The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy
This study examines the disparities between the two dominant American political-military approaches to the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. The first approach argues that if force is employed, it should be used at whatever level necessary to achieve decisive military objectives. The second approach argues that certain limits to the use of force may be necessary and acceptable. Case studies illustrate how the basic disagreements between the two approaches influence policy-making and military decisions. Included in the text is discussion of Vietnam, Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
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