allow itself the habitual latitude in fulfilling its reciprocal obligations, the weaker state must surely yield unless it find as champion some other powerful state.

The smaller and weaker states recognize this situation before matters proceed too far and yield with good grace to a reasonable dictation in matters of policy whenever they find themselves without the counterbalancing support of a rival great state. The practical consequence is to bring the smaller states within the political orbit of their most powerful neighbor. This mutual bond of protection and dependence offers a large opportunity to the paramount state for the exercise of political direction in all matters which in its judgment are important for the health and growth of this political affiliation.

It will be evident to all how large a place political action still holds in the intercourse of independent states, equal though they be as regards the rights which have been recognized as a part of their common-that is international-law.

$22. ADJUSTMENT

Since the object of international law is the preservation and prosperity of the society of states, it follows that the rights which it has recognized for the protection of each state are subject always to the restriction or proviso that they be not used to the detriment of the others.

Otherwise stated, each state is obligated not to insist upon its own right when it will thereby cause a disproportionate injury to the interests and prosperity of others. The conflict between the opposing rights or between rights and interests is to be settled on a basis of a reasonable compromise. Just what this compromise

is in any particular case is a matter of fact to be determined by the states concerned in the same manner as the determination as to the grounds of intervention previously discussed. When either state proves unreasonable and gives evidence of an uncompromising spirit such as to prevent the adjustment of the conflict, a right of intervention upon this ground arises.

It is not the right to decide when the protection of interests requires recourse to force which is the ground of this action, for that is a matter of individual or subjective appreciation which cannot override the right of another state to insist upon the respect of its sovereignty and independence. But when these rights of sovereignty or independence are abused, there arises an offence against the common interest of all the states. For the common interest and prosperity depend upon the prosperity of the individual member. If one member state refuses to depart somewhat from its technical or formal rights of sovereignty and independence in order to facilitate for a sister state the conservation of its important interests, there is an abuse, an antisocial uncompromising spirit which is a justifiable ground of intervention.

It has long been recognized as a precept of international morality that every state should evince a spirit of reasonable compromise for the adjustment of all controversies which threaten to disturb the peace of nations, but the study of international relations shows that this obligation is something more than a precept of morality the fulfilment of which is left to the conscience of the separate states. It is a legal duty rightly recognized as a rule of international law, since

it meets successfully the tests of its jural character, in that it is observed by the states in their practice and enforced by appropriate action. When once we perceive that the obligation to agree to a reasonable compromise is a rule of international law which all the states are obligated to intervene to enforce, we have brought every political controversy within legal limits and we are able to set bounds to the hitherto uncontrolled freedom of political action.

The recognition of the principle of the obligation to compromise one's rights and interests upon a reasonable basis to preserve the peace brings all recourse to force under the domain of law, and permits other states to counter-intervene against a state that has shown an uncompromising attitude or abusively insisted upon its rights. Gradually through experience and through a better understanding of the principles of political science it will be possible to lessen the uncertainty in regard to the basis of a reasonable adjustment.

To those who would reject this principle of intervention to enforce respect for the right of reasonable adjustment we can only point out that the alternative is to permit every state in the exercise of its full and unrestricted discretion to decide when it is necessary to employ force for the defense of its rights and interests and to decide for itself to what degree it will push its insistence thereon. This is the doctrine of perfect rights, and covers for those who accept it the intolerable doctrine of absolute necessity, that is, the right of every state to disregard any right where it believes it necessary for the preservation of its existence. What rational being will discard a system admittedly imper

fect, it is true, as regards its definition, but capable of gradual improvement and ultimate perfection, for a system which enthrones brute force and recognizes doctrines of international anarchy?

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

23. THE RULE OF REASON

In the foregoing pages we have analyzed the various grounds upon which intervention may justly be undertaken to defend international law rights either by way of interposition or international police. We have attempted to draw the line between the due exercise of sovereignty which the law of nations recognizes and the abusive insistence upon independent action without consideration of the equally important rights of other states and the interests of the common weal. Whether the state is acting in the defense of a recognized right or in pursuit of its interests, there is no absolute or perfect right, but all rights are to be asserted with due regard to the preservation of the independence, security, and prosperity of neighboring states. Rights which have been given for the common good of all the states may not be perverted to menace international security.

Finally as a result of our investigation of what we may call rights in political action, we laid down a rule of the broadest application: that the employment of force under international law, whether it be to defend rights or to protect and foster interests, is always limited by the condition that there shall first have been made a reasonable effort to reach an amicable adjustment.

It remains for us to define what effort is "reasonable."