should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies."

In 1950 the General Assembly rejected, by 37 to 11, with 8 abstentions a Soviet draft resolution to seat the representative of the Peoples' Republic of China. Starting in 1951 the tactic of the United States was to seek to postpone discussion of the so-called "ChiRep" item from year to year, thus preventing any substantive debate. This tactic succeeded for a while, but after 1953 the margin in favor of postponing discussion of the issue steadily declined and in 1960 the vote on the United States proposal was 42 in favor, 34 against, and 22 abstentions. The next year, 1961, instead of leading a move to keep the subject off the agenda as in the preceding years, the United States sponsored a resolution designating the question of Chinese representation an important question. This would make a two-thirds majority necessary to adopt a resolution on the subject. The resolution was adopted by a substantial margin, with 61 in favor, 34 against, and 7 abstentions. A Soviet draft resolution to remove the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek and invite representatives from the Peoples' Republic of China to participate was then defeated by a vote of 48 against, 36 in favor, and 20 abstentions.

This has been the pattern of action in the General Assembly every year since. 1965 was the high point for Peking, in terms of votes: in that year the resolution requiring a two-thirds majority on the issue passed by a margin of only seven votes, 56 in favor, 49 against, and 11 abstentions, and the vote on the resolution which would seat Peking and oust Taiwan was defeated by a vote of 48 to 56, with 21 abstentions.

It is interesting to note that in recent years Albania, not the U.S.S.R., has been the principal sponsor of this resolution. The only other Communist sponsor among the 14 co-sponsors last fall was Romania, the other sponsors being Algeria, Cambodia, Congo Brazzaville, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia. Last year for the first time the Soviet Union did not speak in the debate on the item.

Most states which favor the Albanian resolution vote against the important question resolution, but the United Kingdom, while voing for the Albanian resolution, has consistently supported the important question resolution, at the request of the United Staes.

THE "TWO CHINAS" APPROACH

For a number of years it has seemed to many observers that the logical solution to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations was to have both Peking and Taiwan represented. There are various versions of this proposal, especially with respect to China's seat in the Security Council. At the one extreme, it has been suggested that Peking could be admitted to the United Nations (and the General Assembly) as a new member, possibly under the name "Peoples' Republic of China", with the Republic of China (Taiwan) retaining the Security Council seat. Other proposals include: (a) leaving the China seat on the Security Council vacant, and (b) adopting a Charter amendment which would eliminate China as a permanent member, possibly substituting India or Japan. The most common "Two Chinas" proposal would give the Security Council seat to Peking, but would leave Taiwan as a member of the General Assembly. This was the recommendation of a distinguished National Policy Panel set up by the United Nations Association and headed by Robert B. Roosa, as Chairman, and Frederick S. Beebe, as Vice Chairman.

There are all kinds of points to be made in favor of the U.N.A. Policy Panel's recommendation: it is logical; it reflects the factual situation; it is consistent with the idea of eventual self-determination for Taiwan which would give the Taiwanese control over their own political destiny; it preserves the principle of universality, which is widely recognized as the best principle for membership in the United Nations today.

The "Two Chinas" approach, as reflected in the U.N.A. Policy Panel recommendations, is also politically realistic in the United States. A number of elected

2 It is unfortunate that the principle of universality is not consistently supported by a number of United Nations member states that favor the admission of Peking. The Lusaka Manifesto issued last year by Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, and supported by most African states, specifically call for the explusion of South Africa from the United Nations and its related agencies.

officials, including the author of this paper, have made recommendations along these lines without adverse effect, or even much adverse comment. Starting, I believe, in 1963, the State Department and the United States Mission to the United Nations gave serious consideration to the idea of having a study committee set up by the U.N. General Assembly to review the Chinese representation issue, with the idea that such a committee would no doubt come in with recommendations along the lines of the "Two Chinas" approach. In 1966 this idea came to fruition, and Italy emerged as the principal sponsor of such a resolution in the General Assembly, with the United States indicating its support of the resolution. The following paragraphs from Ambassador Goldberg's speech announcing the United States' position are of interest:

"Our discussions of this issue, I would recall, have always foundered on one rock: Peking's insistence that we repudiate solemn treaty commitments to the Republic of China and leave Peking a free hand to take over the people and territory of Taiwan.

