nuclear technology. It came in 1960 after a long series of provocative American actions in Asia which Peking saw as invalidating the long term viability of a "soft line' Bandung policy. Persistent American pressure, coupled with Soviet disinterest in curbing that pressure, played a far more determining role in Peking's decision to support revolutionary movements than any sudden euphoric confidence in the prospects for 'people's wars' and 'national liberation struggles.' These revolutionary forces, whether led by Communists like Ho Chi Minh or nationalists like Sukarno, began to acquire major strategic importance to Peking once it became clear that a policy based on alignment with Russia and cooperation with Afro-Asian neutrals could not be manipulated, effectively, to weaken or deter the United States. Since Peking was not prepared to accept a determination of the status quo in Asia unilaterally imposed by the United States, her previous strategy had to be altered. Peking's actions after 1960 indicate that this alteration took two forms: first, through a sustained ideological assault on Moscow's stance in the Cold War, China attempted to force the Soviets to abandon their 'erroneous' line. Second, while maintaining friendly relations with genuinely neutral states, Peking began to lend vocal and, after 1963, material support to any 'revolutionary' movements deemed capable of weakening or embarrassing the United States, whether or not such movements were led by Communist parties. This approach cost China very little since the revolutionary activity, though indirectly supportive of Peking's strategic goals, was done by others and consequently entailed no serious risk of a direct U.S.-China confrontation." (27) What was the result of China's policy?

"What Chinese policy had accomplished was to incite an even more militant and active policy on the part of the United States in Asia. Not by deeds, but certainly by words, China had supplied ample evidence of revolutionary zeal to support the arguments of those quarters in the United States which felt that a decisive battle must be fought in Asia to 'contain' China, to discredit her thesis on revolution and on how to deal with American power. Where Peking had totally failed to convince Moscow that the decisive arena was the 'national liberation movements' struggle against 'imperialism', she succeeded in convincing the United States." (27)

With the development of Chinese nuclear weapons, the United States immediately began to speak of the Chinese nuclear threat, and of nuclear blackmail. Nuclear weapons have long been based on Taiwan, and on American ships off the Chinese coast. By 1960, Matador missiles had been installed on Taiwan and these were capable of delivering nuclear warheads against the Chinese mainland. President Eisenhower has indicated that there was readiness to use nuclear weapons by the United States at the time of the Ouemoy and Matsu crisis, and there are more detailed indications that the required ordnance was landed on the island during the crisis.

At the time of the Pueblo crisis one learned with irony that carrier based planes in the Sea of Japan were only fitted for delivery of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, our traumatic apprehensions are used to make contemporary national policy, which will have repercussions for many years to come, all the longer because strategic nuclear weaponry is concerned. There is value here in something that has come to pervade the understanding of researchers in many fields of science. The constructs one uses set conceptual limitations, largely through the role of language and by excluding ideas one will not entertain. This realization is evident in the writings of some classical strategists.

One could go on with endless examples to demonstrate what should hardly need demonstration, that bias is not easily curbed, partly because its possessor usually does not recognize it as such; that bias affects and conditions perception as well as action, and the effects of bias on perception are not desultory or spasmodic but constant. (28)

If further substantiation were felt necessary there is much to be said here for the application of knowledge concerning expectations and their effects on resulting behaviour and interactions derived from research in psychology. It is possible to think of few situations in the world to which this is now more relevant than the American attitude to China. What is worse is that the constructs we use for China seem to be more than accidentally deceptive or misleading. They are purposefully false, and are perpetuated in that form.

The emergence of China as a nuclear power is important for its political and psychological implications. It is relevant that we have had ten years in which to prepare for this situation, which have not only been frittered away-which

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would be a mildly passive response-but years in which we have actively set up an environment concerning our relation and understanding of China which make any but a limited and maladaptive group of responses now very difficult, if at all likely. Particularly non-functional and maladaptive as a political and psychological response are ABM weapons. As for the future "larger military threat," wars require two countries-that is, their genesis is most often bilateral. An American study of the Chinese view of the military threat to her, as American nuclear power developed directly off her shores from the 1950s to the present, might be relevant and functional in avoiding a projected conflict.

