as contrasted with the intelligence service of any other government or people from the dawn of history up to tonight. What do you think about it?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. May I speak off the record?

Mr. FLOOD. Well, you had better put some kind of an answer to the breathless question I just asked you on the record.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I will. I disagree with that statement 100 percent. I think it perhaps is not unfortunate that it prevails, however, because the less competent

Mr. ROONEY. Perhaps it is fortunate?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Perhaps it is, sir, because the less competent we are considered to be, the easier our job will be; the less resistance there will be to United States intelligence performance, the more people look down their noses at it. And it is my personal opinion that it is

not true.

Mr. FLOOD. You are satisfied that the intelligence service of the Government of the United States is alert and aware of the situation in the manner which a highly skilled, professional, competent national intelligence service should be and is the equal of any and the superior of most in the world?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I agree with that; yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, what do you want to go off the record about? Mr. ARMSTRONG. Nothing. I was going to make a facetious remark, but I made it less facetiously and would just as soon have it on the record that is, the poorer we may seem to others to be, the better job we are likely to do.

VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE RE KOREA

Mr. FLOOD. Now, in view of this solid defense you have entered, do you have any comment to make upon the quantum and quality of your intelligence service about any phase of the Korean problem that you do not like?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir; I have a comment to make. I think first I should say it is inconceivable that Intelligence will ever be perfect; that it will never miss some bit of information that might have made a difference.

Mr. FLOOD. Omnia homines non est perfectum.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is an excellent statement.

Mr. FLOOD. I use it upon occasion. I read it in a book once. Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think, in connection with any judgment passed upon the success or failure of United States Intelligence in respect to the Korean affair, it is necessary to bear carefully in mind the distinction between-and I must get a little professional here-intentions and capabilities. All too often Intelligence is crucified because it was unable to predict an event which was capable of happening without any prior warning. Intelligence did in the Korean situation determine the actual capabilities and had warned that those capabilities existed for a long time.

Mr. FLOOD. Had warned whom?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Had warned all agencies of the Government. concerned.

Mr. FLOOD. Central Intelligence?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes; among others that had done so. The question then became one of the timing of the action arising out of intentions, and the capabilities were such that no prior warning had to be given and, in this case, we believe, was not given, of a decision to put those capabilities into effect.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that true of the following two instances: first, the original crossing of the Thirty-eighth parallel by the North Koreans and, second, the subsequent pre-Christmas attack?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I was speaking only of the former, of the June 25th happening.

Mr. FLOOD. What about the second one?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When the Chinese came in up near the Yalu River?

Mr. FLOOD. That is right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The same kind of answer would apply but with less force upon the capabilities being so overwhelming as was true in the first instance.

Mr. FLOOD. Would you say that every reasonable and intelligent and possible and probable array of intelligence, raw and analyzed, had been presented, in your judgment, that the circumstances would permit on both of those operations?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I could not say so, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. What failed; what was not present; what element that I just enumerated was not in existence?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is now apparent that there was not a full possession by this side of the United Nations of all possible intelligence. But whether it was possible to get it or not still is obscured by the conditions there.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that failure, if there was a failure, being examined by your office?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir; but it is primarily out of our field.
Mr. FLOOD. As far as you are concerned?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We are concerned with it and are examining it. Mr. FLOOD. Was the chief fault with that in the collection of raw intelligence or the analysis of the information at hand?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is hard to distribute, but I think it would fall more in the former than in the latter.

Mr. PRESTON. I would like to ask some questions off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MARSHALL. How long has this organization within the State Department existed?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Since October 1945.

Mr. MARSHALL. I am a little vague about one thing. Do people use the information you gather?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir; they do. We instituted sometime ago a method of checking on that in two ways. One, we make it a requirement that the intelligence adviser in each of the bueraus of the Department report regularly to us on the use to which our work is put in his area; secondly, we have instituted a series of reaction surveys on a random sample of our output from the people to whom it went, asking them to tell us how useful it was or, if it was not, in what way it fell short and any suggestions they might make for improvement. Mr. MARSHALL. How directly is the information you get transmitted to the Department of Defense?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is almost instantaneous; if it is a matter that would be of interest to the Department of Defense, it goes to them, I think, about the same day it comes into the Department.

(Discussion off the record.)

NATURE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTELLIGENCE

Mr. STEFAN. When we set up your Bureau we were assured we were not setting up an intelligence agency as such, but an evaluation branch to evaluate intelligence.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. This discussion which we had off the record would give the ordinary layman the idea that you are engaged in actual physical intelligence work, which is not the truth. Is not that correct?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I hope I did not convey the idea that we were an operating agency, because we are not.

Mr. STEFAN. Your agency is merely set up for the purpose of gathering information from all possible sources, evaluating it and distributing it to the real intelligence services of the Government? Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is correct.

Mr. STEFAN. And CIA has the responsibility of the physical intelligence work?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Absolutely.

