this particular requirement was not established with any such view. It was directly meant to provide against abuses among Catholics. Nay more, one motive at least, for making the obligation of this law dependent on a promulgation in each parish-a very unusual provision was to exempt Protestants in great measure from its operation, as is explicitly stated and held by Benedict XIV., on the authority of Pallavicini, in his History of the Council of Trent.

It is well to explain here that, though the authority of the Church to prescribe conditions and institute impediments of marriage is connected with the sacramental character wherewith this contract is invested in the New Law; yet the doctrine of the authority alluded to is not identical with the doctrine that matrimony is a sacrament, nor is either doctrine strictly dependent on the other. Christ our Lord could have made matrimony a sacrament without giving the Church all the power he did regarding it. Such power is, no doubt, congruous, fitting, and might be conjectured about as a likely accompaniment of the sacramental institution, but it is not a necessary consequence, so far as I can see. On the other hand, still more obviously, the power could have been given without the elevation of the contract to the dignity of a sacrament. As a matter of fact, it is a dogma of faith that matrimony is a sacrament, and it is a dogma of faith that the Church has the power we are speaking of with reference to the contract; and it is not a dogma of faith, though it is otherwise sufficiently certain, that the contract and the sacrament are inseparable. Long after the Council of Trent, there were theologians who held with impunity that the contract might be entered into validly and indissolubly by Christians and Catholics without their receiving the sacrament. But these theologians held, at the same time, that the validity of the contract depended on its conformity with the laws of the Church; and that where an ecclesiastical diriment impediment stood in the way, the parties did not become man and wife, whence their subsequent life together would be one of concubinage. Suppose a theologian of fifty years ago holding, as many held, that the priest was the minister of the sacrament, and that his active ministration was required to effect it-suppose, I say, such a theologian, asked to state the different classes of cases that might occur, in the marriage of two Catholics, with reference to the priest's intervention, and the results which would respectively follow, he would have said: Where the decree of Trent is not published, the matrimonial contract, without the presence of the parish priest, or any other witness, is valid as a true marriage, but not a sacrament; with a priest's ministration, whether he be the parish priest of either party or not, and with or without other witnesses, it is a sacrament also. Where the Council's decree is published, if the parish priest of either party, or an authorised substitute, and two other witnesses are silently present, a non-sacramental, but valid contract is effected; but if the priest perform the marriage rite, the sacrament is received. On the other hand, if the parish priest of neither party is present, nor his substitute, or if there be not also two other witnesses, the marriage is null and void, and the cohabitation of the parties will be a concubinage. My object in this detailed exposition is to show that no recent de

claration as to the identity of the contract with the sacrament has any practical bearing on the validity of the contract, since ecclesiastical impediments were all along understood to affect the contract, identical or not with the sacrament.

I may be asked why it is that, in the Syllabus and elsewhere, so much stress is laid on the inseparability of the contract from the sacrament, and precisely in connection with the absolute nullity of marriages celebrated otherwise than in conformity with the Tridentine decree. It would seem from this circumstance that the validity of a marriage must stand or fall with the separability of the contract from the sacrament. The answer is easy, and may be gathered from the propositions set down in the Syllabus. The reason then is, that the supposed separability was made a ground for withdrawing the contract from the operation of the law of Trent. This ground was relied on, not by otherwise orthodox theologians, but by innovators. As therefore, in reality, the contract and sacrament are not separable among Christians, a short way of dealing with these false teachers was to say so but their pernicious conclusions were no necessary consequence of the imagined separability, and had not been held by those sound Catholic authors who mistakenly believed that the contract might exist among Christians without the sacrament. Those marriages which from any cause do not fall under the Tridentine law may be not only valid but sacramental without the presence of any priest, as I have clearly explained in that previous paper to which I have referred.

