codes and decisions, and the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court. In his investigations he has personally examined every decision in the sixty volumes of California Reports. The ability, industry and accurate habits of Judge Hayne justify us in anticipating a very valuable treatise on this important subject. We say "important" advisedly, because the multiplicity of Courts, the short terms and poor pay of the Judges, the enormous mass of cases on the Court calendars, are creating a need, more pressing than ever, for aids to the lawyer to follow the principles of law more than the reported adjudications thereof. Supreme Court of California. IN BANK. [Filed May 19, 1883.] ESTATE OF SUEZ MAGEE. SUCCESSION-BASTARD-HEIR. Albert, legitimate son of Elizabeth, deceased, is held entitled to succeed to the estate of Suez, as heir to the mother of Elizabeth and Suez, both the latter having been illegitimates. Appeal from Superior Court, Santa Barbara County. P. R. Wright and A. A. Oglesby for appellant. W. C. Strutton and C. Storck for respondent. MYRICK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The question involved in this appeal concerns the right of succession under the statute of this State as affected by illegitimacy. Sabra Magee was the common ancestor. She had two legitimate daughters-Eliza and Susan. The descendants of Eliza (all legitimate) are the claimants on one side; they are named Cunningham. Albert E. Remond, claims that he, as descendant of Susan, is entitled, on the other side, to the property. His claim is based on the following facts: Susan had two illegitimate daughters-Elizaboth and Suez. Albert E. is the legitimate son of Elizabeth. Susan and Elizabeth died before January 1, 1880. Suez Magee (the intestate, whose property is the subject of consideration) died March 24, 1880; and the question is, Will the property left by Suez Magee go to the Cunninghams, as heirs of the intestate, or will it go to the claimant, Albert E. Remond? According to Section 1,388, Civil Code, if any illegitimate child (not acknowledged or adopted by his father) dies intestate, without lawful issue, his estate goes to his mother, or, in case of her decease, to her heirs-at-law. Suez Magee was illegitimate; she died intestate; Susan, her mother, had died before her; therefore, upon the death of Suez, the property of the latter was to go to the heirs of the mother, Susan. The next question, then, is who are the heirs of Susan? Section 1,387, Civil Code, we think, answers the inquiry: Every illegitimate child is in all cases an heir of his mother, and inherits in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock. There is no question as to the heirship of Albert E.; he is the legitimate son of his mother, Elizabeth. She (Elizabeth) was the illegitimate daughter of Susan. By Section 1,387, just referred to, Elizabeth was the heir of her mother, in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock. If, then, Elizabeth had been born in lawful wedlock, she would unquestionably have been heir of her mother; being born out of wedlock, she is by the statute made heir of her mother in the same manner as if born in wedlock. Being, then, the heir of her mother, and dying leaving issue, the property of Suez goes to such issue; not because the issue is heir of Suez, but is heir of Susan. In this same section there is a proviso regarding the inheritable blood of an illegitimate child, expressed in the following words: "But he does not represent his father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of his or her kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless, before his death, his parents shall have intermarried," etc. This proviso does not apply to the case before us. If Eliza, the other daughter of Sabra, the common ancestor, had died leaving estate, the illegitimate children of Susan (Elizabeth or Suez) or their descendants, could not have represented Susan for the purpose of inheriting from Eliza; Eliza's estate would, rather, have escheated. We think the word " kindred" used in the above-quoted clause, relates to the kindred referred to in Section 1,386, meaning lawful kindred, and is for the purpose of qualifying the general words used in Section 1,387, and excluding the illegitimate from inheriting, through the mother, the estate of other relatives. By the rules of the common law, terms of kindred when used in a statute, include only those who are legitimate, unless a different intention is clearly manifest." (McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, U. S. 459; Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153; Cooley v. Dewey, 4 Pick. 93.) In using the word "kindred," in Section 1,387, the Legislature intended to preclude from the general words preceding it the construction that an illegitimate might by representation inherit from those whom the common law or Section 1,386 acknowledges as kindred; but did not intend to prevent a legitimate son (Albert E.)from inheriting, through his mother (an illegitimate daughter) from her mother Susan, nor from being her heir. Otherwise, we would have the construction that an illegitimate daughter is an heir of her mother, and as such may take the estate of another illegitimate daughter of the same mother, but that the legitimate child of such illegitimate daughter cannot take. If Elizabeth had died intestate and without issue, doubtless the estate of Suez would have gone to the Cunninghams, as the heirs of Susan, the mother of Elizabeth and Suez; but, as Albert E. is, through his mother Elizabeth, the heir of Susan, he is entitled to the estate of Suez-not,, perhaps, because he is heir of Suez, but because he is the heir of the mother of Suez, and as such is, under the statute, entitled to take. We do not think the provisions of Section 1,386 have application to illegitimates; but that the rights of such persons are derived from Section 1,387 and 1,388. Section 1,386 provides for the course of succession among legitimates; Sections 1,387 and 1,388 refer to