great degree of natural, if not hostility, but at least strong chauvinism and anti-Chinese feeling in the peoples of East Asia.

They are not so anxious to have any Chinese control at all.

JUSTIFICATION FOR VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is well to recall that because in the first hearings this committee had upon the China question, about 5 or 6 years ago, although their explanation shifted, one of the first ones was exactly that the real justification for the war, and I believe Secretary Rusk was the principal spokesman, was to prevent the takeover by China. It wasn't very persuasive that it was dangerous to have Ho Chi Minh, but China. They made the assumption that Ho Chi Minh was just a puppet of China. This was, as I have interpreted it at the time, the theory as to why the war was justified.

Mrs. TUCHMAN. I think it was totally invalid that Ho Chi Minh was simply a puppet of China and I don't understand why Dean Rusk was taken in by that or why he propounded it. He had certain experience as an executive officer of CBI and he must have learned something about China and its relations with those countries, and even now, read in the paper the other day Mr. Rostow says, "How have we allowed the domino theory to collapse?" I have forgotten his exact words, but he seemed to want to revive it. This was the theory that got us into the trouble we are now in. It was invalid from the start.

I

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there are still some very prominent publicists in this country who insist upon that point of view. You read it every day.

Mrs. TUCHMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. At one time, of course, Mr. Rusk, I believe in 1950, said the Chinese Communists were the puppets of the Soviet Union and China was not an independent country. Is that not correct?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST

I think you have made a great contribution. There are many other aspects. I can hardly refrain from at least commenting upon your reference to my attitude toward the Middle East. I can only say that this is, I think, a difference of judgment as to what is in the interests of the long-term security of Israel. It is possible that there could be an honest difference of opinion as to which course is in the interests of Israel as well as ourselves. I have several times referred to Mr. Ben Gurion's views about this, to which I subscribe, and have so stated on two or three occasions. There is obviously some difference within the higher echelons of the citizens of Israel as to which policy is most in their long-term interest. Whether or not they should withdraw from Sinai was really the main difference

Mrs. TUCHMAN. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Between my views as to what would be in the interests of both Israel and this country as to whether or not they should seek a political settlement now or not seek one now.

That was what I was seeking to advance in the two or three public statements I made on the subject, which I would only sum up by say

ing it isn't a difference of objectives. I think it is how best to achieve that objective. Just as in this case, while you say you don't wish communism to spread to this country or anyplace else where people don't wish it, there is a difference of opinion. We think now that the policies followed by our Government in this period recently in the news about Southeast Asia were wrong political judgments as to what would achieve the agreed purpose, which was to strengthen the United States to maintain its security in the long term.

I have the same feeling about Israel. Of course, I could be wrong, but that is the way it appeared to me. You brought it in and I thought, I ought to make some kind of a comment.

ISRAEL'S EXAGGERATION OF THREAT OF RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE

QUESTIONED

Mrs. TUCHMAN. I was referring, I think of course, there are differences of opinion within Israel as to the proper course they should take. I was referring, if you will permit me, to the recent statement of yours that Israel was provoking bad feeling between the United States and the U.S.S.R. by exaggerating the threat of Russian interference in the Middle East. It did not seem to me, first, that they were exaggerating it since there is clearly a Russian presence in the Middle East, a dangerous one; and, second, it did not seem to me that it could possibly be in their interest to provoke a third world war that couldn't be in anybody's interest.

The CHAIRMAN. I would agree with the last part of this. I really am not justified in pursuing this and taking the time of the committee, but I would be glad to discuss it further. I have had the distinct impression from hearing Abba Eban himself, who has been here unofficially in consultation with Senators and others, that he has used the apprehension of this country over the spread of Russian influence to influence our judgment, which causes results in the Congress, the Senate, in particular, appropriating vast sums which, of course, he feels are necessary.

