fought militarily in the 1940s and 1950s. There are no easy routes to better relations with China. The kind of fundamental changes I suggest will require a total reassessment and rejection of much of our Asia policy.

And what is so impractical or naive about confronting directly the most serious problems in our relationship with China? Press the so-called 'pragmatic' men who give you all the assertedly 'realistic' arguments why we cannot do what I have proposed. Press them, and you will see the seeds of the Vietnam tragedy and of future such tragedies germinating in their pseudo-realism.

Given our past and continuing behavior toward China, peace between the U.S. and China cannot be achieved without substantial U.S. concessions. But it will be well worth the cost to us. And that is realistic!

STATEMENT OF WARREN S. RICHARDSON, GENERAL COUNSEL,
LIBERTY LOBBY, AUGUST 16, 1971

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: This statement is submitted for Liberty Lobby, representing the views of its 20,000 member Board of Policy and 100,000 subscribers to its monthly legislative report Liberty Letter.

By an overwhelming majority, the Board of Policy opposes recognition of Red China. Yet it seems that the President's overtures to Mao herald the sudden discovery that the communists keep their agreements and are honorable men. Presumably Red China will be recognized in due time, just as Russia was in 1933. The whole situation represents an American security nightmare, a tragedy in the making.

In September, 1968, candidate Richard M. Nixon said, "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations, and to ply it with offers of trade-all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course. . . ."

Now let us look at the record, as President Nixon would say, of what the U.S. has done:

July 1969-Relaxed restrictions on travel by Americans to China and permitted purchases of Chinese goods up to $100

Nov., 1969-Suspended regular U.S. Seventh Fleet naval patrol in the Taiwan Straits after two decades

Dec., 1969-Removed $100 limitation on purchases and permitted trade with mainland China in non-strategic products (is heroin strategic?) Aug., 1970-Lifted restrictions against U.S. oil companies abroad

Oct., 1970-Nixon began to refer to Red China as the "People's Republic of China"

Mar., 1971-Lifted all restrictions on use of U.S. passports for travel to Red China

Then came ping-pong diplomacy.

July, 1971-Accepted invitation to visit Red China

Aug., 1971-Dropped opposition to seating Red China in the U.N.

After these actions, President Nixon should have no doubt how he acquired his famous nickname.

As revealed in the Congressional Record of Aug. 6 (pp. E9177-9), a group, mostly Harvard professors, presented a memorandum to President-elect Nixon just after the 1968 election. They urged that "we move more positively toward the relaxation of tensions between China and the U.S., and the eventual achievement of reconciliation." Most of the proposals of these East Asian "scholars" have been followed, and it appears to be only a matter of time until our Nationalist China ally is dumped, all in the name of "a gradual shift in our China policy."

We think President Nixon would be well advised to recall Gen. Douglas MacArthur's timeless warning, first spoken in 1951: "There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. I strongly recommend that under no circumstances must Formosa (Taiwan) fall under communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington."

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, in the June 1971 V.F.W. Magazine, points out: "Red Chinese intelligence in the U.S., as compared with Soviet Russia's, has a major handicap in that Peking is not recognized diplomatically by this country nor is it a member of the UN. This deprives the Red Chinese of a legal base from which to operate spies. .

"All the time, the red wind of espionage from the Far East continues to blow. The FBI's investigation reflects stepped-up intelligence activity by Peking. . . "Peking is attempting espionage in a variety of ways. One is to endeavor to introduce deep cover intelligence agents into the U.S., trained Peking agents who clandestinely enter this country using false identities and identifications and attempts under the cover of being an American to conduct spy operations. "The shadow of Mao Tse-tung can be seen and felt in the U.S. today. We can expect the subversive danger to grow as time passes. The only way to meet it is to be prepared. . . ."

But doubtless the most devastating document of all is the Senate Judiciary Committee print The Human Cost of Communism in China, by Prof. Richard L. Walker, "widely recognized as one of this country's foremost China scholars." This painstakingly detailed study of the many aspects of Chinese communist inhumanity includes the fact that these butchers are estimated to have slaughtered somewhere between 34.3 and 63.7 million of their fellow countrymen, all in the name of liberation, reform, revolution, et al.

The President's decision to meet with the bloody butchers of Red China is an outright betrayal of Nationalist China and all her supporters. We strongly urge against any policy of appeasing the inhuman Red Chinese aggressors.

