policy "oscillations", if you will, between phases of militancy and moderation on both sides of the Pacific. In the post-Korean war 1950's, for instance, when Secretary Dulles attempted to impose close containment and isolation on Peking, China was in a phase of relative moderation characterized by the "Bandung spirit" and China's participation at Geneva. By the 1960's, however, when both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations attempted small initial overtures toward the People's Republic, Peking, was in a phase of relative militancy both after the Great Leap Forward and during the cultural revolution. What is striking about the past two decades is how out of phase each power has been with the other-how little their oscillations have meshed. And what is most striking about the period in which we find ourselves today is the evolving reality of relative moderation on both sides-a "meshing" to be used while it lasts.

Incidentally, this concept of oscillation should not blind us to linear forward movement at the same time; you never return to precisely where you were before.

NEW POWER CONFIGURATION IN EAST ASIA

Well, against this historical backdrop, where are we at this point? The answer, I think, is that we are at the threshold of a new power configuration in East Asia-a configuration whose component elements have existed for some time but whose elements are apparently now perceived and accepted as never before both in Washington and Peking.

To put the matter simply, what had been seen by both sides—but particularly by Americans-as a bipolar region must now be viewed as a quadrilateral region. The old stereotype of the United States and Japan, on the one side, pitted against the Soviet Union and China, on the other, is clearly an anachronism, well out of date. And while ideologies may and do die hard, nationalisms have inevitably begun to erode and supersede them.

Central to this change, of course, is the Sino-Soviet conflict-long apparent to trained observers but only belatedly accepted by our policymakers as a permanent fact of life. Also central to the change is the spectacular reemergence of Japan as an independent force in its own right. A further factor in the change-and this one is a bit harder to evaluate than the others-is at least the new American aspiration embodied in the so-called Nixon doctrine: namely, gradual American withdrawal from that grandiose role of East Asian and Southeast Asian gendarme that our victory over Japan and the ensuing cold war seemed to force upon us.

So, Russia and China must be seen as independent entities. So, Japan must be similarly viewed. And so the United States seeks to recede from a forward posture of overcommitment to the regionseeks to recede, though may not know precisely how to do it. Four powers, four sets of national interests, are therefore coming into focus. Here are the makings of both instability and balance-a new situation of both danger and opportunity, discerned, one can be certain, in all four capitals.

Such a power configuration is hardly a new phenomenon in history. The essence of diplomacy has usually been the complex and delicate

process of negotiation within such a cluster of great powers in order to safeguard vital national interests, to resolve harmful conflicts, and to advance common goals-to make of the configuration a balance of some sort.

Yet, there is one striking anomaly in the evolving Asian picture, and that is quite obviously the exclusion of the region's most populous power from all agencies of international negotiation and conciliation. In fact the Chinese exclusion, and in the absence of normal diplomatic ties between Peking and either Washington or Tokyo, the move from power configuration to power balance is drastically impeded.

It therefore seems to me and indeed, has seemed to many of us, for many years-that the paramount obligation of a responsible Washington administration should be to help bring the People's Republic of China into full communication with the international community and to seek, as well, to "normalize" both our unofficial relationships and our official ties with Peking.

APPLAUSE FOR STEPS TAKEN BY NIXON ADMINISTRATION

In this connection, I join with many others in welcoming and applauding the significant substantive steps that the Nixon administration has taken in the past 2 years in the areas of rhetoric, travel, and trade. These moves have come at an auspicious time and have been made with considerable skill. I should add, at this point, that they have also had an especially salutary impact here at home, as well as abroad. Let us not forget that the issue of China policy poisoned our domestic political bloodstream as no other foreign issue over the past 20 years. And let us not forget that many gifted civil servants, elected officials, scholars, and others found their careers impaired or shattered over the matter of the so-called loss of China-a nation we obviously never "had," much less "lost." But let us be grateful that some of those who played so prominent a part in the divisive recriminations of the past have been able and willing, in recent times, to heal the wounds of partisanship on the China issue to help "bipartisanize" and "depoliticize" this issue. In so doing, they have removed the major domestic obstacle to movement on China policy, an obstacle that deterred the two administrations I served; namely, fear of domestic repercussions from China policy innovation. There is clearly today a broad public base of support for a more realistic approach to Chinathanks in part to the efforts of the Nixon administration. It is a base that has been ready and waiting for effective Executive leadership.