I don't blame him for advocating a policy here that gives his Government what they wish. I think it is legitimate for us to express our views as to whether this is wise, either in our own interest or in his. But I have personally heard him more or less say, "Well, you Americans are naive. You don't recognize that the Russians are about to take over all of Africa. Really, we are not so afraid of them, but you are the ones who ought to be concerned about them." This is about what he said in my presence, that we don't recognize the Russian threat. This is what I had reference to.

I think he is overdoing that in order to inspire the kind of reaction that we have been subject to for a number of years. Whenever they hold up the specter of communism, certainly since the days that you referred to, the early 1950's, we react just like the Pavlovian_dog. We appropriate whatever amounts they want. This is what I had reference to. I don't think it is really in the long-term interest of Israel and I don't think it is in our interest. This is the point I was seeking to make.

Mrs. TUCHMAN. I see.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate very much your taking the time. I think your statement is an extremely useful one. I hope it will get proper exposure through the media, which is occupied now with other matters not unrelated to your testimony.

I thought your comment about the availability of top secret documents all over the country in private hands very pertinent to the present and I hope the Supreme Court takes notice of what you said. Thank you very much.

Mrs. TUCHMAN. Thank you for asking me.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Dr. Arthur Galston of Yale University who has recently been in China and whom we recentlyon another subject had before this committee. He gave us very valuable testimony regarding the use of herbicides in Vietnam. (Background information on Mr. Galston follows:)

BACKGROUND OF ARTHUR W. GALSTON

My name is Arthur W. Galston. For the last 16 years, I have been Professor of Biology at Yale University, and for 9 years before that, I was on the staff of the California Institute of Technology. During World War II, I served as a member of the U.S. Naval Military Government team for the Ryukyus Islands, filling the position of Agriculture Office on Okinawa. I have also visited other countries in the Far East, including Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Singapore, Hong-Kong and New Zealand, and spent 8 months in Australia.

My professional specialty is plant physiology, with emphasis on the control of plant growth by chemicals. I have published more than 100 research papers and three textbooks in this field, and have been recognized by election to the Presidency of the American Society of Plant Physiologists, the Presidency of the Botanical Society of America, and a Merit Award from the latter organization. I have also served on the Editorial Boards of several journals, as a member of Evaluation Panels for the National Science Foundation, and am currently a member of a committee of the National Research Council.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased to have you, Mr. Galston. I am sorry we delayed longer than anticipated, but Mrs. Tuchman, as you know, had a very provocative statement. Will you proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR W. GALSTON, PROFESSOR OF BIOLOGY, YALE UNIVERSITY

Dr. GALSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am neither a distinguished author like Mrs. Tuchman nor a China expert like the witness who is about to follow. I should therefore explain that my sole reason for being here is a 32-day trip which I was recently privileged to make to the Far East; I thus do not want to pose as a China expert. I had 17 days in North Vietnam during which time I was able to talk with Premier Pham Van Dong and other officials. I was then one of two scientists admitted to the People's Republic of China and was privileged to meet there with Premier Chou En-lai and also with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. I have some photographs of my meetings with these gentlemen in case they are needed to validate my credentials.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take your word for it.

Dr. GALSTON. My work in the chemical control of plants led me to be concerned about the massive military use of herbicides in Vietnam. I became convinced that there were serious ecological and public health dangers inherent in such practices, and undertook to gather data for analysis of that situation. I attended a week-long meeting of the Herbicide Assessment Commission of the American Association of the Advancement of Science in 1970, and have kept up with the conclusions reached by that group. Because of the difficulty of obtaining adequate data from South Vietnam and the reluctance of the Department of Defense to facilitate the acquisition of additional data, I resolved to make a trip to North Vietnam for this purpose. In April of this year, together with Prof. Ethan R. Signer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, I spent 17 days in and around Hanoi, visiting scientific institutions and talking with numerous officials, including Premier Pham Van Dong.