"We have refused and shall continue to refuse to repudiate our commitments to the Republic of China.

"Similarly, we refuse to countenance any solution to the problem of Chinese representation which involves the expulsion of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the United Nations. As we understand the study-committee proposal, it does not in any way prejudice or undermine our commitments, nor indeed does it prejudge the results of the study to be made.

"We hope this inquiry of the committee may help to obtain answers to questions which can only be answered by Peking:

"Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptably demands, and specifically the unacceptable demand that the Republic of China be expelled from this organization?

"And will they assume the obligations of the U.N. Charter, in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state?"

While the study resolution was not put forward in 1969, the statement of the United States Representative in the debate on the Chinese Representation issue (Congressman Whalley) was not at all polemical against Peking provided Taiwan would not have to be expelled.

On the question of political realities, it should be noted that the Congress each year routinely readopts provisions contained in the Department of State, Justice and Commerce Appropriation Act and in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act reiterating the opposition of the Congress "to the seating in the United Nations of the Communist China regime as the representative of China." But these are only "sense of Congress" provisions not binding on the President, and indeed the provision in the Foreign Assistance Act contains the following rather mild language of what the President is requested to do in the even that Peking is seated in the Security Council or the General Assembly: In the event of the seating of representatives of the Chinese Communist regime in the Security Council of General Assembly of the United Nations, the President is requested to inform the Congress insofar as is compatible with the requirements of national security, of the implications of this action upon the foreign policy of the United States and our foreign relationships, including that created by membership in the United Nations, together with any recommendations which he may have with respect to the matter.

The trouble with the Two Chinas approach—and it is likely to prove a fatal weakness is that this approach is opposed both by Taiwan and by Peking. The opposition of Taiwan would not necessarily be fatal, if Peking were agreeable. It is true that Taiwan currently enjoys a veto power in the Security Council and could argue that its expulsion from the Security Council would be a substantive matter, not a procedural one, and hence would be subject to the veto. Taiwan could also argue that a motion to declare the question of credentials for the seat in the Security Council a procedural question would itself be subject to veto (the so-called double veto). All this, however, would probably prove ineffective if all the major powers were prepared to support the substitution of Peking for Taiwan on the Security Council. In that event, it is hard to conceive that procedural devices by Taiwan would long delay the action.

Interestingly enough, in 1950, the United States took the position that the question of China's representation on the Security Council was a procedural matter, but in 1951 Secretary Acheson stated that, if it ever appeared the United States might be in a minority on the question, it would seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the negative vote of a permanent member counted as a veto in such a case.

Regardless of the position of Taiwan, however, so long as Peking remains adamant in its opposition to any form of continued membership in the United Nations for Taiwan, it is hard to see how this approach will lead to the entry into the United Nations of Communist China. The difficulty of proceeding along these lines without Peking's active cooperation is illustrated by the vote in 1966 on Italy's proposed resolution to establish a study committee, which it was expected would lead to a Two Chinas recommendation. Only 34 member states voted in favor of the resolution, 62 were opposed and 25 abstained. Voting against the resolution were not only all of those states which favored Peking's admission, but also the Republic of China and some of its close friends, such as Singapore and Thailand.

What are the prospects for a change of attitude on the part of Peking on this question? While opinions differ, my own judgement is that the prospects are slim indeed. Peking continues to maintain a very tough attitude on Taiwan in discussions with countries about exchanging diplomatic representatives: for example, in the current discussions with Canada, Peking continues to insist, not only that Canada withdraw recognition, but that Canada recognize the validity of Peking's claim to Taiwan as a part of China. The existence of Taiwan as a separate stateand continued United States support for it in that respect-continues to be the major stumbling block for any improvement of relations between Peking and the United States.

If Peking were really interested in obtaining membership in the United Nations, this situation might change, but there is little indication that Peking has such an interest. The evidence on this score is ambiguous at best.