Now, as to the statement which has so much offended Mr. Gladstone, that the quasi-matrimonial life of those who have not received the sacrament of marriage is a life of concubinage, let us consider the force and meaning of that statement with relation to the fulfilment of the condition prescribed by the Council of Trent, the presence, namely, of the parish priest of one of the parties and two other witnesses. Wherever the Tridentine law is in vigour, a Catholic man and woman attempting marriage without the fulfilment of that condition know-as a rule-that their act is null; that it leaves them unmarried, as they were before. If in any case they chance to be inculpably ignorant of the invalidity, they are not accountable, and what is to be thought of this state of things I will say a little further on. So much for Catholics. What is to be said of Protestants? In many places where Catholics fall under the operation of the Tridentine law, Protestants certainly do not. With regard to some other places, none of them in these kingdoms, there are differences of opinion into which I do not feel myself called upon to enter. But suppose in those places Protestant marriages are affected by the law of Trent, on that principle to which Mr. Gladstone alludes in his "Vaticanism,' at p. 71, note: "See," he says, "the anathemas of the Council of Trent against those who deny that heretics, as being baptized per sons, are bound to obedience to the Church. I hope the Archbishop (Manning) has not incautiously incurred them." I have written something on this subject in an early paper of the present series.* Suppose, then, I was saying, that in some places Protestant marriages

• IRISH MONTHLY, Vol. II., pp. 354-5.

that

"

are affected by the Tridentine decree on clandestinity, what will be the result? First, the parties are deprived of the sacrament of marriage, of which privation they cannot be expected to complain, as they reject this sacrament, and do not believe it to be received by Catholics. Then, the contract is invalid in itself, but not in their estimation, not according to their conscience. Their condition is. practically the same as if it was valid. The contract of marriage, abstracting from the sacrament, is a mutual agreement by which the parties, as far as in them lies, bind themselves to each other. Where it is valid it causes a certain indissoluble relation between them; where it is not valid, but is in good faith reputed valid, so long as the belief continues the parties are as much warranted and bound before God to do what they agree upon as if there was no flaw. Their life is not a concubinage, nor was it of such cases the Pope spoke when he used the word. If at a later period the parties, or either of them, come to know of the nullity, in consequence of being converted to the Catholic Faith, the Church will readily afford a means of meeting the difficulty. In some very exceptional and very rare cases there may be a separation. But such rare and exceptional cases are not appreciable. As a fact, we do not hear of unpleasant results, at least with any frequency, on this particular ground. There may be dissatisfaction, or anger, or ill-treatment, on the score of change of religion, but scarcely ever is there any difficulty with reference precisely to the marriage bond. I will here cite a passage of the previous paper already referred to, where I have expressed myself as follows: "I do not pretend that every act done by a Protestant, in contravention of laws which he knows to be enforced in the Catholic Church, is an imputable sin. Even though he be not in what is called invincible ignorance, even though he be guilty of grievous neglect in not inquiring into the truth of his own religion-which, by the way, we are to remember is, unlike ours, a religion of inquiry-even though he be violating the obligation to examine the claims of the Catholic Faith, as is often the case, still it does not follow that he is called on in the meantime to observe the precepts of the true Church, not recognised by him as such, for instance, to keep its prescribed feasts and fasts." In this passage I specify, by way of example, precepts as to feasts and fasts; but the principle is applicable to any ecclesiastical law of the Catholic Church.

66

But why, Mr. Gladstone may ask, should there be any question of Protestant marriages with reference to the Tridentine decree? Why should they be comprehended? I reply, that, so far as they are comprehended, this results from the general principle alluded to. The law was enacted, and, as is usual in laws of the Catholic Church, no exception of non-Catholics was expressed, and so the law included them-so far, I repeat, as they are included. An unusual provision was made in the law itself for restricting its operation, and that operation has been still further restricted since. It must be remembered that the Church legally and judicially views baptized non-Catholics as disobedient subjects not deserving of special favour, whatever may happen to be the actual extenuating or excusing

* IRISH MONTHLY, Vol. II., p. 355.