Mr. ROONEY. That is not exactly so, is it? Are not all of our people at a mission concerned with picking up information?

Mr. STEFAN. Yes. They transmit it to this agency from all possible sources, newspapers, magazines, and reports from our various missions are brought into this agency, and they are there evaluated and then distributed or dispatched to the various agencies of govern

ment.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You are making a distinction between overt and covert?

Mr. STEFAN. I understand that there is overt and covert work and all that business in CIA. They are wondering what the distinction between overt and covert is now. A lot of them do not understand it, but that is not in your jurisdiction anyway.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. You are just an evaluation agency.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Our group is practically all here in Washington. Mr. STEFAN. Except for the fact that you have 35 employees in Germany?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And a few more who are collecting documents and maps as they move around the world.

Mr. STEFAN. And sending the information here for evaluation?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. And after you evaluate it you dispatch it?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is right, sir.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN LAST YEAR

Mr. STEFAN. Can you tell the committee what you have accomplished this last fiscal year, besides getting the history of these prominent people, and that you could get from any mission in the world if you wanted to?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In the written justifications the number of requests for written intelligence research reports are set forth, the number of intelligence projects completed, the number of copies requested and the number distributed.

Mr. STEFAN. What are the outstanding accomplishments of your agency? I have read the justifications. That merely shows your workload and how much work you have been doing in evaluating these papers, and so forth. My question is what have been your real outstanding accomplishments?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think the primary thing I can say that we have done is to provide the operating officials of the Department with a continuous and accurate flow of useful information on a day-by-day basis.

Mr. STEFAN. Is there anything outstanding that you have accomplished?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is difficult to pick out examples, Mr. Stefan. Mr. STEFAN. What did your work contribute preceding the evaluating of these papers, documents, and so forth?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We have contributed a number of basic studies that will be used by our delegation at the forthcoming CFM. Mr. STEFAN. What is that?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The Conference of Foreign Ministers that is projected with the Soviets in Paris. We have contributed to our delegation at several of the economic conferences during the past year a number of basic studies that they used in determining the United States' position on issues that were coming up.

We have given assistance to our Assistant Secretaries when they have gone out into the field and held their regional conferences, such as Assistant Secretary McGhee who is on his way to Ceylon now, and Assistant Secretary Miller, who is going to have a conference in Washington on March 26 of the foreign ministers of the other American republics.

Mr. STEFAN. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

PERSONNEL

Mr. STEFAN. You have 102 people in the Division of Research in the Far East?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I think you mean the Division of Research for Europe. We have 57 for the Far East.

Mr. STEFAN. Yes; I meant to ask if the European Research Division has 102 people?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. One hundred and two, yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. What do they do?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That group is following the development in each of the countries of Europe. The largest part of the group, of course, nearly half of them work entirely on the iron curtain countries, the U.S. S. R. and satellites.

Mr. STEFAN. Evaluating material from there?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir; and conducting studies of all the facts we can get our hands on with respect to all aspects of the political and economic scene.

Mr. STEFAN. Now, in the Far East Research Division you have 57 people?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. They are all here in Washington?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. What are they evaluating?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. They do the same thing with respect to the Asiatic Continent and the islands in the Pacific that the European people do for Europe. They cover from the Soviet border at Manchuria through Japan, continuing down through Southeast Asia, Burma, Indonesia, and all the islands.

Mr. STEFAN. How many people did you have on that task prior to February 1950?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Prior to February 1950, I think it was about the same number.

Mr. STEFAN. About the same number?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. What did they accomplish during that year and the year previous?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. During the past year, sir?

Mr. STEFAN. That is what I am asking for. You had the same number of people in the far eastern bureau evaluating far eastern information?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. They accomplished the preparation of a very sizable volume of written intelligence that was delivered to the far eastern bureau and to the Army and the Navy, and others. As conditions changed they moved on to other subjects, of course. Mr. STEFAN. What conditions?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, for example, there was a heavy workload with respect to the Philippines in the past year because of the seeming deterioration of economic conditions there.

Mr. STEFAN. You did not get my point. I am sorry.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Pardon me, Mr. Stefan.

Mr. STEFAN. You said these people worked in the Far East?
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. That includes Korea; did it not?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. What did they accomplish of value in addition to the information they collected?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. They prepared a considerable number of current studies on conditions in Korea and in adjacant territories that were given to the operating people in the Department for use in deciding what to do.

Mr. STEFAN. What is that, a complete report of the condition that existed there at that particular time?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Some were quite comprehensive, and others would be on narrower subjects; yes, sir.

Mr. STEFAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Clevenger.

Mr. CLEVENGER. You employ about 975 people in this section? Mr. ARMSTRONG. In October 1945, I believe that we had around 1,200.

Mr. CLEVENGER. You are asking in the justifications for 980, are you not?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Five hundred and twenty-one were authorized. Mr. CLEVENGER. How do you reconcile these figures? Adding 25, 275, and 179 it adds up to 479.