Mr. PERKINS. Yes. Mr. FLOOD. At least ostensibly on the surface? Mr. PERKINS. Yes, sir. Mr. FLOOD. The churches are open? Mr. PERKINS. They are not only open, they are crowded. Mr. PERKINS. Yes. THREAT OF FAMINE Mr. FLOOD. Was there actually a threat of famine in Yugoslavia of the proportions that we were led to believe, referring to the food for which we appropriated money? Mr. PERKINS. My impression is that it was worse than we were told, and that they are having a very hard time getting through this winter. Mr. FLOOD. It was as bad as we were led to believe? Mr. PERKINS. Yes. Mr. FLOOD. What do you think the situation as of this morning is? Mr. PERKINS. Well, I think with the food that is going in there that they will be able to get through to the next harvest, but it is very bad, very serious. Mr. FLOOD. From your impression, what do you think would have been the result had we not appropriated this money and the food had not arrived? Mr. PERKINS. I think they would have gotten close to starvation. Mr. FLOOD. What would have been the result of that with reference to the Soviet? Mr. PERKINS. I think the most important effect would have been that people who are not fed are not in a state of mind to resist aggression, and I think the strength and morale of the Army would have disappeared up to the point where it would have been a very easy thing to overrun the country. ATMOSPHERE IN BELGRADE Mr. FLOOD. What is the atmosphere generally in Belgrade insofar as city life is concerned, on the streets, in the restaurants, and in the hotel lobbies-you know what I mean? I have had some impressions of Belgrade, and I wonder what your impression was as of February 1951. What is the atmosphere there among the people, the groups on the streetcars and busses, wherever people are noticed? Mr. PERKINS. I was only there 36 hours, and I was pretty well occupied while I was there, so my impression is very limited, but I would say that Belgrade appeared to be a depressed city. The people were moving around all right, and there did not seem to be any sense of trouble. Most of them looked poor. They did not seem to have any great trouble, but I would describe it as a depressed city. MILITARY SITUATION Mr. FLOOD. Do you have any comments to make, in view of your extended visit to Belgrade, with reference to the Yugoslav military situation? Did you hear, or did anybody volunteer any information to you, did you talk to any Government people or anybody at all, including our own people, on the Yugoslav military picture? What sort of shape are they in, or what sort of shape do they think they are in? What is the general picture? Mr. PERKINS. I think they think that they are in pretty good shape, barring the fact that they are becoming short of equipment. They, of course, have had no new supplies of equipment for 2 years or probably longer than that. Mr. FLOOD. That is all kinds of equipment? Mr. PERKINS. Yes, all kinds of equipment. They, perhaps, have some capacity to make some small arms, but that is insignificant in comparison to the size of the force which they maintain. INTERNAL PROBLEMS Mr. FLOOD. Are there any problems within Yugoslavia that were brought to your attention in any way by anybody with reference to geographic or national group dissensions? Of course, I know that it is not the melting pot that Czechoslovakia is, for instance, but do you know of any? Mr. PERKINS. Well, I was just trying to think whether I had gotten any views that I could pass on to you. We did discuss it, but I do not think I have anything worth passing on to you on that. SITUATION IN AUSTRIA Mr. FLOOD. You were in Vienna? Mr. PERKINS. Yes; I was. Mr. FLOOD. I would like to have your impression of Vienna as well, referring again to my atmosphere question. I remember Vienna, of course, as a "Graustarkian" musical comedy city of my youth, which was quite a while ago. I remember Vienna since the war as a very sober, depressed, very un-Viennese city, which is indescribable. What is the atmosphere in Vienna now? This question of atmosphere I consider very important, although abstract. Mr. PERKINS. I was in Vienna about 20 years ago. This was in 1930, I think, after the First War. I was then very much depressed by Vienna. I suppose I had expected it to be a much gayer place than it turned out to be. When I first arrived this time I startled some of the Austrians by saying that I thought Vienna was in better shape now than it was 20 years ago. I left there still thinking that, although we saw the destruction that had taken place during the war. The reason for that is the people seemed to me to have more spirit, they had more determination, and they were going about their business very smoothly despite the fact that they