Recently, President Nixon proposed that the U.S. pay a subsidy to farmers in Turkey, not to grow poppies. With this practice President Nixon has opened up a Pandora's box.

By international law seven countries are authorized to grow poppies for medicinal supply: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. Greece and Iran have voluntarily stopped production. In addition to the legal producers, Burma, Laos, and Red China are major producers of poppies.

By our new policy, are we obligated to subsidize Bulgaria, India, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia to cut poppy production? There is no doubt that when Greece and Iran hear of the new U.S. policy, they will resume growing poppies so that they can then be subsidized to return to their present status.

Now, what have we accomplished? We have opened up the world market of poppy production to the illegal producers, the Red Chinese.

In a report by Harry P. Anslinger, former U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics, to the United Nations, he stated that "The communist regime of mainland China is distributing drugs abroad and selling heroin and opium in large quantities to the free countries of the world. These purposes (of the traffic in narcotics) include monetary gain, financing political activities in various countries, and sabotage. The Communists have planned well and know a well-trained soldier becomes a liability and a security risk from the moment he first takes a shot of heroin." Now our new subsidy program can be evaluated as to what will result:

(A) We can smoke ourselves to death from poppies grown in Red China, or (B) We can subsidize Red China, not to grow poppies, and thereby finance our own destruction.

Thank you for this opportunity to present our views for the record.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL TRETIAK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY, "FUTURE PERSPECTIVE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS", JULY 23, 1971

(By Daniel Tretiak 1)

I am grateful in an organizational sense to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for giving me the opportunity to present this testimony as the Chair

1 Daniel Tretiak, former Senior Political Scientist, Advanced Studies Group, Westinghouse Electric Corp., is currently Chairman, Committee for New China Policy (CNCP) and Lecturer in Political Science at York University.

Author's Note: Because of time constraints, it was not possible for this document to be circulated to the entire National Board of CNCP and therefore should not be construed as necessarily representing the opinion of the Board. The author does wish, however, to acknowledge the assistance of those members of the Board who aided the author in the preparation of this document: John Fincher, Thomas B. Manton, Ishwer C. Ojha, Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Lois Dougan Tretiak.

A Copy of the CNCP Statement of Policy is attached to this statement for the Committee's reference.

man of the first American political, non-tax-exempt organization to advocate publicly an unequivocal new U.S. policy toward China, the first American organization which, more than two years ago, not only began lobbying in the Congress for a new U.S. policy toward China, but began engaging China officials in meaningful and substantive, often harmonious but sometimes acrimonious dialogues in third countries about the problems which have divided the U.S. and China for so long.

NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW ERA

These Senate hearings are held at a historic but ironic period in the history of America's relations with China. While the future course of those relations remains to be determined, extremely significant steps to improve relations have been taken by both Peking and Washington, despite the doubts and suspicions from those in both countries that genuine improvement in Sino-American relations could occur.

This is a long overdue period in the history of our two countries; sadly, the obstacles to improvement have mainly been on our side. Happily, however, the Nixon Administration-more than many of its erstwhile Democratic criticsnow-supporters and Republican supporters-now-critics-has_realized that the first steps in the journey of 10,000 li must be taken by the U.S., however difficult it may have been for us to recognize that our policies toward China have been wrong and not the reverse. But Chinese responses to the once-seemingly small steps of the Nixon Administration have been neither excessively obsequious-no one should have expected otherwise-nor have they been as stubborn and unyielding as some Americans expected (and perhaps even some Chinese would have preferred). Instead the momentum in improvement in SinoAmerican relations has been nothing short of dazzling: from ping-pong diplomacy, extensive and intensive semi-official contacts between Americans and Chinese especially in Ottawa, lifting of the trade embargo, and finally the stunningly gratifying news that Henry Kissinger and several of his aides had visited Peking and arranged for President Nixon to travel to China between now and next May, with a reciprocal visit by Chou En-Lai to the U.S. also in the offing. The significance of these latest events should in no way be underestimated; the skeptics and critics in China and the U.S. should be thoroughly disarmed, although one should not question their right to speak out against the President's decisions, even if those skeptics and critics might have questioned the right— even the patriotism-of those of us who in the past spoke out for a new China policy and now speak out strongly in favor of the President's new China policy. Ironically, that policy only a short time ago would have been considered radical yea, even unpatriotic, I say "the President's new China policy" because his speech of July 15 unmistakably implies-even if it does not explicitly commit itself to the establishment of an entirely new set of relations between the United States and China.