FURTHER MOVES BY ADMINISTRATION URGED

While applauding the administration's recent initiatives, however, I would strongly urge that it now move further. And this brings me, as I suggested at the outset, to the potential significance of these hearings. It is my hope that the Congress may encourage or perhaps, more accurately, prod-the administration to follow the logic of its own proclaimed desire to "normalize" America's relations with the People's Republic of China.

Some months ago, Mr. Chairman, several of us were told by a thoughtful and respected high administration official that Washington's policy aspiration was, as he put it, to "normalize" our relations.

with Peking, "while preserving our relationship with our old friend and ally, the Republic of China on Taiwan." I would respectfully submit that is an unrealistic and unrealizable aspiration. We simply cannot have it both ways. Foreign policymaking often forces hard choices; and on the Peking-Taipei matter a hard choice is certainly at hand. It need not, however, be quite as hard a choice as some tend to suggest.

Except for our Taiwan legacy, the route toward "normalization" would be clear if not easy. Given that legacy, can a route be somehow mapped?

My answer would be, yes. If we have the good sense and courage to order our East Asian priorities. Our worst mistake would be to keep them in disorder, hoping against hope to achieve mutually contradictory objectives and to pay no price at all.

Our highest immediate priority should be the engagement of the People's Republic of China in the international order. That means, specifically, seeing to it that the People's Republic is granted its rightful seat in the United Nations-as the sole heir to the seat called China in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The question, as you know, is simply one of representation-not one of membership: and I know of no international lawyer inside or outside the Department of State or the U.N. who would subscribe to the thesis that the seats in the General Assembly and the Security Council were awarded to a regime or government in perpetuity instead of to a state. The CHAIRMAN. Is that not what Professor Rowe just said? Dr. THOMSON. I was indicating some disagreement Rowe.

Professor

Since "China" is already a member, indeed a founding member, who shall represent "China" in the U.N.? The unavoidable answer is clearly the government that rules China-and has done so for nearly 22 years. Whether Peking's seating is accomplished through an affirmative vote by Washington, through Washington's abstention, or even despite Washington's negative vote, is a purely tactical matter-of little consequence as long as Peking is seated, as long as we achieve our priority objective.

But what of Taipei, that other claimant to the seat called China? Some of us used to hope, in recent years, that some kind of formula for dual representation "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan"might somehow be workable. Such arrangements certainly have a strong appeal to our Wilsonian spirit. My own evolving view, however, after much reflection, is that such a formula is not now workable, given the deep-seated feeling of virtually all Chinese everywhere that China is indivisible, and given also the relative positions of the two relevant Chinese Governments. Indeed, as Professor Cohen has pointed out in recent articles and, I believe, in his testimony, dual representation could easily become a formula for the continued exclusion of Peking or even of both claimants in the years ahead. And therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that Peking's seating-our proper paramount objective in clearly ordered priorities-will probably require Taiwan's ouster.

Let me be clear on the implications of what I have just said. The ouster of Taiwan from the United Nations will not end Taiwan's existence as a separate state. It need not and probably would not terminate

Washington's recognition of the Taipei Government. It need not terminate our defense commitment, nor will it necessarily preclude Taiwan's admission to the United Nations at some future date under some arrangement agreeable to the authorities in both Peking and Taipei. It will only mean that for the time being Taiwan will exist outside the United Nations-like West Germany, Switzerland, South Korea and

several others.

Peking's entry into the U.N. is then the first step, one of overriding importance. And from that first step can follow, even in the absence of diplomatic relations, a widening of Sino-American contacts, discussions, and negotiations on a broad agenda of subjects—arms control and disarmament, peace in Indochina, scientific and technical cooperation, trade, cultural and educational exchanges, and the modalities of diplomatic recognition.