were right in the middle of the Russian zone. So, my answer to your question would be that I think the atmosphere of Vienna was good. Mr. FLOOD. You were there on a week end? Mr. PERKINS. Yes; I was there over a week end. Mr. FLOOD. You saw a lot of people around town then? Mr. PERKINS. Yes. Mr. FLOOD. What about the restaurants? Mr. PERKINS. I went to only one, but it was crowded. Mr. FLOOD. Do you think there were more than two or three open? Mr. PERKINS. Restaurants open? Mr. FLOOD. Yes. Mr. PERKINS. As far as I know there were a lot of them open. Mr. PERKINS. Yes. AUSTRIAN TREATY Mr. FLOOD. Do you have any impressions with reference to an Austrian treaty, not only as a part, possibly, or probably even of any four power conference if there is any, but as distinct from that? Mr. PERKINS. We have been following a consistent line on trying to obtain an Austrian treaty, but as you know, the thing has badly bogged down. The Russians have brought in several irrelevant issues and said until those were settled they could not do anything on the Austrian treaty. Whether they are going to change their attitude and come up with anything we have not any real idea. There is some indication that maybe they will, but it would be a very surprising thing if they did. Mr. FLOOD. Are the Austrians resistant themselves? Mr. PERKINS. To what? Mr. FLOOD. To any kind of a treaty; can you go that far? Mr. PERKINS. No; I do not think you can go that far. Mr. FLOOD. Can you go pretty far? Mr. PERKINS. They would like to have a treaty, but the present. draft of the treaty has gone pretty far. Mr. FLOOD. Would they take the last thing they talked about? Mr. PERKINS. I think they would take the last thing they talked about. Mr. FLOOD. I gather that you are willing to express some confidence and optimism about the Austrian situation in a vague, general way. Mr. PERKINS. Well, I was trying to express confidence and optimism about the Austrians, but the situation remains a very difficult situation. Mr. FLOOD. Yes. Mr. PERKINS. The Russians were protesting about the presidential election, saying that it was unconstitutional and doing a lot of things which were quite irrational, but the Austrians were taking that in their stride. It was not throwing them off balance at all. Mr. FLOOD. Is there anything at all in your Austrian picture which indicates a revival of the anschluss in Germany or the revival of the pan-German attitude? Mr. PERKINS. No. Mr. FLOOD. They are nationals, are they not? Mr. PERKINS. Very much so. Mr. FLOOD. Were you in Bulgaria or Rumania at all? Mr. PERKINS. No, not at all. Mr. FLOOD. Will Tito fight in Poland if the Russians move against Western Germany, and/or if they move against Greece? Mr. PERKINS. I have brought along a speech that Tito made 3 or 4 days after I was there, and he made a rather obscure statement, but I think what he intended to convey was that he would. This is what he said: Our party has already set up a line strong in its main features. It has determined the course in case of aggression against us or anywhere in Europe, because a localized war in Europe is most unlikely. Those who wish such a war must reckon with this fact. Such is our line. As you read through the rest of the speech there is nothing to indicate what the line is, but by setting a strong line in the case of aggression anywhere in Europe Tito sounds as if he was saying in a veiled way that they intend to come in if anyone were to attack in Europe. TRIESTE Mr. FLOOD. What is the attitude of Yugoslavia with reference to Italy, particularly with reference to Trieste? Mr. PERKINS. The Trieste situation has quieted down. There was great deal of discussion about that some time ago. So far as I know there are no negotiations going on about it at the present time. Generally speaking Yugoslavia is getting on much better with Italy, Austria, and Greece. They are opening up the frontiers, and the railroads are running between Greece and Yugoslavia again. There is a general improvement, but specifically the Trieste question is quiet at the moment. HEAVY INDUSTRY IN YUGOSLAVIA Mr. FLOOD. Are the Yugoslavs doing anything with reference to heavy industry at all? Mr. PERKINS. That was one of the mistakes they made after the war. They took such assets as they had and tried to build up their heavy industry after the war. Most of those projects they were unable to complete with the assets that they had available to them, and it is one of the reasons why they are in the economic difficulties they are in now. They used such external assets as they had on these projects which they have been unable to complete, and they have not gotten the benefit of them. SOLIDARITY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Mr. FLOOD. What