RUSSIA'S MISSION 217 classes in Russia. The people, despite their vastly superior numbers, are certainly freer and less liable to police interference than the moujik. The Chinaman is a far better agriculturist than the Russian, and such a thing as an illiterate is practically unknown; whereas in Russia ninetysix per cent. of the population cannot read. The celestial is, moreover, less hampered in his movements than the Russian. He is at liberty to travel from one end of the country to the other without hindrance, and passports are unknown. And, finally, the dislike of the Chinese to foreigners and their impatience of foreign intercourse, while not existing among the Russian people, is fully shared by the authorities, who place every difficulty in the way of strangers who desire to visit their dominions. Yet with an assurance savouring of impertinence, Russia boasts of her "civilising mission," and pushes on in her attempt to grip the whole of China within her grasp. It is only necessary to turn to those countries which are enthralled under the sway of the Tsar to realise how Russia treats her conquered races. The Amir of Bokhara, the Khan of Khiva, the people of Merv, the Tajiks and Gulches of the Upper Oxus and the Kirghiz of the Pamirs, could their evidence be taken, would be able to enlighten civilisation on that score; and if the true tale were told in all its hideousness, humanity would be bestirred from its self-righteous complaisance and would enter on a crusade for the emancipation of these peoples, to whom the lot of the victims of the erstwhile slave trade was comparative happiness.1 From any standpoint, then, it is the duty of England to stem the tide of Russian expansion. It is needful, in order to secure the integrity of China, and to maintain that country open to the trade of the world. It is desirable, for the benefit of civilisation in order to prevent the 1 See Marvin's Russian Campaign among the Turkomans, Ravenstein's Russians on the Amur, A. C. Yates's Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission, Cobbold's Innermost Asia, and the author's Russia in Asia. Chinese falling under Russian dominion. It is vital, in order that the further southward march of Russia may be stayed, and her capacity for becoming a great naval Power and disturbing the peace of the world be restricted. It remains to be seen how this duty may be best performed. The interests of Great Britain in the Far East may be summarised as being comprised in the maintenance of all existing treaty rights in China, Japan and Korea. The safeguarding of such rights entails of course the restraining of any other Power from acts which would result in their infraction; and the prevention of such a course is of fully equal importance to the mere preservation of the rights themselves at the hands of the Chinese. Hitherto it has been deemed sufficient to look to China for the prevention of any interference from outside. This course has, howover, failed utterly, partly from the insistent action of other Powers, and partly owing to the inability of China to maintain any course of independent action against the desires of her despoilers. The course to be followed by Great Britain in regard to China is then simple. It may be summed up in two paragraphs setting out the requirements of this country, which, in order to be ensured, must be insisted on if necessary by war. They are: 1. The maintenance of all existing treaty rights, and the immediate operation of all those clauses in treaties which have so far remained unobserved. This would ensure the opening up of the whole country to foreign travel, trade, and residence; the opening of the waterways to foreigners, the suppression of piracy, the opening of several treaty ports which remain closed, and the abolition of the likin dues. 2. The notification that the cession of any territory, or accordance of exclusive privileges, to any country, will be resented; and the granting of any rights to one Power which are not equally granted to all other Powers is forbidden. These requirements embody the settlement of the whole question. But it would be useless to expect that the granting of them by China would suffice to ensure their observance. To this end it would be necessary to send a copy of them to all the Powers, with a notification that Great Britain was determined to insist on their operation, and that no efforts will be spared to render them obligatory. Such a course, supported by an attitude which left no room for doubt as to our intention to enforce our requirements at all costs, would ensure the observance of our just demands even by Russia; and the certainty that the United States and Japan would act with us in such a policy places. the result beyond the region of doubt. Anything short of that must fail to consolidate our interests, or restore our prestige from the position to which it has become debased to the high place it formerly occupied. Failing the adoption of the course suggested, it remains. only to retreat from the position we have expressed our determination to maintain, and to revert to a policy of spheres of influence, which means a scramble for territory in Eastern Asia. In such a case, Russia would of course retain Manchuria-That is lost to us definitely in any case, and at once assert her dominion over the province of Pechili. France would advance to the Sikiang; Germany enlarge her sphere of activity in Shantung; and England would as likely as not witness a struggle between the various parties known to our politics, on the question of the exact limits to be drawn as defining the British sphere in the region of the Yangtse Kiang. The difficulties of demarkating any such sphere of influence have al: ady been descanted on. Without reckoning with the f.dists who so seriously interfere in the protection of the cuntry's interests, the problem is beset with difficulties, and, unless held by a strong force ready at any moment to oppose aggression, the maintenance of such limits must be ex-tremely difficult. England's duty, therefore, is plain in regard to China. and the Far East. It comprises the preservation of exist ing countries, the maintenance of free trade and treaty obligations, and the opposition of all attempts at infringing the same. It remains to be seen whether our rulers are possessed of a sufficient sense of duty to carry out such a policy; or whether, by a continuation of their past record of vacillation, impotence, and folly, they allow our trade to be interfered with and our interests to be disregarded, in the coming struggle for empire on the Pacific. CHAPTER XI THE STORY OF THE CRISIS Anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese-British vacillation and its con- THE reader who has perused these pages thus far will not be at a loss to appreciate the true inwardness of the events which culminated in the outbreak of last May. While never welcomed by the Chinese, the presence of foreigners among them had, by the lapse of time, come to be regarded as a necessary evil. The profits derived from intercourse with them, and the realisation of the superior force at their disposal-for the lessons of 1839 and 1860 are not even yet forgotten-tended to reconcile the celestials to a continued intercourse with the "outer barbarians;" but while the Chinaman's attitude thus became one of passive toleration, it never exceeded this; and in all the history of the intercourse between the people of the two nations, no well authenticated instance of real friendship or intimate exchange of ideas has been placed on record. Neither have the Chinese ever profited by the opportunities afforded by the presence of |