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3. Letter of February 14, 1979 to Hon. Lester L. Wolff from former Presi-
dent Nixon____

188

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IMPLEMENTATION OF TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT:

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come to order.

Our witnesses today are Hon. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and members of their staff, including Mr. Harvey Feldman, who are playing a prominent role in the normalization process.

The topic of today's hearing is the administration's China policyhow it has been handled, what it is, and where we all go from here. In particular, we will seek testimony from our witnesses on two pieces of legislation, the administration's own H.R. 1614, the so-called omnibus bill for continued relations between the United States and the people on Taiwan, and House Joint Resolution 167, introduced by myself with nearly 100 cosponsors, which would provide an explicit U.S. statement on the future security of Taiwan. As you know, this measure has been introduced in the other body by Senators Cranston and Kennedy, with more than 30 cosponsors.

I had hoped that Senator Kennedy and Senator Cranston could appear today to discuss our legislation, but as the other body is not in session this week, they were unable to attend. However, they have provided us with statements for the record, which, without objection, will be included at the outset of the printed record.

Our hearings will continue tomorrow at 1 p.m. with witnesses from private industry, as well as from past administrations, such as Mr. Winston Lord, formerly of the policy planning staff, Hon. Walter McConaughy, former U.S. Ambassador to Taiwan, and Adm. Noel Gayler, former CINCPAC. We have also been in contact with former Presidents Nixon and Ford, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, among other historical figures, regarding their thoughts on the present situation.

SECRET AGREEMENTS

One of the basic reasons for contacting these former members of the U.S. Government is to determine whether or not there have been any

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prior agreements or prior understandings that led up to normalization but which we in the Congress are not yet aware of.

Today, and in the coming weeks, we will focus on four major areas: First, as noted, we will need to know-and we ask this of our witnesses as well today—just what prior arrangements or secret agreements, have been made over the years, which affected the normalization process announced by the Carter administration.

Particularly, it has come to my attention that a secret arrangement in the economic field exists, in addition to the apparent agreement not to sign new arms contracts with Taiwan this year, which has already come to light. The Foreign Affairs Committee last week voted to require full disclosure of any other agreements that have been made.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS

Second, we are particularly concerned over what can be defined as the "security issue" addressed by House Joint Resolution 167, and by other measures in both bodies. I note that over the weekend, President Carter made his strongest statement to date on Taiwan's security, and I hope today's witnesses will discuss the details and impact of the President's remarks.

Third, we are also concerned that the so-called omnibus bill, H.R. 1614, while full of good intentions, nonetheless lacks specificity; particularly, the charge has been made that it is too imprecise or too open ended to provide the people on Taiwan or the U.S. business community the legal guarantees they need to carry on our traditional economic and social relationships.

Regarding the omnibus bill, of course, there are a host of questions, including the name of the private U.S. corporation we are being asked to approve, which I know we will discuss in detail in the coming days ahead.

Finally, the fourth major area we will examine might best be characterized as the future or the implications of our China policy as it has been articulated to date by the administration.

Such questions as the effect of normalization, and the remarks of Prseident Carter and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on the triangular relationship between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, particularly come to mind. Despite claims to the contrary, the distinct impression has been made that we have indeed played the "China. card" against the Soviet Union. The grave implications for world peace inherent in this need to be fully explored.

[The statements of Senators Kennedy and Cranston follow:]

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY. U.S. SENATOR, STATE OF
MASSACHUSETTS, ON JOINT RESOLUTION ON TAIWAN (S.J. RES. 31)

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to submit this statement in support of S.J. Res. 31, cosponsored by Senator Alan Cranston in the Senate and Rep. Lester Wolff in the House of Representatives, regarding the "peace, prosperity, and welfare of the people on Taiwan and the Pescadores."

Twenty-eight Senators have now joined us in cosponsoring this resolution, and I understand that an equally substantial number of Congressmen have now joined Congressman Wolff in cosponsoring the same Resolution in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the broad base of support, ranging across the political spectrum, which is reflected in the cosponsorship of this Resolution. I believe

this demonstrates understanding in the Congress that, as we normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, we can and should provide for the future peace and well-being of Taiwan.

If the Congress enacts both this Resolution and the omnibus legislation submitted by the President, I am confident that our ties with the people on Taiwan will not only remain unimpaired, but will actually be enhanced in the months and years ahead.

First, our ties should be unimpaired because they should remain the same in substance even though they change in form. The Administration's legislation provides for substantive continuity in "commercial, cultural and other relations," of unofficial instead of official terms. Our Joint Resolution provides for substantive continuity in the vital security sphere, also on unofficial terms.

Second, our ties should actually be enhanced because we have finally removed Taiwan as a diplomatic issue between China and the United States. No longer do the Chinese feel duty-bound to object to official relations based on our past pretense that the government of 17 million controls a nation of almost one billion. In turn, the Chinese have agreed to continued unofficial ties between us and Taiwan-ties which should expand and strengthen just as Japan's did after it normalized relations on the same basis in 1972. It is no accident that Japanese trade with Taiwan as well as with the mainland has quintupled since normalization, from roughly $1 billion each in 1971 to over $5 billion each in 1978. We look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working with you and the Committee in incorporating the areas covered by our Resolution in the legislative package to be submitted to both Houses of Congress. Indeed, we favor developing a single package with both security and non-security elements, which incorporates the Administration's proposals as well as our own. Whatever the final shape of the package, we hope that it will reflect the following elements which constitute the core of our approach:

Confirmation of our continuing interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue;

Provision for continuing defensive arms sales to Taiwan;

Consultation between the Executive and Legislative Branches on any danger to the peace, prosperity, and welfare of Taiwan; and

Provision for meeting any such danger in accordance with our Constitutional processes and legislative requirements, including the War Powers Act.

This approach is consistent with the agreed terms of normalization. Unlike other proposals, it does not involve official relations with Taipei, which would contradict our recognition of Peking as the sole legal government of China. Nor does it permit unilateral action by the President, without necessary Congressional participation. Nor does it commit our country to specific actions under hypothetical circumstances—a policy which successive Presidents and Congresses have wisely refused to adopt.

Instead, we should do no more nor less than our existing security commitments to allies in Europe and Asia. Article V of our 1954 treaty with Taiwan provides for the United States to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." It does not provide for unilateral Presidential action, and it does not commit us to specific actions under hypothetical circumstances. Similarly, our Joint Resolution provides for Presidential consultation with the Congress and confirms the policy of the United States to act to meet any danger to Taiwan "in accordance with its constitutional processes and procedures established by law."

What this approach does accomplish is Congressional reinforcement of the President's welcome declarations on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves. The capabilities and policies of both Taipei and Peking now contribute to such a prospect. So will a Congressional expression of confidence and readiness to act in even the unlikely event of a danger to the peaceful well-being of Taiwan.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater and others have argued that the President lacked authority to give one year's notice of termination of our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan-in spite of that treaty's explicit provision for such termination under its Article X, which states that "Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party." I have carefully examined the constitutional and historical basis of these objections, and I am personally convinced that the President had full authority to take the actions he did to normalize relations with Peking, including termination of the defense treaty with

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