illegitimates, and provide for the course of succession as to them; and each provision is complete, so far as the Legislature has seen fit to declare. One system is provided for in the one section; another system is provided for in the others. The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to reeder a decree in accordance with this opinion. We concur: McKee J., Thornton, J., Sharpstein, J., Ross, J. IN BANK. [Filed September 28, 1883.] PEOPLE, RESPONDENT, v. WOOD, APPELLANT. LARCENY EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL FACTS INADMISSIBLE, The defendant was charged with larceny. The prosecution was permitted by the Court to introduce, against the objections of the defendant, evidence of other independent transactions between the defendant and persons other than the prosecuting witness, similar in character to the one constituting the offense for which the defendant was being tried. Held, error. *** ID. The Court charged the jury: "The whole case, gentlemen of the jury, turns upon the intent to steal at the time the money was paid. If A parts with his money to B under false representations made by B for the express purpose of defrauding A, and B make at such time his promissory note payable to A sometime after date, B is criminally liable immediately upon the consummation of the agreement, and it is no defense that the time has not arrived at which the note was to be paid." Held, misleading. Appeal from Superior Court, San Francisco. Attorney-General for respondent. SHARPSTEIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The exception to the rulings of the Court, on the defendants objections to the introduction of evidence of other independant transactions, between him and persons other than the prosecuting witness, similar in character to the one which constitutes the basis of the charge on which the defendant was tried and convicted, merit careful consideration. The defendant was charged with larceny. Whether he was guilty depended on the the character of a transaction between him and the prosecuting witness, by which the latter transferred the possession of a certain sum of money to the former. If it was the understanding of the parties that the property in the money, as well as the possession in of it, should pass, the fraudulent acquisition and subsequent use of it would not constitute larceny. Proof that the defendant had obtained money from other persons by means similar to those which he employed to obtain it from the prosecuting witness, might tend to show that the defendant was a great knave, but would not tend to show that he did not obtain the property in the money, as well as the possession of it by fraudulent means. The question is, Was it the understanding that the title to the money should pass? Was it borrowed, or received on deposit for a special purpose? This depends on the understanding of the parties at the time of the actual transfer. Could the defendant be permitted to prove similar transactions between him and other persons, in which it was understood that the title as well as the possession of the money passed? The Court below very properly held that he could not. The understanding between him and persons other than the prosecuting witness, from whom he obtained money by means exactly similar to those resorted to for obtaining it from the prosecuting witness, would not in the least degree tend to prove what was the understanding between the defendant and the prosecuting witness. If the understanding was the same in each case, and was such as to make the obtaining and use of the money in each case larceny, it would simply result that a defendant might be proved to have committed a series of larcenies, although charged with the commission of only one. For obvious reasons the law will not permit that to be done. "To admit evidence of such collateral acts would be to oppress the party implicated by trying him on a case as to which he has no notice to prepare, and sometimes by prejudicing the jury against him by publishing offenses, of which, even if guilty, he may have long since repented, or may have long since been condoned. Trials would, by this process, be injuriously prolonged, the real issue obscured, and the verdicts taken on side issues." (1 Wharton Ev. 29.) The issue in this case is whether the defendant obtained money from the prosecuting witness under such circumstances as would constitute the subsequent use of it by defendant, larceny. And it was inadmissible to put in evidence the fact that he obtained money from others under similar circumstances which he used as he did that obtained from the prosecuting witness. The rule which makes the introduction of such evidence inadmissible has been recognized and applied in numerous cases. In Commonwealth v. Jackson (132 Mass., 116), the defendant was tried and convicted on a charge of obtaining money and property by false pretenses; that is, by falsely pretending and asserting to one John Parker that a certain horse was sound and kind, with the knowledge that such assertion was false and with intent to defraud the said Parker by inducing him to part with his money and other valuable property; and for actually defrauding him." At the trial the Government was permitted to introduce evidence of similar transactions between the defendant and other persons, "solely for the purpose of showing the intent with which the defendant made the sale of the horse to Parker as charged in the indictment." This was held to be error. The Court says: "The other statements made by defendant at other times as to other animals might have been false, while these were not. The transaction formed no part of a single scheme or plan any more than the various robberies of a thief. They were entered upon as from time to time he might succeed in entrapping credulous or unwary persons. " In Regina v. Holt (8 Cox, C. C., 411), the prisoner was charged with obtaining a specific sum of money from one Hirst by false pretenses, i. e., by falsely representing that he was authorized by his |