THE ULTIMATE QUESTION

It seems to me altogether clear that the United States Government should adopt the posture that it favors and would support the kind of Two Chinas approach represented by the U.N.A. Policy Panel's recommendation. I can see virtually no argument against this position, and I take it as perfectly feasible politically. To the extent that the United States has been hurt over the years by appearing unrealistic and doctrinaire in fighting against the admission of Peking China to the United Nations, the U.S. image could be improved by adopting the Two Chinas position. The Government of Taiwan would loudly protest, but this would not adversely affect the interests of the United States to any degree.

However, I believe we should recognize that the adoption of such a posture would be valuable primarily from a public relations point of view and would not lead to the admission of Communist China, at least as long as the present regime or some reasonable facsimile of it continues in office in Peking.

The ultimate question to be faced, therefore, is whether the United States should proceed to accept the notion that Taiwan will have to be expelled from the United Nations if Peking is to take its place in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. What we must attempt to measure in determining the answer to this question is whether there is enough to be gained by having Peking in the U.N. to offset the adverse consequences of such a decision.

What are the adverse consequences?

We must accept the fact that for the United States to abandon a longtime ally in this fashion would raise questions around the world about the faithfulness to its friends of the United States. So far as I can determine no treaty obligation between the United States and the Republic of China would be repudiated by such an action (assuming that in agreeing to the expulsion of Taiwan from the U.N., we would make clear that we would continue to observe our mutual defense treaty commitments to Taiwan and other treaty obligations). But there is no doubt that we could in such a case be fairly accused by the Republic of China and its friends of giving in to an unreasonable demand by the Peking Government, in contravention of the principle of universality. We would not even be able to point to a visible change of circumstances to justify such a reversal.

There would also be short-range adverse consequences for the effectiveness of the United Nations itself if Peking were to have a veto in the Security Council. It is quite possible, for example, that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise settlement in Southeast Asia which would entail some form of United Nations policing, but that Peking might oppose the terms of such a

settlement and veto any U.N. participation. The danger of a similar outcome in the event of a settlement in the Middle East would also have to be faced.

Long range, the picture is a different one. The prestige of the U.N. would undoubtedly be enhanced by having the world's largest nation in terms of population represented in its Councils, instead of being excluded. And the ultimate effect on the behavior of the Peking regime itself might well be a salutary one. Continuing exposure to the opinion of the international community should in time help to moderate Peking's policies. Peking's presence in the U.N. should also enhance prospects of its participation in arms limitation talks and make more difficult its refusal to participate in international efforts to solve Asian issues. Its entrance into the U.N. and its specialized agencies should also make more likely its cooperation in world wide efforts in technical fields such as narcotic control, disease eradication, meteorological advances, and outer space.

Different observers will no doubt assess the advantages and the disadvantages of such a course in different ways. I think all would have to agree, however, that it would be very difficult politically for any Administration in the United States to take such a step, particularly while Chiang Kai-shek himself is still alive and in office.

I am compelled therefore to conclude that, for the near future at least, it is most unlikely that Communist China will become a member of the United Nations.

POLITICAL REPRESSION IN "FREE CHINA"

(By Donald M. Fraser, July 29, 1970)

INTRODUCTION

This paper details the authoritarian nature of the regime controlling Formosa (Taiwan). The suppression of basic political liberties is amply documented. What are the implications for the United States' China policy? A fresh start on U.S. policy must take the country as it is, not as it might have been. The U.S. undoubtedly bears responsibility for helping establish on Formosa and continuing in office the existing Nationalist Chinese government. And most Taiwanese (Formosans, as well as the transplanted mainlanders, if faced with the choice would prefer the present regime, coercive as it is, to the mainland Communist regime. But if the U.S. wants a resolution of the political impasse now existing in that part of the world, the U.S. cannot continue its extensive support of the Nationalist regime simply because it is the lesser of two evils. The people living on Formosa want to and must become masters of their own destiny.

For all practical purposes, the State Department no longer recognizes any claim by the Nationalist government to mainland China. Inevitably the fiction that the Nationalist regime represents all of China must be abandoned. This in turn will force the Nationalist government to receive a mandate from the people living on Formosa or lose the legitimacy it now claims.

When these changes will occur is uncertain. Members who serve in the three national congressional bodies now based in Taiwan (Formosa) were elected in the late 1940's before the flight from the mainland. Now, as National Assembly members die, quorum requirements are lowered. The passage of time alone will force some change in the present system and outlook. But the abandonment of the current Nationalist fictions of legitimacy will be fiercely resisted as long as possible by the present regime.