Several of my colleagues in the academic community have used this forum to regurgitate the sins-and they are manifold-in past U.S. policy toward China. In light of the excellence of their comments-but also in the spirit of the genuinely new era in Sino-American relations which we are now entering-let me endorse their critiques, but focus on the future, because that is where new opportunities-and let us not delude ourselves-new pitfalls may lie. The lessons of the past may have but limited utility.

As is noted below, the U.N. hurdle must be resolved in China's favor; no gimmicks whatsoever should be advanced by the U.S. side against China, unless, of course, the Chinese government demonstrates a most unlikely willingness to compromise on the Taiwan question at the U.N.

However, U.S.-China relations, as President Nixon's trip to China will show, involve more than the successful resolution of the "China representation" question at the U.N. We must consider certain other aspects of Sino-American relations on their own merits, as well as within the framework particularly of our policy toward the rest of Asia.

While I do not want to use your valuable time to recite history, we must use this new era in Sino-American relations to realize that the problems of Asia cannot be resolved unless China plays an active role in their resolution. Because we have failed to accept the central political reality of Asia, China, we have fought two exhausting, demoralizing and tragic wars in Asia since World War II. All efforts which have even a chance of leading to a mutual Sino-American

accommodation which will prevent more Vietnams are certainly worth the work involved. We can no longer ignore China, even if we may take some time to live in perfect harmony with it.

The new direction in our policy toward China will make increasingly less necessary the need for the U.S. to maintain a high military posture in Asia or to encourage our allies to do so. China has, even during periods of Sino-American hostility and tension, been remarkably non-belligerent vis-à-vis Asian neighbors. A China at peace with the U.S. will not want to risk that peace by threatening militarily Asian countries friendly to the U.S. or neutral between the Major Powers. Furthermore, as the Vice-President did recently in South Korea, our Asian allies should be encouraged to understand and accept our motives for improving relations with China. Additionally, as has occurred particularly in Southeast Asia, various nations should be encouraged or supported by the U.S. to reach political accommodations with a China willing to enter into such accommodations. The peace of Asia--which so dramatically affects the peace of the world as well as our own Nation-really demands no less.

U.S. amity with China should not be seen as a zero-sum game in terms of our relations with Asia's two other Major Powers, Japan and the USSR. In fact, for the past twenty years, their relations with China have had that unfortunate effect on Sino-American relations. Particularly in the Japanese case, we should use our good offices in both Peking and Tokyo to discourage SinoJapanese mistrust, not exploit it to no one's real advantage. Taking a brief historical look backward, Sino-Japanese hostility in the inter-War period bode ill for the U.S. by 1941. Hopefully, we can learn from that lesson.

The Taiwan question, certain Chinese claims to the contrary, will not be easy to resolve. But certain assumptions will have to be accepted by the U.S.; for the Chinese People's Republic (CPR), Taiwan is more a question of legitimacy than of territoriality-although that question will have to be faced some day, as well; second, however difficult it may be for some American decision-makers, the U.S. cannot expect to impose its wishes on the CPR, as the latter government and people attempt to resolve the Taiwan question with the authorities and people on Taiwan. In this connection, two myths should be discarded: Taiwan's "uniqueness" and "the bloodbath theory." Taiwanese, like the majority of the inhabitants on the Mainland, are Han Chinese; they are dissimilar from many Mainlanders, but we should not forget the heterogeneity-and homogeneity— that exists in China, even if few of us have had the opportunity to observe the regional and provincial diversity of Chinese life since 1949. As for the bloodbath theory, it should be realized that: first, the Taiwanese military estabilshment is one of Asia's strongest, as long as the troops remain loyal to their commanders. Only an all-out CPR onslaught on Taiwan could conquer the island. Second, and more importantly, if the CPR is genuinely committed to better relations with the U.S., it will realize that those relations could be jeopardized by an armed attack on Taiwan. To sum up, however, the United States, if it is to have a new policy toward China, must understand that it cannot dictate to China the terms of the settlement of the Taiwan question, which is, after all, an internal Chinese matter.