POSSIBILITY OF DEVICES PERMITTING TEMPORARY BYPASS OF TAIWAN ISSUE

As we begin to explore such issues, it is quite possible, I think, that both powers-China and America-will find sufficient common ground, common language, and mutual facesaving devices to permit a temporary bypassing of the Taiwan issue. It is quite possible that American military disengagement from Taiwan-already underway to some degree-and American assurances that Taiwan's political future is for the people on both sides of the straits to decide, all this can gradually open the way to fuller Washington-Peking conversations and even diplomatic relations. Peking, while adamant on Taiwan's ultimate future, has recently proved to be somewhat flexible in what it demands of other foreign powers on the subject as it enters into diplomatic relations with them. Furthermore, as has already been noted, Premier Chou En-lai has intimated further flexibility on SinoAmerican relations with regard to Taiwan in his recent dinner with three American journalists.

And Chinese ingenuity (a quality we should keep in mind) on both sides of the Taiwan Straits may-thanks to time and mortality-may in due course provide a longer term accommodation, perhaps through mainland "sovereignty" and island "autonomy," as John K. Fairbank has suggested, a longer term accommodation between the island and the mainland that will defuse the issue and avoid violence while assuring the indivisibility of China.

NEW APPROACH TO CHINA REQUIRED

These, of course, are matters, Mr. Chairman, that can only be tested through the trying. But of one thing I am certain: the legacies that complicate our Sino-American relationship require of us a new approach to China that is alien to our approaches of the past-both our patronizing and self-assumed benevolence of the pro-Communist period and our inflated fear and hostility of the past two decades. They require of us, instead, a willingness to treat China as an equal, as an adult, as a great power, and as a great people; and they require of us a sensitivity to China's legitimate national security interests in the region and the world.

6/28/71

EVOLUTION OF PEACE-PRODUCING FOUR-POWER BALANCE NOT

GUARANTEED

If we move to adopt an approach, there is certainly no guarantee that a peace-producing four-power balance will evolve with great ease in East Asia. China is only one of the region's key elements, as are we; and each of us is only one of a multitude of factors affecting each other's foreign policy. Even if our Sino-American relationship were to improve and perhaps even as it improves, we can undoubtedly expect new problems, for instance, in our mutual relationship with Japanwhose stake in Taiwan, I should note, is already probably greater than the American stake. And we may both make Moscow nervous, which is not necessarily in all seasons a bad thing.

But at the least in adopting such an approach, we Americans will be responding at very long last to our obligation as a great power to try to help achieve such a four-power balance and also to help secure the long-term benefits that this can bring to all the peoples of the East Asian and Pacific region.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would only note that the views I have tried to set forth seem most fully reflected in the resolutions before this committee offered by Senators Kennedy and McGovern.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Thomson, it is a very interesting statement.

Mr. Whiting, would you proceed with your statement?

STATEMENT OF PROF. ALLEN S. WHITING, CHAIRMAN, CITIZENS
TO CHANGE U.S. CHINA POLICY, AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, AND ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNI-
VERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Mr. WHITING. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation for this opportunity to address the question of U.S. policy toward China. I only hope that your hearings on future prospects of China policy are examined as closely in this Government as are the Pentagon papers of past Vietnam policy.

One of our problems in understanding Peking's foreign policy lies

INFORMATION ON CHINA WHICH MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO LEAK

Senator MCGEE. May I ask, do you know about a repository of information on China that might be subject of such leak?

Mr. WHITING. Yes, sir; I do and I hope the Department of State accelerates declassification of those papers instead of making us wait 20 years to find what has been locked in those secret files.

Senator MCGEE. I didn't mean to interrupt.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that interruption is quite appropriate. As you can see by the attendance this morning of the committee that unless they are classified and leaked, they won't attract very much attention. [Laughter.]