We have been looking at the assumptions that surround or underlie discussions of whether the United States Sentinel ABM system can be considered anti-Chinese or not. For this discussion one's general assessment of the technological capabilities of a particular ABM system are largely irrelevant. Given the announced context of the American decision, what may be its subsequent effects? It is likely that Chinese missile development decisions will only be affected in their details. It is not likely that China will be deterred from completing to the best of her ability whatever stages in weapons development she had already intended. The United States had repeatedly stated that it would have to go ahead with an ABM system unless the Soviet Union would agree to discussions concerning such systems. It initiated an ABM system, saying that it was aimed against China, and then obtained Soviet agreement to the talks about the same ABM system. If domestic political pressures motivated the American decision and Sentinel was neither an "anti-Soviet" system, nor an "anti-Chinese" system, some have argued that it would in fact be desirable if it were considered anti-Chinese rather than anti-Soviet, as the Soviet Union has more immediate capabilities to respond in that way which would accelerate the arms race. However, once the Sentinel system is in existence, it will be an antiSoviet, or an anti-Chinese one, whatever reasons it may have been initiated for. Others have argued that the rationalization chosen in the United States was particularly unfortunate as it will maintain and accentuate the stereotyped images of American-Chinese opposition and recrimination, distorting perceptions further. Though there may be short-term strategic arguments in its favour, such as those expressed by Mr. Nitze, the larger military effect would be to push on the confrontation. Some have pointed to the utility of an American ABM system in reinforcing the credibility of the nuclear umbrella for Asian nations. This argument has been stressed in relation to India, and in relation to discussions of proliferation. Others have replied that crediting the Chinese with provoking an ABM necessity will only accentuate the Chinese bomb in particular, and nuclear weapons in general, in Asian judgments. Some have said that the implication that the United States needs protection against the Chinese runs the risk of "going to their heads", leading China to overestimate the effect of her possession of a nuclear weapon. Hsieh has pointed out that the Chinese seem quite capable in general of making their own reality estimations, and are not likely to be so easily misled.

It would not be surprising, however, if the attendant publicity required in the United States to accompany the decision will act to convince large segments of the American public that China is so dangerous that they need protection from her, and that a threat is realistic. Again, if the American decision was mediated by domestic politics, it might imply that there was no intention to go farther to a larger ABM system. Arguing against this are the implications of Mr. McNamara's repeated warnings, the political inability to resist pressures so directly connected with problems of national security, and the vain effort of the move as a domestic political gesture. The decision, particularly in conjunction with the MIRV potential scheduled in the United States for 1973, may have implications for ages to come. At the least, within 5-10 years it will become obvious that we have been saddled with an expensive, strategically difficult and politically hard to reverse ABM system.

There are other aspects of the interaction between the topic of a comprehensive test ban and Chinese foreign policy, such as its effect on Sino-Soviet relations. (29) China is also the only nuclear power to have made a "no first use" pledge. Obviously this is consistent with China's nuclear capability vis-a-vis the West. At the same time it also serves as a direct message to its Asian neighbors as well as perhaps offering the West a lever which it must be imaginative enough to make use of in some way for purposes of negotiations.

We have gone from a discussion of the United States ABM decision as re

gards China to what is essentially a plea for "single standardism" on the international political scene. This plea is of course not terribly novel.

China's exclusion from the U.N. and, in reality, from all international negotiations, particularly in Asia, is creating an unreal situation, which doubtless explains the disturbing reactions on its part that we witness periodically and that, in actual fact, prevent any progress towards a settlement. In Asia as elsewhere, there are specific questions for which solutions should be found. At the same time, there is reason to seek an overall balance of forces and positions, which actually is the problem of peace. The point is to ascertain how this balance can be established all around the huge Chinese empire. A unilateral policy of containment does not seem to be the right answer. What is needed is solutions reached through agreement, or at least resulting from some modus vivendi. sooner it is possible to begin the better it will be for everyone. (30) Since nothing has been done "to begin," it is necessary to repeat the plea.

REFERENCES

The

1 The Chinese Question and ABM Deployment, J. I. Coffey, Study paper no. 6, Office of National Security Studies, Bendix, Sept. 1965.

2 U.S. Armament and Disarmament Problems, Hearings, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb. and Mar. 1967.

3 Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 Aug. 1968, pp. 77.

4 "The Case Against An Antiballistic Missile System", J. B. Wiesner, Look magazine, 28 Nov. 1967.

