Heytesbury, the Governor-General of India, who was known to be an admirer of Nicholas, was accordingly recalled; and Lord Auckland sent out with instructions to inaugurate a forward policy. Translated into action,

forward policy resolved itself into Burnes's mission to Cabul, which was checkmated by the counter mission of the Russian Vicovitch, and next into the expedition to Cabul with the object of deposing Dost Mahommed, who had proved an able ruler, and crowning in his stead the incompetent refugee, Shah Soojah. Endeavours have been made to fix the blame for this mad leap in the dark upon Palmerston; Lord Auckland, it has been said, was his Governor-general, but though there is strong presumption, documentary proof is wanting. Certainly Lord Palmerston was the man of action in the Melbourne Cabinet, and at this time was full of distrust of Russia. On the other hand, it may be noticed that though he strongly approved of the expedition, he did not, even when its prospects were most favourable, assume any direct responsibility for it. In a letter to Lord Melbourne, he said:

Auckland seems to have taken a just view of the importance of making Afghanistan a British and not a Russian dependency, since the autocrat has determined that it shall not be left to itself. If we succeed in taking the Afghans under our protection, and in garrisoning (if necessary) Herat, we shall regain our ascendancy in Persia, and get our commercial treaty with that Power. But British ascendancy in Persia gives security on the eastward to Turkey, and tends to make the Sultan more independent, and to place the Dardanelles more securely out of the grasp of Nicholas. Again, our baffling on so large a scale the intrigues and attempts of Russia cannot fail to add greatly to the moral weight and political influence of England, and to help us in many European questions, while it must also tend to give us strength and authority at home.

This is the language of the supporter, rather than of the creator, of a line of action, but it must be owned

that it is exceedingly compromising. The idea that Cabul was the centre whence prosperity was to illuminate the British Empire, is completely unlike the sobriety of most of Palmerston's conclusions, and shows that his judgment was for the time being completely clouded by irritation. The actual result of the campaign was indeed a grave comment on his extravagant anticipations, and his argument that the disaster was caused by the neglect of proper military precautions will not bear investigation, for the second Afghan war proved conclusively, even if the first did not, the futility of an attempt on the part of England, to keep a permanent hold on Cabul. But Lord Palmerston and his colleagues were able to reap the credit which attended. the commencement of operations, while to their successors fell the task of dealing with the collapse.

Connected with the declaration of the Afghan war was a proceeding of political expediency, the mention of which would probably be omitted by a panegyrist of the Melbourne ministry-possibly without much danger of detection-but which a candid biographer of the most important member of that ministry can hardly leave unnoticed. We allude to the suppression of passages in the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes which were unfavourable to the forward policy of the Government, with the general result that the unfortunate envoy became the ostensible defender of a course of action to which he was directly opposed. The proceeding was, to say the least of it, one of doubtful morality, and if Burnes had lived, a speedy detection must have certainly ensued. As it was, the murderous hand of Akbar Khan saved the Government from an ignominious exposure. The stigma of complicity in the war was allowed to remain on Burnes's memory, and, though

the truth had leaked out in driblets, it was not until the next generation that the whole scandal became publicly known. Here, again, it is impossible to fix on Palmerston more than a share in the responsibility for the collective sins of the Melbourne Cabinet; but his line of defence, when in 1861 the whole question was brought before the House of Commons by Mr. Dunlop, would seem to prove that he was more than a tacitly consentient party to the transaction, and even regarded it as rather praiseworthy than otherwise.

...

It is quite true [he said] that several of the despatches were curtailed and parts omitted, but enough remained to reveal the outline of affairs which I have traced. . . . If, on the one hand, passages containing the opinions of Lieutenant Burnes have been omitted, on the other hand, a despatch written by Sir William Macnaghten, by the order of Lord Auckland, censuring in very severe terms and disavowing totally the policy of Lieutenant Burnes, has also been omitted. The opinions of Lieutenant Burnes which are omitted from the despatches formed no elements in the policy which was adopted, and it was unnecessary to state reasons and opinions by which the Indian Government had not been guided. It is not necessary when you give reasons for a course you pursue to give also the reasons against that course. They form no part of your case. You state reasons why you do not do a thing, but it is not usual to state reasons which you refuse to accept and do not act upon.

Lord Palmerston's views as to the composition of State Papers may be left severely alone. If all Blue Books are compiled in this fashion, they are indeed, as Sir John Kaye, the historian of the Afghan war, termed those containing the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, counterfeits which the ministerial stamp forces into currency, defrauding a present generation, and handing down to posterity a chain of dangerous lies.

Long before the horrors of the retreat from Cabul had been avenged by General Pollock, the development of events in Europe had converted Palmerston from an

attitude hostile to Russia to one of cordial co-operation with the Czar. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had gained the Porte a respite; it had by no means reduced Mehemet Ali to impotence. The Pasha was determined to make himself Lord of the Levant: Mahmoud, untaught by his previous disasters, was panting for revenge. It was only by supreme exertions, by threats, cajoleries, and naval demonstrations, that the Powers, forced by the acuteness of the crisis to act with some appearance of concert, were able to prevent the two from flying at each other's throats. At last, in 1839, the inevitable collision occurred; once more Ibrahim Pasha smote the Turkish troops hip and thigh; their ruin was followed, in startling succession, by the death of Mahmoud, who was succeeded by a feeble boy, Abd-el-Medjid, and the treachery of the Turkish admiral, who handed over his fleet to the triumphant Mehemet Ali.

Once more the Turkish empire seemed to be in extremis, for Mehemet Ali declined to be satisfied with anything smaller than the entire and hereditary possession of his conquests, the concession of which would at once have reduced the Porte to the position of a second-rate Power. Intervention was necessary, and collective intervention, for if Russia had been allowed to go to the rescue alone, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would certainly have been renewed in some more objectionable form. It was, therefore, Palmerston's object to obtain united action, and so to merge the Unkiar Skelessi agreement in some more general arrangement for which the Powers would be conjointly responsible. But directly the coercion of Mehemet Ali came under discussion, a complete divergence of opinion between France and England was forced into prominence. How

ever anxious the French Ministry might be to keep on good terms with England, there could be no doubt. that the people were all in favour of the Egyptian. The establishment of French influence in the land of the Pharaohs, the high-road to India, had been a longcherished dream, which Napoleon for a moment had made a reality; and if it was a dream of pleasant anticipation for the patriot Frenchman, it was not the less delectable because it was a familiar nightmare to English ministers. When therefore Palmerston urged that Mehemet Ali should be compelled to restore the Turkish fleet without delay, Marshal Soult, the French Premier, flatly declined to adopt the proposal; and subsequent negotiations showed that while England was desirous. of confining Mehemet Ali to Egypt, Soult would gladly see him in possession of Syria and Arabia. M. de Rémusat, at a later stage of the complication, avowed in the Chamber that the aim of the French Government was to establish a second-rate Power in the Mediterranean, whose fleet might unite with that of France as a counterpoise to that of England.

Inaction at such a crisis would have resulted, as Palmerston afterwards wrote to Lord Melbourne, in the practical division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent States, whereof one would be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political independence would be annulled and our commercial interests sacrificed." He resolved, therefore, to throw aside the entente cordiale, and to enter into intimate relations with the autocratic Powers, of whom the Czar, delighted at the discomfiture of Louis Philippe, whom he scorned as a constitutionalist and a parvenu, was more than ready to meet him half way. Baron Brünnow was sent to