Let me move

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Guyer, may I just complete the answer because I would like the record to reflect clearly what he did say, in addition to what he did not say.

He stated publicly, before your colleagues, before the Senate, and before Congressmen visiting Peking, that if Taiwan recognized PRC sovereignty, "the social system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan. Change might take 100 years or 1,000 years. We will not change the society by force."

I believe that goes very far in the direction you have cited. In addition, I would cite the most important single fact about this issue to my mind, which is that as Deng Xiaoping made clear repeatedly during his visit to the States, that China has opted for a major program of modernization involving essential access to American, Western, and Japanese technology, and financing and investment capital. By choosing modernization they have in effect signaled that they are no longer interested in making the Taiwan issue an issue because

Mr. GUYER. I agree, I think I got more answer than I asked for. At any rate, I have the feeling that China was so desperate in wanting the things that you have outlined that we could have gotten that without the price we paid to get it. That is my personal feeling.

On page 6, you made a statement-I would like the chairman, Mr. Wolff, to just listen. I would like for you to answer this. On page 8 the Secretary said, the U.S. position in East Asia today is stronger than at any time in the past two or three decades. Do you agree with that?

U.S. POSITION IN ASIA

Mr. WOLFF. I do think, if the gentleman will yield, that the U.S. position today in Asia certainly has been strengthened as a result of our end of the Vietnam war and the fact that there is peace in the area. However, I do feel there are some very serious questions about our continuing presence and effect of our presence in the area.

Mr. GUYER. I only say this: We are not going to solve the Taiwan issue here in 5 minutes, but I do think that the bold, unannounced, unconfirmed, and discussed result of the announcement, the way it came, is tantamount only to the way the Panamanian Treaties were made after 1 day of recess of Congress; further, Congress was not consulted, the leaders were not consulted, and I have reason to believe from little visitings I have made the credibility of our country certainly has been jeopardized by an instance, I think the only one precedent in American history, by the way and day it was made.

I am not disputing the overall results or the down-the-path benefits, but I am saying it does place us in a very negative diplomatic situation when our work, our integrity, is now being questioned around the world.

Mr. WOLFF. The gentleman's time has expired. We will take questions from Mr. Diggs. After Mr. Diggs' questions, we will recess, as we have previously determined, to make the announcement regarding the MIA's. We will recess for 10 minutes.

Mr. DIGGS. I reserve my time.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have 5 minutes now?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADVANTAGES TO UNITED STATES FROM NORMALIZATION

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could perhaps give us a more precise indication than you have in your testimony of the concrete advantages to our country of normalization with the People's Republic of China, in the light of the fact that prior to normalization we did through our liaison office in Peking have some diplomatic contacts with them, so that no one could say that we had no communication with one-quarter of the world's population? We did have cultural and commercial relations of a sort with them, so it wasn't as if we were cut off from trade with them. And there is the fact that normalization did require a termination of the mutual defense treaty, which at least to the people of Taiwan was a source of psychological and perhaps military sustenance as well.

Let me just say or conclude this rather rambling question by saying that the comments that both you and Secretary Armacost made about the strategic consequences of the Sino-Soviet split would presumably be equally applicable even if there were not normalization of relations between ourselves and the People's Republic of China, because that split in the Communist world derives from factors that are fundamentally unrelated to the bilateral relationship between Washington and Peking.

So given all of these considerations, what are the concrete advantages of normalization that justify the price of terminating a longstanding mutual defense treaty and diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Solarz, you asked a difficult question but one that is central to why the President decided he should normalize.

I would answer by dividing the answer into at least two parts. First, the negative consequences of not normalizing and, second, the prospective gains over a long period of time of normalization. First, on the negative side. I would assert very firmly, that the failure to move forward on normalization, a failure to attempt to normalize relations, would have caused the United States-Chinese relationship actually to be set back.

Now, when the President reached that same conclusion, early in 1977, a conclusion he made very clear to the public, he did not know at that time if normalization was achievable. He authorized Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski and Ambassador Woodcock to begin to discuss normalization with the Chinese in a serious and sincere manner, not knowing whether it was possible. We were convinced that not to move forward would be to move back. I note that this subcommittee reached a very similar conclusion in its report last year.

Now, you refer to the strategic advantages and their not changing whether we have normalization or not. I believe in the short term that is correct. In the long term one might argue that normalization significantly reduces the chances of losing the advantages that were outlined by Mr. Armacost in his statement.

It seems to me that we went through distinct phases in our relations with mainland China, as it used to be called by everyone between 1949

and 1978. In the first phase, from 1949 to 1971, there was no relationship at all. In the next 6 years we had limited relationships. While it is true that there was trade and it is true trade was increasing, and while it is true there was communication, there were very serious legal, economic, political, psychological, and historical constraints on the relationship, all of which are now in the process of being removed.

I think that the events in the bilateral relationship between Washington and Peking since normalization have demonstrated how rapidly both sides will be able to explore new possibilities.

TRADE RESTRICTIONS PRENORMALIZATION

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you elaborate in more specific terms on what precisely were these legal and other constraints on the improvement of our relationship?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Some of the most obvious are in the field of trade. The claims-assets issue, which has plagued us since 1950 and had become a more and more serious constraint on trade, was really not being resolved until normalization. We now have asked Secretary Blumenthal to address the issue on an urgent basis in his trip to Peking the week after next.

The Chinese made clear repeatedly that in the absence of normalization they would prefer to buy things from other countries rather than the United States, if they could get a comparable arrangement from someone else. That constraint has been removed.