5 Editorial, The Times (London), 19 Sept. 1967.

6 The Weapons Culture, R. E. Lapp, 1968. W. W. Norton.

7 "Keeping the Strategic Balance", Foreign Affairs, C. Kaysen, 46, no. 4, July 1968.

8 Scope, Magazine and Implications of the U.S. Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings, Subcommittee on Military Applications, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nov. 1967.

9 "The U.S. and Communist China", Seato Record, 5, no. 2, W. Bundy, Apr. 1966. 10 "Nike-X Deployment May wait for Chinese Launch Pads", Space/Aeronautics, 44, no. 5, Oct. 1965, p. 14.

11 Strategy and Arms Control, T. C. Schelling and M. H. Halperin, 1961, 20 Cent. Fund.

12 Address by Sec. of Defense McNamara. Before the New York Economic Club, 18 Nov. 1963, Dept. of State Bulletin, 16 Dec. 1963, pp. 914-21, and Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 583-94.

13 Review of a Systems Analysis Evaluation of Nato vs. Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces, Report Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Section by Alain Eithoven, Sept. 1968.

14 Authorization for Military Procurement, R & D, Fiscal Year 1969, and Reserve Strength Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Feb., Mar. 1968.

15 Chinese-Soviet Treaty on Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, 14 Feb. 1950. There was no time limit set to the treaty, and it is still valid, and has not been renounced by either signatory. The last official Soviet statement in this regard was Mr. Khrushchev's in 1963: "Soviet Union is always ready to come to the military assistance of China. Should she be attacked . . and . . . it is not important for the defense of socialist countries for two socialist countries to have atomic weapons."

16 Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Alice Langley Hsieh, 1962 (Prentice Hall).

17 China and the Bomb, M. H. Halperin, 1965 (Praeger).

18 Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear weapons Progress on U.S. National Security, Report of Joint Committee of Atomic Energy (JCAE), July 1967. 19 Communist China and Arms Control, M. Halperin, and D. Perkins, 1965. 20 Communist China and Arms Control, A Contingency Study, 1967-1976. Hoover Ins. on War, Revolution and Peace (for ACDA), Feb. 1968.

21 The U.S. and China, J. K. Fairbank, 1959 (Viking).

22 The China White Paper Vol. I and II. Aug. 1949, 1967, Stanford Univ. Press; United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Dept. State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, 1949. 23 Review of China Crosses the Yalu. Lord Lindsay of Birker, Science, 10 Feb.

1961.

24 China Crosses the Yalu, the Decision to Enter the Korean War, A. S. Whiting, 1960, Macmillan.

25 How Communist China Negotiates, A. Lall, 1968.

26 SEATO Record, C. Vance, IV, no. 6, Dec. 1965.

27 "The Maoist Imprint on China's Foreign Policy," D. Mozingo, in China Briefing, F. Armbruster. J. W. Lewis, D. Mozing, and Tang Tsou, 1968 (Univ. of Chicago).

28 Defense Policy and Total War, B. Brodie, Daedalus, 91 American Foreign Policy, Freedoms and Restraints, Fall, 1962.

29 "The Nuclear Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations", W. C. Clemens, Jr., in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (ed.) M. H. Halperin, 1967, MIT Press.

30 Maurice Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Oct. 1965.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Berkeley, Calif., June 21, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Since talking with a member of your staff by telephone on June 15 and since receiving your letter, I have given serious thought to your invitation to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the problems of the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and China's representation in the United Nations. I have decided that there is little that I could contribute to these subjects beyond what I wrote in an article entitled "A China Policy for the Seventies," published two years ago. A copy of this article is enclosed. Much of what I advocated there has already begun to be implemented by the U.S. Government, and I believe that the analysis on which these policy recommendations were based remains fundamentally sound. You are certainly free to reproduce and use this article in any way that might further the work of your Committee. Because of several long-standing commitments of my time here within the University, I must respectfully decline your invitation to appear in person before the Committee for its forthcoming series of hearings.