Our present Ambassador to Taiwan recently said: "The established policy of our Government is to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area which could easily imperil the peace of Asia." I agree that this should be a part of our policy. But this is not enough. Although we have no vital security interest in Formosa, we have a great humanitarian interest in and concern for the people who live on Formosa.

Thus, we should neither explicitly nor tacitly encourage incursions by the Nationalists onto the mainland or the expansion of Formosan military airfields to accommodate U.S. military aircraft as large as B-52 bombers. We should encourage more realistic military defense levels. And until a process begins that will result in the destiny of Formosa being placed in the hands of all those who live there, we should scale down or discontinue military and other support to the Nationalist regime. We should strongly assert our belief that the people living on Taiwan be given full political rights including self-determination.

Beyond reducing our support for the regime, it is unclear how the U.S. can directly aid the growth of political freedom on Formosa. Were we better equipped, we might find other ways to contribute to the growth of freedom there. But it is clear that the most important contribution the U.S. can make is its support of the morally right position of self-determination. The people of Taiwan are capable of directing their own affairs.

In any event, a more realistic appraisal of the facts about Formosa must underlie new U.S. policies toward the regime, and the American public must become aware of the realities.

BRIEF HISTORY OF FORMOSA

Chinese, primarily from Fukien Province, began to migrate in substantial numbers to the island of Formosa in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. During the 17th century, various colonial powers (the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch) and dissident Chinese vied for the island. In 1683 the Ching Dynasty formally annexed Formosa. For the next two centuries, Formosa was very loosely controlled by China. After being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, China ceded Formosa to Japan and agreed to Korea's "independence.” Although Korea was not annexed by Japan until 15 years later. Formosa was annexed immediately. For the next 50 years, Formosa was ruled by Japan.

as...

In 1943, at a meeting in Cairo, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-Shek issued a declaration which read in part: "All-territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such . . Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" (which had never governed them). The terms of this declaration were repeated two years later at the Potsdam Conference. When Japan surrendered, General MacArthur authorized the Chinese Nationali to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to occupy the island in behalf of the allied powers. Peace treaties subsequently signed with Japan ended that nation's "right, title and claim" to Formosa. But the islands status was left in limbo. The official position of the U.S. is that the status of Formosa remains unresolved.

When the Chinese came to Taiwan in 1945 and 1946, they found a highly literate (80%) and modern state. Chinese troops took advantage of the relative prosperity of Formosa and numerous incidents of pillage, rape and murder occurred. A former resident of Formosa, Albert Axelbank, wrote in Harper's: "Formosan rage (at the conduct of the occupation forces) exploded February 28, 1947, after police beat to death a woman who alleged sold untaxed cigarettes." Blood literally flowed in the streets of Taipei. A recent State Department paper summarized a memorandum submitted by Ambassador Leighton Stuart to President Chiang on April 18, 1947: "The memorandum recounts numerous incidents of widespread and indiscriminating killings by government police and troops, particularly after reinforcements began to arrive from the mainland on March 8. Some of these incidents which occurred in Taipei were observed by American consular officials; others were reported by foreign residents there and elsewhere. U.S. official documents, written well after the event, generally have accepted the figure of 10,000 persons as the approximate number killed during the period which extended until the end of March, 1947." The Formosans have not forgotten.

This tragedy received little foreign attention because even as the Nationalists were occupying Formosa in 1947, they were engaged in a bloody civil war on the mainland. In 1949, Chiang and the remnants of his government and armies were driven out of China and sought refuge on Formosa. Chiang arrived on the island on December 10, 1949.

The area controlled by the Nationalist Government was reduced from 3.700.000 square miles and a population of 500,000,000 on the Chinese mainland to Taiwan proper, the Pescadores, and the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, with a combined area of 13.890 square miles and population of 8,000,000. Today there are 14,000,000 people on Formosa. Of that number, 85% are native Taiwanese.

PERMANENT "STATE OF SIEGE"

The Nationalist Government now had control over a relatively small territory and it had taken steps to ensure that its rule over Taiwan would be virtually complete. On May 19, 1949, the Nationalist Chinese Garrison Command in For