Beyond the resolution of outstanding problems like the Taiwan one, we should look forward to well-rounded, increasingly normal relations between China and the United States. The U.S. Government should not merely end partially the trade embargo with China, but expand the list of salable items as well as make Export-Import Bank loans available to finance future Sino-American trade, thereby actively encouraging U.S. businessmen to trade with China. Most-favored nation status should be accorded China in future foreign trade. Furthermore, the U.S. should begin making plans for extending foreign aid to China, if the CPR is interested in seeking assistance, and on terms fully acceptable to the Chinese. However, if China is unprepared, uninterested or unwilling to accept government-to-government aid, private U.S. citizens should be encouraged to travel to China for varying lengths of time in order to contribute their knowledge to the Chinese in fields determined by the Chinese; additionally, public and private American institutions should be encouraged to provide funds and facilities for Chinese teachers and students to travel and study in this country.

Our policy of military threats to China must end. The first step toward terminating that threat is to prevent the transfer of nuclear missiles from Okinawa to Taiwan in 1972; next, all nuclear weapons should be removed from Taiwan; and finally, our military presence on and around that island-already in the process of being reduced-should be removed.

For the first time in the long Chinese-American relationship, both countries will have to learn to deal with each other as equals. Our leaders seem already to have begun to accept this reality; I hope that they will set the tone for other Americans in this area. Additionally, after 20 years of non-contact we and the Chinese run the grave risk of having excessively high expectations about how far and how fast our mutual relations may develop and concomitant disappointment and disillusionment. (I tend to feel the problem may be more severe on the American side.) But here again, the relatively slow but steady improvement in the state of Sino-American relations-coupled with the disastrous impact on those relations of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April-May 1970may have helped to prepare both sides against pendulum swings from unwarranted optimism to unnecessary military high risk-taking.

TOWARD A NEW BIPARTISANSHIP IN U.S.-CHINA POLICY

I suggested earlier that these hearings were held in an ironic period in our Nation's history. Let the ironies be spelled out explicitly; the correct, even courageous moves that President Nixon has taken-had they been carried out by a Democratic President-would almost certainly have brought charges of "appeasement" and "being soft on Chinese Communism" against a Democratic President by a Richard Nixon not in the White House. It is no wonder that some Democratic Party leaders were somewhat slow to applaud initiatives taken in March and April of this year to improve Sino-American relations. But as I have stressed in private discussions with several Democratic Senators as well as with Chinese diplomats during frequent discussions in Ottawa, it would be self-defeating to assume that this Administration was not moving to begin fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward China. Quite obviously, that is precisely the direction in which the Administration has been moving, as the President's dramatic announcement of July 15 confirmed.

For the past half-decade this country has been divided by the bipartisan disaster that has been the Vietnam War. Few of us can remember, certainly not I, the divisive role that U.S. policy toward China played in the U.S. body politic 20 years ago. Another irony of today's Sino-American relationship is that it provides an opportunity to build a new bi-partisanship of peace-of neither war nor hostility-between the U.S. and China. I was profoundly encouraged by the statesmanlike praise given the President's pre- (and post-) July 15 initiatives toward China by Senators Gravel, Kennedy and McGovern in their testimonies before this Committee. Political rivalries aside, the Nation and the international community deserved no less. Their position-and that of the President-points the way toward a positive, new bipartisan U.S. policy toward China.

The President should be encouraged by Democrats and Republicans alike to continue to move as dramatically forward in the coming months as he has in the past few ones. Such bi-partisan support for a new China policy should not be unconditional, however; particularly those Democrats who have had the courage to speak out early on the Chinese issue should quietly but firmly make it clear to the President that their support does not extend to any efforts the Administration may be contemplating to attempt to block the CPR's resumption of its rightful seats in the U.N. on China's terms. How ludicrous and counterproductive in terms of the Administration's own policy-goals toward China would it be if on the one hand the President were speaking about traveling to China to discuss normalization of relations with that nation and simultaneously attempting to prevent China from resuming those positions in the world community which American policy, more than any other nation's has attempted to deny.

I would like to conclude my call for genuine bipartisanship on the China issue by offering the suggestion that I do not believe that President Nixon's July 15 speech means anything other than that the US will acquiesce in the CPR's assuming its rightful seats in the UN in the Fall of 1971, however bitter a pill that may be for some members of the Administration to swallow. The Chiang Kai-shek government-in-exile should be allowed to continue to regard us as its friend if it wishes, but we should not allow it to block any longer the normalization of relations between the US and the CPR, either in the UN or, sooner rather than later, in Washington.

CHINESE RESPONSIVENESS

Any discussion which deals essentially with U.S. policy toward China should ipso facto focus on what U.S. policy toward China should t as we in the