With regard to the legislative proposals enclosed with your letter, perhaps a further comment would be in order. It is my judgment that it would be preferable if none of the proposals were adopted by the U.S. Congress at the present time. I regard the primary considerations of the United States, with regard to Chinese recognition and U.N. representation, to be the restoration and maintenance of peace in east Asia and the peaceful resolution of long-standing disputes that have barred China from participating in international diplomacy. To that end it seems to me that the United States must maintain the closest liaison and coordination of policies on the China issue with Japan, our leading ally in the Pacific, the most powerful nation in the area, and the foreign nation with the greatest economic interests in both Mainland China and Taiwan. I believe that the recent Chinese initiatives in foreign policy toward the United States-i.e., the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" were designed by the Chinese in part to embarrass the Japanese government. In my view, it would be extremely shortsighted if the Congress were to pass one or more resolutions that would further exacerbate the difficulties of Japan in living with a de facto one China and one Taiwan, even though both Chinese parties deny the existence of this de facto situation.

Since it is extremely unlikely that the United States or Japanese governments can affect the probable adoption this autumn of the so-called Albanian Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, it seems to me that the most prudent policy would be one of "low posture"-i.e., abstention on the voting and avoidance of strong verbal commitments to one or another outcome. The Albanian Resolution will, of course, result in the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the places currently occupied by the representatives of the Republic of China. This outcome probably will help to further the primary American and Japanese interests in the area. It will serve notice to the Government of the Republic of China that its claims to represent all of China are no longer honored in the United Nations, and it may cause the gov

ernment on Taiwan to begin to adopt more realistic foreign policies and to become more responsive to the aspirations of the people it rules. In any case, it would be premature for the United States or Japan publicly to foreclose Taiwan's future before pressure to reform has been brought to bear on the Taiwan government and before responsible efforts have been made to determine the wishes of the fifteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. At the same time, an American decision to abstain on the United Nations vote would clearly demonstrate our lack of commitment to continue the status quo on Taiwan.

These complexities and nuances of timing appear to be appreciated by the U.S. Department of State. Over the past two years the Department has proceeded with care and insight to initiate policies that have broken the China deadlock and that have produced the present thaw. I believe that for the next few months it would be desirable to trust the matter to the hands of State Department professionals, in consultation with Congress. I doubt that public statements by academic specialists or political figures favoring an extremely rapid change in the China situation will contribute to the desired outcome, and I fear that they could lead to unintended consequences that would undo the results achieved thus far. A United States Ambassador in Peking at the cost of Japanese-American understanding or of the legitimate rights of the Taiwanese would hardly be a bargain.

Finally, I am enclosing a monograph recently published by the Center for Chinese Studies and written by Mr. John S. Service, formerly a United States Foreign Service officer in China. It deals with certain aspects of Sino-American relations in the 1940's that I believe are germane to the current changes in both Chinese and American foreign policies.

I hope that you will find some of these materials and remarks of use, and I trust that you will accept my apologies for not appearing at this time in person before your Committee.

Respectfully yours,

CHALMERS JOHNSON,

Professor, Political Science; Chairman, Center for Chinese Studies.

[From Paul Seabury and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., "U.S. Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Proposals for the 1970s." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969]

A CHINA POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES

(Chalmers Johnson)

China policy in the twentieth century has been a graveyard for foreign ministers. The Communist victory of 1949, followed by the Korean War, traumatized the United States into positions that, to say the least, have not served American purposes well. Other nations-the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and Japan-have not had much better luck with the Chinese either, in the past or today. Of all the foreign powers, possibly Germany has been best able to do business with the Chinese, first in the form of very cordial relations between Reichswehr advisers and Chiang Kai-shek during the late twenties and early thirties, and again today in the form of trade. Leaving Hong Kong out of account, West Germany is at present China's second trading partner, exceeded only by Japan. Distinguishing Germany from other nations in its approach to the nation that still thinks of itself as the Middle Kingdom-midway between heaven and everything else under the sun-are its relative clarity of purpose and limited objectives. There is a lesson in this.

America's objectives vis-a-vis China are more important than Germany's, but they must also be limited. In short, the purpose of America's China policy should be the prevention of war in Asia-not reversal of the Chinese Communist revolution, nor containment of Communist ideology, nor realization of Chiang's revanchist dreams, nor the economic development of China, nor rescuing the United Nations Charter from some of its more obvious distortions, although some of these things may also be achieved through the maintenance of peace. War prevention is what draws America to Asia, and it is in this regard that one criticism of the conduct of the war in Vietnam is well taken: U.S. policy has not prevented war, although it may have served to prevent a wider one. Vietnam is relevant to this discussion primarily because the situation there must be stabilized before