WITNESS' VISIT TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Prior to leaving for North Vietnam, we had taken advantage of the beginning of the era of ping pong diplomacy to file applications in Ottawa for permission to visit the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the latter days of our stay in Vietnam, we were invited to visit the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, and there received a visa for the PRC. We arrived in Nanning on May 10, and after visits of 3 days in Canton, 8 days in Peking and 4 days in Shanghai, left China via Hong Kong on May 25. During our stay, we visited three universities, four research institutions associated with the Academic Sinica, libraries, factories, communes, schools, apartment houses, villages, hospitals, and clinics. We were taken to an opera, a ballet, a play, and a cinema. We were free to walk the streets alone and to photograph at will, except from airplanes and from the top of a 14-story building in Canton. In the course of our wanderings, we made several impromptu visits to markets and stores and were able to interact directly with people, although our ignorance of the language prevented explorations in depth without the intervention of interpreters. In both Peking and Shanghai, I met old scientific friends whom I had known years earlier at the California Institute of Technology and at Yale. I was able to speak with these individuals privately in English and obtained direct answers to some complex questions. Our stay was climaxed by 2-hour visits with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking and Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Shanghai. While I certainly do not qualify as a China expert, I believe that our 15 days in China, filled as they were with visits each morning, noon, and night gave us some insight into that country which I am happy to share with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

OVERALL IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA

Our travels in the eastern part of China left us with the impression that on the whole, the people are healthy, adequately fed, and clothed, reasonably well housed and loyal to their present government. All the cities we visited were clean, orderly and free of any obvious trouble or violence; we frequently walked the streets alone at night

and were never warned by our hosts about dangerous areas; nor did we ever observe muggings or crime in the streets. Young girls seemed to stroll or bicycle alone without fear; young couples walked arm in arm and were not molested, and people seemed relaxed and not under pressure. I conclude that the present regime has managed to produce a reasonably stable and orderly social structure, and that it deserves to be recognized as the legitimate government of the area under its control. I assume that some crime and violence must exist and that opposition to the present regime has not completely disappeared, but these are not obvious on the surface.

PEOPLE'S VOICE IN FORMULATION OF POLICIES

What about democracy? Do the people have any voice in the formulation of the policies which guide their lives? Clearly, the situation differs from that in the United States. Pictures, statutes, and statements in praise of Mao Tse-tung and ubiquitous and his pronouncements and poems are visible everywhere on giant billboards. Many of these are translated into English and are uncomplimentary to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the people wear Mao buttons; many people carry and brandish copies of the little red book containing the sayings of Chairman Mao, and songs and verbal homage to the honor of Mao are heard in all schools and public ceremonies. I assume that political thought or activity in opposition to the now dominant Mao line would not be tolerated. In that sense, political freedom and freedom of expression are certainly limited.

At the local level, however, I got the impression that the people exerted considerable control over the factories, communes, and municipalities with which they are in intimate daily contact. Each such body is run by a revolutionary committee organized according to the double "three in one" principle; that is, it must contain representatives of three groups: (a) the workers or masses in the organization, (b) political cadres-usually, but not always, members of the Communist Party-and (c) members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

It should be noted that the PLA is not purely a military organization; it seemed to us a combination of militia together with activities like the Peace Corps, VISTA, and Civilian Conservation Corps. It is, in fact, one agency for education, training, and national service for many of the young people. Some are assigned to military duties, but others might serve as hospital orderlies, helpers in a school or members of a land reclamation or reforestation team. The other "three in one” principle says that revolutionary committees must contain members chosen from the young, the middle aged, and the older members of the group. While the chairman of the revolutionary committee is apparently always a political cadre, the vice chairman of each revolutionary committee is an expert in the work of the particular organization, and runs the organization, the chairman standing by unless the organization starts to deviate from the approved ideological line. It was our impression that the nomination and election of the members of the revolutionary committee followed procedures which we in the Western World would accept as fair and basically democratic, except that in