Mr. WOLFF. Time has expired. You may finish your answer.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. In the field of frank dialog between the two nations on political matters, there were clear inhibitions throughout and our discussions with the Chinese since normalization have shown a significant change in the tenor, they are much franker now, they are much easier. There will be a vast increase in exchanges involving businessmen, students, science, and technology.

Let me conclude, Mr. Solarz, by stressing what I think the real gain of this is to the United States.

REAL GAIN TO UNITED STATES

China is a country with many years to go before it catches up with the modern industrialized countries of the world. We all recognize that. As it does, this massive and historic modernization effort, an effort whose outcome is clearly not foreordained and could proceed in a number of ways, it is very much in the interest of our Nation that the Chinese modernization effort be tied as closely as is feasible to the economies and societies of Japan and the West.

Normalization has made that far more possible than would otherwise have been the case. I believe that whatever the future course of China's foreign policy, the fact that the modernization effort is now beginning and will require such a degree of Western and Japanese assistance, is in itself a major plus for the nations of the world who share our values and our systems. I think that whatever the future course of China's foreign policy, the deep involvement they will have with us will be a hedge against the kind of reversion to another foreign policy tendency which could act against our interests.

I would cite that as the most important long-range and tangible gain.

Mr. WOLFF. Time has expired and the committee will stand in recess for 10 minutes for an important national announcement. [A brief recess was taken.]

RESOLUTION ON PAKISTAN

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come forward.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we might proceed out of order for a few minutes.

Mr. WOLFF. Without objection.

Mr. GOODLING. I would like to have the support of this subcommittee in cosponsoring a resolution that we might be able to present to the Congress tomorrow on a unanimous consent basis, and the resolution would say the following:

Whereas the people of the United States and the people of Pakistan have had long, friendly and mutual beneficial relations;

And whereas, the continued development and prosperity of Pakistan is important to the people of Pakistan, Pakistan's friends in the United States, and the peace of the world, and,

Whereas, the judicial proceedings in the case of former Prime Minister Bhutto have led to a sentence of death, implementation of which might well precipitate unnecesary confrontation between the supporters of Mr. Bhutto and the government of Pakistan. Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States should convey immediately and in the most urgent possible terms the friendly concern of this body about the possible execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto, and

That a demonstration of clemency by the President of Pakistan and in commuting Mr. Bhutto's death sentence would be a statesmanlike and humane gesture.

Mr. GUYER. I think the sequence here is a little bit already out of date because the President has already acted. What you might say is to have this rephrased to support the President because he has already made his appeal of clemency. It would make your language come up to date.

Mr. GOODLING. We can rephrase that.

Mr. WOLFF. I would suggest that the gentleman rephrase it. I will be happy to support it personally, and I think that we should take this to the individual members since the committee will not be able to act in time.

Mr. GOODLING. Yes.

Mr. GUYER. Could we not, Mr. Chairman, if I might, with the reservation of bringing the language up to date, take action as a subcommittee even now?

Mr. WOLFF. If the gentleman moves in that direction.

Mr. GUYER. I So move that the language be brought into conformity supporting the President's action and showing our concern and appeal in the same direction, and have the staff draft such a statement, and I so move now.

Mr. GOODLING. I will second it.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am sure this is an entirely meritorious recommendation. If the subcommittee is being asked to vote on this, I just came in. Could you or Mr. Guyer just briefly indicate what the recommendation is?

Mr. GOODLING. I gave you a copy, Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. All right.

Mr. GOODLING. It merely mentions we should bring it up to the committee as support of the President in this regard.

Mr. WOLFF. The question is before the committee. Is there a second? Mr. GOODLING. I second.

Mr. WOLFF. On the question, would anyone like to speak on this? I might just advise the subcommittee that several months ago the subcommittee made such an appeal directly to the Government of Pakistan on the same subject.

Mr. SOLARZ. This resolution, Mr. Chairman, I gather does not in any way express a judgment on the part of the Congress as to whether or not Mr. Bhutto was guilty as charged, but is simply an expression of hope that his sentence of death will not be carried out?

Mr. WOLFF. As I understand the resolution of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that the resolution is based upon an appeal for clemency, and that is all.

Mr. GOODLING. Yes; the last line would indicate that.

Mr. WOLFF. Any further discussion?

If not, I will put the question. All in favor say "aye."

[Chorus of "ayes."]

Mr. WOLFF. Opposed?

[No response.]

Mr. WOLFF. Since it is the wish of the subcommittee that this resolution be passed on, I take it, Mr. Goodling, you would like this resolution passed on to the full committee?

Mr. GOODLING. Yes.

Mr. WOLFF. So ordered.

Mr. Pritchard.

RESOLUTION OF TAIWAN QUESTION

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we continually stress that the resolution of the differences between Taiwan and the mainland should be worked out peacefully. This presupposes there has to be a resolution and that eventually these two nations will have to get together. Is that our official position?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Pritchard, I do want to stress that that is not at all what I meant and, in fact, I tried to make clear at the end of my statement that is not our position. We are not going to propose a solution on the Taiwan question.

We have no further position on when or how this should happen. Our only interest is if it happens, it happened peacefully. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of this point. For over 30 years, the United States was an active participant in the Chinese civil war. By the act of normalization, we are no longer involved; our interests are only that the solution, if and when it takes place, be peaceful. Speaking for myself, I have no problems with seeing the present situation