Rhenish Prussia by France, to the peril of Holland. and Belgium. After the refusal of Napoleon, Lord Palmerston came reluctantly to the conclusion that the Danes must be left to their fate.

The truth is [he wrote to Earl Russell on February 13th, 1864] that to enter into a military conflict with all Germany on continental ground would be a serious undertaking. If Sweden and Deumark

*Count Beust's Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 241-42.

were actively co-operating with us, our twenty thousand men ought to do a good deal; but Austria and Prussia would bring two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand into the field, and would be joined by the smaller German States.

The position was somewhat humiliating, but as there had been no pledge that we should come to the assistance of the Danes alone, there had been no breach of faith. And what diplomatic influence England could exercise in favour of the Danes, she exercised without stint. By his personal authority with the Austrian ambassador, Lord Palmerston prevented the Austrian fleet from entering the Baltic and bombarding Copenhagen. At the Conference of London, Lord Clarendon nearly saved the situation by his proposal that Denmark should cede Holstein and the German part of Schleswig. The terms were better than the Danes ultimately obtained, and they were accepted by the German plenipotentiaries. But statesmanship at Copenhagen was unable to recognise accomplished facts, and from first to last the efforts of English diplomacy on behalf of the Danes were doomed to futility.

It was least with no petulant quos ego that Lord Palmerston accepted the defeat of his policy. Writing to Earl Russell the following year he dealt with the fate which was to be hoped for the Duchies, and at the same time indulged in one of the most remarkable political forecasts that has ever been penned. It was better, he considered, that Schleswig-Holstein should be absorbed into Prussia, than be formed into a petty German State.

Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action, and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive Powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east. As to France, we know how restless and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the