causes which affect individuals. It must be remembered, too, that Ecclesiastical Law, like all other human laws, proceeds on certain general principles, with considerable regard, no doubt, to varieties of circumstances in different times and places, but not such regard as to remove all difficulties, or even what may be termed hardships. The Church, moreover, is conservative, and somewhat slow to modify her enactments. The decisions and answers of ecclesiastical tribunals include and rest on interpretations of the law and apply it to the cases proposed, without changing the law, though, within certain limits, there may be at times an exercise of a discretionary power, either permanently possessed by the tribunal or supplied by the action of the Sovereign Pontiff. There is, too, that, at least, apparent contradiction which occurs in the determinations of civil courts in our own and other countries, often attributable to a comparatively minute difference of features in the cases, a difference which cannot always be afterwards clearly traced. We know what an array of conflicting judgments and dicta is often brought forward by counsel engaged on the two sides of a cause, and what ingenuity is bestowed on explaining and reconciling them. I have spoken of decisions and answers, because there are ecclesiastical tribunals which reply to questions where there is no judicial sentence pronounced between parties, and where there is not properly any suit before the court, nay, where what I call a tribunal, for want of another term, may not have properly judicial attributes. Then, besides decisions, juridicial or otherwise, there are dispensations from ecclesiastical laws: these are granted either by the Pope, in virtue of his supreme authority, or by his delegates at Rome or elsewhere, or by bishops in virtue of the authority annexed to their office. The Pope, too, may abrogate or vary particular ecclesiastical laws either throughout the Church or in one or more countries. To return to decisions and answers regarding ecclesiastical law; though there is a machinery provided for giving them, it is by no means to be supposed that they either are or could be so copiously given as to eliminate controversies as to the meaning and comprehensiveness of ecclesiastical laws. The laws once made are left a good deal to themselves and to unauthorized interpreters-that is to say, writers or others who may be often well qualified to deal with the questions arising, but not commissioned to pronounce on them. Often certainty cannot be attained, but a reasonable probability sufficient for moral direction may be reached. It is a pretty generally received principle that a really doubtful law does not bind in conscience. This principle extends to a solid doubt whether certain cases are comprised in a law otherwise known to exist. The law is doubtful as regards those cases. I have used the terms really doubtful and solid doubts, because frivolous, unsubstantial, factitious doubts do not stand in the way of obligations. The application, too, of the principle I have mentioned requires reflection and a proper acquaintance with the subject. Now, as to the policy which the Pope and his Curia are said to practise with regard to marriage, or with regard to other matters of ecclesiastical law, I cannot undertake to enter thoroughly into an involved question of this kind, nor to vindicate in detail the proceedings of the

Holy See. Mr. Gladstone's charges are sweepingly made in a few sentences. A complete explanation and refutation of them would take at least many pages, and these I cannot afford to give. I will content myself with a few observations.

What is meant by the policy of the Pope or the Holy See, and measures dictated by this policy, or adopted for the purpose of carrying it out? Here I must clear away and put aside some matters which do not concern me at the present moment. There is not question, just now, of political intrigues which a Pope or his Curia might be imagined to engage in, either through ambition or through partisanship with friendly sovereigns, nor even of favours bestowed on kings or princes, or nations, from gratitude, or for the purpose of conciliation. We have to deal with laws of strictly ecclesiastical discipline, and the mode of their administration or enforcement. The Pope, with or without the aid of a General Council, legislates for the Church, and is presumed to do so with the intention of promoting the spiritual welfare of his subjects and carrying out the designs of God. The laws thus made the Pope-as possessing the chief executive authority-and under him the bishops and clergy throughout the world apply and enforce, it is again presumed, in the same spirit and with the same view. These laws, besides being liable to total repeal, admit of dispensation as to particular persons, and also of partial abrogation as to places. Questions likewise arise about their meaning and comprehensiveness, that is to say, the cases and circumstances which they comprise, and many such questions are decided at Rome, as I have stated above. The decision of these questions depends a great deal on various circumstances, and upon alleged facts about which there may be mistakes. Even independently of such mistakes, the answers given are not infallible, though sufficiently reliable for practical purposes. Now, before going any further, I may observe that an ordinarily prudent and perfectly honest course followed in the making, administering, applying of ecclesiastical laws in the department of marriage, as well as in other departments, even where extraordinary difficulties did not occur, would involve results not very intelligible to persons not well versed in such matters. There would be seeming contradictions and inconsistencies. In the civil order this is the case. But in the jurisprudence of the Church some considerations enter that have not place in that of the State. The great object the Church has in view is the spiritual welfare of the faithful, and this object demands that there should be more regard for human infirmity than is or can be paid to it by temporal legislators and tribunals. There are two things to be balanced and reconciled, namely, sufficient strictness of discipline and a fair amount of suavity and allowances made for difficulties. I would not be understood to deny that there ought to be, and is, a measure of this mildness in the civil order, but the measure is less, and by no means unjustly so, as could be shown if we had time to go more fully into the subject.

Besdes this intrinsic economy, if I may so call it, of ecclesiastical law, and its administration, provision has to be made for collisions between the Church and the State-collisions arising from false