is the result, if anything, of those conferences in Europe, such as the Strasbourg Conference or the Brussels Conference, and what is the attitude of the British generally? Are we playing games, or do you feel that there is a potential for solidarity among the nations of Western Europe on the Continent with the British, those not only in the Atlantic Pact, but others, and I include in this general question the Schuman plan? What do you feel as Chief of the European Section about the Schuman plan with the Commonwealth of the European nations, with the operations among Europeans as distinct from any liaison with us, keeping in mind the British attitude toward the Continent? What do you think about that generally? Mr. PERKINS. I would say, yes, that generally the European nations themselves are anxious to get closer together. In the Schuman plan specifically we have evidence in that direction, and the meetings which have now been started in Paris involving the formation of an European army. They have difficulties in carrying some of these cooperative efforts through because they find that it is important that the community be large enough and strong enough to work effectively. That is where the British problem comes in. They want very much to have the British in, because they feel that with them in, it counterbalances the German and French strength and gives more even distribution of power and a better basis for operation. The British, as you know, are not interested in entering into any such detailed arrangements. Whether they will be later on or not remains to be seen. Their attitude has changed recently. They were opposed to the continentals getting together. Now they are not opposing and are lending some support to such efforts. The Europeans also would like to have us tied in as closely as we can be for the same reason. I am concerned with the economic atmospnere rather than the military question, and I am concerned chiefly with those elements. in these proposals of these meetings, and these councils, a half dozen of them that have been going on for 3 or 4 years, with reference especially to the economic, commercial, industrial, and financial liaison. Mr. PERKINS. The OEEC has done a very excellent job on a cooperative basis. Mr. FLOOD. You think it has? Mr. PERKINS. Yes; I think it has been a very constructive force, but that is a different thing from surrendering some of your sovereignty as you would in some of the proposals which the French made in connection with the Schuman plan. Whether the Schuman plan will actually go through or not is still in doubt. It is not a certain thing at this time, but the very fact that they have gone as far as they have gone in the conversations, I think, is one indication that they do want to get together. The difficulties of merging sovereignties are very, very great. Whether they will get them all worked out or not is still in doubt. PROGRAM FOR THE SATELLITE NATIONS Mr. FLOOD. What is the planning in your shop-and I consider this of material and vital importance, if there is anything being done about it I have not heard about it, but if there is nothing being done about it I think it is one of the top two or three things that you should do something about within your shop or your Department-what is your planning or thinking with reference to holding something out to the satellite nations behind the iron curtain if and when democracy is successful, and if and when Russia is contained, and if and when they withdraw to their original borders, or are driven behind them? What are you doing to offer something to the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Bulgarians, the Rumanians, and the Albanians? Now, we are criticizing everybody, and we are giving part of our everything, we are spending our dollars, we are spending our substance, and we are giving, giving, and giving, we are Uncle Sucker, and it is "Operation Rat Hole," and so forth, what are you going to do, how many troops are you giving on this side of the iron curtain? The atmosphere has become repugnant, that we are going back questioning everything that we did give, if we have ever given anything. Now, I want to jump over the iron curtain with that same point of view. What are we holding out to these satellites, to the people of those satellite nations whom we are convinced are not Communists and never will be? What are we going to say to those people if and when this thing is ever straightened out? What can you say you are going to do for them? What is going to happen to Middle Europe? Are they going to regain their national sovereignties, or is there going to be a maelstrom of small little scrambling nations, is there going to be a federa |